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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the value of hedging decisions for Australian and Canadian firms. 
Hedging theories, which examine the use of derivatives in the tradition of Modigliani 
and Miller’s (1958) perfect capital market assumptions, suggest that risk management 
strategies do not create shareholder value. In addition, the evidence from empirical 
research testing the value of derivative usage remains inconclusive.  
Following a theoretical framework which suggests that hedging decisions need to be 
evaluated in the context of capital structure and industry-specific distress costs 
(Hahnenstein and Röder, 2006), this thesis tests the value of hedging with derivatives 
for Australian and Canadian firms from 2009 to 2013. To do so, a large sample of non-
financial firms from six industries in Australia and Canada is examined. The use of 
two countries is motivated by the attempt to extend the level of analysis and to cross-
validate results beyond a particular region. 
The reported use of derivatives for hedging foreign exchange, interest rate and 
commodity risks across Australian and Canadian industries is investigated. This is 
done to assess whether industry-specific hedging practices can be identified and to 
examine how cross-sectional differences in hedging practices between firms and 
industries can be explained. Firms which operate in the same industries face common 
market risks and comparable industry environments. Thus, it is expected that they 
make similar decisions on whether to hedge or not, on the extent of hedging, and about 
which market risks to hedge.  
Country level results from Chapter Four show a higher propensity for Canadian firms 
to use derivatives with 46.2 per cent of sampled firms using derivatives compared to 
32.0 per cent for Australian firms. Both figures are also lower than reported by 
previous research, where single-year snapshots were taken.  
When examining industry-specific hedging practices, significant differences for four 
of the sampled industries are found. Derivative use is significantly higher for Canadian 
Energy, Industrials, Health Care and IT firms compared to Australian companies from 
the same industries, suggesting a higher demand for risk management instruments. For 
example, 53.1 per cent of Canadian Energy and 44.5 per cent of Canadian IT firms 
hedge with derivatives, compared to 19.1 per cent and 16.4 per cent of Australian firms 
from the same industries, respectively.  
 vii 
Four arguments commonly cited in the hedging literature propose that hedging allows 
firms i) to save tax, ii) to mitigate financial distress, iii) to reduce underinvestment 
costs, and iv) that the use of derivatives can be justified based on economies of scale 
(Froot et al., 1993; Graham and Rogers, 2002; Nance et al., 1993; Smith and Stulz, 
1985). Results from Chapter Four confirm that hedging decisions are significantly 
determined by financial distress costs and economies of scale. These firm-level factors 
provide the most consistent hedging rationales in both countries and for most 
industries. Examining cross-sectional differences in derivative use also reveals that an 
overall industry effect exists that influences hedging decisions in both countries. This 
is an important finding, as it emphasises the importance of industry environments for 
hedging decisions and their value proposition.  
The direct firm value of hedging is examined in Chapter Five. The question whether 
hedging creates value is not new, but so far international evidence on the unconditional 
value effect of derivative use remains inconclusive or reports modest gains at best 
(Adam and Fernando, 2006; Brown et al., 2006). 
The effect of hedging on firm value as measured by Tobin’s Q is examined on a 
country and on an industry level and in the context of different capital structure 
settings. Country level results do not confirm that the decision to hedge creates firm 
value across countries. Whilst it can be observed that Canadian firms benefit from the 
decision to hedge, derivatives use has a negative effect for Australian firms, 
confirming earlier results from Nguyen and Faff (2003a) that Australian investors do 
not value this risk management policy. Moreover, the use of commodity derivatives is 
found to be value-diminishing for firms in both countries. These results indicate that 
hedging, per se, is not value-enhancing and can even reduce firm value.  
Investigating industry level hedging decisions shows significant differences in firm 
value derived from hedging instruments across industries. The conflicting results 
confirm some of the propositions made by Hahnenstein and Röder (2006) that industry 
settings are of great importance due to industry-specific financial distress costs, which 
need to be considered carefully when evaluating whether firms should hedge or not, 
and to what extent they should use derivatives.  
Further research is needed to investigate the value of hedging under varying industry-
specific distress costs and capital structures as results obtained from country and 
industry level analyses do not provide consistent results. Overall, the notion that 
hedging creates firm value cannot be cross-validated across Australia and Canada.     
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Chapter One:  Introduction 
1.1 Chapter introduction 
Finance theory has proposed various explanations as to how hedging creates firm 
value, for example by decreasing financial distress and agency costs and reducing 
taxes (Froot et al., 1993; Smith and Stulz, 1985). Empirical testing of proposed 
hedging incentives has led to several propositions on what motivates firms to hedge 
based on economic or managerial incentives (Benson and Oliver, 2004; Géczy et al, 
1997; Nance et al., 1993, Nguyen and Faff, 2002).  
Results from empirical studies testing the value effect of hedging lack consensus on 
whether the use of derivatives creates firm value or not. For example, studies 
conducted by Jin and Jorion (2006) and Brown et al. (2006) have reported that hedging 
does not have a value-enhancing effect. Allayannis and Weston (2001), on the other 
hand, have found a four per cent hedging premium when examining large listed US 
firms from 1990 to 1995.  
Moreover, there is no overall accepted framework that explains why hedging is a 
value-enhancing activity that may guide financial managers to make firm-specific 
decisions about whether to hedge or not, which risks to hedge and the type of 
instruments to use, based on a company’s industry context and capital structure setting. 
No consensus in the empirical literature exists as to whether the use of hedging is 
effective financial management or a waste of companies’ resources, which remains an 
important gap in the empirical hedging literature. Therefore, the overall research 
question for this thesis is whether hedging creates firm value. This is addressed by 
examining hedging practices and firm value of hedging decisions for Australian and 
Canadian firms from six industries based on propositions by Hahnenstein and Röder 
(2006), who state the value of hedging needs to be considered within the context of 
capital structure decisions and industry settings.  
As finance managers need to insulate firm cash flows from common market risks, 
including foreign exchange, interest rate or commodity risks, to avoid financial 
distress, this creates the need for value-enhancing risk management practices to ensure 
corporate long-term survival. However, finance theories investigating derivative usage 
for hedging in the tradition of Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) perfect capital markets 
assumption, state that risk management strategies do not create value. In addition, 
research testing the efficiency of hedging strategies has shown that hedging or not 
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hedging foreign exchange exposure will result in similar positions, which confirms the 
unbiased market efficiency hypothesis in the long run. For example, Moosa (2004) 
categorises firms as either not hedging, fully hedging, or as hedging some of their 
foreign currency transactions and demonstrates the long-term irrelevance of hedging 
instruments in his analysis.  
Furthermore, the examination of what drives derivative usage and its value proposition 
for shareholders has long been hindered by the lack of detailed disclosures on 
derivative instruments in corporate reports. Examinations of hedging determinants 
were limited to survey data until regulatory accounting changes required further 
information disclosures on risk management practices.  
Also, the identification of firm characteristics that influence the likelihood to hedge is 
made difficult by the fact that several variables commonly used to test alternative 
hedging theories are frequently considered for more than one argument, which 
complicates the interpretation of results (Triki, 2005). Moreover, the lack of consensus 
about the extent to which corporate hedging theories explain different hedging 
decisions can largely be attributed to the fact that only a few studies examine identical 
empirical questions.  
For example, the decision to hedge and the extent of derivative usage may be 
motivated by different firm factors. Haushalter (2000) investigates hedging policies of 
oil and gas producers and finds that the decision to hedge is significantly related to 
economies of scale, while the extent of derivative usage is determined by financing 
considerations. Allayannis and Ofek (2001) on the other hand report that the hedging 
decision is influenced by commonly-cited determinants, such as firm size or research 
and development (R&D) expenditure. The authors also find that international exposure 
to foreign sales and trade will influence both decisions, on whether to use derivatives 
or not and on the extent of hedging, in the context of foreign currency derivatives.  
This illustrates that results from empirical studies testing common hedging theories 
often focus on different hedging decisions and base general conclusions about hedging 
determinants and value effects on results gained from examining specific industries or 
derivative instruments, which limits the generalisability of their findings.  
To address some of these shortcomings, this thesis investigates hedging decisions for 
a large sample of 523 Australian and 338 Canadian firms over a five-year period 
following the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), to 1) examine the hedging practices of 
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firms and 2) investigate whether hedging with derivatives is valuable on a country or 
industry level. A shortcoming of previous international empirical studies is that they 
have rarely investigated identical derivative instruments and conclusions often reflect 
industry-specific results. This thesis aims to address this shortcoming by attempting to 
cross-validate findings beyond a particular economy for two comparable countries.  
While most prior research has also focused on the unconditional value effect of 
hedging, this thesis aims to clarify the value of hedging in the context of more specific 
capital structure and industry settings.  
Financial managers routinely make finance decisions that are closely related and will 
impact the effectiveness of individual policy choices. For example, hedging and capital 
structure decisions are two very important finance decisions which are closely related 
but often reviewed separately. To investigate the value proposition of hedging, it is 
hypothesised that the value of hedging decisions should be examined in the context of 
a firm’s capital structure and industry environment, which determine the type and 
extent of firm-specific financial distress costs that hedging may alleviate (Froot et al., 
1993; Hahnenstein and Röder, 2006). Hahnenstein and Röder (2006) argue that these 
two corporate finance decisions should not be made in isolation. To decide what sort 
of hedging, if any, would be valuable in a variety of industry settings, hedging 
strategies should be evaluated based on a firm’s capital structure as both decisions are 
closely related. 
This is because decisions about firm leverage are driven by the need to establish an 
optimal capital structure which minimises the cost of capital (Talberg et al., 2008). A 
valuable hedging strategy should enable a particular firm to balance out transaction 
costs associated with derivatives with various hedging benefits, depending on the 
firm’s business environment and competitor strategies (Froot et al., 1993). For 
example, hedging corporate risk exposures allows a firm to reduce financial distress 
costs from additional leverage, and, therefore, increase its debt capacity by hedging 
risks from adverse market movements (Graham and Rogers, 2002; Hahnenstein and 
Röder, 2006). A comprehensive overview of corporate hedging theories addressing 
how the use of derivatives creates value based on economic benefits as well as agency 
cost and corporate governance considerations is presented in the literature review in 
Chapter Two.  
The key argument presented in the thesis is based on the theoretical framework of 
Hahnenstein and Röder (2006), who suggest the value of hedging is related to the 
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capital structure and industry environment of a firm. They suggest that making hedging 
decisions based on long-term capital structure contexts enhances shareholders’ wealth 
based on industry-specific financial distress costs (Hahnenstein and Röder, 2006). One 
of their key propositions is that hedging is industry-specific. Therefore, it is expected 
that firms from the same industries make similar choices about derivative use, 
examined in Chapter Four, and that they will experience similar value effects from 
derivatives, which is examined in Chapter Five. 
To address whether hedging creates value, this thesis examines derivative practices by 
a large cross-section of non-financial Australian and Canadian firms from 2009 to 
2013. This sample includes 523 Australian and 338 Canadian firms that operate in the 
Energy, Industrials, Materials, Consumer Discretionary, Health Care and Information 
Technology (IT) industries.  
The motivation behind examining hedging decisions for these two countries is two-
fold. First, conducting a broader examination of hedging practices, determinants and 
value effects across two countries allows the level of analysis to be extended, and the 
hypotheses to be tested beyond a specific geographic region. Second, the two selected 
countries are on the opposite sides of the globe with different trading partners. 
However, they also share a range of common financial and economic market factors, 
which make them suitable to examine whether observed results hold beyond a 
particular jurisdiction. For example, both countries represent open economies with 
free-floating exchange regimes, and similar cultural and historical backgrounds that 
have shaped their legal system and corporate governance environments. Therefore, 
common country level hedging incentives can be expected to influence corporate risk 
management practices in both economies. It is important to point out that the focus of 
this research is not to compare countries or industries, but to cross-validate results. The 
country and sample selection process are explained in Chapter Three.  
Chapter Four discusses how finance managers from the sampled firms choose to hedge 
foreign exchange, interest rate and commodity risks. The results from this 
investigation show that significant differences exist in the level of derivative use 
between the two countries. In contrast to previous hedging studies on derivative 
practices, this thesis finds that Canadian companies have a significantly higher 
propensity to use derivatives, with 46.2 per cent compared to only 32.0 per cent for 
Australian firms over the same period. Both countries’ figures of derivative usage are 
also lower than reported by earlier research (Bartram et al., 2009; Nguyen and Faff, 
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2002), which suggests that firms might place less importance on derivative instruments 
than previously thought.  
The results also show that there are significant differences in hedging decisions in four 
of the investigated industries. Canadian firms operating in the Energy, Industrials, 
Health Care and IT industries have a significantly higher level of derivative use than 
their Australian counterparts. For example, on average, 53.1 per cent of Canadian 
Energy firms use derivatives, compared to only 19.1 per cent of Australian firms from 
the same industry. For IT firms, it can be observed that 44.5 per cent of Canadian firms 
use derivatives, compared to 16.4 per cent of Australian firms. In both cases, this 
difference is statistically significant at the one per cent level. 
The analysis presented in Chapter Four also suggests that industry classification is a 
significant determinant of the decision to use derivatives and the types of risk to hedge. 
Moreover, firm characteristics that motivate the use of derivatives differ between 
industries. In this context, firm leverage and economies of scale are the most consistent 
determinants that drive the decision to hedge.  
These findings have two implications for examining the value of derivatives. First, an 
examination of the value effect of hedging should incorporate industry-specific 
measures when examining cross-sectional samples or should be conducted on an 
industry level. Thus, this thesis analyses the value effect of hedging under different 
capital structure contexts on a country and industry level in Chapter Five. Second, the 
results from Chapter Four support the argument that firm size and financial distress 
costs determine the likelihood to hedge, and are likely to have implications for the 
value proposition of hedging. Accordingly, besides considering capital structure 
decisions when examining the value of hedging, country results are also tested for 
robustness across firm size sub-samples.  
Chapter Five presents the examination of the impact of hedging on firm value. Results 
from the country level analysis show that the binary decision to hedge is not associated 
with higher firm value across both countries. It can be observed that the decision to 
use derivatives has a negative influence on firm value, proxied by Tobin’s Q for 
Australian firms. This might be explained by arguments stating that investors cannot 
assess managerial motivations behind hedging policies (Géczy et al., 2007, Lel, 2012), 
nor are they privy to details of derivative contracts (Nguyen and Faff, 2003c). This 
makes it hard for investors to evaluate whether corporate derivative usage should be 
regarded as value-enhancing, risk management practices.  
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However, for Canadian firms the decision to hedge has a positive effect on Tobin’s Q. 
Therefore, the hypothesis that derivatives create firm value cannot be confirmed on a 
country level. Also, for both countries the use of commodity derivatives is observed 
to have a negative impact on Tobin’s Q, which suggests that these types of derivatives 
have diminishing value effects.  
The investigation of hedging decisions across debt levels do not produce statistically 
significant results, providing no evidence that hedging creates firm value for firms 
with higher levels of debt relative to their industry peers. Examining the interaction 
between hedging decisions and leverage shows that derivative use becomes more 
valuable with increasing firm leverage for the Canadian sample. However, no other 
significant results from the examination of hedging decisions with increasing leverage 
can be observed. 
Therefore, the value of hedging cannot be confirmed across Australia and Canada, 
with contradictory results on hedging decisions and evidence of diminishing firm value 
for the use of commodity derivatives for firms in both countries.  
On an industry level, differences between the value effect of derivatives can be 
observed across industries. For example, a positive relationship between the use of 
derivatives and firm value can be observed for Australian Energy firms.  
For Canada, conflicting results can be observed on the extent of derivative use. 
Hedging to a larger extent results in a hedging discount for Energy firms but has a 
positive impact on firm value for firms in the Materials industry. This means that the 
value of hedging does greatly depend on the industry environment; however, results 
are not constant across both countries.  
Industry level similarities across both countries can only be observed when testing for 
the interaction between the extent of derivatives and leverage. The decision to hedge 
with increasing debt has a negative impact on firm value for Australian and Canadian 
IT firms. On the other hand, for Materials firms in Australia and Canada, hedging with 
increasing leverage has a positive impact on firm value. 
These results confirm some of the propositions made by Hahnenstein and Röder 
(2006) that industry settings are of great significance due to industry-specific financial 
distress costs, which need to be considered carefully when evaluating whether firms 
should hedge or not and to what extent they should use derivatives. However, further 
research is needed to investigate the value of hedging under varying industry-specific 
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distress costs and capital structures as results from country and industry level analyses 
do not provide consistent results. Overall, the notion that hedging creates firm value 
cannot be unconditionally confirmed. Results depend on the model specification and 
the industry in question.   
The remainder of this chapter introduces the theoretical research context, provides an 
overview of common risk management practices and motives and describes derivative 
instruments and reporting practices. It also comments on the relationship between 
operational and financial hedging strategies, the increase in global derivative 
transactions and market developments. These explanations provide the background to 
discuss what motivates this research project, and which research questions are 
addressed in this thesis. The chapter concludes with an outline of the remaining thesis 
chapters.  
 
1.2 Research context 
1.2.1 Risk management rationale 
The theoretical background to the research problem is founded in financial 
management theory, which evaluates corporate financial decision-making based on 
the concept of shareholder value creation.  
As corporate decisions relating to a company’s investment, finance or dividend policy 
will affect the market value of a firm, these policy choices must be carefully evaluated 
and translated into share price estimates. Thus, financial managers need to identify 
investment and financing decisions that have a positive impact on the company’s share 
value. Two financial decisions that can add value in this context relate to deciding on 
the appropriate capital structure and corporate hedging policy.  
In Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) world of perfect capital markets, neither investment 
nor hedging decisions can enhance firm value, as shareholders may diversify their 
investments across a range of companies to hedge their wealth. Only the existence of 
market imperfections, such as transactions costs and tax benefits, creates a starting 
point for investors to critically evaluate a firm’s investment and risk management 
decisions and, potentially, assign higher market values to well-structured and 
appropriately hedged firms. This makes corporate risk management an important part 
of a company’s overall strategy.  
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Stulz (1996) describes the objective of risk management as “to eliminate the 
probability of costly lower-tail outcomes – those that could cause financial distress or 
make a company unable to carry out its investment strategy. Moreover, by eliminating 
downside risk and reducing the expected costs of financial trouble, risk management 
can also help move companies toward their optimal capital and ownership structure” 
(p. 23). This means that hedging with financial derivatives will be valuable when the 
costs of implementing and overseeing derivative programs are outweighed by 
associated benefits. These benefits may include an increased capacity to take on 
additional debt, to hold less cash or to avoid underinvestment and financial distress 
costs (Froot et al., 1993, Gay and Nam, 1998). Apart from this approach to justify the 
use of derivatives on trade-offs between economic costs and benefits, financial risk 
management theory also refers to agency costs and corporate governance incentives to 
provide further explanations for why firms engage in costly risk management 
programs (Allayannis et al., 2012; Lel, 2012; Smith and Stulz, 1985; Stulz, 1984).  
 
1.2.2 Risk management practices 
Risk can be defined as uncertainty about expected outcomes. The GFC that started 
spreading across global markets at the end of 2008 caught many firms off-guard and 
provided an important reminder about the importance of effective and well-monitored 
risk management practices, which vary significantly across firms.  Servaes et al. (2009) 
describe the risk management function as “a set of methods and procedures by which 
executives identify the kinds and levels of risk exposures faced by their companies, and 
then choose which exposures to bear and which to transfer to others through a variety 
of risk management techniques” (p. 60). Common financial risks that might be 
transferred include exchange rate, interest rate or commodity risks. Corporations faced 
with a range of uncertainties in market prices affecting their operational costs and 
profit forecasts can manage those risks through diversification, insurance or hedging.   
Here, hedging describes a range of activities that can be taken by corporate 
management to limit risk exposures and mitigate adverse effects of market 
uncertainties on firm value. Smith and Stulz (1985) describe hedging as follows: “A 
firm can hedge by trading in a particular futures, forward, or option market even 
though it has no identifiable cash position in the underlying commodity. Furthermore, 
a firm can hedge by altering real operating decisions: for instance, a merger can 
produce similar effects to those of hedging through financial contracts… Therefore, 
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hedging reduces the dependence of firm value on changes in the state variable” (p. 
392). Hahnenstein and Röder (2006) further define the purpose of hedging as “a 
reduction in dependence between uncertain future corporate profits and random 
market prices” (p. 162).  
The latter definition stands in contrast to speculative derivative activities, which are 
aimed at creating additional profits by taking advantage of information about future 
market prices. Investors and regulatory agencies have long pointed to anecdotal 
evidence of large-scale derivative losses to voice their concerns about whether the use 
of derivatives may expose shareholders to increased risks (Hentschel and Kothari, 
2001).  
However, one cannot tell directly whether derivatives reported in corporate annual 
reports are held to speculate or to hedge. The difference lies in whether the derivative 
counterparty intends to increase or decrease its risk exposure. If a firm intends to hedge 
underlying market risks with derivatives as part of its risk management strategy, it uses 
derivatives to offset those exposures. To speculate implies that a firm intends to take 
on additional risk exposures to make a profit.  
Hentschel and Kothari (2001) comment that there is a widespread notion that the 
“social value of derivatives” (p.117) is based on whether the firm uses derivatives to 
hedge or to speculate. Speculation is generally discussed with a negative connotation 
despite the fact that several empirical investigations conclude that the extent of 
speculative derivative usage appears to be modest (Géczy et al., 2007). In fact, 
empirical studies have only been able to identify modest gains from the speculative 
use of derivative instruments in the gold-mining industry (Adam and Fernando, 2006; 
Brown, Crabb and Haushalter, 2006). On the other hand, various instances of 
speculation-related losses involving derivatives have been well-publicised over the 
years, which suggest that significant dollar amounts are at risk. For example, derivative 
instruments have been widely criticised for their association with near collapses or 
corporate bankruptcies including the Proctor and Gamble and the Barings Bank in the 
1990s or the case of Enron in 2001 (Géczy et al., 2007).  
Hentschel and Kothari (2001) examine a sample of 425 large US non-financial firms 
and report that derivative users in their sample do not exhibit increased risk levels. 
They conclude that derivatives are used for hedging, and that common concerns about 
the use of derivatives for speculative activities cannot be empirically substantiated. On 
the other hand, Géczy et al. (2007) examine whether firms choose to use derivatives 
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for hedging or speculation by comparing survey answers about speculative derivative 
use with information from relevant annual reports. They conclude that investors are 
not able to identify speculative derivative practices from publicly available corporate 
disclosures. According to Allayannis et al. (2012), this impacts how investors value 
hedging firms.   
This thesis takes two measures to ensure that reported derivatives can be used as a 
proxy for hedging practices. First, any selected companies that state usage of 
derivatives for speculative purposes have been excluded and classified as non-hedgers. 
Second, the analysis is based on a five-year timeframe. This provides a better 
indication of whether derivatives are used continuously over longer periods and as part 
of an overall risk management program, rather than for short-term speculations. If 
firms are truly hedging, their use of derivatives should remain consistent over time. 
Whether this is the case or not is analysed in Chapter Four.   
 
Derivatives reporting practices 
Shareholders and potential investors rely on financial statement information as one 
source of information to evaluate their investment choices. The recent introduction of 
the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) allows users of financial 
statement information to better compare derivative practices in different jurisdictions. 
IFRS represent the global accounting standards that were designed so that corporate 
financial statements are understandable and comparable across national borders. Since 
their launch in 2005, they have been adopted around the world and have progressively 
replaced former national accounting standards. In 2015, 116 jurisdictions required 
either all or most of their domestic accounting entities to report according to IFRS 
(International Accounting Standards Board, 2015a).  
Australia was among the first countries to adopt IFRS for all domestic reporting 
entities on January 1, 2005. An early convergence process with standards issued by 
the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and its predecessor, 
International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC), had also already begun in 
1996 (International Accounting Standards Board, 2015b). Canada, on the other hand 
adopted IFRS for interim and financial statements of all publicly accountable 
enterprises on January 1, 2011. Early adoption of the standards was encouraged to 
enable an easy transition to the new reporting regime. Mandatory adoption for life 
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insurance and investment companies, which are not part of this study, was deferred 
until 2014 (International Accounting Standards Board, 2015c).  
The key standard in the context of derivative reporting is IAS 39 Financial 
Instruments: Recognition and Measurement (IAS39), which sets out that all financial 
assets and liabilities including derivatives must be recognised on the balance sheet at 
fair value or historical cost, and that financial instruments need to be revalued regularly 
to reflect the fair value of the instruments. The fair value of an asset is the price for 
which an asset could be exchanged (or at which a liability could be settled) at arm’s 
length between knowledgeable parties. This thesis uses the reported fair value of 
derivatives scaled by total firm assets as a proxy for the decision on the extent of 
hedging.  
IAS39 defines derivatives as financial instruments with three interesting 
characteristics. First, their fair value fluctuates based on changes in the price of a 
specified underlying variable, such as an interest rate, commodity price, index of prices 
or foreign exchange rate. For example, the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) 
is the underlying instrument for interest rate swaps, and the foreign currency exchange 
rate the underlying variable for foreign currency forwards. Consequently, if the foreign 
exchange rate changes, the fair value of all foreign currency forwards will increase or 
decrease. Therefore, traditional accounting practices that carry these instruments on 
the balance sheet as historical cost do not provide a fair reflection of those assets. Thus, 
derivative contracts are consequently recognised at fair value on the balance sheet.  
Second, there is little or no upfront investment required to enter into derivative 
contracts. For example, no cash is exchanged when derivative contracts are entered 
into, and only very little in the case of currency swaps, which are exchanged at spot 
rates at inception and at maturity. Third, derivatives are settled at a future date. This is 
rarely done through physical delivery and represents only an investment in the change 
of value by the underlying variable, not an investment in the notional amount or 
quantity of the actual asset (Ernst and Young, 2010). 
 
Operational vs. financial hedging 
Besides financial derivatives, operational policies and investments can serve as hedges 
against adverse market volatilities. Operational hedging is understood to be 
“mitigating risk by counter-balancing actions in a processing network that do not 
involve financial instruments” (Van Mieghem, 2003, p. 271). For example, a 
 12 
multinational company might decide to manage its exchange risk exposure by moving 
production to a country where significant sales are expected. Any changes in the value 
of the domestic currency would be hedged by accompanying changes in the sales 
revenue of that country, which provides incentives for firms with global sales to set up 
manufacturing facilities in various geographic locations (Chowdhry and Howe, 1999).  
The relationship between these two forms of risk management has been the focus of 
various empirical studies, which aim to determine whether financial hedging could be 
regarded as a complement or substitute to operational hedging. While financial 
hedging is commonly used to mitigate cash flow volatility and a firm’s transaction 
exposure, operational hedging can be employed to decrease longer-term economic risk 
exposures (Kim et al., 2006). In this context, Guay and Kothari (2003) point out that 
financial derivatives are generally employed “…to fine-tune an overall risk 
management program that is likely to include operational hedges. This may be due to 
the fact that much of the overall risk facing non-financial firms (e.g., operating risks) 
cannot be managed through the use of standard derivative contracts written over asset 
prices such as interest rates, exchange rates, and commodity prices” (p. 425). 
The authors also criticise that the use of derivatives for firms which rely mostly on 
operational hedging constitutes only a small fraction of the overall risk management 
program and are a noisy and insufficient proxy to examine risk management practices 
(Guay and Kothari, 2003).  
Most firms that operate internationally often engage in both financial and operational 
hedging. In comparison to the longer-term nature of operational hedging strategies, the 
use of financial derivative instruments is much more flexible and allows firms to 
quickly adjust maturities, size, instrument types and denominations according to 
changes in a firm’s market environments. A study by Allayannis et al. (2001) finds 
that corporations with operational hedging strategies are also more likely to use 
financial hedging instruments. The authors conclude that operational hedging 
strategies alone do not result in increased firm value, but when operational and 
financial hedging strategies are employed simultaneously, for example, to reduce 
foreign exchange risk, operational hedging has been found to have significant positive 
effects on firm value.  
For the purpose of this research, it is assumed that derivative use is indicative of a 
firm’s overall risk management strategy, and that derivatives are chosen after long-
term operational and investment decisions have been made. Thus, risk management 
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practices proxied by the use of financial derivatives will be the focus of the analysis. 
Therefore, the terms hedging and derivative use will be used interchangeably, 
describing the case that a corporation uses derivative instruments for risk management 
purposes. This is consistent with the empirical literature on corporate hedging, which 
widely uses derivatives as a proxy for risk management (Aretz and Bartram, 2010).  
 
1.2.3 Derivative market context 
This thesis examines financial derivatives that are commonly employed to hedge 
against foreign exchange, interest rate and commodity risks, including the most 
common types of corporate derivatives: forwards or futures, swaps and options. What 
all these types of derivative instruments have in common is that the value of these 
instruments is based on the price of the underlying reference assets. Detailed 
definitions of foreign exchange, interest rate and commodity derivative instruments 
can be found in Appendix A.1 (Bank of International Settlement, 2013).  
Estimating the extent of international derivative activity is difficult. Weber (2009) 
criticises academic literature as often implying that derivatives are modern financial 
instruments which have only recently become important. In fact, the use of derivatives 
in modern trade relationship can be traced back to the 17th century, when options on 
tulips and futures on rice were traded in Holland and Japan, respectively (Weber, 
2009). However, the market demand for these types of financial contracts remained 
fairly small until the 1970s, a period with increased interest rate and market price 
volatility (Stulz, 2004).  
However, the nature of bilateral derivative agreements and the zero initial set-up costs 
for most contracts result in few historical records that provide evidence to estimate 
market activity so that “even today, the international commodity and financial 
markets, which have been the primary focus of derivative dealings, remain beyond the 
reach of national statistical offices” (Weber, 2009, p. 2). 
Early corporate survey data presented by Bodnar et al. (1998) reports that the use of 
derivatives by US firms has grown from 35.0 per cent in 1994 to 50.0 per cent of 
sampled firms in 1998. Reports from the Bank of International Settlement (BIS) 
confirm this trend (Bank of International Settlement, 2013). Figure 1.1 illustrates the 
exponential growth in the global use of over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives since the 
1980s, until the onset of the GFC slowed down this trend.  
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In 2013, the value of the total notional derivatives was US$710,633 billion, which 
represents a proxy for the total value of claims against underlying reference assets 
traded in the OTC derivative market. In comparison, Australia’s GDP in 2013 was 
estimated at US$1,563 billion, and Canada’s GDP was approximately US$1,826 
billion (World Bank, 2015).   
 
 
Figure 1.1 OTC derivatives by type 1998-2013 
    Source: Bank of International Settlement (2015) 
Since 1988, the BIS has conducted bi-annual surveys of derivative dealers to estimate 
the size of the OTC derivative market, which represents the most significant share of 
derivative activity. Based on 2013 survey data, the BIS reports that about 85 per cent 
to 90 per cent of derivatives are traded between financial institutions, with most 
counterparties being large banks.  
Figure 1.2 shows OTC derivatives by non-financial counterparties from 1998 to 2013. 
Non-financial counterparties include governments and corporations that are mostly 
involved in foreign exchange or commodity derivative trades, requiring derivatives to 
hedge against adverse price movements and protect future cash flows. Even though 
they represent a significantly smaller share, Figure 1.2. shows that OTC derivatives 
traded by non-financial counterparties have also significantly increased from 
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US$9,563 billion in 1998 to US$26,551 billion in 2013 (Bank of International 
Settlement, 2013).  
Measuring a local derivative market is difficult as OTC derivatives are generally 
traded across borders and Australian transactions often involve an overseas 
counterparty. In fact, most derivatives are denominated in US dollars, Euros, Japanese 
Yen or Pounds Sterling – only 2 per cent or US$11 trillion of the global derivative 
trade was denominated in Australian dollars in 2011. 
 
Figure 1.2 OTC derivatives by non-financial counterparties 1998-2013 
Source: Bank of International Settlement (2015) 
Australian market activity is defined as involving transactions that have been executed 
or ordered by Australian-based entities. The daily turnover of OTC derivatives is 
estimated to be around $180 billion, mostly composed of foreign exchange OTC 
derivatives of approximately $120 billion, followed by single and cross-currency OTC 
interest rate derivatives, of which 80 per cent of the notional outstanding values are 
denominated in Australian dollars. This makes the Australian derivatives market a 
relatively small participant in global derivative trading, but of comparable size to other 
G-20 economies (Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, 2012). The Canadian 
derivative market ranks among the top 20 in the world, being number 17 in 2013 by 
number of contracts traded (Anshuman, 2013).  
 16 
An overview of Australia’s and Canada’s OTC derivative turnover in 2013 is 
presented in Table 1.1. It shows that the turnover for single-currency interest rate 
derivatives in Australia was US$7,853 billion in April 2013 (Council of Financial 
Regulators, 2015). This type of derivative also represents the largest market share, 
with 64.5% of OCT derivatives in Australia being single-currency interest rate 
derivatives, followed by foreign exchange derivatives with 33.2% and a turnover of 
US$4,039 billion.  
In Canada, the turnover for single-currency interest rate derivatives decreased from its 
high of US$875.5 billion in 2010 to US$747.4 billion in April 2013. Non-financial 
counterparties have similarly dropped from 61,250 customers in 2010 to 24,712 
counterparties in April 2013, according to the 2013 Triennial Central Bank Survey 
(Bank of Canada, 2013). No detailed information on other OTC derivatives and their 
market share is available.   
 
Table 1.1 OTC derivatives turnover 2013 
Sources: Council of Financial Regulators (2015), Bank of Canada (2013) 
Overall, the global OTC derivative market has grown exponentially over the last few 
decades, although growth slowed during the 2008 crisis, prompting several regulatory 
reforms by international regulatory authorities (Gyntelberg and Upper, 2013).  
Chapter Four examines how non-financial firms in Australia and Canada have 
responded to the experience of the GFC and what type of market risks are most 
commonly hedged with derivatives across industries.  
Notional principal 
amounts of 
turnover 
Australia (April 2013) Canada (April 2013) 
Value in US$ 
billions Market share  
Value in US$ 
billions Market share  
Single-currency 
interest rate 7,853 64.5% 747 N/A 
Foreign exchange 4,039 33.2% 1,098 N/A 
Credit 150 1.2% N/A N/A 
Commodities 111 0.9% N/A N/A 
Equity linked 26 0.2% N/A N/A 
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1.3 Research problem 
1.3.1 Research motivation  
This chapter so far has introduced the rationale for corporate risk management, 
described common derivative instruments and reporting practices, and alluded to other 
operational strategies that can be used to hedge against market fluctuations. It has also 
been discussed that financial derivative trading has experienced immense growth in 
the last decades, despite the fact that finance theory in the tradition of Modigliani and 
Miller’s (1958) sees no value in using derivatives, and that empirical studies 
investigating the value of derivatives have delivered conflicting results (Allayannis 
and Weston, 2001; Jin and Jorion, 2006). 
This research project is motivated by three aspects: the importance of corporate risk 
management, limited research examining current derivative practices across 
Australian and Canadian industries in a post-GFC environment, and the lack of 
consensus regarding the value proposition of derivatives used for hedging.  
Hedging is an important topic for the financial risk management of multinational 
corporations. To be able to maximise shareholder value and invest in positive net 
present value (NPV) investments, corporate managers must protect future cash flows 
and ensure the “possible survival of business in general” (Friedman, 2007, p.5). The 
development of interrelated global markets and the experience of corporate collapses 
and spectacular financial losses during the GFC demand that financial managers 
protect shareholders’ wealth through adequate risk management practices, and make 
appropriate decisions on whether or not, and on how much, a firm should hedge.  
Also, businesses play an essential role in society by advancing progress and finding 
solutions to greater problems given their vast resources and technological expertise. 
Remaining a viable and stable organisation when markets are volatile allows firms not 
only to grow shareholder wealth but also to provide continuous employment and 
benefits to non-investor stakeholders. Moreover, financial distress costs or corporate 
collapse result in damaging consequences far beyond the mere financial loss to 
corporate investors. They also take a devastating and lasting toll on affected 
employees, their families and communities.  
Despite the theoretical argument that hedging does not create value in perfect capital 
markets (Modigliani and Miller, 1958), financial derivatives can provide significant 
economic benefits to help manage market risks (Froot et al., 1993; Gay and Nam, 
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1998; Smith and Stulz, 1985). The continuous growth of derivative use by financial 
and non-financial counterparties also demonstrates that firms increasingly employ 
derivatives (Bank of International Settlement, 2013), which makes this area an 
important focus for continuing academic research.  
However, even though finance theory explains under which conditions, based on 
capital market imperfections, corporate hedging creates value, no guidance is provided 
on which hedging decisions are optimal for a given firm in a particular industry (Froot 
et al., 1993). In addition, few studies have reported on derivative practices since the 
GFC. In particular, most studies in the Australian and Canadian context are based on 
data from 1993 to 2002, a period before the GFC and improved risk management 
disclosures. This creates the need for research into current hedging practices to inform 
financial managers and shareholders about industry hedging decisions, for example 
the types of risk commonly hedged and the instruments most often used by industry 
peers. Therefore, it is one of the objectives of this thesis to provide further evidence 
on the current derivative usage of non-financial corporations in Australia and Canada 
in a post-GFC environment. The results from this analysis can provide benchmarks to 
guide financial managers whether and how risk exposures are commonly hedged by 
industry competitors, so that firms can establish risk management practices in line with 
industry practices. Current evidence on industry practices will also enable investors to 
make informed investment choices between firms when evaluating potential market 
risk exposures (Panaretou et al., 2013). 
Moreover, a lack of consensus is found in the empirical literature regarding the value 
proposition of financial derivatives (Adam and Fernando, 2006; Carter et al., 2006; Jin 
and Jorion, 2006; Nguyen and Faff, 2003a). Results from previous research studies 
testing the value effect of hedging remain inconsistent and the generalisability of 
results is limited due to small sample size and selective instruments and industries 
(Allayannis et al., 2012; Birt et al., 2013; Brown et al., 2006). Therefore, this research 
examines an extended range of current hedging practices across six industries in two 
countries to present robust cross-section of data. The two countries, Australia and 
Canada, are chosen as they represent two similar open economies, which enables an 
examination of factors that motivate corporate hedging choices beyond a particular 
region and sheds further light on the value effect of these decisions.  
What is also missing in the literature is a more thorough examination of a variety of 
hedging decisions in the context of capital structure and industry settings. Though 
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financial management literature has traditionally addressed capital structure decisions 
and the value of hedging practices as two separate areas, an argument can be made that 
both these financing and investment decisions have to be viewed as interrelated areas 
(Froot at al. 1993; Hahnenstein and Röder, 2006). Similarly, industry-specific distress 
costs are expected to be important determinants of hedging decisions and their value 
effect. This gap in the hedging literature provides the main motivation for re-
examining the value effect of derivatives by conducting a comprehensive examination 
of current industry hedging practices and the value of hedging decisions under specific 
industry and capital structure contexts. 
 
1.3.2 Research questions 
In the tax-free world of Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) perfect capital markets, active 
risk management through corporate hedging policies would not be worthwhile – there 
would be no demand for hedging instruments as the informed and rational investor 
could hedge their own investments through diversification across industries, different 
types of investments and countries. Needless to say, financial distress occurs and has 
to be dealt with in the short-term to ensure corporate long-term survival, creating the 
urgent need for value-enhancing risk management practices. 
Financial management theory has developed two lines of thinking to explain corporate 
derivative usage. The first set of explanations as to why firms hedge, focuses on the 
paradigm to maximise shareholders’ wealth. This line of enquiry, founded on the 
existence of market imperfections, explains how risk management strategies, 
including the use of derivatives, can add value by reducing financial distress costs, 
taxes and by mitigating the underinvestment problem (Froot, 1993; Graham and 
Rogers, 2002; Smith and Stulz, 1985).  
How firms should hedge has been further addressed by examining how much a firm 
should hedge (Black, 1989; Froot et al., 1993; Perold and Schulman, 1988). A second 
theoretical approach focuses on agency theory and explains how derivative usage may 
be motivated by a manager’s utility to hedge (Smith and Stulz, 1985; Stulz, 1984).  
The purpose of this thesis is to look at how financial managers in six different 
industries choose to reduce commodity, interest rate and foreign exchange risks 
through hedging with derivatives in Australia and Canada, from 2009 to 2013, and 
whether these hedging decisions can be associated with an increase in firm value.  This 
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will provide recent and more robust evidence on the hedging practices and associated 
value of derivative use for Australian and Canadian firms.  
In order to address the existing gap in the empirical literature, current hedging 
practices and cross-sectional differences for a sample of listed Australian and 
Canadian firms that operate in six different industries will be examined in Chapter 
Four by asking the following: 
1) What are the current hedging practices in Australia and Canada? 
2) Are there significant differences between countries? 
To address existing gaps in the empirical literature related to conflicting results about 
the value of hedging, the thesis further examines the value of hedging decisions under 
different capital structure and industry settings. This is based on propositions that the 
value-enhancing effect of hedging policies is closely related to industry-specific 
distress costs and capital structure decisions (Hahnenstein and Röder, 2006). A more 
careful consideration of industry-specific results across a range of capital structure 
settings should provide a more comprehensive picture of whether derivatives create 
firm value. Chapter Five tests the direct value effect of various hedging decisions on 
firm value proxied by Tobin’s Q. This investigation, which includes the decision 
whether to hedge or not, whether to use foreign exchange, interest rate, or commodity 
instruments, and the extent of hedging, takes place at the country and industry levels 
with the aim to cross-validate results across Australia and Canada. To do so, Chapter 
Five addresses the following questions:  
3) Does hedging create firm value in Australia and Canada? 
4) Does hedging create firm value across industries? 
 
Figure 1.3 provides an overview of the overall research question for this thesis, the 
research questions and hypotheses developed in Chapter Three, which are tested in 
Chapters Four and Five. 
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Figure 1.3 Research question and hypotheses 
Overall, this thesis hypothesises that firms in both countries make similar hedging 
decisions due to similar financial market and country corporate governance 
environments, which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Three. It is also 
expected that investors should value hedging decisions based on common hedging 
rationales and that industry results on the value of hedging decisions can be cross-
validated across countries.  
 
1.3.3 Research contribution 
This research provides important evidence about current hedging practices in a post-
GFC environment, and whether hedging decisions create firm value. The most 
important contributions relate to the comprehensive evidence provided on current 
hedging practices, and the testing of the value of hedging decisions based on the 
framework proposed by Hahnenstein and Röder (2006), who state that hedging needs 
to be evaluated in the context of industry and capital structures. This provides 
important empirical evidence that addresses current research gaps.  
While some hedging studies include various types of risks and hedging instruments 
(e.g., Bartram et al., 2009; Benson and Oliver, 2004; Mian, 1996; Nguyen and Faff, 
2002; Servaes et al., 2009), most empirical research focuses only on specific types of 
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derivative instruments, or a particular industry to examine risk management 
motivations and value effects. This limits the generalisability of those findings. 
The data sample in this thesis addresses this shortcoming by including a broad cross-
section of non-financial firms from six Australian and Canadian industries, and by 
documenting different market risk derivatives, including foreign exchange, interest 
rate and commodity instruments. This provides a robust cross-section of data and a 
comprehensive overview of common hedging decisions, which allows for more 
meaningful conclusions.  
To do so, this thesis analyses a large cross-section of panel data over a five-year period 
from 2009 to 2013 to provide evidence on the value of hedging in a post-GFC 
environment.  Therefore, this research makes a significant contribution to the growing 
literature on corporate hedging practices by examining a large cross-section of listed 
non-financial firms across six industries for both economies to ascertain whether the 
value effect of hedging can be validated across countries and for firms from the same 
industries across both countries under investigation.  
Providing more industry-specific information on hedging practices is important, as the 
management of risk exposures is a crucial task for corporate managers, and because 
financial theory does not provide clear guidance as to which risks should be hedged in 
a specific industry environment. This is important, as having comparable information 
on industry hedging usage will enable market participants to compare corporate 
derivative choices and encourage managers to make optimal use of derivative 
instruments, and to set risk management policies in line with their firm characteristics 
and their industry peers (Panaretou et al., 2013).  
This study also differs from previous research in other ways. First, the sample, 
collected from two distinct economies over a five-year time frame from 2009 to 2013, 
enables the testing of hypotheses beyond geographic borders and a comparison of 
industry results. The use of two countries in this study is motivated by the attempt to 
extend the level of analysis to test the robustness of the findings beyond a specific 
regional economy. Both countries are similar in that they operate open economies with 
free-floating exchange rates and share a multitude of historical and cultural influences. 
They also have similar corporate governance and market environments, which provide 
common hedging incentives.  
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Moreover, the sample covers a five-year period rather than just a snapshot of a single 
year. There are two reasons for this decision. First, the longer timeframe allows 
broader conclusions to be drawn in relation to whether the reported derivatives are 
being used for risk mitigation or for speculative purposes (Chernenko and Faulkender, 
2011). Second, this is a time period in which firms had strong incentives to hedge 
following the increased financial market volatility during the GFC and consequently 
heightened awareness of managers and investors of risk management needs (Slimane, 
Mehanaoui and Kazi, 2013). The findings from Chapter Four show if and how firms 
in various industry settings decided to hedge their risk exposures since.  
In addition, previous research commonly classifies firms as either hedgers or non-
hedgers, which does not account for firms that move between both positions within a 
financial year. This study takes advantage of recently improved derivative disclosures 
following the implementation of and transition to IFRS and further classifies sampled 
firms as either hedging, not hedging, or as hedging some risks during the financial year 
for the analysis presented in Chapter Four. By introducing a classification of firms 
who hedge some-times, when considered necessary, or have hedged during the year, 
but report no outstanding derivatives on balance date, are identified. These firms are 
usually considered non-hedgers in the academic literature, which underestimates the 
actual proportion of derivative users. 
Finally, the empirical evidence on the value-adding effect of hedging with derivatives 
instruments has provided mixed results. Even though financial management literature 
has traditionally addressed capital structure decisions and the value of hedging 
practices as two separate areas, an argument can be made that both decisions should 
be considered together when evaluating whether hedging creates value (Hahnenstein 
and Röder, 2006).   
By investigating the value of hedging for a range of sub-samples of industries and 
capital structure levels, this thesis aims to provide an improved explanation of the 
conditions under which the hedging creates value.   
In summary, the study will contribute to the existing literature by providing new 
information on industry practices and by shedding light on the value proposition of 
derivative usage.  
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1.4 Outline of thesis chapters 
This chapter has introduced the theoretical risk management background to examine 
derivative practices in Australia and Canada and provided a brief overview of 
derivative reporting practices and market context. Then, the research motivation and 
research questions were discussed.  
Chapter Two reviews the academic literature relating to corporate hedging theories, 
presents an overview of empirical findings and discusses current research gaps. Then, 
Chapter Three outlines the research hypotheses and discusses the research design 
including the sample selection, data collection process and provides an overview of 
the empirical methods used.  
The empirical section starts with Chapter Four, which reports the results from 
investigating industry derivative practices across non-financial firms in Australia and 
Canada from 2009 to 2013. It also discusses hedging determinants of cross-sectional 
differences across industries. Chapter Five examines the value effect of hedging, 
considering capital structure and industry contexts of Australian and Canadian firms.  
Finally, Chapter Six summarises the findings, provides a conclusion to the research 
question of whether hedging creates firm value, and outlines the limitations of this 
study and areas for future research.  
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Chapter Two:  Literature Review 
2.1 Chapter introduction  
This chapter reviews the academic literature on corporate hedging and firm value. The 
theoretical background to this thesis is financial management theory, which evaluates 
managerial decision-making about investment, financing and dividend policies on 
whether those corporate practices create shareholder value1. As the firm’s market value 
will be affected by the way its managers set such policies, it is imperative to understand 
the channels through which specific financing decisions can affect firm value to 
ascertain whether a specific corporate finance policy can add value for the residual 
shareholder.  
Consequently, the first objective of this chapter is to discuss how hedging with 
derivatives creates economic benefits and firm value by overcoming market frictions. 
According to this stream of risk management theory, the justification for hedging 
results from tax savings, the mitigation of financial distress and underinvestment costs 
(Froot et al., 1993; Graham and Rogers, 2002; Smith and Stulz, 1985). Another line of 
research suggests that managerial risk-aversion and incentive structures motivate 
derivative usage (Bartram et al., 2009; Géczy et al., 2007; Nance et al., 1993; Stulz, 
1984). 
The next section discusses how hedging decisions should be considered in the context 
of capital structures and industry-specific financial distress costs to evaluate their value 
proposition (Froot et al., 1993, Hahnenstein and Röder, 2006; Leland, 1998), which 
provides the theoretical framework for this thesis.  
Finally, this chapter provides an overview of the existing empirical literature on 
corporate hedging and highlights research gaps. This will include a review of empirical 
studies on derivative practices, hedging determinants and research that tests the value 
proposition of hedging decisions. While there has been some support in the academic 
literature from studies that found a measurable value effect of derivative usage 
(Allayannis and Weston, 2001; Campello et al., 2011; Carter et al., 2006), the overall 
empirical results remain mixed and provide only limited evidence on particular 
                                               
1 Please note that for the purpose of thesis the terms shareholder value and firm value carry the 
same conotation in the literature review to discuss common hedging theories and how they justify 
the use of derivatives. However, the subsequent analysis presented in Chapter Five examines the 
effect of hedging on firm value, which is proxied by Tobin’s Q and is discussed in Chapter Three. 
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derivative types or industry contexts (Jin and Jorion, 2006; Nguyen and Faff, 2003a), 
which makes this research topic an interesting area for further research.  
 
2.2 Hedging decisions and firm value 
A substantial body of literature exists which has addressed the question of why firms 
hedge. According to traditional financial management theory, corporate hedging has 
been criticised as irrelevant and a waste of shareholders’ resources (Dufey and 
Srinivasulu, 1983). This view rests on the original insights of Modigliani and Miller 
(1958), who propose that financing decisions cannot enhance firm value but only affect 
how wealth is divided among claim holders in perfect capital markets.  
Consequently, individual investors can replicate corporate hedging strategies if they 
wish to limit their exposure to certain risk factors. Any changes in corporate hedging 
policy can be offset by the firm’s investors on their individual accounts, leaving the 
overall wealth outcome unchanged (Smith and Stulz, 1985). In this case, corporate and 
individual hedging efforts are considered perfect substitutes, which challenges the 
value proposition of corporate risk management activities. Firm value is created by 
activities that increase cash flow, not through financing choices (Modigliani and 
Miller, 1958). According to this line of thought, corporate financing decisions can only 
enhance firm value when Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) perfect capital market 
assumptions are violated. 
Real-world imperfections, including corporate taxes, agency and financial distress 
costs create a rationale for corporate risk management practices and provide the bridge 
between the theoretical dismissal of the value of a hedging policy and the wide-spread 
corporate use of derivative instruments (Bartram, 2000). In the real world, hedging 
policies and the use of derivatives allow firms to protect their future cash flows from 
adverse market movements, which matters to investors. The use of derivatives for risk 
management also enables firms to re-evaluate capital structure choices and potentially 
increase firm leverage and reduce the cost of capital (Froot et al., 1993; Titman and 
Wessels, 1988).  
In practice, most non-financial firms that use derivative instruments employ hedging 
instruments to protect the firm’s cash flow against foreign exchange or interest rate 
risk. For example, a study by Bartram et al. (2011) finds that 66.4 per cent of sampled 
Australian firms use derivatives, with 52.2 per cent using foreign exchange 
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instruments and 42.2 per cent employing interest risk derivatives. The same study finds 
that Canadian firms use hedging instruments 60.0 per cent of the time, with 46.2 per 
cent using foreign exchange and 27.2 per cent using interest rate risk instruments 
(Bartram et al., 2011). Even though firms may also employ derivatives for selective 
hedging practices which time derivative positions based on current market views 
(Brown et al., 2006), the common use of derivatives by non-financial firms seems to 
be motivated by risk management purposes. This is in line with positive theories of 
corporate hedging that explain how derivative usage can create firm value in the 
presence of market frictions (Aretz and Bartram, 2010).  
Figure 2.1 depicts the various channels that are commonly presented as theoretical 
rationales for explaining the value of derivative use. The theoretical debate can be 
classified into two main approaches providing rationales for the corporate hedging 
decision. The first deals with direct economic costs and benefits derived from 
derivative instruments. Removing the theoretical assumptions of perfect capital 
markets (Modigliani and Miller, 1958), Smith and Stulz (1985) argue that hedging 
firms must be motivated by either a reduction in costs or an increase in benefits from 
derivative use. For example, hedging promotes higher leverage through tax deductions 
of additional interest payments (Smith and Stulz, 1985). Similarly, derivatives can 
reduce financial constraints as hedging lowers indirect costs of financial distress and 
reduces default costs.  
 
Figure 2.1 Value creation through hedging  
The second approach incorporates agency cost considerations following Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) and explains how hedging mitigates underinvestment costs (Froot, 
1993; Gay and Nam, 1998). Moreover, research investigating managerial risk-aversion 
discusses how executive ownership stakes and compensation packages may lead to 
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risk-averse behaviour by managers or might encourage the implementation of 
derivative programmes which are not primarily aimed at creating shareholder wealth 
(Smith and Stulz, 1985; Stulz, 1984; Tufano, 1998). In addition, corporate governance 
research suggests that the use of derivatives for hedging purposes is strongly 
encouraged by corporate environments that motivate managers to act according to the 
value-maximising paradigm (Allayannis et al., 2012).   
The following sections discuss in more detail the theoretical rationales for hedging 
based on these value propositions of derivative use and review which proxies have 
commonly been used to test these hedging determinants. 
 
2.2.1 Tax benefits  
Most theoretical explanations for the use of financial derivatives start by referring to 
the works of Modigliani and Miller (1958), who demonstrated that under a defined set 
of perfect market conditions a firm’s corporate finance policy is irrelevant. However, 
after the introduction of market imperfections, one of the major arguments to 
demonstrate the benefit of corporate hedging is the expected reduction in corporate 
taxes for firms that have convex tax schedules and are not close to bankruptcy (Graham 
and Rogers, 2002; Graham and Smith, 1999; Smith and Stulz, 1985).  
Smith and Stulz (1985) consider the benefit of hedging for value-maximising firms 
with convex statutory tax functions, that is, a zero-tax rate on corporate losses, 
progressive tax rates for taxable income up to a determined threshold and a constant 
tax rate for profits above. They argue that corporations with effective marginal tax 
rates, which are increasing functions of their before-tax company value, have a post-
tax company value with a concave function of its before-tax value. In such cases, 
corporate hedging will decrease the variability of before-tax firm values as well as 
expected corporate taxes. Assuming considerably low hedging costs, where benefits 
gained from hedging are higher than associated costs, this will enable firms to further 
increase their corporate after-tax value (Smith and Stulz, 1985). Thus, hedging has tax-
reducing benefits for value-maximising firms with convex tax functions that are 
operating in progressive tax systems such as the US.   
However, statutory progressive tax rates are limited so that firms with low taxable 
income or losses may not be able to benefit from tax-reducing hedging strategies 
(MacKie-Mason, 2012). Accordingly, the tax saving effect of corporate risk 
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management is of higher value to firms with taxable income in the convex region of 
the tax schedule. Special tax items such as tax-loss carry forwards or investment tax 
credits can also indirectly give rise to a convex tax function, which means that firms 
with either taxable income in the convex tax region or those that report special tax 
items have increased incentives to use corporate risk management tools to reduce their 
income volatility and thereby their tax burden. Hedging also becomes more valuable 
in the presence of leverage as the tax deductibility of interest provides incentives to 
move to debt financing, but this approach provides no hedging incentive for all-equity 
firms.  
Such an explanation is presented by Eytan (1990) who discusses the benefit of hedging 
in a tax system with tax-loss carry forwards that offset future profits. If no immediate 
tax rebates are available when corporate losses occur, and losses are carried forward 
to offset future profits, this results in deferred tax rebates with reduced present value, 
which may be completely lost as they are contingent on future profits. Hedging can 
reduce potential losses due to adverse market movements with the trade-off of 
reducing future profits. In this case, hedging results in a less costly decrease in after-
tax profits compared to the gain from preventing potential losses that carry an 
“additional tax penalty” (Eytan, 1990, p. 539). 
An overview of how tax benefits of hedging have been tested in the empirical literature 
is provided in Table 2.1. Most empirical studies that examine tax incentives for 
hedging either test for income in the convex tax region or discuss special tax items 
(Aretz and Bartram, 2010). Overall, empirical results from testing the tax structure 
progressivity support that corporate taxes provide a rationale for corporate hedging 
(Haushalter, 2000; Howton and Perfect, 1998; Nance et al., 1993). For example, 
Graham and Smith (1999) analyse firms with convex tax functions and measure a 5.4 
per cent reduction of tax payable following a five per cent decrease in income 
volatility. Thus, under a progressive tax regime, low taxable income results in 
decreased tax payable and higher income will lead to an increased tax rate and tax 
payable. When firms that commonly pay higher levels of income tax use hedging 
strategies to limit income volatility, their tax increases are smaller compared to the tax 
reduction received in times when taxable income would have been high, which 
decreases expected tax liabilities and provides a theoretical incentive to hedge.  
However, using marginal tax rates as proxies for the tax benefit hedging rationale does 
not yield any results in support of the tax hypothesis (Haushalter, 2000). Also, results 
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for special tax items, whether scaled proxies or dummies are used, are inconclusive. 
On the one hand, studies focusing on tax credits seem to find support for the 
proposition that hedging creates tax benefits (Bartram et al., 2009; Fok et al., 1997; 
Mian, 1996; Nance et al., 1993). Yet, results on tax-loss carry forwards are mixed. 
Although Berkman and Bradbury (1996) and Gay and Nam (1998) report supporting 
evidence, other research studies cannot confirm that tax-loss carry forwards provide a 
significant hedging motivation (Chen-Miao and Smith, 2007; Fok et al., 1997; Géczy 
et al., 1997; Graham and Rogers, 2002; Nance et al., 1993). 
 
Table 2.1 Overview of common proxy variables: Tax benefits 
Proxy & predicted sign Proxy formula Previous studies 
Tax-loss carry forward (1) + 
Dummy indicating the 
availability of tax-loss 
carry forwards 
Berkman and Bradbury (1996), Mian (1996), 
Howton and Perfect (1998), Allayannis and 
Ofek (2001), Berkman et al. (2002), Marsden 
and Prevost (2005) 
Tax-loss carry forward (2) + 
Available tax-loss 
carry forwards 
(scaled) 
Nance et al. (1993), Tufano (1996), Géczy et al. 
(1997), Fok et al. (1997), Gay and Nam (1998), 
Graham and Rogers (2002), Lin et al. (2008) 
Tax credit (1) + 
Dummy indicating the 
availability of tax 
credits 
Mian (1996), Bartram et al. (2009) 
Tax credit (2) + Available tax credits (scaled) Nance et al. (1993), Fok et al. (1997) 
Marginal tax rate - Current year’s marginal tax rate Haushalter (2000), Bartram et al. (2009) 
Progressive corporate tax 
structure 
+ 
Dummy indicating 
whether reported 
earnings are in convex 
tax region 
Nance et al. (1993), Mian (1996), Howton and 
Perfect (1998), Haushalter (2000) 
Note: This table provides an overview of proxy variables commonly used to test the hypothesis that tax benefits of 
hedging create firm value. The column on the left describes the proxy variable and the hypothesised sign indicates 
the predicted relationship with the hedging decision. The Proxy formula is listed in the next column. The column 
titled Previous studies lists examples of empirical studies that have used this variable.  
Overall, there is only weak support for the hypothesis that hedging creates firm value 
through tax benefits. Aretz and Bartram (2010) point out that this might result from 
the fact that tax benefits are considerably smaller than other hedging benefits and are 
hard to measure for statistical testing.  
Moreover, Graham and Rogers (2002) report that the tax benefits created by increased 
debt capacity and interest deductions through hedging outweigh the tax benefits 
created from hedging in tax progressive environments.  Graham and Smith (1999) also 
point out that potential tax savings constitute only one of the benefits justifying the use 
of derivatives, and that the total value from hedging derives from various hedging 
motives, including an increased ability to take on debt or reducing an underinvestment 
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problem. An appropriate mix of hedging instruments may, therefore, enable a firm to 
simultaneously maximise its value and reportable income while reducing the tax 
payable. 
2.2.2 Financial distress costs 
Cash flow volatility and the possibility of unexpected market movements can create 
situations of financial distress. Companies financed with debt operate under the risk 
that their incoming cash flows might not be sufficient to meet their fixed interest 
obligations when due. This risk increases with additional leverage or when cash flows 
from operations are more volatile. If a company is unable to meet its interest 
obligations in a timely manner it can be forced into bankruptcy by its creditors, who 
will try to recover their funds from any residual firm assets ahead of the firms’ 
shareholders (Warner, 1977b).  
Hedging can reduce the probability of facing financial distress costs, which increases 
firm value. Here, financial distress costs relate to the probability of expected 
bankruptcy which impact a firm’s value even before bankruptcy forms are filed. These 
may include loss of business from customers who no longer wish to purchase products 
that might require future servicing or long-time warranty, losing suppliers, higher re-
financing costs, a distraction of management, additional costs to retain valuable 
personnel, loss of market share and opportunity costs associated with foregoing 
positive NPV projects (Purnanandam, 2008). Therefore, a firm under financial distress 
will incur additional direct and indirect financial distress costs that further decrease the 
value of the firm (Cassar and Holmes, 2003). 
Direct financial distress costs include bankruptcy costs, i.e. expenses related to the 
actual bankruptcy proceedings including legal and accounting fees (Altman and 
Hotchkiss, 2010). Whereas these direct costs are only estimated to be around one to 
three per cent of company value (Warner, 1977a), estimation of the indirect costs of 
expected bankruptcy seems to be more difficult with a wider range of associated losses 
in firm value reported in the literature. For example, Cutler and Summers (1987) 
estimate that financial distress may cost the firm up to 20 per cent of its value. On the 
other hand, Kwansa and Cho (1995) report average indirect bankruptcy costs of around 
four per cent for firms in their study, but the authors acknowledge that these costs 
increase closer to the bankruptcy year and make a significant contribution to the 
eventual bankruptcy proceedings. 
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As the use of hedging instruments can decrease the volatility of future cash flows and 
firm value, it is argued that hedging can reduce the probability of direct bankruptcy 
and preceding indirect costs of financial distress (Smith and Stulz, 1985). By reducing 
the likelihood of financial distress, hedging lowers expected financial distress costs, 
thereby promoting the use of additional debt financing to increase optimal leverage 
and to benefit from further interest tax deductions (Graham and Rogers, 2002).  
An overview of the most common financial distress proxies used in the empirical 
literature can be found in Table 2.2. 
The actual value of corporate hedging associated with limiting financial distress costs 
depends on the firm’s expected likelihood to encounter periods of financial distress 
and the level of the costs arising from operating under distress. Thus, firms with higher 
probabilities of default and distress costs are more likely to hedge, which can be tested 
by examining long-term debt ratios and interest coverage ratio (Aretz and Bartram, 
2010). Here, a firm’s interest coverage ratio is expected to have a negative relationship 
with derivative use, as higher coverage signals higher pre-tax income available to meet 
interest payments.  
Likewise, corporations with high debt ratios incur higher interest payments and are 
more likely to hedge to ensure payment obligations can be met. Yet, it must be pointed 
out that financial distress costs are determined by a multitude of industry factors 
beyond the debt-to-equity ratio, such as industry competition level and a firm’s product 
characteristics (Hahnenstein and Röder, 2006; Shapiro and Titman, 1986; Talberg et 
al., 2008). Therefore, a firm’s financial distress costs may not only depend on its 
leverage ratio but also on exogenous industry characteristics, which means that firms 
may have already incurred financial distress costs and have hedging incentives despite 
low debt-to-equity ratios on their balance sheets (Aretz and Bartram, 2010). Géczy et 
al. (1997) incorporate these industry-specific factors and use industry adjusted 
leverage ratios when testing the benefits of hedging to reduce financial distress by 
deducting the industry median debt ratio from each firm’s debt ratio, so that a debt 
ratio exceeding the industry median would indicate a higher probability of financial 
distress.  
Moreover, it is important to consider that high debt ratios only result in financial 
default when a company lacks sufficient cash and other marketable securities to service 
its debt obligations. Therefore, higher short-term liquidity is expected to be associated 
with lower demand for hedging instruments. Likewise, it can be argued that only liquid 
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firms pay dividends to shareholders, which provides little motivation to hedge (Lau 
2016). On the other hand, firms committed to a stable dividend policy need to protect 
their liquidity, which could also imply a hedging incentive. This leaves the direction 
of the relationship between dividend payments and hedging for empirical testing.  
 Similarly, the existence of preference shares or convertible debt can be seen as an 
indicator of financial constraints creating higher financial distress costs (Géczy et al., 
1997), or they could be regarded as a substitute for risk management instruments 
limiting potential agency conflicts (Nance et al., 1993).  
According to Smith and Stulz (1985), both shareholders and debtholders profit from 
hedging as a means to avoid the costly consequences of bankruptcy, including direct 
bankruptcy costs as well as the loss of the tax shield. They point out that it is imperative 
for potential bondholders to be assured that hedging activities will be continued after 
the bond issue which will limit expected bankruptcy costs, even though the use of 
hedging derivatives might not be in the explicit interest of all shareholders. Although 
hedging activities are generally considered to increase firm value, it must be pointed 
out that hedging also shifts wealth and potential payoffs from shareholders to 
debtholders.  
However, noteworthy incentives also exist for shareholders to support hedging 
programs in this context. First, as firms usually borrow repeatedly, consistent hedging 
policies will form part of the firm’s reputation, increasing the price of new debt issues 
while the probability of bankruptcy remains low. Once bankruptcy appears certain, 
hedging costs will outweigh any potential and tentative reputation benefits, which are 
only valuable as long as the firm expects to keep operating. Second, hedging activities 
also reduce financial distress costs, in the form of limiting bond covenants by avoiding 
times of financial distress and the likelihood that such covenants come into effect and 
prescribe shareholders’ actions (Smith and Stulz, 1985).  
Given that less profitable firms might have difficulties in meeting debt obligations, 
profitability can also be taken as a determinant for corporate hedging. Highly 
profitable firms are less likely to face financial distress costs and are expected to hedge 
less, which is commonly examined with profitability measures including sales, gross 
margin or return-on-assets (Allayannis and Ihrig, 2001; Bartram et al., 2009; Dionne 
and Triki, 2013; Fok et al., 1997). As firms with high production costs are expected to 
be more likely to encounter financial distress with adverse market movements, several 
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studies also examine the relationship between operating leverage and hedging (Dionne 
and Garand, 2003; Haushalter, 2000; Tufano, 1996).  
Table 2.2 Overview of common proxy variables: Financial distress costs 
Proxy & predicted sign Proxy formula Previous studies 
Leverage (1) + 
(Book value of 
long-term + short-
term debt)/ total 
assets 
Nance et al. (1993), Berkman and Bradbury (1996), Mian 
(1996), Tufano (1996), Géczy et al. (1997), Fok et al. 
(1997), Howton and Perfect (1998), Gay and Nam (1998), 
Haushalter (2000), Allayannis and Ofek (2001), Graham 
and Rogers (2002), Dionne and Garand (2003), 
Borokhovich et al. (2004), Marsden and Prevost (2005), 
Lin et al. (2008) Bartram et al. (2009), Dionne and Triki 
(2013), Lel (2012) 
Leverage (2) + Industry-adjusted debt ratio Géczy et al. (1997), Clark and Judge (2008) 
Debt maturity - Total long-term debt / total debt Bartram et al. (2009) 
Interest coverage 
ratio - EBIT/ interest 
Nance et al. (1993), Berkman and Bradbury (1996), 
Géczy et al. (1997), Fok et al. (1997), Howton and Perfect 
(1998), Haushalter (2000), Bartram et al. (2009) 
Current ratio - Current assets / current liabilities Marsden and Prevost (2005) 
Liquidity (Quick 
ratio) - 
(Cash + short-
term investment)/ 
current liabilities 
Nance et al. (1993), Berkman and Bradbury (1996), Mian 
(1996), Tufano (1996), Géczy et al. (1997), Fok et al. 
(1997), Howton and Perfect (1998), Dionne and Garand 
(2003), Borokhovich et al. (2004), Dionne and Triki 
(2013)  
Dividend (1) +/- 
Cash dividend / 
closing share 
price 
Nance et al. (1993), Berkman and Bradbury (1996), Mian 
(1996), Géczy et al. (1997), Fok et al. (1997), Haushalter 
(2000), Allayannis and Ofek (2001), Dionne and Garand 
(2003), Marsden and Prevost (2005), Lel (2012) 
Dividend (2) +/- Dividend dummy  Bartram et al. (2009) 
Convertible debt +/- 
Book value of 
convertible debt 
(scaled) 
Nance et al. (1993), Berkman and Bradbury (1996), 
Géczy et al. (1997), Fok et al. (1997), Howton and Perfect 
(1998), Gay and Nam (1998), Bartram et al. (2009), Lel 
(2012) 
Profitability (1) - 
Gross income / 
Net sales or 
revenues 
Bartram et al. (2009), Dionne and Triki (2013) 
Profitability (2) - Sales Fok et al. (1997), Dionne and Triki (2013) 
Profitability (3) - Return on assets  Allayannis and Ofek (2001) 
Operating leverage + Production costs per unit of output 
Tufano (1996), Haushalter (2000), Dionne and Garand 
(2003), Dionne and Triki (2013) 
Altman Z-score + Bankruptcy index Francis and Stephan (1993), Bartram et al. (2009) 
Tangible assets - 
Total assets – 
intangibles / total 
assets  
Howton and Perfect (1998), Bartram et al. (2009) 
Note: This table provides an overview of proxy variables used to test the hypothesis that hedging creates firm value 
by alleviating financial distress costs. The column on the left describes the proxy variable and the hypothesized 
sign indicates the predicted relationship with the hedging decision. Please note that some proxy variables are used 
to test for more than one positive theory explaining the value effect of derivative use. The Proxy formula is listed 
in the next column. The column titled Previous studies lists examples of empirical studies that have used this 
variable. 
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In addition, several studies investigate the value of hedging by examining the 
relationship between derivative usage and the likelihood of encountering financial 
distress proxied by the Altman Z-score, a measure of the probability of bankruptcy, 
and asset tangibility (Bartram et al., 2009; Francis and Stephan, 1993; Howton and 
Perfect, 1998). In this context, firms with a higher expected likelihood to file for 
bankruptcy are expected to be more likely to hedge (Altman and Hotchkiss, 2010). In 
contrast, firms with significant tangible assets that can be sold in times of distress have 
lower financial distress costs and less motivation to use derivatives. Finally, one might 
employ other market participants’ views on a firm’s likelihood of financial distress 
and related costs by using corporate credit ratings as financial distress proxies (Géczy 
et al., 1997).   
Overall, the results confirm the positive relationship between leverage or interest 
coverage and hedging (Bartram et al., 2009; Berkman and Bradbury, 1996; Fok et al., 
1997; Gay and Nam, 1998; Graham and Rogers, 2002; Howton and Perfect, 1998; 
Mian, 1996). Yet, Lel (2012) finds that this relationship only holds in the context of 
firms with strong corporate governance structures.  
It has been observed that higher short-term liquidity can provide fewer incentives for 
firms to hedge (Dionne and Garand, 2003; Fok et al., 1997; Géczy et al., 1997; Tufano, 
1996). However, as expected, the results from examining the link between dividends 
and hedging remain inconclusive (Bartram et al., 2009; Berkman and Bradbury, 1996; 
Dionne and Garand, 2003; Fok et al., 1997; Gay and Nam, 1998; Haushalter, 2000; 
Mian, 1996; Nance et al., 1993).   
Testing the distress hypothesis by analysing profitability measures provides 
unexpected results. In contrast to theoretical expectations, results from univariate 
analysis reveal that more profitable firms have a higher propensity to hedge (Bartram 
et al., 2009; Fok et al., 1997; Gay and Nam, 1998; Nance et al., 1993). Yet, in 
multivariate testing, only some studies confirm this result (Allayannis and Ofek, 2001; 
Fok et al., 1997) whereas others confirm the theoretical prediction that profitable firms 
are less likely to hedge due to lower financial distress costs (Dionne and Garand, 2003; 
Nance et al., 1993). Consistent with the financial distress hypothesis, derivative users 
have fewer tangible assets (Bartram et al., 2009; Howton and Perfect, 1998) and a 
higher Altman Z-score (Francis and Stephan, 1993).  
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It can be concluded that expected bankruptcy and financial distress costs are significant 
drivers of a firm’s decision to hedge, which creates firm value by reducing financial 
distress costs.   
Aretz and Bartram (2010) point out that leverage and hedging are associated with a 
significant endogeneity problem. High debt levels provide incentives to hedge future 
cash flows, however, hedging also enables firms to increase their debt-to-equity ratio 
to benefit from additional tax benefits. To account for the endogeneity problem 
between leverage and derivative use, several studies also employ simultaneous 
equation modelling and confirm a significant positive relationship between both 
variables (Bartram et al., 2009; Géczy et al., 1997; Graham and Rogers, 2002). 
Allayannis et al. (2012) use an instrumental variable approach to mitigate potential 
endogeneity concerns between leverage and firm value, which is an approach also 
followed in this thesis.  
 
2.2.3 Underinvestment costs 
Companies create shareholder value by investing in positive NPV investment projects. 
When a firm does not generate sufficient internal cash flows to fund investments they 
may forego valuable projects due to costly external financing, which creates an 
underinvestment problem (Gay and Nam, 1998). 
In this context, Froot et al. (1993) explain that hedging increases firm value by 
ensuring that internally generated funds will be available for upcoming investment 
projects. If companies face a perfectly elastic supply of external financing, investment 
plans would not change due to internal cash flow shortfalls, and external financing 
could provide a buffer of additional capital whenever needed. However, without the 
use of derivative instruments, cash flow volatility is likely to exist and will either result 
in the firm seeking external funds, or will lead to an undesirable variability of new 
investments. 
Given the possibility of changing financing environments with increasing marginal 
costs for external funds, a company might simultaneously face cash flow shortfalls as 
well as costly outside financing which will restrict the level of new investment projects 
and create opportunity costs of foregoing positive NPV prospects. Consequently, the 
volatility of internally generated cash flows adversely impacts financing and 
investment possibilities for firms. Thus, hedging corporate cash flows provides a 
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powerful risk management strategy to control underinvestment problems by insulating 
firms from cash flow shortfalls to enhance firm value (Froot et al., 1993). 
Even though underinvestment due to cash flow volatility can be avoided by reducing 
firm leverage, corporate hedging will alleviate underinvestment costs while also 
allowing the firm to benefit from the tax shield of debt. However, the use of debt 
creates another line of conflict between shareholders and debtholders with agency 
costs related to risk shifting and underinvestment when default probability is non-zero 
(Myers, 2001). When debt levels are high shareholders only have a small residual 
claim on corporate assets and only benefit from performance outcomes that provide 
cash flows beyond the debt payments. In this scenario, additional investments will 
mostly benefit debtholders and might be rejected by managers working as agents for 
the business owners (Myers, 1977). However, debt holders’ payoffs are restricted to 
the negotiated interest payments from the debt contract and are concerned with the 
“lower end of the probability distribution outcomes” (Balakrishnan and Fox, 1993, p. 
4), as downside losses will be absorbed by the firm’s creditors.  
Managers, who wish to act in the interest of shareholders, may transfer wealth from 
debtholders to the firm’s shareholders by investing in riskier projects, which creates 
an asset substitution problem. Substituting low-risk investments with more risky 
projects provides a larger potential payoff to shareholders, as they will capture the 
upside of additional risky profits, whereas debtholders are limited to their 
predetermined debt claims. Shareholders, therefore, have an incentive to demand a 
move towards riskier assets in anticipation of larger returns. Overall, “going for broke” 
(Harris and Raviv, 1991, p. 301) can potentially lead to higher shareholder returns 
while losses from investment failures will be recouped by additional gains of other 
high-risk projects.  
Debtholders, on the other hand, will protect their interests by incorporating estimates 
of potential losses and monitoring costs associated with more risky debt into the price 
of borrowing, by demanding higher yields, or including loan covenants. These agency 
costs of debt will be passed on to the shareholders and reduce the market value of the 
firm (Myers, 1977). Hedging corporate funds can decrease cash flow volatility to avoid 
asset substitution, thereby decreasing agency costs and creating shareholder value 
(Smith, 1995).  
Problems associated with asset substitution and underinvestment represent significant 
agency costs of debt. Their effects can lead to the rejection of positive NPV-projects 
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due to the underlying capital structure that determines the distribution of future cash 
flows from investment. Both problems associated with leverage also result in negative 
relationships between debt ratio and growth opportunities. Thus, equity financing 
benefits the interests of shareholders and managers for firms faced with strong growth 
opportunities (Balakrishnan and Fox, 1993).  
An overview of the most common variables used to test whether hedging is motivated 
by the rationale to reduce underinvestment is given in Table 2.3. Expected 
underinvestment costs are often proxied by R&D expenses to sales, and capital 
expenditures predicting the development of future projects, and the market-to-book-
ratio. Géczy et al. (1997) expect a positive association between underinvestment costs 
and derivative usage. However, R&D expenses may also capture other relationships 
and be a measure for intangible assets, and proxy costly external financing under 
financial distress, as it might be harder for a firm with less tangible assets to raise cash 
in that situation (Froot et al., 1993).  
Underinvestment and asset substitution problems are considered to be more severe for 
firms with significant growth opportunities that have larger opportunity costs if they 
are not investing in profitable projects, and for firms that are highly leveraged (Aretz 
and Bartram, 2010). As hedging can reduce the need for, and costs of, external 
financing to fund optimal investment levels, interaction variables between growth 
opportunities and leverage are also used to measure underinvestment costs in the 
empirical literature (Géczy et al., 1997).  
Other proxies used in the literature include the book-to-market ratio and cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs). Smaller book-to-market ratios suggest significant growth 
opportunities (Géczy et al., 1997) and increases in growth opportunities are expected 
to result in higher cumulative abnormal returns (Gay and Nam, 1998). In both cases, 
firms are expected to have a higher propensity to hedge to support investment in 
positive NPV-projects.  
Results from testing the relationship between underinvestment and derivative use are 
mixed. Empirical studies using R&D expenditures to proxy for potential 
underinvestment costs mostly confirm the proposed relationship (Allayannis and Ofek, 
2001; Fok et al., 1997; Gay and Nam, 1998; Géczy et al., 1997; Howton and Perfect, 
1998; Nance et al., 1993). Also, Gay and Nam (1998) report a positive relationship 
between CARs and derivative usage, which supports the underinvestment hypothesis. 
Yet, most studies measuring growth opportunities with a capital expenditure proxy 
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find a negative relationship between growth options and hedging in contrast to 
predictions (Bartram et al., 2009; Dionne and Garand, 2003; Haushalter, 2000).  
Results of tests relating growth opportunities with financial constraints, by using the 
interaction variables of leverage multiplied with market-to-book ratio, support the 
hypothesised positive association with hedging (Bartram et al., 2009; Graham and 
Rogers, 2002). Lel (2012) further confirms the positive relationship between growth 
opportunities and the use of hedging for firms with strong corporate governance 
mechanisms. These results indicate that hedging creates value by reducing 
underinvestment costs, enabling the firm to take on positive NPV-projects with 
internally created funds.  
 
Table 2.3 Overview of proxy variables: Underinvestment costs 
Proxy & predicted sign Proxy formula Previous studies 
R&D expenditure + R&D expenses to net sales or revenues 
Nance et al. (1993), 
Fok et al. (1997), Géczy et al. 
(1997), Gay and Nam (1998), 
Howton and Perfect (1998),  
Allayannis and Ofek (2001),  
Graham and Rogers (2002),  
Bartram et al. (2009) 
Capital expenditure (1) + 
Ratio of PPE to firm size, measured 
as book value of debt and preference 
shares plus market value of equity 
Géczy et al. (1997) 
Capital expenditure (2) + Capital expenditures / net sales or revenues Bartram et al. (2009) 
Capital expenditure (3) + Exploration expenditure to market value of the firm 
Haushalter (2000), Dionne and 
Garand (2003) 
Market-to-book ratio + 
Year-end common equity market 
price to book value by share 
(limited to max. 20) 
Nance et al. (1993), Mian (1996), 
Bartram et al. (2009) 
Book-to-market ratio - 
Book value of common equity at end 
of FY equals total assets less total 
liabilities, less preference shares. 
Market value of equity equals closing 
share price multiplied by common 
shares at year end 
Géczy et al. (1997) 
Market-to-Book * 
Leverage + 
Interaction variable for market-to-
book multiplied by leverage 
Graham and Rogers (2002), 
Bartram et al. (2009), Lel (2012) 
CAR + Cumulative abnormal returns Gay and Nam (1998) 
Note: This table provides an overview of proxy variables used to test the hypothesis that hedging is motivated by 
a need to minimise underinvestment. The columns on the left describes the proxy variable and the hypothesized 
sign indicates the predicted relationship with the hedging decision. Please note that some proxy variables are used 
to test for more than one positive theory explaining the value effect of derivative use. The Proxy formula is listed 
in the next column. The column titled Previous studies lists examples of empirical studies that have used this 
variable. 
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2.2.4 Managerial risk-aversion 
The hedging theories discussed above explain how the use of derivatives can be 
justified due to the existence of market imperfections by reducing taxes, expected 
financial distress or underinvestment costs. The use of hedging instruments also allows 
firms to protect their future cash flows from adverse market movements, thus enabling 
firms to increase their debt capacity and to benefit from additional tax deductions 
(Graham and Rogers, 2002).   
Managers play an important part in risk management decisions by identifying relevant 
market risks and managing risk exposures with the appropriate instruments. Thus, 
another theoretical attempt to explain the decision to hedge is based on agency 
conflicts, and addresses managerial incentives for corporate derivative use that are not 
solely focused on the shareholder value paradigm. Stulz (1984) reminds us that 
“shareholders do not decide the hedging policy of the firm, but managers do. 
Shareholders, however, choose managerial compensation contracts that maximise 
their wealth and hence the value of the firm” (p. 127). 
Managerial risk-aversion can be an important determinant of the use of corporate 
hedging instruments, based on the need to protect or increase the personal wealth of 
corporate managers (Smith and Stulz, 1985; Stulz, 1984). On the other hand, 
derivatives can also be used for speculation when financial managers decide to take a 
view on expected market movements and increase corporate risk exposure for potential 
profits instead of reducing firm value volatility to protect shareholders’ wealth (Géczy 
et al., 2007; Guay, 1999).   
Smith and Stulz (1985) examine the risk-aversion hypothesis in the light of managerial 
compensation, which proposes that managers’ utility aligns with increasing firm value. 
Hedging strategies, which reduce the volatility of corporate earnings, impact the 
distribution of expected payoffs and therefore affect managers’ expected utility. 
Depending on whether the compensation package makes a manager’s wealth a 
concave or convex function of end-of-period firm value, he will decide to bear no risk 
(Stulz, 1984), or not to hedge at all to seek increased risk for a higher payoff (Smith 
and Stulz, 1985). Accordingly, corporate managers do not have a risk-averse attitude, 
per se, and the managerial incentive to use hedging instruments will stand in close 
relationship with the remuneration schemes put in place by the firm’s shareholders.  
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Another explanation to rationalise the hedging decision is related to managerial 
ownership in the firm. Smith and Stulz (1985) argue that considerable managerial 
ownership stake results in higher use of hedging instruments. Here, managerial utility 
is a direct linear function of firm value and provides an incentive to decrease income 
volatility through hedging instruments.  
However, Nance et al. (1993) have criticised the argument that hedging can be 
explained by risk-averse behaviour of individuals. In their view, given the scale of the 
global derivative market and market participants, derivative instruments only provide 
hedging opportunities for corporations and large-scale institutions, not for individuals 
aiming to protect their personal wealth. They conclude that the managerial risk-
aversion argument constitutes an unsatisfactory explanation for corporate hedging, as 
portfolio theory implies that no benefits can be derived from corporate hedging for the 
individual investor, who may eliminate his risk exposure through overall portfolio 
diversification.  
An overview of common proxy variables used to analyse managerial incentives and 
motivations to hedge is presented in Table 2.4. 
 
Table 2.4 Overview of proxy variables: Managerial risk-aversion 
Proxy & predicted sign Proxy formula Previous studies 
Blockholders +/ - 
Percentage of common shares 
owned by substantial 
shareholders (>5%), 
excluding managers and 
directors 
Tufano (1996), Haushalter (2000), 
Borokhovich et al. (2004), Marsden 
and Prevost (2005) 
Closely held shares - 
Number of closely held shares 
(Directors and senior 
managers) / total shares 
Bartram et al. (2009)  
CEO/ managerial option 
ownerships + 
Number of outstanding 
options held by managers and 
directors 
Géczy et al. (1997), Gay and Nam 
(1998), Haushalter (2000), Allayannis 
and Ofek (2001), Dionne and Triki 
(2013) 
CEO/ managerial share 
ownership + 
Log of the value of common 
shares owned at average 
annual share price 
Allayannis and Ofek (2001), Marsden 
and Prevost (2005), Dionne and Triki 
(2013) 
Managerial tenure +/ - CFO tenure Tufano (1996) 
Note: This table provides an overview of proxy variables used to test for the managerial risk-aversion hypothesis. 
The column on the left describes the proxy variable and the hypothesized sign indicates the predicted relationship 
with the hedging decision. The Proxy formula is listed in the next column. The column titled Previous studies lists 
examples of empirical studies that have used the described proxy formula.  
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Empirical studies that analyse the relationship between hedging policies and 
managerial compensation often focus on the percentage of shares and options owned 
by the CEO or highly placed directors. Share ownership is expected to have a positive 
relationship with derivative usage, whereas the direction of the association between 
holding options and derivatives is unclear. Hedging reduces firm volatility and 
therefore the value of company options, but, depending on the sensitivities of option 
programs to firm value and volatility, similar incentives may result as with company 
shares (Gay and Nam, 1998).  
Another proxy variable considered in this context is the existence of large blockholders 
(other than managers or company directors) who own in excess of five per cent or ten 
per cent of a company’s shares. Tufano (1996) explains that those investors, including 
large institutional investors, mutual funds or private investors, would be better 
diversified than company managers and, therefore, a negative relationship with 
derivative use is expected. However, this explanation holds for well-diversified 
investors, but, on the other hand, if the firm is largely owned by large ill-diversified 
investors a preference for derivatives should be expected (Aretz and Bartram, 2010). 
Results from studies by Tufano (1996) and Haushalter (2000) confirm the negative 
relationship between institutional investors and derivative usage.  
In addition, managerial tenure and educational background might also influence risk 
management decisions. Dionne et al. (2013) find that directors’ educational 
backgrounds influence corporate derivatives usage, and that managers’ financial 
education has a positive association with the use of derivative instruments. Moreover, 
Tufano (1996) proposes managers’ age to be a proxy for risk-aversion, as older 
managers close to retirement might want to minimise share price volatilities and, 
accordingly, have a higher propensity to hedge corporate risks. On the other hand, one 
could argue that older managers might be more averse to setting up complex 
derivatives programs that require the use of modern technologies, and that younger 
executives with shorter expected tenure might be more interested in managing firm 
risks. Results from this study confirm the negative relationship between tenure and 
derivatives, however, no convincing explanation is presented (Tufano, 1996). Either 
younger managers are more likely to engage with derivatives programs and 
technologies, or firms wishing to implement and maintain risk management policies 
hire new managers who bring the required expertise. Nonetheless, managerial tenure 
seems to motivate corporate risk management (Tufano, 1996).  
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In summary, the evidence explaining the decision to use derivatives based on 
managerial risk-aversion is inconclusive. Only weak support can be found for the 
hypotheses related to agency problems between managers and shareholders as a 
hedging incentive. This might be explained by the fact that studies assume common 
managerial motivations, even though managerial determinants to use derivatives might 
be driven by a range of diverse and complex incentives, supporting the creation of 
shareholder wealth if managerial compensation is aligned with the shareholder value 
paradigm.  
Based on this review of managerial risk-aversion explanations for hedging, it has been 
decided not to include these proxy variables as possible explanatory variables when 
examining cross-sectional differences of hedging decisions in Chapter Four. Instead, 
the analysis focuses on economic benefits gained from hedging as proposed by 
hedging theories incorporating arguments of reduced taxes, financial distress and 
underinvestment costs. This is because managerial motivation itself is influenced by 
too many conflicting motives to provide a common rationale for derivative usage for 
the sampled firms from two countries.  
 
2.2.5 Corporate governance  
Corporate governance relates to the “study of power and influence over decision 
making within the corporation” (Aguilera and Jackson, 2010, p. 473). Whilst there are 
numerous definitions of corporate governance, most of the finance literature focuses 
on how governance structures can mitigate agency problems and allow the firm to be 
governed efficiently to increase firm performance.  
Besides firm governance characteristics that influence managerial oversight and 
hedging incentives, a country’s economic and legal environment also impacts 
derivative usage and whether it can create firm value (Aretz and Bartram, 2010). First, 
firms operating in economies with larger, more liquid derivatives markets have better 
and cheaper access to various derivative instruments and are thus more likely to hedge. 
Bartram et al. (2009) propose a derivative market access variable based on local-
currency derivatives turnover scaled by nominal Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to 
test this hypothesis.  
Derivative market activity is also expected to be higher in countries with strong legal 
systems where contracts are widely enforced, which reduces transaction costs and 
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results in firms being likely to hedge more. On the other hand, it can be argued that 
hedging benefits may be larger for firms that operate in countries with weak legal 
systems or higher political and financial risks as such firms face increased bankruptcy 
costs in times of corporate collapse. In this context, Bartram et al. (2009) conclude that 
the extent of a country’s derivative market has a positive relationship with corporate 
hedging. The authors find that firms located in countries with increased financial and 
economic risks are more likely to use derivatives, but firms operating in countries with 
high political risk are not more likely to hedge.  
Also, a country’s investor protection laws indicate how management activities are 
monitored, which makes the institutional setting a significant determinant for use of 
corporate risk management instruments (Bodnar et al., 2003). Corporate governance 
theory proposes that corporate executives, who work in countries with strong 
managerial oversight and strong shareholder protection mechanisms, proxied by the 
degree of overall law enforcement, security market laws, investor protection laws and 
property rights (La Porta et al., 2008; La Porta et al., 2000; Spamann, 2010), are 
expected to use derivatives to smooth out market volatilities and avoid being replaced 
due to poor performance. At the same time, weak governance structures provide 
managers with incentives to use derivatives to increase their personal wealth (Bartram 
et al., 2009; Géczy et al., 2007). 
Examining country corporate governance incentives to hedge, Allayannis et al. (2012) 
find a positive relationship between shareholder rights, creditor rights and derivative 
usage. Lel (2012) further reports that firms with weak governance environments use 
derivatives for managerial reasons and that derivative use in strongly governed 
countries is more likely to be motivated by financial needs. 
Both studies also investigate the interplay between risk management and firm level 
corporate governance policies and argue that these practices can be linked through 
agency conflicts (Allayannis et al., 2012; Lel, 2012). Hedging theory proposes that 
agency problems can be a rationale for employing derivatives based on managerial risk 
preferences (Smith and Stulz, 1985; Tufano, 1998). Corporate governance structures 
are set in place to manage those agency conflicts, which questions how different 
corporate governance environments may influence the hedging decision.  
For example, a strong corporate governance environment is characterised by a board 
of directors that can exert significant control over its executives, whereas a weak 
governance environment allows for more managerial discretion (Verriest et al., 2013). 
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Lel (2012) investigates how corporate governance structures influence managerial 
hedging incentives. The author describes three ways in which the governance 
structures affect corporate risk management.  
First, the strength of the corporate governance environment can determine whether 
derivatives are aimed at hedging to reduce market risks or are employed selectively 
for speculative purposes. Strong governance structures monitor managers and create 
transparency in the decision-making process, which disciplines managers to use 
derivatives for risk management purposes rather than for speculative reasons using 
their discretional decision-making powers. This is consistent with findings by Géczy 
et al. (2007) who report that managers in weakly governed firms, as measured by a 
high GIM governance index2 (Gompers et al., 2001), are more likely to “take a view” 
(Géczy et al., 2007, p. 2,405) and use derivatives with the primary intention of making 
a profit, when they believe they possess superior market information.  
Second, Lel (2012) argues that shareholders use ex-ante governance structures, related 
to managerial compensation, as well as ex-post structures, related to monitoring 
managers, as substitutes for maximising firm value. If monitoring is too costly, the use 
of derivatives can mitigate potential agency costs resulting from risk-averse managers 
avoiding risky long-term NPV projects. Here, the use of derivatives can reduce firm-
specific risks and align the goals of risk-averse managers and shareholders. 
Furthermore, hedging firm-level risk away enables shareholders to lower managerial 
compensation associated with bearing this additional firm-level risk accordingly.  
Finally, hedging theories which discuss how the use of derivatives can overcome 
market frictions ignore agency problems and the possibility that managers’ and 
shareholders’ goals might not be aligned - managerial oversight is needed to reduce 
arising conflicts of interest. Firms with stronger corporate governance environments 
reduce agency costs by closely monitoring managers. Therefore, the use of derivatives 
in strongly governed firms can be better aligned with a firm’s financial policy, making 
derivatives more effective in overcoming market frictions and thus creating economic 
hedging benefits, as proposed in the risk management literature (Lel, 2012). Lel (2012) 
constructs a firm-level governance index to test the strength of corporate governance 
structures. His index ranges from zero to seven points by scoring firms one point each 
                                               
2 The GIM index is a broad corporate governance index designed by Gompers et al. (2001) based on 24 
provisions relating to firm-level charter and by-laws and state-level anti-takeover law. A high GIM-
index indicates strong managerial power.  
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for the following five firm characteristics: Separation of CEO and chairman of the 
board (Jensen, 1993); no difference between cash flow and voting rights (La Porta et 
al., 2002); no differential voting rights (Doidge, 2004); a large outside non-institutional 
shareholder and no state ownership (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997); and a large 
institutional shareholder (Gillan and Starks, 2000) but no large family shareholder 
(Faccio et al., 2001). A higher score on the index is expected to indicate increased 
monitoring of management, which has implications for derivative use. Also, having 
outside directors can provide much needed expertise if management has little 
knowledge about derivative usage, and is expected to have a positive association with 
derivative usage (Borokhovich et al., 2004).  
Proxy variables commonly used in the empirical hedging literature to test whether 
hedging is motivated by country and firm level governance mechanisms are shown in 
Table 2.5. 
Results from Lel (2012) suggest that managers in firms with weak governance 
structures have more discretion and use derivatives selectively for managerial or 
speculative reasons, whereas strong governance policies discipline managers to 
employ derivatives to eliminate risk exposures. Overall, the level of managerial 
oversight that corporate governance structures enforce influence corporate hedging 
decisions and rationales significantly as “managers may behave differently when their 
activities are not well-monitored” (Lel, 2012, p. 236).  
Another interesting study by Marsden and Prevost (2005) focuses on the influence of 
board composition on derivative usage after legislative changes in New Zealand. 
Corporate boards play a significant role in monitoring risk management policies since 
the widely discussed derivative losses in the early 1990s. Outside directors who are 
expected to be less aligned to management become particularly important for 
shareholders in high growth companies to monitor managerial decisions. Also, 
hedging is particularly beneficial for companies with higher investment opportunities 
to ensure that internally generated funds will be available to maximise investment 
opportunities (Froot et al., 1993; Stulz, 1990). Thus, Marsden and Prevost (2005) 
hypothesise that high growth companies with more outside directors are more likely 
to hedge with derivative instruments.   
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Table 2.5 Overview of proxy variables: Corporate governance environment 
Proxy & predicted sign Proxy formula Previous studies 
Derivative market rank + Ranking of size of derivatives market scaled by GDP relative to other countries 
Bartram et al. (2009) 
Financial, Economic & 
Political Risk + 
International Country Risk index (PRS 
Group) Bartram et al. (2009) 
Investor protection (1) + Law enforcement Bartram et al. (2009), Allayannis et al. (2012) 
Investor protection (2) + Anti-director rights index Lel (2012) 
Investor protection (3) + Creditor rights index 
Bartram et al. (2009), 
Allayannis et al. (2012), Lel 
(2012) 
Investor protection (4) + Property rights index Lel (2012) 
Outside directors (1) +/- Interaction variable of outside directors for firms with high growth opportunities Marsden and Prevost (2005) 
Outside directors (2) + Percentage of independent directors on the board Dionne and Triki (2013) 
Managerial ownership + 
Number of shares held by managers and 
directors scaled by total number of 
outstanding shares 
Nguyen and Faff (2003a) 
Chairman/ CEO 
separation - 
Dummy indicating if CEO is also 
chairman of the board Dionne and Triki (2013) 
Firm-level internal 
governance index (1) + 
Index from 0 (weak governance) to 7 
(strong governance)  
Lel (2012), Allayannis et al. 
(2012) 
Firm-level governance 
index (2) - 
GIM broad governance index from 0 
(strong governance) to 24 (weak 
governance)  
Géczy et al. (2007) 
Audit committee + 
Dummy variable indicating if risk 
management is overseen by audit 
committee 
Birt et al. (2013) 
Risk management 
committee + 
Dummy variable indicating if a separate 
risk management committee exists Birt et al. (2013) 
Note: This table provides an overview of proxy variables used to test the hypotheses that corporate governance 
influences hedging decisions and that hedging creates firm value in specific corporate governance environments. 
The column on the left describes the proxy variable and the hypothesized sign indicates the predicted relationship 
with the hedging decision. The Proxy formula is listed in the next column. The column titled Previous studies lists 
examples of empirical studies that have used the described proxy formula.  
However, the introduction of the 1993 Companies Act in New Zealand placed further 
fiduciary responsibilities on company directors, which changed the perceived risks for 
directors making hedging decisions. As derivative transactions are complex, this 
legislative change meant that corporate directors face a greater risk of liability 
regarding potential losses and scrutiny from “inappropriate” derivative activity, 
compared to merely incurring a loss due to a decision not to hedge that can be blamed 
on “unpredictable” adverse market movements (Marsden and Prevost, 2005, p. 267). 
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Thus, after the legislative change outside directors are expected to be more risk-averse 
and less likely to approve hedging programs. The results of this study confirm that 
outside directors have become more risk-averse and less likely to use derivatives 
following the legislative change, which provides further evidence that corporate 
governance legislation influences the hedging decision.  
Allayannis et al. (2012) also focus on managerial motivations behind the hedging 
decision under different governance environments. They conclude that the mixed 
results of empirical studies testing the value effect of derivatives can be explained by 
the fact that investors cannot easily distinguish between managerial motivations for 
hedging. Thus, the information asymmetry between managers and firm outsiders as to 
whether the use of derivatives is motivated by an intention to reduce market volatility, 
managerial self-interest or speculation on market outlooks makes it hard for investors 
to decide whether the use of derivatives is a valuable corporate risk management 
strategy that should result in a higher firm market value or not.  
Allayannis et al. (2012) argue that investors are not expected to benefit from hedging 
for speculative reasons on average and that shareholders assign hedging premiums for 
firms using derivatives for risk management purposes. For this purpose, investors may 
gauge the intention behind hedging policies from a firm’s corporate governance 
environment. Results from this study indicate that hedging for firms “that have strong 
internal firm-level or external country-level governance is associated with significant 
value premium” (Allayannis et al., 2012, p. 65). Overall, their study finds that firms 
with a high score on their governance index have a positive relationship between 
foreign currency hedging and firm value, and that for firms with low governance 
structures, hedging is not significantly associated with firm value.  
These results on the impact of corporate governance on derivative usage and the 
hedging premium are significant for the context of this research in several ways. 
Investors only value hedging in strong corporate governance environments, which 
promote the use of derivatives for shareholder value protection. Research that attempts 
to investigate the value effect of hedging decisions across countries, therefore, needs 
to establish that country corporate governance environments are comparable from the 
outset to provide similar external managerial incentives to use derivatives for value-
enhancing risk management purposes. Moreover, the strength of the corporate 
governance environment could also provide an explanation for the mixed empirical 
results of how shareholders value the hedging decision when comparing hedging 
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premiums across countries or industries (Allayannis et al., 2012; Brown et al., 2006; 
Carter et al., 2006; Jin and Jorion, 2006).  
 
2.2.6 Economies of scale and industry factors   
Traditional hedging models that explain the use of derivatives based on economic 
hedging benefits generally ignore transaction costs associated with derivative use. This 
has been criticised by Arias et al. (2000), who point out that hedging costs have a 
significant impact on the hedging decision and the consequent value of the derivative 
program.  
Most studies hypothesise that large firms hedge more, which is consistent with the 
notion that hedging requires significant firm resources and managerial expertise to be 
beneficial (Nance et al., 1993). Yet, when considering firm size as a proxy for 
economies of scale, arguments can be made for either smaller or larger firms to be 
more likely to hedge.  
Small firms can be expected to hedge more for two main reasons. First, financial 
distress costs involve both substantial fixed as well as indirect costs, including 
significant legal and professional fees, lost profits, deteriorating relationships with 
creditors, suppliers and customers and inability to refinance. Warner (1977a) reports 
that these costs are not necessarily proportional to firm size, which leads to an 
increased incentive for smaller firms to employ hedging strategies to minimise these 
charges. Likewise, smaller firms are more likely to be assessed in the progressive tax 
region, presenting another incentive for smaller firms to hedge more. On the other 
hand, it can be argued that larger firms have increased capacity to engage highly skilled 
managers to oversee corporate hedging programs, and that larger firms also experience 
higher economies of scale benefits from hedging transaction costs, which favours an 
increased use of hedging instruments for large firms compared to smaller ones (Nance 
et al., 1993).  
Empirical studies testing the hedging determinants have found that economies of scale 
are an important factor in the hedging decision. In this context, Géczy et al. (1997) 
explain that two types of costs are of significance to the hedging decision - costs related 
to establishing risk management policies as well as costs associated with using specific 
instruments to hedge market risks. Even though hedging costs might be sufficiently 
low to enable a firm to set up and maintain a corporate risk management program, they 
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could determine the instrument due to associated transaction, customisation and basis 
or counterparty default risk costs.  
Results from Arias et al. (2000) also support the hypothesis that economies of scale 
determine the value of derivative use. In their study, examining a sample from the 
farming industry, the authors conclude that transaction costs may exceed tax benefits 
gained from hedging, and that optimal hedge ratios calculated are subject to hedging 
costs incurred. In this case, even slight increases in associated hedging costs will 
significantly reduce the proposed hedging benefits, which results in a significant 
decrease in the optimal hedge ratio obtained. 
Firm size may also impact the value of derivative use via financial distress costs, which 
increase less than proportionately with firm size (Ang et al., 1982; Warner, 1977a). 
This implies a higher motivation for smaller firms to implement hedging programs to 
avoid financial distress costs which are more costly in their circumstances. Nguyen 
and Faff (2002) predict a positive relationship between the decision to hedge and firm 
size, based on the assumption that the hedging decision is significantly influenced by 
the costs of implementing a derivative program. The authors further hypothesise a 
negative relationship between firm size and the extent to which derivatives are used - 
this assumes that financial distress costs decrease for larger firms, which reduces the 
value from increased hedging levels.  
An overview of common variables used to test whether economies of scale create 
valuable hedging incentives is presented in Table 2.6. For example, Géczy et al. (1997) 
proxy economies of scale in various ways. First, pre-tax foreign income and foreign 
denominated debt are used, which are expected to have a positive relationship with the 
use of foreign exchange derivatives. Second, a dummy variable is used to indicate 
whether the firm already uses other derivatives, which will lower the costs of initiating 
another derivatives program based on existing expertise and decreasing transaction 
costs. Finally, firm size is measured to proxy for economies of scale of direct hedging 
costs (Géczy et al., 1997). 
Nguyen and Faff (2002), Bartram et al. (2009) and Nelson et al. (2005) report a 
positive relationship between firm size and the decision to hedge. Yet, contradictory 
evidence suggesting that smaller firms benefit more from hedging has also been found 
(Allayannis and Ofek, 2001; Graham and Rogers, 2002; Haushalter, 2000). This 
indicates that the direction of the size variable remains ambiguous (Géczy et al., 1997).   
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Table 2.6 Overview of common proxy variables: Firm size and industry factors  
Proxy & predicted sign Proxy formula Previous studies 
Firm size (1) + 
Natural log of Market 
value of common stock + 
book value of debt and 
preferred stock 
Francis and Stephan (1993), Nance et al. (1993), 
Berkman and Bradbury (1996), Mian (1996), 
Tufano (1996), Fok et al. (1997), Géczy et al. 
(1997), Howton and Perfect (1998), Gay and Nam 
(1998), Guay (1999), Haushalter (2000), 
Allayannis and Ofek (2001), Graham and Rogers 
(2002), Dionne and Garand (2003), Borokhovich 
et al. (2004), Marsden and Prevost (2005), 
Bartram et al. (2009) 
Firm size (2) + 
Log of the book value of 
total assets as a proxy for 
size 
 Hagelin and Pramborg (2006), Birt et al. (2013) 
Foreign income + Pre-tax foreign income Géczy et al. (1997) 
Foreign debt + Foreign denominated debt Géczy et al. (1997) 
Other derivatives + Dummy indicating use of other derivatives 
Géczy et al. (1997) 
Industry setting +/- Dummy indicating firm industry environment 
 Nguyen and Faff (2010), Birt et al. (2013) 
Note: This table provides an overview of proxy variables used to the hypothesis that economies of scale and 
industry setting influence the hedging decision. The column on the left describes the proxy variable and the 
hypothesised sign indicates the predicted relationship with the hedging decision. Please note that some proxy 
variables are used to test for more than one positive theory explaining the value effect of corporate risk management. 
The Proxy formula is listed in the next column. The column titled Previous studies list examples of empirical 
studies that have used the described proxy formula.  
Industry classification is another important factor that influences the hedging decision 
based on industry-specific distress costs and differences in benefits that can be gained 
from hedging specific market risks. Several empirical hedging studies investigating 
the value of the hedging decision and intensity have focused on specific industries that 
have been predicted to have significant incentives to use derivatives.  
For example, Shin and Soenen (1999) discuss how the electrical and primary metals 
industry have a higher propensity to use foreign currency derivatives based on 
exposure to international market prices. Similarly, profits in the airline industry are 
significantly impacted by price movements in jet fuel prices. Carter et al. (2006) state 
that airline prices fluctuated approximately 27 per cent from 1992 to 2003 in their 
sample of US airlines, which provides a strong rationale to implement commodity-
focused derivative programs.  
Mining firms are particularly interesting when examining the value of hedging 
practices. This is because they make significant contributions to their economies and 
world trade, and commonly face all three of the most common risk factors hedged with 
derivative instruments: foreign exchange, interest rate and commodity risks (Birt et al., 
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2013). High exploration and production costs, volatile commodity prices, and foreign 
exchange transactions require a range of financial derivative instruments to actively 
manage risk exposures. Noteworthy hedging studies include Tufano (1996) and Birt et 
al. (2013), who examine derivative practices and determinants in the gold-mining and 
extractives industry, and Jin and Jorion (2006), who investigate the direct impact on 
firm value of derivatives in the oil and gas industry.  
Other industries that derive increased benefits from hedging future cash flows include 
the pharmaceutical and IT sectors. Firms in these industries have high research and 
development (R&D) expenditure and spend about approximately five per cent of their 
annual sale revenues on R&D compared to an estimated one per cent in low-
technology industries (Neelankavil and Alaganar, 2003). Increased R&D expenditure 
indicates future growth options. Earning uncertainty due to market price fluctuations 
can restrict investment into R&D projects and future company growth, which provides 
a motivation for R&D intensive industries to use derivative instruments.  
In this context, Lewent and Kearney (1990) illustrate how pharmaceutical companies 
are particularly vulnerable to exchange rate fluctuations. The authors explain that firms 
from this high-risk and capital intensive industry have expanded more rapidly into 
foreign markets than firms from other sectors. They note that compared to most US 
exporters, who invoice overseas customers in US dollars, US pharmaceutical firms 
commonly bill their customers in local currencies leaving their revenue stream 
significantly exposed to exchange rate movements. As it often takes up to ten years to 
bring a product to the market, a reliable and steady stream of funds into research is 
required to achieve long-term business success. This provides a significant incentive 
to implement hedging strategies that ensure stable company cash flows. This argument 
is supported by findings from Nance et al. (1993) who report that hedging firms have 
higher R&D expenses than firms that do not hedge.  
In conclusion, market risk exposures vary for firms from different industry 
environments, which provide different incentives to use hedging instruments to protect 
the firm from adverse market movements and consequently shareholder wealth. 
Consequently, industry classification will influence not only a company’s decision to 
hedge, but also the type of risk it needs to hedge with appropriate relevant derivate 
instruments.   
The discussion above presented the common theoretical explanations in the academic 
literature on how financial derivatives create value based on the existence of financial 
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market imperfections. Additional factors such as corporate governance structures, 
economies of scale and industry classification may further affect the hedging decision 
and the value it may create for shareholders. 
Overall, a review of empirical studies testing the proposed hypotheses reveals mixed 
results for corporate hedging rationales. The most commonly used long-term debt 
proxy testing the financial distress hypothesis confirms that bankruptcy and financial 
distress costs are an important determinant motivating derivative use. 
Research testing agency theories of underinvestment have mostly presented mixed 
results, and studies examining the tax benefits of hedging provide only weak empirical 
support for firms with convex tax functions, which demonstrates that hedging 
decreases income volatility and the tax burden. However, the tax benefits are small 
and do not present a sufficiently significant determinant that explains widespread 
corporate derivative usage (Graham and Smith, 1999). 
Aretz and Bartram (2010) suggest that derivative usage might further be motivated by 
other aspects of corporate decision making, including earnings management, 
speculative behaviour or industry pressures. However, the authors conclude that 
overall results from empirical research on derivatives appears to be “in line with 
derivatives use being just one part of a broader financial strategy that considers the 
type and level of financial risks, the availability of risk management tools, and the 
operating environment of the firm” (Aretz and Bartram, 2010, p. 318).   
The next section will explore another approach to explain why hedging is a value-
enhancing strategy based on its relationship with capital structure decisions and 
industry-specific distress costs.  
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2.2.7 Hedging and capital structure decisions 
Froot et al. (1993) explain that hedging theory provides various propositions as to why 
hedging provides firm benefits. Most hedging theories provide theoretical rationales 
as to how hedging can control certain costs, for example, a firm’s tax liability, financial 
distress and underinvestment costs, and agency concerns (Géczy et al., 1997; Graham 
and Rogers, 2002; Smith and Stulz, 1985). Earlier empirical studies that investigate 
the value of hedging review whether firms that have higher hypothesised incentives to 
hedge, also have a higher propensity to use derivatives (Berkman et al., 2002; Carneiro 
and Sherris, 2008; Heaney and Winata, 2005; Nguyen and Faff, 2002).  
Less effort has been directed towards identifying a specific hedging position or type 
of hedging that would be beneficial for a particular firm in its industry setting. This is 
further evident from the fact that many theoretical discussions result in 
recommendations at the extreme ends of the spectrum of either hedging fully or not at 
all (Froot, 1993; Perold and Schulman, 1988).  
An alternative approach to examine whether hedging creates value is to directly test 
for the impact of corporate hedging on firm value. More recent empirical hedging 
studies test for the direct effect of corporate derivative usage on firm value measured 
by relative valuation metrics such as Tobin’s Q. However, results are mixed and 
strongly dependent on the sampled firms. For example, Allayannis and Weston (2001) 
find a four per cent hedging premium for a large sample of US firms using currency 
derivatives and Carter et al. (2006) report an increase of shareholder wealth by 12 to 
16 per cent for US airline firms. Similarly, Allayannis et al. (2012) provide 
international evidence on the value of derivative use by examining firms from 39 
countries and find that the hedging premium is positively related to strong country- 
and firm-level corporate governance principles. On the other hand, none of the studies 
by Nguyen and Faff (2003a) examining Australian listed firms, Brown et al. (2006) 
investigating the US and Canadian gold-mining industry, or Jin and Jorion (2006) with 
their study on US oil and gas producers, have been able to confirm a value effect of 
hedging on firm value. Moreover, Guay and Kothari (2003) question the importance 
of derivatives for risk management given that their findings indicate that corporations 
seem to manage only a relatively small amount of risk with financial derivatives.  
These results indicate the need for a broader framework of how hedging creates firm 
value under a variety of settings, such as industry environments and firm specific 
capital structure scenarios. Hedging theories discussed earlier in this chapter proposed 
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how hedging creates firm value, assuming a fixed capital structure, by reducing taxes 
and alleviating financial distress costs (Graham and Rogers, 2002; Smith and Stulz, 
1985). Another benefit of hedging in this context is that hedging allows firms to benefit 
from increased debt capacities and additional tax savings without incurring increased 
financial distress (Leland, 1998).  
Froot et al. (1993) take the discussion in the right direction and focus on the benefit of 
hedging to smooth out cash flow volatilities that may disturb “both investment and 
financing plans in a way that is costly to the firm” (p. 1,631). Going beyond the 
argument that hedging is valuable based on the rationales discussed in the theoretical 
literature, the authors argue that a “firm’s optimal hedging strategy – in terms of both 
the amount of hedging and instruments used – depends on the nature of its investment 
and financing opportunities” (p. 1,631). According to Froot et al. (1993) hedging is 
valuable as it enables firms to reduce their need for costly external financing by 
coordinating investing and financing decisions.  
Joint consideration of these two corporate finance areas has also been proposed by 
Hahnenstein and Röder (2006). Their focus is on cross-sectional differences of indirect 
bankruptcy costs between industries, including loss of profits from deteriorating 
relationships with the firm’s stakeholders. In their model, the impact of financial 
distress costs across firms and industries has a direct impact on hedging and capital 
structures, leading to the question of whether an optimal mix of both financial 
decisions can enhance firm value.  
Hahnenstein and Röder (2006) explain how corporate hedging can create firm value 
under three different capital structure scenarios. The starting point for their argument 
is a review of the trade-off between corporate taxes and financial distress costs to 
determine the optimal degree of corporate leverage. In contrast to earlier trade-off 
models (Kraus and Litzenberger, 1973; Myers, 1984), this approach focuses primarily 
on financial distress costs, which impact corporate performance at early stages of 
financial difficulty long before direct bankruptcy costs are faced. These costs are 
assumed to increase with higher levels of financial distress and to differ widely across 
industries, depending on the nature of the business, its products and competitor 
environment (Hahnenstein and Röder, 2006). The balancing counterweight of 
financial distress is given by the tax benefits of additional debt. Here, the optimal 
leverage that minimises the costs of capital for a particular firm is determined as the 
point where the present value of additional tax benefits is offset by the present value 
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of additional financial distress costs associated with an increase in leverage. As 
companies face different industry environments with cross-sectional differences in 
financial distress costs, differences in optimal capital structures between industries 
exist (Talberg et al., 2008).  
 
Case I: Value through hedging with a fixed capital structure  
To establish how an integrated decision-making framework for hedging and capital 
structure can be value-enhancing for shareholders, Hahnenstein and Röder (2006) first 
consider a case when capital structure is predetermined as an exogenous variable and 
the hedging ratio is subject to optimisation. This case has been discussed in more detail 
by Brown and Toft (2002), who describe a firm’s capital structure as a strategic long-
run decision, which is rather inflexible and depends on risk management instruments 
to adjust for short-term volatilities.  
In this case, a marginal increase in the hedge ratio leads to a reduction of financial 
distress costs as well as the government’s tax claim, as long as the probability of 
bankruptcy is further reduced by employing hedging instruments (Hahnenstein and 
Röder, 2006). If existing derivatives already fully ensure payments to creditors, then 
no further benefit from increasing the hedge ratio can be derived for shareholders.  
The existence of a threshold limiting the benefits of additional hedging implies that a 
fixed capital structure with competing goals of risk-minimisation and shareholder 
value maximisation will result in varying cross-sectional hedging policies. Therefore, 
covering full exposure does not present an optimal solution for shareholder value and 
each firm will have to establish a suitable hedge ratio, which avoids expected 
bankruptcy “with sufficient certainty” (Hahnenstein and Röder, 2006, p. 165) while 
balancing out derivative transaction costs. Under the described scenario, hedging 
creates shareholder value by reducing tax liabilities as well as deadweight costs of 
financial distress. 
 
Case II: Value through hedging with a fixed hedge ratio  
The second scenario considers a predetermined hedge ratio and a flexible capital 
structure subject to optimisation. Examining alternate hedge policies of either fully 
hedging, hedging some exposure or hedging none, Hahnenstein and Röder (2006) 
discuss how a change among hedging policies affects capital structure decisions. They 
argue that if an increase in the firm’s hedge ratio reduces expected bankruptcy costs, 
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this results in lower financial distress costs from future borrowing while also 
increasing the present value of the interest tax shield of additional leverage. As this 
reduction in bankruptcy risk through higher hedging levels encourages additional 
leverage, optimal capital structures will be adjusted to a higher level of more attractive 
debt. Therefore, hedging enables firms to carry more debt without incurring additional 
distress costs, which enhances value through a reduction in the cost of capital.  
 
Case III: Value though joint hedging and leverage decisions  
The last case presented in the analysis examines a simultaneous selection of capital 
structure and hedging ratio. In this case, a joint decision on those two financing aspects 
allows firms to reduce their cash flow volatility as well as the probability of 
bankruptcy. Furthermore, it is proposed that hedging value is an increasing function 
of the firm’s hedge ratio, when the firm is optimally leveraged and transaction costs 
can be ignored as “…total shareholder wealth always increases with the firm’s hedge 
ratio for an optimal capital structure” (Hahnenstein and Röder, 2006, p. 166). 
Consequently, in a joint optimum scenario of capital structure and hedging, companies 
would be motivated to fully hedge their market exposures.  
Nonetheless, cross-sectional differences in hedging levels below the maximum hedge 
ratio across firms and industries can be observed. Therefore, a unique set of optimal 
hedge ratios can be explained in the context of real-world hedging transaction costs, 
which directly reduce shareholder wealth and offset potential benefits derived from a 
reduction in deadweight costs.  
Several propositions can be made under a joint optimum of hedging and leverage 
levels. First, firms with lower marginal hedging transaction costs are more likely to 
either hedge fully, or at least some, of their exposure. Second, firms facing highly 
fluctuating cash flows from operations will benefit more from implementing hedging 
policies. Finally, firms operating in industries where indirect bankruptcy costs are 
more sensitive to financial distress benefit more from hedging and should hedge more 
compared to firms in other industries. Finally, transaction costs of hedging can explain 
varying degrees of hedge ratios of otherwise similar firms with optimal debt levels 
(Hahnenstein and Röder, 2006). 
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Thus, this framework of joint consideration of hedging and capital structures presents 
an interesting approach to explain under which conditions hedging creates firm value 
and how it is strongly related to industry-specific distress costs.  
This has several implications for this research. First, as the value of hedging is closely 
related to leverage, this research examines the value of hedging in the context of firm 
leverage relative to its industry by examining the value of hedging decisions for 
various sub-samples of industry debt quartiles.  
For example, it will be investigated whether firms, which decide to have higher debt 
than suggested by industry median levels, benefit more from hedging (Graham and 
Rogers, 2002). Based on theoretical predictions, firms that carry above average 
industry leverage approach financial distress, in which case hedging is expected to be 
value-enhancing. On the other hand, when firms experience financial distress by 
having very high levels of debt, derivatives may no longer be valuable. This is because 
hedging also re-distributes wealth from shareholder to bondholders (Smith and Stulz, 
1985). This means that shareholders may place a ‘hedging discount’ on firms that 
hedge under financial distress of very high debt levels, as they have incentives to 
engage in wealth substitution and expropriate bondholders. These circumstances will 
be examined by testing the value for hedging across leverage sub-samples in Chapter 
Five.   
Second, the influence of the interaction between hedging decisions and leverage will 
be investigated to assess whether hedging decisions are positively associated with firm 
value for increasing leverage. In this case, hedging should create value based on 
reducing financial distress costs, which will enable firms to minimise the cost of 
capital.  
Lastly, according to Hahnenstein and Röder (2006), cross-sectional differences in 
indirect bankruptcy costs provide an explanation for a range of optimal combinations 
between hedging and leverage choices, depending on the nature of a firm’s business 
and their industry environment. Thus, an examination of the influence of different 
hedging decisions on firm value will be conducted at an industry level to identify 
whether hedging has a positive impact on firm value under specific capital structure 
settings, e.g. for firms with higher than median industry debt or firms with very high 
levels of debt (above the 75 percentile). 
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2.3 Previous empirical research  
Over the last two decades many research studies have reviewed hedging practices, 
investigated hedging determinants and tested the value effect.  
A summary of previous empirical studies that are highly relevant to this research 
project can be found in Appendix B.1., which provides details on sample sizes, scope 
and focus of the research questions. Figure 2.2 provides an overview of relevant 
publications from 1993 until 2016, by geographic location, and is categorised into 
three main research areas. The first group of studies focuses on hedging practices, the 
second line of enquiry examines hedging determinants and a more recent stream of 
studies has investigated the direct value effect of using derivatives for hedging 
purposes.  
Related literature on empirical studies testing the motives for hedging can be separated 
into survey-based and panel data studies. The survey-based studies have provided 
insights into derivative practices and management motivation for hedging (e.g., 
Benson and Oliver, 2004; Jalilvand, 1999; Tufano, 1996). Research using panel data 
has further attempted to test economic predictions and establish whether or not tax 
incentives, financial distress, underinvestment costs or economies of scale provide 
motivations to use derivatives (e.g., Bartram et al., 2009; Berkman and Bradbury, 
1996; Géczy et al.,1997; Nance et al., 1993). These empirical studies investigate 
whether their empirical results are consistent with conventional theories on firm 
characteristics and hedging rationales. According to Jin and Jorion (2006), empirical 
evidence resulting from this line of investigation does not point to a particular theory 
and only provides indirect support for the value proposition advocating the use of 
hedging instruments. 
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Figure 2.2 Empirical hedging studies 1993-2016 
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2.3.1 International hedging practices 
Most empirical hedging research has focused on US firms. Several comparative 
studies have attempted to provide comparisons with results from the USA or to 
investigate cross-national derivatives practices from the mid-1990s.  
Bodnar and Gebhardt (1999) compare hedging determinants in the USA with 
Germany; Bodnar et al. (2003) investigate institutional influences on risk management 
practices in the US and the Netherlands; and Shu and Chen (2003) compare their 
findings on derivative usage and determinants in Taiwan with results from the USA 
and New Zealand. Pramborg (2005) examines the foreign exchange management 
strategies of firms in Sweden and Korea.  
More recent comparative studies investigate derivatives across multiple economies. 
Bartram et al. (2009) provide the first global study on derivative determinants using 
an extensive sample of 7,319 firms from 50 countries, representing 80 per cent of 
market capitalisation of listed firms. The authors investigate the significance of firm 
level and country level factors on derivative motivations and confirm that derivative 
use is significantly related to leverage, debt maturity, liquidity, dividend policy and 
operational hedges. 
Allayannis et al. (2012) examine the influence of corporate governance principles on 
derivative usage based on a sample of 372 firms in 39 countries and conclude that 
firms with strong governance structures on a firm or country level that use derivatives 
gain a hedging premium.   
Table 2.7 summarises results from selected international studies examining 
international derivative usage conducted on non-financial firms in OECD economies. 
The level of firms using derivatives among sampled firms varies greatly between 
examined countries, ranging from 40.0 per cent derivative use for US firms (Bodnar 
et al., 2003) to 94.9 per cent among firms in New Zealand (Bartram et al., 2011). On 
average, there are larger proportions of derivative users among firms in Australian 
studies compared to their Canadian counterparts. Derivative usage also differs greatly 
between studies sampling the same economy. For example, a 1995 Canadian study 
observed derivative usage to be 55.0 per cent (Downie et al., 1996), whereas another 
study using 1996 data has found that 75.0 per cent of sampled firms use derivatives 
(Jalilvand et al., 2000). 
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Table 2.7 International comparison of derivative usage  
 Panel A: International comparison of derivative usage and instruments 
 Study  Country  Years  Sample size  Derivative users  FX derivatives  IR derivatives  Com derivatives 
 Berkman et al. (1997)  New Zealand  1997  79  53.1%  N/a  N/a  7.0% 
 Naylor and Greenwood (2008)  New Zealand  2002; 2003  360  65.0%  N/a  N/a  N/a 
 Bartram et al. (2009) 
 Australia  2000- 2001  305 (7,319)  66.6%  51.5%  42.3%  14.1% 
 Canada  2000- 2001  599 (7,319)  59.9%  45.4%  27.2%  18.7% 
 USA  2000- 2001  2,232 (7,319)  64.9%  37.7%  40.4%  16.3% 
 Germany  2000- 2001  413 (7,319)  47.0%  39.2%  24.2%  4.6% 
 OECD  2000- 2001  6,133 (7,319)  64.3%  47.3%  37.4%  11.4% 
 Non-US firms  2000- 2001  5,088 (7,319)  58.3%  48.5%  29.9%  7.3% 
 UK  2000- 2001  886 (7,319)  64.2%  54.5%  36.6%  3.8% 
 Bartram et al. (2011) 
 Australia  2000-2001  301 (6,888)  66.4%  52.2%  42.2%  14.3% 
 Canada  2000-2001  537 (6,888)  60.3%  46.2%  27.2%  17.7% 
 New Zealand  2000-2001  39 (6,888)  94.9%  79.5%  76.9%  17.9% 
 Panel B: International comparison of derivative usage and instruments used by hedging firms 
Study  Country  Years  Sample size  Derivative users  FX derivatives  IR derivatives  Com derivatives 
 Nguyen and Faff (2002)  Australia  1999-2000  239  74.2%  83.6%  68.7%  35.6% 
 Heaney and Winata (2005)  Australia  1999  374  65.0%  74.0%  59.0%  32.0% 
 Downie et al. (1996)  Canada  1995  243  55.0%  92.0%  65.0%  57.0% 
 Jalilvand et al. (2000)  Canada  1996  154  75.0%  68.0%  93.0%  39.0% 
 Gay and Nam (1998)  USA  1995  486  66.9%  65.8%  53.5%  22.2% 
 Bodnar et al. (1998)  USA  1998  399  50.0%  83.0%  76.0%  56.0% 
 Guay and Kothari (2003)  USA  1997  413  56.7%  61.1%  61.1%  15.4% 
 Bodnar and Gebhardt (1999)  USA  1995  197  56.9%  78.6%  75.9%  40.0%  Germany  1997  126  77.8%  95.9%  88.8%  40.0% 
 Bodnar et al. (2003)  USA  1998  267  40.0%  79.0%  73.0%  44.0%  Netherlands  1998  84  60.0%  96.0%  81.0%  20.0% 
Note: This table presents relevant previous empirical studies examining derivative practices. FX derivatives, IR derivatives and Com derivatives refer to foreign exchange, interest rate and commodity 
derivatives, respectively.  
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In the Australian context, a study by Nguyen and Faff (2002) on 1999 and 2000 firm 
data found derivative usage to be around 74.2 per cent. This is substantially higher 
than results from two studies by Bartram et al. (2009; 2011) who reported that 66.6 
per cent and 66.4 per cent of firms used derivatives in their 2000 and 2001 sample.  
Results on instrument use also differ greatly depending on the selected sample. 
Downie et al. (1996) examine non-financial Canadian firms using 1995 data and report 
that 55.0 per cent of firms use derivatives. Specifically, they report that 92.0 per cent 
of hedging firms in their sample use foreign exchange derivative instruments, 65.0 per 
cent use interest rate derivatives and 57.0 per cent of firms use commodity derivatives, 
respectively. In contrast, Jalilvand et al. (2000) report the overall derivative use of 
sampled firms to be 75 per cent in their 1996 sample. The authors state that 68.0 per 
cent of hedging firms use foreign exchange, 93.0 per cent of firms use interest rate 
derivatives and only 39.0 per cent of firms report the use of commodity derivatives.  
These are significant differences between studies, which might be explained by 
significant variation in year-by-year usage, differences in sample selection or reporting 
requirements between economies. For example, Bartram et al. (2009) exclude all firms 
in financial services whereas Nguyen and Faff (2002) exclude banks but include 
insurance and financial services firms. 
Removing these firms from the sample would result in a 70.2 per cent derivative usage 
for Nguyen and Faff (2002), which is closer to what has been found by Bartram et al. 
(2009). Both studies investigating Canadian non-financial firms are based on survey 
data. Jalilvand et al. (2000) examine 154 firms, resulting from a 28.0 per cent response 
rate, and Downie et al. (1996) discuss data from 243 firms, which represent 23.0 per 
cent of the sample. These sampling differences might also account for the significant 
discrepancy in derivative usage between studies.   
 
2.3.2 Australian and Canadian hedging studies  
Australian and Canadian firms operate both in open economies with free-floating 
exchange rate regimes and have high percentages of exports. For example, 19.9 per 
cent and 30.1 per cent of Australia’s and Canada’s GDP derived from exports of goods 
and services in 2013, respectively (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2015).  Consequently, 
they face a high degree of international exposures and it is surprising that relatively 
little effort has been directed at investigating Canadian and Australian hedging 
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practices. In fact, most empirical studies focus on US firms as can be seen in a review 
of the most relevant empirical studies for this research presented in Appendix B.1. 
Table 2.8 lists selected Australian and Canadian hedging studies from 1993 to 2013. 
Studies for the Australian context can be found in Panel A. In Australia, most notably 
Nguyen and Faff (2002, 2003a, 2003c, 2010) investigate hedging determinants (2002; 
2003c), practices (2003a), firm value (2003a) and the relationship between exchange 
rate derivatives and firm risk as well as foreign denominated debt (Nguyen and Faff, 
2010). They examine a broad range of hedging decisions, including the use of 
derivatives, foreign exchange, interest rate and commodity risk derivatives for non-
banking (2002) and nonfinancial firms (2003a; 2003c; 2010), However, all their data 
are from 1999 to 2000. The most recent Australian data used are reported by Birt et al. 
(2013), who examine derivative practices and determinants in the extractive industry. 
Also, three of the studies listed in Table 2.8 use survey data to investigate foreign 
exchange practices (Batten et al., 1993) and determinants of foreign exchange, interest 
rate and commodity derivatives (Benson and Oliver, 2004) and derivatives (Batten and 
Hettihewa, 2007). This illustrates that recent empirical evidence that might guide 
Australian firms across a range of risk factors and industries is sparse.  
Panel B presents relevant studies on Canadian as well as Canadian and US data. For 
Canada, derivative practices have been documented by Downie et al. (1996), Jalilvand 
(1999), Jalilvand et al. (2000) and Smistad and Pustylnick (2012). All three studies 
that use Canadian and US data have a narrow focus on commodity derivatives in the 
gold-mining industry. Furthermore, two studies by Adam and Fernando (2006) and 
Brown et al. (2006) investigate the firm value of commodity derivatives and find that 
that the use of derivatives has a positive effect on firms’ value in the context of 
Canadian oil and gas producers. Overall, it can be observed that little evidence on 
derivative practices and value effect exists for Canadian firms. Furthermore, all 
selected studies use data from the 1990’s except for the most recent study by Smistad 
and Pustylnick (2012). However, their investigation has a very narrow focus on 
derivative practices in the oil and gas industry with a sample size of 12 firms. Again, 
empirical evidence is limited, with little scope beyond and pre-GFC data. This 
illustrates one of the gaps in the empirical literature this thesis addresses.  
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Table 2.8 Selected Australian and Canadian studies 1993-2013 
Note: This table lists relevant previous empirical studies examining derivative practices in Australia and Canada. FX derivatives, IR derivatives and Com derivatives refer to foreign 
exchange, interest rate and commodity derivatives, respectively. 
Panel A: Australian studies Years Country Sample size  Sample type Scope  Pr
ac
tic
es 
 De
ter
mi
na
nt
s  Fi
rm
 va
lue
 
Ot
he
r  
Batten et al. (1993) N/a Australia 72 Across industries    FX derivatives  - -  
Berkman et al. (2002) 1995 Australia 158 Industrial and mining    Derivatives   -  
Nguyen and Faff (2002) 1999-2000 Australia 230, 239 Non-banking    Derivatives -  -  
Nguyen and Faff (2003a) 1999-2000 Australia 217, 211 Nonfinancial    FX, IR & Com derivatives  -   
Nguyen and Faff (2003c) 1999-2000 Australia 469 Nonfinancial    FX & IR derivatives -  -  
Benson and Oliver (2004) 2000 Australia 100 Across industries    FX, IR & Com derivatives -  -  
Heaney and Winata (2005) 1999 Australia 374 Nonfinancial    Derivatives -  -  
Batten and Hettihewa (2007) 2002 Australia 135 Nonfinancial    Derivatives -  -  
Carneiro and Sherris (2008) 1998-2003 Australia 1102, 465 S&P/ ASX 300    IR derivatives -  -  
Nguyen and Faff (2010) 1999-2000 Australia 239, 230 Nonfinancial    FX & IR derivatives - - - Firm risk 
Birt et al. (2013) 2008 Australia 341 Extractive industry    Derivatives   -  
Panel B: Canadian studies Years Country Sample size Sample type    Scope     
Downie et al. (1996) 1995 Canada 243 Nonfinancial    Derivatives  - -  
Tufano (1996) 1991-1993 USA & Canada 48 Gold-mining industry    Com derivatives   -  
Jalilvand (1999) 1992-1994 Canada 77 Nonfinancial    Derivatives   -  
Jalilvand et al. (2000) 1996 Canada 154 Nonfinancial    Derivatives  - -  
Adam and Fernando (2006) 1989-1999 USA & Canada 92 Gold-mining industry    Com derivatives - -   
Brown et al. (2006) 1999-1998 USA & Canada 44 Gold-mining industry    Com derivatives - -    
Smistad and Pustylnick (2012) 2010 Canada 12 Oil and gas    Derivatives  -   -  
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An overview of the findings of selected Australian and Canadian studies on the 
determinants and the extent of derivatives and derivatives by risk type is shown in 
Tables 2.9 and 2.10, respectively. For both tables, Panel A presents results on 
independent variables that have also been included in the investigation into derivative 
determinants in Chapter Four. Other independent variables that are not part of the 
examination of this thesis have been separately presented in Panel B.  
The decision to hedge with derivatives is tested using probit or logit models (e.g. 
Heaney and Winata, 2005; Berkman et al., 2002; Jalilvand, 1999), whereas the 
decision on the extent of hedging is examined using one-sided Tobit models (Nguyen 
and Faff, 2002), which is shown in Table 2.9.  
Except for firm size, the theoretical predictions of the variable relationship are 
expected to be the same for both hedging decisions (Nguyen and Faff, 2002). It can be 
observed that all listed studies confirm a positive and statistically significant 
relationship between leverage and firm size on derivative use, tested by the logit and 
probit models.  
However, this is not the case for the analysis tested by one-sided Tobit models 
presented on the extent of derivative as shown in Table 2.10. Nguyen and Faff (2003c) 
as well as Carneiro and Sherris (2008) report a negative relationship between firm size 
and the extent of foreign exchange and interest rate derivative use, respectively. 
Whether these results hold on more recent Australian and Canadian data will be 
presented in Chapter Four.  
 
 
 
 67 
Table 2.9 Selected studies: Derivatives determinants 
 Predicted sign 
Berkman et al. 
(2002) 
Nguyen and Faff 
(2002) 
Heaney and 
Winata (2005) 
Birt et al. 
(2013) 
Jalilvand 
(1999) 
Country  Australia Australia Australia Australia Canada 
Sample  Industrials/ mining Non-banking Non-financial 
Extractive 
firms 
Non-
financial 
Model  Logit Logit Tobit Logit Probit Logit Logit 
Panel A: Independent variables included in this study 
Tax losses  + +/-   +** +*   
Leverage + +*/+** +*** +*** +*** +*** +*** +** 
Current ratio -  - -     
Dividends -/+ -/- + +** + +  -** 
ROA -    +*** +***   
Tangible assets -        
R&D expenditure +    +*** +***   
Capital expenditure +        
Firm size +/- +***/+** +** + +*** +*** +*** +** 
Foreign income + -/-*   + +   
Panel B: Independent variables not included in this study 
Profitability -      +  
Liquidity - -/+ -** - -** -**   
Interest cover - -/-   - -  +** 
Earnings price ratio - +/+       
Managerial share 
ownership + -/+ - -*** -** -***   
Asset growth/ Cash 
flow + -/-       
Managerial option 
holding -  - - - -   
Block holders -  + +     
Market-to-book +  - -* - -   
Market-to-book* 
Leverage +    - -   
R&D expenditure* 
Leverage +    - -   
Income volatility +  ?     +** 
Cash flow/Total 
assets -       +** 
Foreign assets + -/+   + +   
Share dummy -  - +     
Audit committee +      -  
Risk management 
committee 
+      +*  
Audit quality +      -  
Note: Logit models test the relationship between independent variables and the decision to hedge, Tobit models 
test the relationship between independent variables and the extent of hedging. Audit quality is measured by whether 
the firm uses a Big-4 auditor. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, ***, 
respectively.  
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Table 2.10 Selected studies: Derivative determinants by type of risk 
 Predicted 
sign Nguyen and Faff (2003c) Carneiro and Sherris (2008) 
Tufano (1996) 
Country  Australia Australia North America 
Sample  Non-financial S&P/ ASX 300 Non-financial  
Risk exposures  FX derivatives IR derivatives IR derivatives Com derivatives 
Models  Logit Tobit Logit Tobit Probit Tobit^ Tobit (Panel A) 
Panel A: Independent variables included in this research 
Tax losses  +     - - + 
Leverage + +*** +*** +*** +** +*  + 
Current ratio - - + + - -   
Dividends -/+        
ROA -        
Tangible assets -        
R&D expenditure +     -   
Capital 
expenditure +        
Firm size +/- +*** -*** +*** + +*** -*  
Foreign income +        
Panel B: Independent variables not included in this research 
Industry adj. 
leverage +        
Market-to-book + + - -** -    
Liquidity - - + -***    - 
Dividend yield + - -*** +** +**    
Managerial share 
ownership + - - - -   +*** 
Managerial option 
holding - - + - +   + 
Block holders        - 
Free Cash flow      +   
EPS      +   
Financial ratio       +  
Float ratio       +  
Cash costs        + 
Exploration 
activities        -* 
Acquisition 
activities        + 
Firm value        + 
Reserves        - 
Diversification        - 
Note: ^ Results shown here are for the Model (2) specification presented in the paper by Carneiro and Sherris (2008), 
which measured the hedging extent as the notional value of derivative assets scaled by total assets. Financial ratio 
describes the ratio of financial liabilities to financial assets; the float ratio measures the floating-to-fixed interest-
bearing liabilities, used as a proxy for ex-ante interest rate risk exposure. Exploration activities measure exploration 
activities scaled by total assets, acquisition activities describe the value of attempted acquisitions, firm value is 
proxied by average daily equity value plus book value of total debt and diversification is measured as the percentage 
of assets used outside of mining activities. FX derivatives, IR derivatives and Com derivatives refer to foreign 
exchange, interest rate and commodity derivatives, respectively. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels is indicated by *, **, ***, respectively.  
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2.3.3 Hedging and firm value 
When examining the direct value that hedging creates for shareholders, the value 
implication of hedging is generally tested by comparing valuation metrics such as the 
market-to-book ratios or Tobin’s Q of hedging and non-hedging firms (Allayannis and 
Weston, 2001; Carter et al., 2006; Jin and Jorion, 2006; MacKay and Moeller, 2007). 
Overall, the effect of hedging on firm value remains unclear due to conflicting results 
and a limited examination of small samples, selected industries and the types of risks 
under investigation.   
Table 2.11 presents selected hedging studies on derivatives and firm value. For 
example, Allayannis and Weston (2001) report a hedging premium of five per cent 
related to foreign currency hedging for 720 large firms analysed from 1990 until 1995. 
Also, MacKay and Moeller (2007) find that hedging concave revenues relates to two 
per cent of firm value for a sample of 34 oil refiners from 1985 until 2004, and Carter 
et al. (2006) state that the hedging premium for airlines that hedged fuel costs between 
1992 and 2003 might be as significant as ten per cent.  
However, neither Nguyen and Faff (2003a), Belghitar et al. (2013) nor Jin and Jorion 
(2006) can confirm these results and find no association between derivative hedging 
and firm value in their studies. Adam and Fernando (2006) and Brown et al. (2006), 
who find a positive association between hedging and firm value, qualify their results 
and state that only small economic gains can be measured.  
One of the main problems with those results is that apart from Allayannis and Weston 
(2001), the studies have focused on relatively homogenous and small industries with 
unique dependence on commodity prices which does not translate to a broader cross-
section of non-financial firms from other industries. For example, Jin and Jorion 
(2006) state that the airline industry offers a unique opportunity to analyse the potential 
value of hedging commodity price risk due to the volatility of jet fuel prices and 
significant distress costs in this competitive industry. This environment is consistent 
with the framework proposed by Froot et al. (1993) who relate the value of firm 
hedging to potential distress and underinvestment costs.  
Results from these studies should be treated with caution, as most studies have a very 
narrow focus of firms from a specific industry, a sample subset (e.g., large firms in 
Allayannis and Weston, 2001) or a specific risk exposure (MacKay and Moeller, 2007; 
Nguyen and Liu, 2014), which limits the conclusions that can be drawn. 
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Table 2.11 Selected studies: Derivatives and firm value 
Studies Country Sample (size) 
Firm value 
proxy 
Does the decision to hedge create 
firm value? 
Does the extent of hedging create 
firm value?  
Deriv FX IR Com Deriv FX IR Com How much? 
Nguyen and Faff (2003a) Australia Non-financial (217, 211) Tobin’s Q -* - -*** - -* - -*** - None 
Nguyen and Liu (2014) Australia Resource IPO firms (180) 
Buy-and-hold-
abnormal-return +    +    
12-month BHAR: 
H>NH by 32.7% 
Adam and Fernando (2006) USA & Canada Gold-mining industry (92) Derivative cash flow     +***    Small gains  
Brown et al. (2006) USA & Canada Gold-mining industry (44) 
Gains on selective 
hedging     +    Small gains 
Bartram et al. (2011) 47 countries Non-financial (6,888) Tobin’s Q +*/+**        7-14% 
Allayannis et al. (2012) 39 countries Non-financial (372) Tobin’s Q  +**/+** +/-      10.7%^ 
Allayannis and Weston (2001) USA Non-financial (720) Tobin’s Q  +***/+**       4.8% 
Nelson et al. (2005) USA Non-financial (5,570) Stock abnormal returns, Tobin’s Q +*/-*** +*/- -/- +/-     4%/ None 
Carter et al. (2006) USA Airline industry (29) Tobin’s Q  + +     +*/+*** 10% 
Jin and Jorion (2006) USA Oil and gas (119) Tobin’s Q    -    - None 
MacKay and Moeller (2007) USA Oil-refiners (34) Tobin’s Q    +***    +*** 2-3% 
Clark and Judge (2009) UK Non-financial (412) Tobin’s Q  +**/-       12% 
Belghitar et al. (2013) France Non-financial (211) Tobin’s Q      +/-/-/-/+   None 
Panaretou (2014) UK Non-financial (186) Tobin’s Q + +** + + +** +** +* + Only FX:6% 
Nova et al. (2015) UK Non-financial (130) Tobin’s Q      +**/+ +/+***  Swaps positive, options not 
Lau (2016) Malaysia Non-financial (680) Tobin’s Q/ ROA / ROE -***/ +/+        None for Tobin’s Q 
Note: Results on the value effect of derivatives are indicated by ‘+’ or ‘-’ for the type of risk investigated in this study. Results for firms with foreign sales >0 and high internal governance index are 
indicated by ‘^’, Deriv, FX, IR and Com refer to derivatives, foreign exchange, interest rate and commodity derivatives. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, ***, 
respectively.
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However, the value that hedging and hedging specific market risks, such as foreign 
exchange, interest rate and commodity risk, may provide will differ with industry 
classification. Firms operating in different industries will be faced with different risk 
exposures (e.g., Birt et al, 2013; Carter et al., 2006; Lewent and Kearney, 1990; Shin 
and Soenen, 1999), differences in what constitutes optimal capital structures in their 
industry setting (Talberg et al., 2008), and in their financing environments (Froot et 
al., 1993).  
Thus, while these empirical contributions discussed above provide valuable pieces for 
the hedging puzzle, their conflicting results do not provide a definite answer to the 
question of whether hedging creates value (Allayannis and Weston, 2001; Campello 
et al., 2011; Carter et al., 2006; Jin and Jorion, 2006). Further evidence of the value of 
hedging for a broader cross-section of firms remains outstanding and represents a 
significant gap in the empirical literature that this thesis aims to address.  
 
2.4 Empirical challenges and remaining gaps in the literature 
As pointed out by Allayannis and Weston (2001), empirical hedging studies were 
limited to survey analysis of hedging determinants until the early 1990s because of the 
unavailability of detailed hedging data. Since then, disclosures on derivative positions 
have been made compulsory in countries like Australia and Canada as part of the 
footnotes to the annual financial statements, making information on derivative 
positions more accessible, transparent and comparable for shareholders. 
Empirically, many international studies have tested hedging determinants, but little 
has been published on how industry classification impacts hedging decisions by 
examining hedging theories systematically across different industries. Also, research 
reporting on hedging practices and determinants in Australia and Canada using recent 
data since the onset of the GFC is sparse.  In fact, only two studies with an industry-
specific focus have been undertaken after the introduction of IFRS and since the GFC 
(Birt et al., 2013; Smistad and Pustylnick, 2012).   
It is likely that both these events will have had an impact on reported derivative use. 
This creates a need for further inquiry into common derivative practices by Australian 
and Canadian non-financial firms, which is addressed by this research. First, the GFC 
highlighted the potential risks related to the use of derivatives, resulting in public 
demands for more transparent derivative reporting. Second, the introduction of IFRS 
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resulted in standardised and therefore more transparent disclosure of derivative 
practices allowing investors to get a better picture of a company’s risk exposure and 
risk management policies.  
In Australia, where IFRS was fully adopted in June 2006, Birt et al. (2013) examine 
derivative disclosures in the Australian extractives industry using 2008 financial 
reporting data. Canadian firms, on the other hand, started the IFRS transition period in 
2006 and have been fully IFRS compliant since January 2011. The most recent related 
study by Smistad and Pustylnick (2012) examines derivative usage among Canadian 
oil and gas producers based on 2010 financial year data, but with a limited sample size 
of 12 oil and gas producing firms. This shows that comprehensive research on industry 
level-hedging practices and determinants value is scarce. 
Figure 2.3 illustrates on a timeline how this study differs from previous ones in relation 
to the date of its data and its sample size. Overall, studies investigating Australian 
derivative use have larger cross-sectional sample sizes, whereas most Canadian studies 
have been focused on smaller sample sizes and have been predominantly industry-
specific (e.g., Brown et al., 2006; Smistad and Pustylnick, 2012). 
Figure 2.3 Timeline of previous studies by sample size  
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This is the first gap in the empirical literature which this thesis addresses to answer: 
What are the current hedging practices in Australia and Canada? Are there significant 
differences between both countries? Results from addressing these research questions 
will be presented in Chapter Four.  
Other gaps in the literature in this context relate to the use of single year data, the 
narrow focus of most hedging studies and the binary classification of firms into either 
derivative users or nonusers. 
Given the difficulties of hand-collecting hedging data, most previous studies focus on 
single-year data for their analysis. Yet, as market environments and derivative 
transaction costs might significantly change, derivative practices and determinants 
might change over time. Indeed, Haushalter (2000) has reported significant variation 
in hedging determinants when examining oil and gas producers from 1992 to 1994. As 
the possibility exists that incentives vary across periods, this thesis analyses five-year 
panel data, to ascertain whether derivative use remains stable over time and to ensure 
that results from the analysis are not based on unusual one-year derivative positions.  
Moreover, this thesis provides a more comprehensive overview of industry hedging 
decisions across both countries. Most research has either focused on a specific industry 
only to limit the variation in hedging incentives or selected a broader sample of non-
financial firms from different sectors. The first approach limits the comparability of 
the findings, whereas the latter is likely to affect results on hedging determinants and 
value propositions, as firms from different industries face different risk exposures and 
financial distress costs, resulting in varying hedging motives and instrument needs.  
To address this shortcoming, this thesis examines derivative practices on a country as 
well as on an industry level by using a comprehensive sample of firms from six non-
financial industries. The hedging decisions examined include the decision on whether 
to hedge with derivatives or not, the extent of derivative use and the type of market 
risk to hedge. Market risk instruments include foreign exchange, interest rate and 
commodity risk derivatives, which is consistent with previous empirical studies 
presented in Tables 2.7 to 2.11. 
Also, the binary classification of firms that is commonly used in the literature and 
refers to firms as being either ‘hedgers’ or ‘not hedgers’ is extended to provide a more 
thorough overview of current derivative practices in Australia and Canada. Previous 
studies fail to document the level of firms that do some hedging throughout the year, 
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even though all derivative contracts are closed by year-end. This approach might 
significantly underestimate hedging activity among firms. Therefore, this thesis 
includes firms that hedge some-times as an additional category of firms in the 
investigation of derivative practices to provide a closer estimate of the actual extent of 
derivative usage across the examined industries.  
Another gap in the current literature relates to the mixed results regarding the hedging 
premium reported in earlier research. Even though several studies have examined the 
value proposition of hedging instruments, the results are not conclusive as to whether 
hedging creates firm value or not (Adam and Fernando, 2006; Belghitar et al., 2013; 
Carter et al., 2006; Nguyen and Faff, 2003a). 
Again, most investigations have an industry-specific focus which limits the 
generalisability of findings. For example, as more detailed hedging data are often 
available for firms from commodity-based industries such as oil and gas producers or 
gold-mining firms, strong motivation is provided to examine risk management 
practices for single industry firms where more exact hedging proxies, including the 
(net) notional values of derivatives or the hedge ratio of expected production, are 
available (Adam and Fernando, 2006; Haushalter, 2000; Tufano, 1996).  
As shown in Table 2.11, only two empirical studies relevant in this context have 
examined the value effect of derivatives (Nguyen and Faff, 2003a; Panaretou, 2014). 
Panaretou (2014) reports that the use of derivatives has a positive impact on firm value 
in the UK, but only the decision to use foreign exchange derivatives has been found to 
have a significant positive economic effect of approximately six per cent to firm value. 
Nguyen and Faff (2003a), on the other hand, who also examine the value effect of the 
hedging decision and the extent of derivative as well as foreign exchange, interest rate 
and commodity derivative use, find no positive impact on firm value for Australian 
firms. Both samples are also too small to provide further evidence of how hedging 
specific market risks might be valuable for firms in particular industries. 
Thus, an examination of the value effect of hedging using a comprehensive sample of 
firms from several industries with exposures to various risk factors, including foreign 
exchange, interest rate and commodity rate risks is missing from the existing literature. 
This gap will be addressed in this research.   
More importantly, what has also been neglected in the empirical literature is a 
thorough consideration of hedging in the context of varying capital structures across 
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firms and their industry environment. According to Hahnenstein and Röder (2006) 
these two factors have significant influence on the value of hedging. That is the another 
gap in the empirical literature which this thesis investigates. Chapter Five presents the 
results on the direct value effect of derivatives use for Australian and Canadian firms.  
Another challenge with empirical studies testing hedging theories is that most studies 
do not account for endogeneity problems between variables. Aretz and Bartram (2010) 
point out that it is challenging to find proxy variables for hedging determinants that do 
not also influence other corporate finance policy decisions, including leverage or 
compensation. Graham and Rogers (2002) discuss how the hedging-leverage-causality 
may go either way, as hedging can allow firms to increase their debt capacity, but at 
the same time increasing firm leverage can provide incentives to hedge due to 
increasing financial distress costs. Also, it has been criticised that firm value may 
determine the hedging decision rather than vice versa. These methodological issues 
suggest using caution when interpreting results from previous empirical research.  
While Nguyen and Faff (2003a) report not to have endogeneity issues between 
included variables, some studies have addressed this issue by using simultaneous 
equations to control for endogeneity (Bartram et al., 2009; Chen-Miao and Smith, 
2007; Graham and Rogers, 2002; Jin and Jorion, 2006). More recent papers by Bartram 
et al. (2011) and Panaretou (2014) use propensity score matching techniques to control 
for selection bias. Furthermore, Allayannis et al. (2012) and Lel (2012) employ an 
instrumental-variable (IV) approach to address endogeneity issues, which is the 
method followed for this research when testing for the effect of hedging on firm value 
Chapter Five.  
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2.5 Chapter conclusion 
This chapter has presented the theoretical background to this research project and 
discussed how financial management theory justifies corporate risk management 
practices based on the existence of capital market frictions, rejecting the perfect capital 
market assumptions proposed by Modigliani and Miller (1958).  
Hedging theories suggest that the use of derivatives for hedging creates value by 
enabling firms to reduce taxes, financial distress costs and alleviate underinvestment 
(Froot et al., 1993; Géczy et al., 1997; Graham and Rogers, 2002; Smith and Stulz, 
1985). Corporate governance, economies of scale and industry environments also 
influence a firm’s decision to hedge (Bartram et al, 2009; Géczy et al., 2007; Lel, 2012; 
Nguyen and Faff, 2002). 
Following the arguments made by Froot et al. (1993), who discuss that hedging is 
needed to protect “both investment and financing plans” (p. 1,631), Hahnenstein and 
Röder (2006) extend the discussion about whether derivatives create firm value to 
incorporate capital structure decisions and highlight the importance of industry level 
financial distress costs. They discuss that the value proposition of hedging needs to be 
evaluated in the context of a firm’s industry environment, and that leverage and 
hedging decisions need to be considered as closely related policy decisions.  
Empirical studies that have investigated the motivations behind the hedging decisions 
confirm the economic incentives proposed in the literature, although results on the 
managerial risk-aversion hypothesis remain inconsistent, reflecting the complexity of 
managerial incentives (Aretz and Bartram, 2010). Even though various studies have 
documented hedging practices and determinants over the years, there are discrepancies 
as to the level of hedging between countries and studies examining the same markets. 
Empirical research on the value derivatives for shareholders also remains inconclusive. 
Most of the empirical studies have focused on commodity driven industries (Adam 
and Fernando, 2006; Carter et al., 2006; Mackay and Moeller, 2007), where hedging 
data are easier to obtain, or have examined cross-sectional samples without 
comprehensive industry level analysis (Allayannis and Weston, 2001; Bartram et al., 
2011, Clark and Judge, 2009). 
Based on a review of the existing empirical research, significant gaps relating to 
industry practices of Australian and Canadian firms and the value proposition of 
hedging remain. First, comprehensive research on industry level-hedging practices, 
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determinants and firm value is scarce. Second, empirical findings testing the direct 
value effect of derivative use are inconclusive. To clarify the mixed results, the value 
of derivatives use should be evaluated more comprehensively. First, by including a 
broader range of firms across industries and different types of market risk hedging 
decisions, including the decision to hedge, to hedging with foreign exchange, interest 
rate and commodity risk derivatives, as well as the extent of hedging with derivatives. 
 Second, the value hedging with derivatives needs to be examined under different 
capital structure settings, e.g. for sub-samples of firms with higher than their industry 
median debt, and on an industry level to provide more comprehensive results on a 
variety of settings under which conditions hedging may create firm value.  
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Chapter Three:  Research Design  
3.1 Chapter introduction 
This chapter develops the hypotheses for this thesis and presents the research design. 
The first section describes the research hypotheses developed from the research 
questions introduced in Chapter One and addressed in Chapters Four and Five. Then, 
the sample selection and data collection process are explained and dependent and 
independent variables are explained. Next, summary statistics are discussed. This 
chapter concludes with an overview of the empirical methods used.  
3.2 Hypothesis development 
Chapter Two presented the theoretical incentives for the use of derivative instruments 
based on economic and agency cost considerations when market frictions are present. 
According to economic arguments, firms use derivatives when hedging benefits 
outweigh associated transaction costs. Hedging theory proposes that such benefits 
result from reducing taxes, financial distress and underinvestment costs (Froot et al., 
1993; Géczy et al., 1997; Smith and Stulz, 1985). Moreover, strong corporate 
governance environments and economies of scale further influence hedging decisions 
(Géczy et al., 2007; Lel, 2012; Nguyen and Faff, 2002).  
This thesis investigates four research questions. Research questions one and two 
address current hedging practices in Australia and Canada and examine whether 
significant differences exist between both countries. This thesis develops six 
hypotheses to investigate these questions. The results of this analysis are presented in 
Chapter Four and provide the necessary background to investigate the value of 
derivative use.  
The third and fourth research questions ask whether hedging creates value for firms in 
Australia and Canada and for firms across different industries, respectively. 
Inconclusive results from previous empirical research on the value of hedging and the 
propositions by Hahnenstein and Röder (2006) suggest that the use of derivatives 
should be evaluated in the context of capital structure and industry settings, which 
impact the need for and the value derived from risk management instruments (Froot et 
al., 1993; Hahnenstein and Röder, 2006). A further three hypotheses are developed to 
investigate the value of hedging in Chapter Five, which provides the results for these 
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analyses and attempts to cross-validate findings on the value of hedging across 
Australia and Canada. 
 
3.2.1 Country level influence 
The study investigates derivative usage as a proxy for corporate hedging practices of 
Australian and Canadian firms. Cross-country comparisons of hedging practices can 
be problematic due to differences in reporting standards and economic market 
conditions, which influence the decision to hedge and the extent of derivative use. The 
two countries examined in this study are both open economies with well-developed 
equity and derivative markets (Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, 2012; 
Bank of Canada, 2013; World Bank, 2015). They also have similar corporate 
governance environments with high levels of investor protection (La Porta et al., 2002, 
La Porta et al., 2008; Spamann, 2010), which are discussed in more detail in Section 
3.3.1. These factors are important, as they encourage the use of derivatives for value-
enhancing risk management purposes which are more highly valued by investors than 
speculative activities (Bartram et al., 2009; Bodnar et al., 2003; Lel, 2012). Therefore, 
on average, managers across Australia and Canada have similar incentives to use 
derivatives for risk management purposes and to make similar hedging decisions to 
manage risk exposures. This should result in similar hedging practices for non-
financial firms in both countries. The first hypothesis to be tested is that: 
 HYPOTHESIS 1: Derivative use is not significantly different for non-financial 
firms across Australia and Canada. 
 
3.2.2 Industry influence 
Financial theory predicts that a firm will hedge when the benefits of hedging outweigh 
its associated costs (Berkman et al., 2002). Froot et al. (1993) discuss that hedging 
creates value by protecting future cash flows to support the investment and financing 
plans. They suggest that a firm’s optimal hedging policy is closely related to its 
investment and financing opportunities as well as the hedging policies used by industry 
competitors. In fact, industry classification plays a significant role in hedging decisions 
and is expected to influence the decision to hedge as well as the type of derivative 
instruments to use. 
This is because the industry environment determines the type and extent of indirect 
financial distress costs firms face through the nature of their business, as well as 
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through industry-specific indirect bankruptcy costs, including the potential 
deterioration in relationships with a company’s customers and broader stakeholders 
prior to the official bankruptcy proceedings. Firms operating in industries with higher 
distress costs will not only have a higher propensity to use derivatives but are also 
expected to benefit increasingly from higher hedging levels (Hahnenstein and Röder, 
2006). 
The differences in potential costs arising from the perception of financial troubles 
within an industry are likely to be small when products can be substituted and will 
vary between industries depending on the nature of the non-investor stakeholder’s 
involvement with the firm and its products (Cornell and Shapiro, 1987). Also, R&D 
intensive industries with high levels of intangible assets, such as pharmaceutical and 
IT industries, are expected to find it more difficult to raise external financing. This is 
because their assets are hard to use as collateral because asymmetric information 
between managers and firm outsiders about the quality of their future products make 
it hard to value their projects (Titman and Wessels, 1988).  
Due to these financing constraints, firms from industries that are characterised by 
lower tangible assets and higher growth options, proxied by R&D expenditure, are 
expected to benefit more from hedging (Froot et al., 1993).  
Moreover, firms face industry-specific risk factors based on their industry 
classification (Nguyen and Faff, 2010), and are expected to be more likely to hedge 
risks with relevant instruments, such as foreign exchange, interest rate and commodity 
derivatives. For example, firms that are significantly exposed to international 
commodity price fluctuations, like materials and energy firms, are expected to be more 
likely to hedge with commodity derivatives (Birt et al., 2013); pharmaceutical firms 
are expected to hedge their foreign revenues with foreign exchange derivatives 
(Lewent and Kearney, 1990). 
Overall, firms in different industries operate under varying degrees of industry 
competition, financial distress costs (Hahnenstein and Röder, 2006; Talberg et al., 
2008), and face different types of market risks (Nguyen and Faff, 2010). This thesis 
hypothesises that these industry factors influence hedging decisions, and that distinct 
industry-specific choices can be observed regarding whether firms hedge, the extent 
of hedging and the type of market risk instruments to use. This leads to the following 
hypotheses: 
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HYPOTHESIS 2: Derivative use and types of risks hedged are not significantly 
different for firms in the same industry. 
HYPOTHESIS 3:  Derivative use is significantly different between industries. 
HYPOTHESIS 4: Derivative use is significantly determined by industry type.  
 
3.2.3 Time horizon  
The next hypothesis that is relates to whether the propensity of firms to use derivatives 
remains stable over time.  
Allayannis et al. (2012) examine hedging value in the context of corporate governance 
structures and point out that derivative instruments can be used for two completely 
different reasons, that is, they can be used to speculate or to hedge risk exposures. 
Analysing derivative positions from end-of-year financial statements does not enable 
investors to conclude for which purpose derivatives are being used, which, in turn, 
might affect the value that investors assign to a firm and provide some explanation as 
to why research on the value of hedging has delivered mixed results. 
As pointed out by Chernenko and Faulkender (2011), empirical studies on hedging 
practices are also commonly limited to single-year data (e.g. Birt et al., 2013; Smistad 
and Pustylnick, 2012) and based on the assumption that reported derivatives are 
employed solely for hedging. To develop a more thorough understanding of industry 
hedging practices, multi-year panel data are analysed in this thesis. This is because 
consistent derivative usage over time is more likely to reflect common industry 
hedging practices that can be explained by theoretical hedging rationales, rather than 
one-off speculative positions.  
Accordingly, if hedging is consistent over time then this suggests that derivatives are 
used for hedging rather than for speculative purposes (Chernenko and Faulkender, 
2011). In addition, assuming that industries have ongoing risk exposure to market 
risks, the relevant derivative instruments should be consistent over time. The 
hypothesis which addresses the consistency of derivative use in Australia and Canada 
is as follows: 
HYPOTHESIS 5:  Derivative activity is stable over time. 
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3.2.4 Cross-sectional differences 
Hedging is aimed at reducing market uncertainties and is proposed to create firm value 
by minimising various economic costs, including taxes, financial distress and 
underinvestment (Froot et al., 1993; Graham and Rogers, 2002; Smith and Stulz, 
1985). Accordingly, cross-sectional differences in hedging decisions should be related 
to the determinants discussed in the hedging literature.  
For example, theory predicts that firms which face higher financial distress costs, 
benefit more from hedging (Carneiro and Sherris, 2008). This is because firms in 
financial distress can be defined as having low cash resources and experiencing 
significant losses due to the uncertainty of their long-term survival, all of which 
provide hedging motives (Hahnenstein and Röder, 2006; Purnanandam, 2008).  
In addition, firms with higher leverage, which enables them to reduce their taxes, carry 
more risk of default on interest payments and are more likely to benefit from financial 
derivatives to protect incoming cash flows (Berkman et al., 2002; Heaney and Winata, 
2005), which could explain the differences in hedging among firms with similar 
market risk exposures but different capital structures. 
The use of derivatives for hedging future cash flows also ensures that growth firms do 
not suffer from underinvestment problems and are able to take on positive NPV 
projects using internally-generated funds (Froot et al., 1993; Myers, 1977). As firms 
with high growth opportunities face higher underinvestment costs, they are expected 
to have a standing hedging policy and be likely to hedge to a greater extent (Jalilvand, 
1999).  
Firm size, as a proxy for economies of scale determinants, can be argued to be a 
determinant for the use of derivatives, or to be a barrier to implementing hedging 
strategies. Also, given the significant costs associated with derivative programs, larger 
firms are more likely to benefit from derivative instruments due to economies of scale 
(Berkman et al., 2002; Nguyen and Faff, 2002). In contrast, the case can be made that 
smaller firms have higher external financing costs and an increased incentive to hedge 
(Ameer, 2010). As most empirical studies have found that increasing firm size seems 
to be an incentive for derivative use (Schiozer and Saito, 2009), a positive relationship 
between firm size and derivative practices is anticipated. Moreover, cross-sectional 
differences between hedging decisions according to economies of scale arguments 
might also be related to the degree of foreign revenues (Géczy et al., 1997). Given the 
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smaller, open economies of Australia and Canada, it is expected that firms involved in 
international transactions are more likely to use derivatives to hedge adverse currency 
movements, creating another incentive to employ derivative instruments (Ameer, 
2010). In conclusion, the hypothesis regarding the cross-sectional differences in 
hedging decisions between firms is this: 
HYPOTHESIS 6:  Cross-sectional differences in hedging decisions are 
related to a reduction in costs associated with taxes, underinvestment, 
financial distress and economies of scale.   
 
 
3.2.5 Hedging and firm value 
This thesis examines country and industry hedging practices for Australian and 
Canadian firms and examines the value implication of their hedging decisions. To 
examine the third and fourth research questions this thesis draws on the influence of 
capital structure and industry settings as proposed by Hahnenstein and Röder (2006) 
and tests three hypotheses.  
According to Modigliani and Miller (1958) the value of the firm is unaffected by 
financing choices in a world without taxes, transactions costs or the probability of 
default. Hedging theories suggest various channels that explain why hedging creates 
value for corporations with particular firm-level characteristics, including the 
existence of tax losses, higher debt levels, increased R&D expenditures, less tangible 
assets and smaller firm size (Froot et al., 1993; Géczy et al., 1997; Graham and Rogers, 
2002, Smith and Stulz, 1985). These provide the key rationales for how hedging 
decisions can be value-enhancing and reduce the variance of firm value when market 
frictions exist (Stulz, 1984). Hedging decisions considered in this context include the 
binary decision to hedge or not, the decision about the type of market risk to hedge, 
including hedging with foreign exchange, interest rate and commodity derivatives, and 
the decision on the extent of derivative use.   
The first hypothesis addressing the value effect from hedging is based on common 
hedging theories discussed in Chapter Two and states that:   
HYPOTHESIS 7: Hedging creates firm value by reducing costs associated with 
taxes, underinvestment, financial distress and economies of scale.  
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To examine propositions by Hahnenstein and Röder (2006) that hedging needs to be 
evaluated in the context of capital structure and industry settings, the value of various 
hedging decisions is examined with regard to firm capital structures in two ways.  
This thesis assumes that firms decide on their hedging policies after long-term 
financing and operating decisions have been made. This is consistent with Berkman 
and Bradbury (1996) and Berkman et al. (2002), who argue that firms make derivative 
choices to manage risk exposures after other finance choices, including the firm’s 
capital structure have been decided on. According to Brown and Toft (2002) this can 
be justified by considering the firm’s capital structure decision as a long-term policy 
choice, depending on the industry environment, whereas hedging decisions can be 
flexible and short-term to manage market volatilities. This view is further supported 
by evidence presented by Berkman et al. (1997), who report that the majority of 
surveyed firms employ derivative instruments for short-term risk management and 
only hedge already contracted positions and transactions expected within 12 months, 
rather than make long-term capital structure adjustments and increase the firm’s debt 
capacity (Graham and Rogers, 2002).    
Assuming a situation in which the firm’s capital structure is determined exogenously, 
hedging will be valuable by minimising financial distress costs and taxes as long as 
the probability of bankruptcy is further reduced. This means that hedging risk 
exposures fully as proposed by Black (1989) is no longer optimal, and that value-
enhancing hedging policies resulting from the trade-off between reducing risk and 
maximising value will differ between firms based on their capital structure and 
industry environment (Hahnenstein and Röder, 2006). 
To examine the conditions under which hedging is valuable in the context of capital 
structures, this thesis tests whether hedging is associated with higher firm value for 
firms with higher debt levels than their industry peers, proxied by the ratio of firm 
leverage to median industry leverage, or with increasing debt levels as proposed in the 
theoretical literature.  
Nance et al. (1993) have reported that firms that carry higher debt levels hedge more. 
This can be explained based on propositions by Froot et al. (1993) who discuss that 
firms with higher than optimal leverage, i.e. with higher debt levels than their industry 
peers, might face difficulties raising additional external financing, which makes 
hedging more valuable.  
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It is also expected that a positive firm value effect exists for increasing debt levels, i.e. 
for the interaction between hedging decisions and firm leverage. This means that 
hedging becomes more valuable as debt levels increase, because hedging reduces 
financial distress costs while allowing firms to benefit from additional tax benefits 
(Smith and Stulz, 1985; Graham and Rogers, 2002). Testing the interaction between 
debt and hedging decisions will provide further insights into whether hedging is value-
enhancing for financially constrained firms.  
The two hypotheses proposed to examine the direct value of hedging conditional on 
firm-specific capital structure environments are: 
HYPOTHESIS 8: Hedging creates firm value for firms with higher leverage. 
HYPOTHESIS 9: Hedging creates firm value with increasing firm leverage. 
 
To address the propositions by Hahnenstein and Röder (2006) that the value of hedging 
is based on capital structure settings as well as industry-specific distress costs, the 
hypotheses will be examined on a country as well as on an industry level. This allows 
to validate whether the value of hedging decisions are consistent across Australia and 
Canada. 
Froot et al. (1993) suggest that the nature of product markets and competition between 
peers will influence the optimal hedging decision for a firm, i.e. a decision on 
derivative use that creates value for its investors. Furthermore, firms operating in 
industries with higher financial distress costs are expected to benefit more from using 
derivatives through a reduction in industry-specific distress costs (Hahnenstein and 
Röder, 2006). These cross-sectional differences in financial distress costs provide an 
explanation for differences in the value derived from using derivatives, depending on 
the nature of a firm’s business and its industry environment. 
This research hypothesises comparable market and corporate governance settings, 
which should result in similar hedging practices for firms in Australia and Canada. 
However, differences between industry hedging practices are expected. This is 
examined by six hypotheses in Chapter Four to provide the background for an analysis 
of the value of derivative decisions by Australian and Canadian firms across a wide 
range of six industries.  
To clarify the mixed results of previous research about the value of hedging, this 
research extends previous work by incorporating aspects of capital structure and by 
examining the value of hedging on a country as well as on an industry level in Chapter 
 
 
	 86 
Five. The findings from this investigation will provide evidence to address the third 
and fourth research questions for this thesis, whether hedging creates value for firms 
in Australia and Canada and across industries, respectively.  
 
3.3 Data sample   
This study examines hedging policies of 523 listed Australian and 338 listed Canadian 
companies over a five-year period from 2009 to 2013. Cross-country corporate studies 
are usually aimed at detecting how differences in corporate governance regimes, 
market efficiencies and institutions affect the dependent variable under investigation. 
A study by Bartram et al. (2009) investigates the determinants of using derivatives in 
50 countries, citing that a larger sample size with more cross-sectional variability 
motivated the authors to extend their research across geographical regions. However, 
Levine and Zervos (1993) caution against including significantly different countries 
in the same regression due to “substantial conceptual and statistical problems that 
plague cross-country investigations” (Levine and Zervos, 1993, p. 426).  
Similar to Bartram et al. (2009), this study also seeks to increase the sample size and 
strengthen the significance of the results by extending the sample across Australia and 
Canada. In this case, two countries have been chosen that share a multitude of 
historical, cultural, demographical and economic characteristics, despite their being 
subject to two very distinct economic markets on opposite sides of the globe.  
Table 3.1 provides an overview and market comparison of the two countries 
investigated in this research. To begin with, the two countries are well-developed open 
economies, being members of the OECD as well as the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) forum. It is also the case that both nations share a similar British 
heritage and are members of the Commonwealth, resulting in similarities in their 
institutional background, legal, tax and financial systems (Bolton and Dollery, 2005, 
p. 51). Both countries are sparsely populated in relation to their size, with Australia 
having a population of approximately 23.3 million and Canada reporting a population 
of 35.5 million in 2013. They are also comparatively smaller economies in their 
regional marketplace, with Canada being closely tied to the USA and Australia to the 
Asia-Pacific markets (Svensson et al., 2009, p. 486). 
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Table 3.1 Country comparison 
Panel A: Overview Australia  Canada 
Population (2013) 23.3m.  35.5m. 
GDP in US$ (2013) 1,560 bn.  1,826 bn. 
Exchange rate regime Independent float (1983)  Independent float (1970) 
2009-2013 Financial Year 1 Jul 2008 - 30 Jun 2013  1 Jan 2009 - 31 Dec 2013 
IFRS implementation 30 June 2006  1 January 2011 
Panel B: Market comparison 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) 
Australia 22.50 19.50 21.20 21.30 19.90 
Canada 28.40 29.10 30.70 30.00 30.10 
Listed domestic companies  
Australia 1,882 1,913 1,922 1,959 2,048* 
Canada 3,761 3,805 3,932 3,876 3,873* 
Market capitalisation of listed companies (US$b) 
Australia 1,258 1,455 1,198 1,286 1,365* 
Canada 1,681 2,160 1,907 2,016 2,113* 
Market capitalisation of listed companies (% of GDP) 
Australia 135.9 127.5 86.3 83.8 86.8 
Canada 122.6 133.8 107.2 110.7 114.7 
Note: GDP and population data have been based on The World in Figures published by the Economist Intelligence 
Unit (2015). Market comparison data are based on the World Development Indicators published by the WorldBank 
(2015). Figures with a * are based on data provided by the Sustainable Stock Exchange Initiative (2015a, 2015b). 
The significant degree of internationalisation and reliance on trade can be confirmed 
by looking at the long history of commodity exports and current trade and foreign 
investment statistics. In 2013, the export of goods and services accounted for an 
estimated 30.1 per cent of Canada’s GDP and 19.9 per cent of Australia’s GDP in 2013 
(Economist Intelligence Unit, 2015). Also, both countries list similar products as their 
top export commodities such as petroleum, oil and gases, gold and aluminium, with 
China being the top export market for Australia, and Canada sending 75 per cent of 
exports across the border to the USA in 2012 (UN Comtrade, 2014a, 2014b).  
Both economies are characterised by free-floating exchange rate regimes: Australia 
since 1983 and Canada since 1970. Furthermore, firms in both countries have access 
to developed equity markets, which presents an option for external financing through 
equity issue rather than debt financing (Booth et al., 2001). In 2013, 2,048 companies 
are listed on the stock exchange in Australia with a market capitalisation of US$1,365 
billion, and 3,873 companies are listed in Canada with a market capitalisation of 
US2,113 billion, respectively. This market orientation also results in a higher 
relevance for financial statements compared to countries that frequently access 
required capital from banks (Bushman and Smith, 2003). Finally, both countries have 
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recently adopted International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), Australia was 
one of the first countries to fully adopt IFRS as of 30 June 2006 (Australian 
Accounting Standards Board, 2009). Canada started a convergence process from 
Canadian GAAP to IFRS for public companies in 2006, which was concluded on 1 
January 2011 with the mandatory adoption of IFRS for all public companies (IASPlus, 
2015). While evidence of improved accounting quality following the mandatory IFRS 
adoption seems to hold only for countries in which domestic standards differ 
significantly from IFRS principles (Ahmed et al., 2013), a study by Brochet et al. 
(2013) found that mandatory IFRS implementation has resulted in higher 
comparability across firms and therefore benefits capital market participants. This 
increased similarity in financial reporting across Australia and Canada allows for more 
robust comparisons between hedging practices, as is reported on in this thesis.  
To summarise, companies in both Canada and Australia are exposed to commodity 
and foreign exchange risks, operate in liquid and well-developed capital markets and 
have similar reporting requirements.  
 
3.3.1 Corporate governance environment   
As pointed out by Hutson and Stevenson (2010), besides capital market conditions, a 
country’s corporate governance environment also plays a significant role in hedging 
decisions. Derivatives can be used for speculative or managerial reasons other than for 
protecting shareholders’ wealth, which investors may not be able to assess accurately. 
Allayannis et al. (2012) suggest that investors might draw inferences about the motives 
of derivative use from a firm’s internal and country level corporate governance 
environment. For example, shareholders face significantly higher bankruptcy costs in 
countries with strong creditor protection, thus, hedging financial risks becomes more 
cost-effective. La Porta et al. (2000) claim that a higher level of investor protection 
encourages managers to engage in value-enhancing activities like derivative use to 
protect shareholders’ wealth, which results in a higher value for corporate assets and 
consequently shareholder equity.  
Gospel and Pendleton (2003) state that equity financing is an important characteristic 
of “market-outsider systems” (p. 563) that have large and developed equity markets 
such as Australia and Canada. Even though market capitalisation of listed Australian 
and Canadian companies (expressed as a percentage of domestic GDP) has decreased 
from 2009 to 2013 as shown in Table 3.1. This demonstrates the significance of equity 
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financing for firms in both economies and supports the notion of value-creation as a 
leading principle of doing business. This stands in contrast to countries that have larger 
degrees of bank-based debt or family ownership, which lead to more direct channels 
of influence and might result in other management directives other than the 
shareholder value paradigm. In equity centred markets, the higher dispersion of 
ownership and associated costs to coordinate shareholder activity generally limits 
corporate owners to influence decision-making by management via market 
mechanisms, including divestment and threats of hostile takeovers (Gospel and 
Pendleton, 2003).   
Lel (2012) investigates how various country level corporate governance structures can 
impact agency costs and encourage hedging incentives. He concludes that a high level 
of corporate governance with strong monitoring structures provides a motive to use 
derivatives to reduce risk exposures and external financing costs (Lel, 2012). This is 
further supported by Allayannis et al. (2012) who identified a significant hedging 
premium for currency derivative users with strong firm level or country level corporate 
governance structures.  
Table 3.2 provides a comparison of country level investor protection indicators 
commonly used in the corporate governance literature for Australia and Canada, which 
shows a strong resemblance of common governance variables for both countries. For 
example, Panel A provides a comparison of shareholder rights across both countries 
based on the indices developed by La Porta et al. (2002). It shows that Canada has a 
higher percentage of average control rights by the largest shareholder with 41.0% of 
voting rights held on average, compared to 30.0% of voting rights held by the largest 
shareholder for Australia firms. However, in both countries, the largest shareholder 
holds on average 25% of cash flow rights (La Porta et al., 2002). Both countries also 
rank highly with regards to investor protection on security market law indices with 4.0 
out of 6.0 as reported by Spamann (2010). Furthermore, both countries have strong 
security market laws, which ensure that actions by corporate directors can be 
monitored and security laws are enforced to protect shareholders. La Porta et al. (2006) 
report that both counties exceed the average criminal sanctions index with 0.83 
compared to 0.63 for common law countries, which demonstrates strong investor 
protection. These figures demonstrate that corporate governance environments with 
regards to investor protection and security laws are strong and comparable in both 
countries. This means that non-financial firms in Australia and Canada countries face 
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similar corporate hedging incentives (Lel, 2012) and are suitable for the analysis in 
this thesis. Here, it is important to highlight that this thesis aims to cross-validate 
results on hedging value and not to compare countries.  
 
Table 3.2 Corporate governance comparison 
Indicator Australia Canada Common law countries mean 
Panel A: Shareholder rights 
Control rights 0.30 0.41 0.33 
Cash flow rights 0.25 0.25 0.25 
Anti-director rights 4 4 4.22 
Panel B: Security market law  
Disclosure requirements 0.75 0.92 0.78 
Criminal sanctions 0.83 0.83 0.65 
Public enforcement 0.90 0.80 0.62 
Note: This table presents an overview of commonly cited corporate governance indices. Control rights indicate the 
fraction of the firm’s voting rights held by the largest shareholder, and Cash flow rights indicate the fraction of the 
firm’s ultimate cash flow rights by its controlling shareholder, respectively (La Porta et al., 2002). Anti-director 
rights present an index ranging from one to six, with higher figures indicating stronger shareholder rights 
(Spamann, 2010). Security market law indices are taken from La Porta et al. (2006). These indices range from ‘0.0’ 
to ‘1.0’, with higher figures indicating stronger security market laws that ensure monitoring of corporate directors. 
Full definitions can be found in La Porta et al. (2006). 
 
3.3.2 Sample period  
The data for this research have been collected from published financial statements and 
accompanying notes of Australian and Canadian public firms over a five-year period 
from 2009 until 2013.  
This sample period has been selected for several reasons. First, as previously presented 
in Chapter Two, the existing literature on hedging practices and derivative value after 
the GFC is sparse and most empirical research on corporate hedging in both countries 
is based on data from the late-1990s and early-2000s. While those earlier studies can 
be used for comparison with results from this thesis, this gap in the empirical literature 
creates a need for more current research on derivative practices and hedging value. 
Also, it is particularly interesting to see how firms have responded to the experience 
of the GFC, and whether and how non-financial firms have incorporated derivative 
instruments since, to compare this with hedging practices that have been reported in 
the earlier 2000s.  
Availability of hedging data was another important consideration when deciding on 
the sampling time frame. Earlier empirical hedging studies in Australia (Batten et al., 
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1993; Benson and Oliver, 2004) and Canada (Downie et al., 1996; Jalilvand et al., 
2000) are mostly based on survey data (Batten et al., 1993; Benson and Oliver, 2004; 
Downie et al., 1996; Jalilvand et al., 2000) or voluntary disclosures, which limited 
research on broader cross-sectional samples until the implementation of further 
mandatory financial instrument disclosures. Empirical hedging studies on US 
companies have mostly relied on data collected from filings to the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) or private databases, such as the Ted Reeve Survey on 
commodity derivatives (Adam and Fernando, 2006; Brown et al., 2006; Tufano, 1996) 
or the Corporate Risk Management Handbook (Borokhovich et al., 2004), which 
provides derivative details such as notional amounts of each type of derivative for S&P 
500 companies in the US (see Triki, 2005). Unfortunately, there is no central database 
in Australia that captures corporate derivative contract details, and researchers rely on 
derivative disclosures information in annual reports. However, following the 
introduction of IFRS 7 Financial Instruments: Disclosures in 2007, publicly listed 
firms in Australia must disclose the fair value amounts of outstanding derivatives on 
their balance sheet (Australian Accounting Standards Board, 2009). Before 2007, 
derivatives were often treated as off-balance sheet items in Australia, even though they 
represent contractual rights or obligations which meet the definitions of assets or 
liabilities. Having all financial instruments measured at fair value at reporting date 
ensures that the level of outstanding derivative contracts is comparable among firms 
since 2007 (Accounting Standards Board, 2007).  In Canada, IFRS was not fully 
implemented until 1 January 2011, which means that derivatives might have been 
treated as off-balance sheet items in 2009 and 2010 annual reports. However, all 
Canadian firms sampled across the six investigated industries have already been 
reporting according to IFRS-transition rules for the 2009 and 2010 financial years and 
IFRS reporting is one of the selection criteria applied in the sample selection process.  
Overall, the testing of proposed hedging theories from previous empirical literature 
has been limited due to the lack of quality data. Improvements in recent reporting 
disclosures have enabled researchers to move beyond survey data, which provides a 
more reliable source of information on a larger cross-section of firms and avoids the 
non-response bias inherent in survey data. This thesis takes advantage of the recent 
improvements in derivative reporting in financial reports to investigate derivative 
practices after the start of the GFC, which provided significant incentives to implement 
risk management programs for firms operating in open economies such as Australia 
and Canada.  
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Furthermore, in order to have more reliable data on derivative practices and to ensure 
results are not based on unusual one-year positions, data on derivative use were 
collected from annual reports for 2009 until the year in which this research project 
commenced, i.e. the 2013 financial year. This provides a robust five-year timeframe 
to investigate derivative practices and the value effect of hedging using panel data 
techniques, which are further discussed at the end of this chapter.  
 
3.3.3 Sample selection and data collection process 
This thesis uses information disclosed in the financial statements and accompanying 
notes of publicly listed Australian and Canadian firms between 2009 and 2013. The 
list of sampled firms has been established using access to the Osiris3 database provided 
by Deakin University, which presents financial information on listed companies 
around the globe (Bureau van Dijk, 2013).  
Companies were selected based on the broad four-digit Global Industry Classification 
Standard (GICS) code in the database. The selected companies are from six non-
financial industry sectors to represent a cross-section of each economy, including firms 
in the Energy, Industrials, Materials, Consumer Discretionary, Health Care and the IT 
industries. Telecommunications and Consumer Staples industries have been excluded 
due to small sample sizes. Financial and Utility firms have been excluded from the 
analysis for the following reasons. Financial firms commonly deal with derivatives for 
speculative risk management purposes, which makes results difficult to interpret 
(Allayannis and Weston, 2001; Nguyen and Faff, 2003b). As the focus of this research 
is on derivatives used for risk management, financial firms are excluded, in common 
with similar empirical studies (Allayannis and Weston, 2001; Campello et al., 2011; 
Nguyen and Faff, 2010). Utility companies are excluded as they operate in highly 
regulated markets and may have hedging incentives that are different from unregulated 
firms (Samant, 1996). Finally, firms that have explicitly stated using derivatives for 
speculative purposes are not considered.  
Further selection criteria have been applied using the Osiris search function to derive 
the final sample. First, only the top 100 firms by market capitalisation from each sector 
listed on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) and the Toronto Stock Exchange 
                                               
3 Osiris, which is operated by Bureau van Dijk (2013), provides information on listed global companies 
including company financials and allows for company searches across different countries and multiple 
years with a range of search criteria. The search steps resulting from the search criteria used to establish 
the sample for this thesis are detailed in Appendix C.  
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(TSX) have been included to capture derivative practices of industry leaders. These 
firms are expected to have better information disclosures (Birt et al., 2013), which is 
important as all derivative data is hand-collected from annual reports. Second, only 
firms that have adopted the IFRS have been included. Third, companies for which the 
required data are not available for the sample period from 2009 to 2013 due to mergers, 
acquisitions or recent delisting have been excluded.  
The final sample composition is presented in Table 3.3. The 523 Australian firms are 
split fairly even across all six sampled industries. The country sample ranges from 72, 
or 13.8 per cent of IT firms, to 95 Health Care firms, which represent 18.2 per cent of 
total Australian firms under investigation. Canada, Materials and Energy firms 
represent the largest sub-sample proportions with 25.7 per cent and 24.9 per cent of 
total firms, respectively. In contrast to Australia, Health Care firms only represent 7.7 
per cent of total sampled Canadian firms. A complete list of the all sampled firms by 
industry can be found in Appendices C1. to C.12. 
Table 3.3 Sample composition 
Panel A: Australia 
GICS classification Osiris search results 
Firms in final 
sample Firms-years Sample % 
10 - Energy 100 89 445 17.02 
20 - Industrials 100 91 455 17.40 
15 - Materials 100 84 420 16.06 
25 - Consumer Discretionary 100 92 460 17.59 
35 - Health Care 100 95 475 18.16 
45 - Information Technology 88 72 360 13.77 
Total Australia 588 523 2,615 100.00 
Panel B: Canada 
GICS classification Osiris search results 
Firms in final 
sample Firms-years Sample % 
10 - Energy 100 84 420 24.85 
20 - Industrials 69 63 315 18.64 
15 - Materials 100 87 435 25.74 
25 - Consumer Discretionary 55 47 235 13.91 
35 - Health Care 31 26 130 7.69 
45 - Information Technology 38 31 155 9.17 
Total Canada 393 338 1,690 100.00 
Total Australia & Canada 981 861 4,305  
Note: This table presents the sample composition by country. Osiris search results presents the number of firms 
identified in the original search for the top 100 firms by market capitalisation for each industry. Firms in the final 
sample presents the number of firms used for further analysis after excluding firms according to the selection 
criteria.     
Table 3.4 provides an overview of the collected annual report data. The data collection 
process has resulted in a list of sample firms with the following company details: name, 
country and GICS code. As the Osiris database provides only key financial information 
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from annual statements, this database has only been used to establish the list of 
companies to be used for each country sample based on the cross-country search 
functions. All data including information on derivative usage have been subsequently 
collected from published annual reports using access to the OneSource4 database (D&B 
Hoovers, 2014) provided by Deakin University. If annual results were reported in 
different currencies, they have been converted to Australian or Canadian dollars using 
the exchange rates provided by OneSource. In a few cases, the 2013 annual reports 
had not been yet made available via OneSource at the time of data collection. In those 
instances, missing annual reports have been sourced via SEDAR5 for Canadian 
companies (Canadian Securities Administrators, 2014) or Datanalysis Premium6 for 
Australian firms (Morningstar, 2014). 
  
                                               
4 OneSource database is operated by D&B Hoovers (2014) and provides financial statements as well as 
full annual reports for public companies worldwide.  
5 SEDAR, the System for Electronic Document Analysis and Retrieval, is a mandatory filing system for 
Canadian public companies, which provides public access to financial statements and other company 
reports (Canadian Securities Administrators, 2014).  
6 Datanalysis Premium is a database operated by Morningstar (2014) and provides detailed information 
on all companies listed on the Australian Stock Exchange. The database can be accessed via the Deakin 
University library. 	
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Table 3.4 Data collection 
# Data items Measurement details 
1. Company details: Osiris company search (Osiris database) 
1 Company ID Company identifier, coded for analysis in Stata software 
2 Country Country of listing equals 1 for Australia and 2 for Canada 
3 Year  2009-2013 
4 GICS classification Equals 1 for Energy, 2 for Industrials, 3 for Materials, 4 for Consumer discretionary, 5 for Health care and 6 for IT 
2. Hedging practices: Notes to the financial statements (OneSource) 
5 None Equals 1 if the firm has no outstanding derivative contracts  
6 Some Equals 1 if the firm has used derivatives or uses derivatives when required but has no outstanding contracts at year end 
7 Derivatives Equals 1 if the firm holds outstanding derivative contracts  
     2.1 Hedging instruments: Notes to the financial statements (OneSource) 
8 IR instruments Equals 1 if the firm used interest rate derivatives  
9 FX instruments Equals 1 if the firm used foreign exchange derivatives 
10 Commodity instruments Equals 1 if the firm used commodity derivatives 
11 Other instruments Equals 1 if the firm used other derivatives 
     2.2 IR instruments: Notes to the financial statements (OneSource) 
12 IR swaps Equals 1 if the firm used IR swap derivatives   
13 IR options Equals 1 if the firm used IR option derivatives   
14 IR forwards Equals 1 if the firm used IR forward derivatives   
15 Other IR instruments Equals 1 if the firm used other IR derivatives   
     2.3 FX instruments: Notes to the financial statements (OneSource) 
16 FX swaps Equals 1 if the firm used FX swap derivatives   
17 FX options Equals 1 if the firm used FX option derivatives   
18 FX forwards Equals 1 if the firm used FX forward derivatives   
19 Other FX instruments Equals 1 if the firm used other FX derivatives   
     2.4 Commodity instruments: Notes to the financial statements (OneSource) 
20 Commodity swaps Equals 1 if the firm used commodity swap derivatives  
21 Commodity options Equals 1 if the firm used commodity option derivatives  
22 Commodity forwards Equals 1 if the firm used commodity forward derivatives  
23 Other com. instruments Equals 1 if the firm used other commodity derivatives  
     2.5 Derivative fair values: Balance sheet or notes to the financial statements (OneSource) 
24 Derivative assets  Total fair value of derivative assets in 000’s, Australian or Canadian dollars 
25 Derivative liabilities  Total fair value of derivative liabilities in 000’s, Australian or Canadian dollars 
Note: This table presents the measurement details for each variable collected and identifies the relevant source of 
the data.  
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Table 3.4 Data collection (cont’d.) 
3. Balance sheet items (OneSource) 
26 Cash and short-term investment  In 000’s, Australian or Canadian dollars 
27 Total current assets In 000’s, Australian or Canadian dollars 
28 Net PPE  In 000’s, Australian or Canadian dollars 
29 Net intangibles In 000’s, Australian or Canadian dollars 
30 Total assets In 000’s, Australian or Canadian dollars 
31 Total current liabilities  In 000’s, Australian or Canadian dollars 
32 Total long-term debt In 000’s, Australian or Canadian dollars 
33 Total debt  In 000’s, Australian or Canadian dollars 
34 Total liabilities In 000’s, Australian or Canadian dollars 
35 Total equity  In 000’s, Australian or Canadian dollars 
36 Retained earnings/ (accounting deficit)  In 000’s, Australian or Canadian dollars 
37 Foreign assets In 000’s, Australian or Canadian dollars 
38 Common shares outstanding In 000’s, Australian or Canadian dollars 
4. Income statement items (OneSource) 
43 Net sales In 000’s, Australian or Canadian dollars 
44 Total revenue  In 000’s, Australian or Canadian dollars 
45 Research & development expenses In 000’s, Australian or Canadian dollars 
46 Gross profit In 000’s, Australian or Canadian dollars 
47 Operating income In 000’s, Australian or Canadian dollars 
48 Net income In 000’s, Australian or Canadian dollars 
49 Normalized EBIT In 000’s, Australian or Canadian dollars 
50 Foreign revenue In 000’s, Australian or Canadian dollars 
51 Total income tax In 000’s, Australian or Canadian dollars 
52 Interest expense debt (non-operating) In 000’s, Australian or Canadian dollars 
53 Share price In 000’s, Australian or Canadian dollars 
54 Dividends per share In 000’s, Australian or Canadian dollars 
Note: This table presents the measurement details for each variable collected and identifies the relevant source of 
the data.  
 
3.4 Data preparation  
The data were collected and structured in Excel before being imported into Stata. The 
data were checked using Stata’s codebook command to verify that variables had been 
imported correctly before they were examined for underlying missing data patterns 
and outliers. 
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3.4.1 Missing data   
Missing data can have significant practical and substantive impacts. First, missing data 
may significantly reduce sample sizes, which could restrict further analysis, if no 
missing data remedies are applied. Second, the statistical results obtained from 
analysis using non-random missing data might be biased, if the process that causes 
observations to be missing is systematic (Hair et al., 2010).  
The sample for this study only includes firms that have been publicly listed and have 
published financial statements between 2009 and 2013, which means the extent of 
missing data is not of high concern for this research. Variables with missing values are 
presented in Table 3.5. It shows that missing values are not concentrated in one 
industry but are spread out across the sample.  
 
Table 3.5 Missing values 
Panel A: Australia N Derivative fair values Normalised EBIT 
Energy 445 - - 
Industrials 455 1 6 
Materials 420 4 - 
Consumer Disc. 460 1 - 
Health care 475 - 9 
IT 360 - 1 
Total missing values (%) 2,615 6 (0.23%) 16 (0.61%) 
Panel B: Canada N Derivative fair values Normalised EBIT 
Energy 420 6  
Industrials 315 19 7 
Materials 435 3 6 
Consumer Disc. 235 3 - 
Health care 130 - - 
IT 155 - - 
Total missing values (%) 1,690 31 (1.83%) 13 (0.77%) 
Note: This table presents the number and percentages of missing data for the Derivative fair values and the 
Normalised EBIT variable.  
 
Missing values are deemed to be “ignorable missing data” values (Hair et al., 2010, 
p. 46) if they result from incomplete information in the source database or annual 
financial report without any underlying patterns that would bias subsequent analysis. 
Even if the missing data are in fact non-random, the extent of missing values is 
sufficiently low and no further action is required. 
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3.4.2 Examination of outliers  
Outliers are extreme observations or responses that might impact the outcome of the 
data analysis and distort results. Hair et al. (2010) define outlier observations as those 
with a “unique combination of characteristics identifiable as distinctively different 
from the other observations” (Hair et al., 2010, p. 64). These unique characteristics are 
generally values that are perceived to be rather high or low given the context of the 
other variable values, which may have practical or substantive implications for the 
analysis.  
Extreme cases may significantly distort the empirical results. For example, a 
significantly larger company can affect the average company size of a sample. On the 
other hand, an outlier observation needs to be viewed with caution as to how 
representative the case is of the sampled observations. If the number of extremely large 
firms are only a small but important part of the studied industry, the outlier observation 
might be retained in the sample. Extreme observations should only be deleted if it can 
be established that these values are not representative of the population. Deletion of 
outlier values does impact the generalisability of results even though it might improve 
statistical results (Hair et al., 2010).  
To assess the impact of potential outliers, boxplots of all metric variables have been 
created in Stata to identify unique or extreme observations. The visualisation of the 
outliers allows comparison of the distribution of observations and outliers across 
different groups of the total sample. This research project retained outliers so as not to 
“overfit the data” so that the results would be “artificially good” but would not allow 
any generalisation from the sample (Hair et al., 2010, p. 67). 
 
3.4.3 Sample size considerations 
Sample sizes play an important role in establishing statistical significance of results as 
smaller samples may not have significant statistical power. This means that applying 
rigorous data selection criteria and excluding outliers might lead to a small sample, 
which artificially suits the model but does not allow for any meaningful inference from 
the sample (Hair et al., 2010).  
The sampling procedure explained above results in a small sample size for one of the 
industry groups, with only 26 Canadian firms from the Health Care industry. However, 
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given that more than 20 firms have been identified in this group, all the industry groups 
can be analysed using parametric tests.  
Table 3.6 Sample sizes of industry groups 
 Australia Canada Total 
GICS classification # Sampled firms # Sampled firms # Sampled firms 
10 - Energy 89 84 173 
20 - Industrials 91 63 154 
15 - Materials 84 87 171 
25 – Consumer Discretionary 92 47 139 
35 - Health Care 95 26 121 
45 - Information Technology 72 31 103 
Total  523 338 861 
Note: The table above lists the final sample established using the search function in Osiris database. The full list 
of search results and excluded firms is provided in Appendix C.  
 
3.4.4 Measurement errors, reliability and validity concerns 
Measurement errors may occur when variables are difficult to observe directly and 
proxies are used instead - any differences between the examined proxy and the actual 
variable of interest through data entry errors, imperfect measurement or conceptual 
discrepancies result in a measurement error. Roberts and Whited (2012) point out that 
imperfect measurements of the variables become part of the error term and the impact 
on the coefficient estimates will depend on its statistical properties. Therefore, the 
observed values will include both the true values and a noise component. To reduce 
measurement errors one must address the validity and reliability of variable 
measurement. 
The term validity concerns the absence of a systematic measurement error, meaning 
that the study measures the phenomenon to be investigated. To ensure construct 
validity, this study has conducted a careful literature review on previous empirical 
studies and selected variables that have been commonly used to measure hedging 
behaviour and levels. Given the nature of the data coming from audited financial 
statements, the accuracy of the collected data are very high.  
Reliability refers to whether the collected data measure the true value and includes 
little noise. If measures are consistent when collected repeatedly, they are considered 
to be reliable and the results can be evaluated with faith in the underlying data (Hair 
et al., 2010). The data collected in this study come from audited financial statements 
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of public corporations, which is considered highly reliable. This assessment is also 
supported by the fact that repeated checks of collected the data have delivered mostly 
unvarying results for company data.  
Reliability has been checked by accessing and comparing alternative measures for 
financial statement data. Balance sheet and income statement data have been directly 
collected via the OneSource database and cross-checked with the financial statements 
published in the relevant annual reports. Few discrepancies between the measures 
provided by the database and the published financial statements were found. In the 
case of inconsistencies, the measures from the financial statements published in the 
annual reports were preferred. Where discrepancies between financial data for the 
same period have been found, for example, differences between data from the 2009 
financial statements and 2009 data shown in comparison in the 2010 financial 
statements, the more recently published financial statement data for the same period 
have been included in this study. These few discrepancies in diachronic reliability may 
result from financial statements being altered retrospectively, when accounting errors 
have been found after the reporting date. The more recent financial data for any period 
are assumed to be a more reliable reflection of the nature of a company’s business and 
relevant accounting rules.  
Synchronic reliability has been checked for in this study by investigating changes in 
company variables over time. Overall, there is little variation in company variables 
during the investigated timeframe. Therefore, the data are considered synchronically 
reliable.  
As pointed out by Hair et al. (2010), since measurement errors are incorporated into 
observed variables, the impact of poor reliability and errors in measurement cannot be 
directly evaluated. While it cannot be concluded that poor results are due to 
measurement issues, measurement errors will surely misrepresent the variables and 
relationships of interest. Therefore, a considerable amount of time since the initial data 
collection was spent on cross-checking collected variables from databases with their 
financial statement counterparts to increase data reliability for this research and 
improve the accuracy of the results.  
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3.5 Variable measurements 
3.5.1 Hedging variables 
The hedging decision has several dimensions and has been measured in various ways 
in the literature. The most popular measures include using a dummy variable that 
indicates whether firms hedge or not (Birt et al., 2013; Géczy et al., 1997; Heaney and 
Winata, 2005; Nance et al., 1993), gross or net notional values (Borokhovich et al., 
2004; Graham and Rogers, 2002; Nguyen and Faff, 2010), fair values (Howton and 
Perfect, 1998; Lantara, 2012; Zhou and Wang, 2013), or delta percentages measured 
as the delta of the risk management portfolio divided by the expected production 
(Dionne and Garand, 2003; Haushalter, 2000).  
First, the firm makes a binary decision whether to hedge or not, which can be captured 
by a dummy variable. Second, the financial manager decides on which risks to hedge 
and how much to hedge, which requires a continuous variable of measurement. Most 
empirical research papers use more than one single measure for the dependent variable 
when testing hedging theories, and research testing theories of hedging determinants 
concludes that different firm characteristics influence the hedging decision and the 
decision on how much to hedge (Allayannis and Ofek, 2001; Marsden and Prevost, 
2005). While the dummy variable provides a simple indicator of a company’s risk 
management approach, it does not offer any insights about the extent of hedging, 
which continuous measures such as the notional value of contracts do.  
Triki (2005) states that even though gross notional values provide further quantitative 
details, the extent of hedging might be overestimated when a firm holds offsetting 
positions. Hentschel and Kothari (2001) also point out that there is in fact “no strict 
relation between the size of a contract and the sensitivity of its value to the underlying 
price” (p. 96). Also, companies commonly hold net positions across currencies which 
creates a measurement error when examining foreign exchange hedging (Allayannis 
and Ofek, 2001). Graham and Rogers (2002) propose using the absolute value of the 
net position held as a better measure of corporate hedging, scaled by firm size. 
However, using net notional value positions means that the risk management strategy 
of a firm with a $90 million long position and a $50 million short position equals that 
of a firm with a $40 million position, without any distinction between them. In sum, 
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each measure used in the empirical literature has limitations7. The choice of measure 
is generally determined by data availability.  
The hedging variables used in this research are outlined in Table 3.7. First, firms are 
classified as using no derivatives, using some derivatives or as using derivatives. To 
do this, the notes to the financial statements of all sampled firms have been reviewed 
to ascertain whether any type of derivatives, such as interest rates, foreign exchange, 
commodity or other derivatives have been used to classify firms into derivative user 
or non-user. If references are made to hedging or derivatives, the context is read and 
each company is classified as using no derivatives, using some derivatives or as using 
derivatives. In this context, firms that have used derivatives for hedging purposes 
during the year but closed their positions by balance date, or state that they frequently 
use derivatives whenever necessary but do not provide exact details have been 
classified as using some derivatives. If a company has provided no details of their risk 
management program or clearly states that they have used derivatives for speculative 
purposes, they are classified as no derivatives. For firms that hedge with derivatives 
or with some derivatives, data have been collected on the type of risk hedged, for 
example, whether the firm has employed interest rates, foreign exchange, or 
commodity derivatives and the type of instruments used, including forwards or futures, 
swaps and options. All of these variables are recorded with dummy variables as 
outlined in Table 3.7, taking ‘1’ if the firms use this policy or these instruments.  
To proxy how actively a firm uses derivative instruments, the fair values of derivative 
contracts have been collected from the balance sheet of the annual reports. Ideally, one 
would use detailed information about the hedge ratio of each contract type and by 
market risk, but as these data are not available this study uses the fair values of all 
outstanding derivative contracts at balance date. The fair value measure has been 
proposed by Berkman and Bradbury (1996), which is an ex-post result of the decision 
to use derivatives. It is defined as the absolute net value of all outstanding derivative 
contracts at balance date scaled by total assets. The authors state that this measure can 
be understood as an “unbiased measure of the extent to which a firm manages its ‘value 
at risk’ using derivatives” despite the fact that two factors make this ratio a noisy proxy 
                                               
7 Each measure also equates risk management with derivative usage, which is not always true as firms 
can further reduce their foreign currency risk exposures, for example, by moving production facilities. 
Derivative data collected from annual report do not tell the whole story about a firm’s risk management 
policy and can only be used as an indication of a firm’s practice to hedge risks with derivatives. Judge 
(2006) therefore proposes to use a more inclusive definition of hedging and incorporate further dummy 
variables for non-derivative hedging methods.  
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for hedging (Berkman and Bradbury, 1996, p. 8). This is because the fair value is 
highly dependent on the movement of the risk variable being managed and the time 
passed since the contract has been entered. If either factor is minimal, the fair value 
may be relatively small compared to the actual hedge ratio of the derivative instrument. 
However, the fair value does provide a useful measure for cross-sectional models 
which is why it is used in previous studies (for example, Berkman and Bradbury, 1996; 
Howton and Perfect, 1998; Zhou and Wang, 2013), and as a proxy for corporate 
hedging activity in this thesis.  
Table 3.7 Hedging variables 
Variable Definition 
1. Hedging decision  
No derivatives Dummy variable that equals 1 if no derivatives used, otherwise 0 
Some derivatives Dummy variable that equals 1 if stated that derivatives used but no contracts are outstanding at balance date, otherwise 0 
Derivative user Dummy variable that equals 1 if derivative contracts are outstanding  
2. Hedging market risk type 
Foreign exchange instruments Dummy variable that equals 1 if foreign exchange instruments used, otherwise 0 
Interest rate instruments Dummy variable that equals 1 if interest rate instruments used, otherwise 0 
Commodity instruments Dummy variable that equals 1 if commodity instruments were, otherwise 0 
Other hedging instruments Dummy variable that equals 1 if other derivative instruments used, otherwise 0 
3. Hedging instrument (by market risk type) 
Swaps  Dummy variable that equals 1 if swap derivatives used, otherwise 0 
Options   Dummy variable that equals 1 if option derivatives used, otherwise 0 
Forwards  Dummy variable that equals 1 if forward derivatives used, otherwise 0 
Other  Dummy variable that equals 1 if other derivatives used, otherwise 0 
4. Hedging extent  
Derivative fair values  Total net fair value of derivatives contracts outstanding scaled by total assets  
Note: This table presents the definitions of the hedging variables used in this thesis as dependent variables in 
Chapter Four to examine the determinants of hedging practices, and as independent variables in Chapter Five to 
examine the value of hedging with derivatives.  
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To investigate the direct value effect in Chapter Five, Tobin’s Q has been used as a 
proxy to evaluate the firm value effect of hedging decisions for two reasons.  
First, Tobin’s Q, defined as the ratio of firm market value to the replacement costs of 
its assets, has commonly been used to measure the hedging premium in previous 
empirical studies, including Allayannis and Weston (2001), MacKay and Moeller 
(2007), Allayannis et al. (2012) and Panaretou (2014). This allows results from this 
thesis to be compared with previous findings. Second, Tobin’s Q is a forward-looking 
measure of market value created over the book value that is less susceptible to 
accounting measures and useful when comparing results (Lau, 2016; Panaretou, 2014).  
Using Tobin’s Q as a measure for firm value in this context and comparing this market 
measure between firms that hedge and those that do not means that a conclusion will 
be made not about how hedging firms perform, but about the value investors place on 
firms with derivative use relative to their book values (Nelson et al., 2005). This means 
that the results presented in Chapter Five will show whether shareholders place a 
premium on firms that hedge with derivatives compared to similar firms that do not, 
or whether investors, on average, place a discount on firms that use derivatives.  
A simple approximation of Tobin’s Q is used, calculated as the sum of the market 
value of equity, the book value of debt and preference shares, divided by the sum of 
the book values of equity, debt and preference shares (Bartram et al., 2009; Panaretou, 
2014). Chung and Pruitt (1994) examine the usefulness of a simple approximation for 
Tobin’s Q and conclude that a simple estimation of Tobin’s Q value “may be safely 
employed” (p. 74) when data for more rigorous approximations are unavailable. As the 
variable is highly skewed, the natural log of Tobin’s Q is used to proxy firm value in 
the regression models (Bartram et al., 2009).  
 
3.5.2 Independent firm variables  
Table 3.8 details the independent variables that have been used to investigate cross-
sectional differences in hedging practices and associated value propositions. These 
variables are proxy variables for hedging theories justifying the use of derivatives 
based on hedging benefits from reduced taxes, financial distress and underinvestment 
costs and economies of scale as discussed in Chapter Two. They are employed as 
explanatory variables in Chapter Four, which investigates hedging practices and 
determinants across Australia and Canada. The same variables are also included as 
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control variables in Chapter Five which investigates the value effect of hedging by 
regressing hedging decisions on firm value, proxied by Tobin’s Q.  
Table 3.8 Independent firm variables 
Variable Variable description  Examples of previous studies 
1. Tax benefits variables  
Tax loss  Available Tax losses scaled to total assets 
Nance et al. (1993), Tufano (1996), 
Géczy et al. (1997), Fok et al. (1997), 
Gay and Nam (1998), Graham and 
Rogers (2002), Lin et al. (2008) 
2. Financial distress variables 
Leverage 
Ratio of total debt to capital ratio; 
total debt / (total debt + market 
value of equity + book value of 
preference shares) 
Deesomsak et al. (2004), Bartram et al. 
(2009) 
Current ratio Ratio of current assets / current liabilities Marsden and Prevost (2005) 
Dividends Dummy variable that equals 1 if dividend was paid, otherwise 0 Bartram et al. (2009) 
ROA Net income/ total assets Allayannis and Ofek (2001), Bartram et al. (2009) 
Tangible assets Total assets – intangibles / total assets 
Howton and Perfect (1998), Bartram et 
al. (2009) 
3. Underinvestment variables 
R&D expenditure Ratio of R&D expenses / net sales or revenues 
Nance et al. (1993), Fok et al. (1997), 
Géczy et al. (1997), Gay and Nam 
(1998), Howton and Perfect (1998), 
Allayannis and Ofek (2001), Graham 
and Rogers (2002), Bartram et al. 
(2009) 
Capital 
expenditure  
Ratio of PPE to firm size, measured 
as book value of debt and 
preference shares plus market value 
of equity 
Géczy et al. (1997) 
4. Economies of scale and industry factors 
Firm size  Log of the book value of total assets as a proxy for size 
Hagelin and Pramborg (2006), Birt et 
al. (2013) 
Foreign income Ratio of pre-tax foreign income to total revenue 
Géczy et al. (1997), Heaney and 
Winata (2005), Bartram et al. (2009), 
Ameer (2010) 
Industry 
environment 
1= Energy, 2= Industrials, 3 = 
Materials, 4= Consumer 
discretionary, 5 = Health care, 6 = 
IT 
Campello et al. (2011) 
Note: This table presents the independent firm variables used in this thesis to examine cross-sectional differences 
in hedging behaviour in Chapter Four. These variables have also been used as control variables for the regression 
models examining firm value in Chapter Five. Example of previous studies refers to the empirical literature where 
these definitions were used.  
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3.6 Summary statistics 
A breakdown of hedging decisions by country and industry over the five-year period 
is presented in Table 3.9. Canadian firms in the sample hedge more than Australian 
ones, with 46.2 per cent of firms using derivatives in Canada compared to only 32.0 
per cent of firms in Australia. This is also the case for most industries, except for 
Consumer Discretionary firms, where 53.5 per cent of Australian firms use derivatives 
versus 51.1 per cent of Canadian ones. In both countries, firms in the Health Care 
industry report the lowest percentage of derivative use, with only 16.0 per cent of 
Australian firms and 23.1 per cent of Canadian firms using derivatives.  
Table 3.9 Derivative use by industry 2009 - 2013 
 All firms No derivatives  Some derivatives Derivatives 
 N % N % N % N % 
Panel A: Australia  
Energy   445 100.0 322 72.4 38  8.5 85 19.1 
Industrials   455 100.0 174 38.2 58 12.8 223 49.0 
Materials   420 100.0 238 56.7 34  8.1 148 35.2 
Consumer Discretionary   460 100.0 171 37.4 43  9.4 246 53.5 
Health Care   475 100.0 338 71.4 61 12.8  76 16.0 
IT   360 100.0 258 71.7 43 11.9  59 16.4 
All firms 2,615 100.0 1,501 57.4 277 10.6 837 32.0 
Panel B: Canada  
Energy   420 100.0 181 43.10 16 3.81 223 53.1 
Industrials   315 100.0  97 30.79 40 12.70 178 56.5 
Materials   435 100.0 228 52.41 47 10.80 160 36.8 
Consumer Discretionary   235 100.0  87 37.02 28 11.91 120 51.1 
Health Care   130 100.0  90 69.23 10 7.69  30 23.1 
 IT   155 100.0  80 51.61  6 3.87  69 44.5 
All firms 1,690 100.0 763 45.15 147 8.70 780 46.2 
Note: This table presents the derivative use by industry for the total sample of firms from 2009 - 2013 by country. 
No derivatives describes firms that do not use derivatives, Some derivatives describes firms that have used 
derivatives during the financial year but have no derivatives outstanding at year-end, and Derivatives describes 
firms that use derivatives.    
 
The highest use of derivatives in Australia is in Consumer Discretionary industry with 
53.3 per cent. In Canada Industrials have the highest proportion of derivative use with 
56.5 per cent of firms. Whether differences between country and industry derivative 
use are statistically significant will be examined in Chapter Four.   
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Table 3.10 presents descriptive statistics for the ratio of fair value of derivatives scaled 
by total assets over the five-year timeframe, which is used in this thesis as a proxy for 
the extent of hedging with derivatives. Despite Canadian firms having a higher 
propensity to use derivative instruments with 46.2 per cent of sample firms reporting 
derivative use compared to only 32.0 per cent of Australian firms (see Table 3.9), the 
extent of hedging measured by the fair value of derivatives is higher for Australian 
firms. Once the decision to use derivatives has been made, Australian firms, on 
average, hedge to a larger extent relative to their size. Over the total sample period, 
the average fair value of derivatives is 0.0086 for Australian firms compared to 0.0066 
for Canadian firms. However, Canadian firms report a higher extent of derivative use 
for three industries. For example, Canadian Energy firms have a fair value of 
derivative ratio of 0.0065 compared to 0.0041 of Australian firms. Also, Canadian 
Health Care and IT firms have derivative fair value ratios of 0.0021 and 0.0027 
compared to 0.0018 and 0.0024 of Australian firms, respectively. On the other hand, 
the extent of derivative use is higher for Australian Industrials and Materials firms. 
These firms report average derivative fair value ratios of 0.0136 and 0.0193 compared 
to 0.0068 and 0.0069 for Canadian firms, respectively. Detailed year-by year statistics 
ratio are included in Appendices D.1 and D.2. 
Table 3.10 Descriptive statistics: Derivative fair values by industry 2009 - 2013 
 N Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Panel A: Australia  
Energy   445 0.0041 0.0000 0.0191 0.0000 0.2532 
Industrials   454 0.0136 0.0000 0.0445 0.0000 0.4835 
Materials   416 0.0193 0.0000 0.1121 0.0000 1.7844 
Consumer Discretionary   459 0.0102 0.0003 0.0286 0.0000 0.2990 
Health Care   475 0.0018 0.0000 0.0095 0.0000 0.1384 
IT   360 0.0024 0.0000 0.0106 0.0000 0.1077 
All firms 2,609 0.0086 0.0000 0.0512 0.0000 1.7844 
Panel B: Canada  
Energy   414 0.0065 0.0001 0.0376 0.0000 0.7361 
Industrials   296 0.0068 0.0001 0.0261 0.0000 0.2496 
Materials   432 0.0069 0.0000 0.0302 0.0000 0.3152 
Consumer Discretionary   232 0.0104 0.0000 0.0357 0.0000 0.2919 
Health Care   130 0.0021 0.0000 0.0109 0.0000 0.1135 
IT   155 0.0027 0.0000 0.0069 0.0000 0.0559 
All firms 1,659 0.0066 0.0000 0.0301 0.0000 0.7361 
Note: This table presents descriptive statistics for the ratio of derivatives fair values scaled by total assets by 
industry over the total sample period 2009 – 2013. 
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Descriptive statistics for Tobin’s Q, the measure of firm value used in this thesis, are 
presented in Table 3.11 for the overall period from 2009 to 2013.  
Table 3.11 Descriptive statistics: Tobin’s Q by industry 2009 - 2013 
 N Mean Median Std. Dev Min. Max. 
Panel A: Australia  
Energy   443 0.3436 0.2995 0.8149 -2.1335 2.9526 
Industrials   455 0.0846 0.0092 0.6045 -1.4842 1.8432 
Materials   416 0.4577 0.4252 0.8894 -1.7665 7.8761 
Consumer Discretionary   460 0.3524 0.1583 0.8456 -1.9428 4.6661 
Health Care   463 0.8738 0.8650 1.2240 -3.8757 6.2253 
IT   348 0.7567 0.5442 1.3924 -1.5298 8.3674 
All firms 2,585 0.4685 0.3209 1.0157 -3.8757 8.3674 
Panel B: Canada  
Energy   420 0.2899 0.2625 0.5449 -1.5096 1.9544 
Industrials   315 0.2563 0.1885 0.5676 -1.3951 3.2210 
Materials   434 0.5272 0.5059 0.7595 -3.0067 3.2217 
Consumer Discretionary   235 0.1605 0.1024 0.5881 -1.3238 2.4116 
Health Care   119 1.3663 1.0386 1.1995 -0.7493 6.8947 
IT   149 0.6035 0.4824 0.9428 -1.7530 5.0271 
All firms 1,672 0.4315 0.3403 0.7757 -3.0067 6.8947 
Note: This table presents descriptive statistics for Tobin’s Q by industry over the total sample period 2009 – 2013. 
Tobin’s Q is defined as the sum of the market value of equity, the book value of debt and preference shares, divided 
by the sum of the book values of equity, debt and preference shares.  
Overall, Australian firms in the sample have higher firm value proxied by Tobin’s Q 
with a ratio of 0.4685 compared to 0.4315 for Canadian firms, respectively. Year-by-
year data included in Appendices D.3 and D.4 show that this also holds for four out of 
the five years under investigation. For 2009, Tobin’s Q for Australian firms is 0.4110 
compared to 0.3885 for Canadian firms, for 2011 it is 0.5621 compared to 0.4419, for 
2012 it is 0.4151 compared to 0.3762 and for 2013 it is 0.3378 compared to 0.3346. 
Only in 2010 can a higher Tobin’s Q be observed for Canadian firms with 0.0.6169 
compared to 0.5367 for Australian ones, respectively. This might be explained with 
the difference in timing of the financial years between Australia and Canada. As the 
2010 financial year for Australian firms finished on 30 June 2010 compared to 31 
December 2010 for Canadian firms, the 2010 figures for Australian firms are closer to 
the GFC which was characterised by a sharp decline in global equity prices, whereas 
the 2010 figures for Canadian firms were estimated six months later. This means that 
at least one of the market prices for the sampled Canadian firms might have already 
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rebounded on the share market, leading to higher share values compared to Australian 
firms for this particular year.  
On an industry level, Tobin’s Q is also higher for Australian Energy, Consumer 
Discretionary and IT firms, with 0.3436, 0.3524 and 0.7567, respectively. This 
compares to 0.2899, 0.1605 and 0.6035 for Canadian firms from the same industry, 
respectively. Also, Australian Industrials firms have the lowest Tobin’s Q with a ratio 
of 0.0846, compared to 0.2563 for Canadian firms, respectively. On the other hand, 
Tobin’s Q for Canadian Consumer Discretionary firms in this sample is only 0.1605 
compared to 0.3524 for Australian firms, respectively.   
 
Table 3.12 Descriptive statistics: Independent variables all firms 2009 - 2013 
 Mean Median Std. Dev Min. Max. 
Panel A: Australia (N=2,615) 
Tax losses 0.0089 0.0000 0.0416 0.0000 0.8306 
Leverage 0.1591 0.0528 0.2127 0.0000 0.9843 
Current ratio 5.5099 1.9531 16.5186 0.0000 294.7395 
Dividends 0.3992 0.0000 0.4898 0.0000 1.0000 
ROA 0.7432 0.0069 41.3567 -392.5171 1709.3431 
Tangible assets 0.9402 1.0000 0.1438 0.0000 1.0000 
R&D expenditure 1.0362 0.0000 7.1086 -0.0478 170.4103 
Capital expenditure 0.3369 0.1368 0.5012 0.0000 6.5509 
Firm size 11.6389 11.4920 2.1277 3.3911 19.2221 
Foreign income 0.2466 0.0000 0.5371 0.0000 21.0054 
Panel B: Canada (N=1,690) 
Tax losses 0.0050 0.0000 0.0203 0.0000 0.5310 
Leverage 0.1901 0.1193 0.2182 0.0000 0.9942 
Current ratio 4.0855 1.9782 11.2872 0.0390 250.8471 
Dividends 0.4491 0.0000 0.4976 0.0000 1.0000 
ROA -0.0441 0.0223 0.4043 -6.9326 2.6800 
Tangible assets 0.9405 0.9946 0.1178 0.0997 1.0000 
R&D expenditure 0.3664 0.0000 4.3860 -0.1933 141.4878 
Capital expenditure 0.4723 0.3219 0.6993 0.0000 21.2879 
Firm size 12.9812 12.8807 1.8359 6.4297 18.0401 
Foreign income 0.3744 0.1845 0.3980 0.0000 1.0000 
Note: This table presents descriptive statistics of independent variables for the total samples of Australian and 
Canadian firms. Year by year descriptive statistics can be found in Appendix D. 
 
Descriptive statistics of independent variables over the total timeframe are presented 
in Table 3.12, and year-by year figures have been included in Appendix D.5 and D.6 
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for Australia and Canada, respectively. It can be observed that firms in the Australian 
sample have a larger current ratio of 5.5 compared to 4.1, and larger R&D expenditure 
with 1.0362 compared to 0.336, for Australian and Canadian firms, respectively. 
Canadian firms are higher leveraged, with a ratio of 0.1901 compare to 0.1591, are 
larger with a size ratio of 12.9815 compared to 11.6389 and have a larger foreign 
income ratio with 0.3744 compared to 0.2466 for Canadian and Australian firms, 
respectively.  
Differences in means between derivative users and firms that do not use derivatives 
are presented in Table 3.13. Year-by-year differences can be found in Appendix E.1 
and E.2. No statistical difference for tax losses can be observed between Canadian 
derivative users and non-users. Canadian derivative users report average tax losses of 
0.0047 compared to 0.0053 for derivative users and non-users, respectively. The p-
value is 0.5894, which is not statistically significant.  
For Australian firms, the difference in means for tax losses are not as expected. Here, 
derivative users report lower average tax losses of 0.0045 compared to non-users 
reporting tax losses of 0.0109. This difference in means is statistically significant at 
p<0.001.This might indicate that despite the theoretical explanation that tax losses 
motivate derivative use (Graham and Smith, 1999), the tax incentives are less of a 
motivation compared to other hedging determinants as suggested by previous studies 
(Chen-Miao and Smith, 2007; Fok et al., 1997; Géczy et al., 1997; Graham and Rogers, 
2002; Nance et al., 1993). No statistically significant differences in means can be 
observed for tax losses between Canadian derivative users and non-users (p>0.1). 
Next, for both countries derivatives users have higher leverage than firms that do not 
hedge, which is consistent with the literature that hedging promotes increased debt 
capacity (Graham and Rogers, 2002).  Australian derivative users have a leverage ratio 
of 0.2528 compared to 0.1150 for firms that do not hedge, respectively. Canadian 
derivative users have a leverage ratio of 0.2478 compared to 0.1407 for firms that do 
not hedge, respectively. Both differences in means are statistically significant at 
p<0.001. Moreover, hedging firms are less liquid across both countries supporting the 
view that financial distress costs provide incentives to use derivatives (Tufano, 1996; 
Fok at al., 1997). For Australia, firms that hedge report a current ratio of 2.3546 
compared to 6.9952 for firms that do not hedge. This difference in means is statistically 
significant at p<0.001. Similarly, in Canada, derivative users have a current ratio of 
2.0386 compared to 5.8399 for non-derivative users. Again, the difference in means is 
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statistically significant at p<0.001. Hedging firms also have a propensity to pay 
dividends, suggesting that hedging supports a stable dividend policy by protecting 
future cash flows from adverse market movements (Géczy et al., 1997). For Australia, 
71.2 per cent of sampled firms pay a dividend compared to only 25.2 per cent on of 
non-derivative users, which is statistically significant at p<0.001. Similarly, 57.6 per 
cent of Canadian derivative users pay dividends compared to only 34.1 per cent of 
firms that do not pay derivatives. This difference in proportions is statistically 
significant at p<0.001. This supports the view that firms hedge to protect cash flows 
to investors, although previous results testing this relationship have been inconclusive 
(Bartram et al., 2009; Berkman and Bradbury, 1996; Dionne and Garand, 2003; Fok 
et al., 1997; Gay and Nam, 1998; Haushalter, 2000).   
More profitable firms are expected to have less of a need for hedging due to lower 
financial distress costs (Nance et al., 1993). However, this cannot be observed from 
Table 3.13. There is no statistically significant difference with regards to ROA for 
derivative users and firms that do not use derivatives for Australian firms (p>0.1). 
Moreover, Canadian firms that hedge report a ROA ratio of 0.0213 compared to a 
negative ROA of -0.1001 for firms that do not hedge at p<0.001. 
Consistent with the underinvestment hypothesis, derivative users in both countries 
have higher capital expenditure (Bartram et al., 2009; Nguyen and Faff, 2002). 
Australian derivatives users report a capital expenditure ratio of 0.3895 compared to 
0.3121, which is statistically significant at the one per cent level. This is confirmed for 
Canadian derivative users, which can be observed to have a capital expenditure ratio 
of 0.5309 compared to 0.4221, for derivative users and firms that do not hedge, 
respectively. This difference in means is statistically different at p<0.01. Contradictory 
to expectations, hedging firms have slightly higher tangible assets compared to firms 
that do not hedge. In Australia, derivative users report a tangible asset ratio of 0.9530 
compared to 0.9342 for non-derivative users, which is statistically significantly 
different at p<0.01. In Canada, derivative users report 0.9462 compared to 0.9355 for 
the tangible asset ratio, but this difference is only statistically significantly at p<0.1. 
Contrary to expectations, the R&D ratio as a proxy for underinvestment costs is not 
larger for derivate users in both countries, although this has been mostly confirmed in 
the empirical literature (Allayannis and Ofek, 2001; Fok et al., 1997; Gay and Nam, 
1998; Géczy et al., 1997; Howton and Perfect, 1998; Nance et al., 1993). For Australia, 
derivative users report a ratio of 0.1270 compared to 1.4642 for firms that do not hedge 
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with derivatives, respectively. In Canada, derivative users report a ratio of 0.0421 
compared to 0.6444 for derivative users and non-users, respectively. In both cases the 
differences in means are statistically different at p<0.001 and p<0.01, respectively. 
 
Table 3.13 Differences in means: Independent variables 2009 - 2013 
 
Exp. 
relationship 
Means (^Proportions) t-test p-value 
 All firms Derivative users (D) 
No derivatives 
(ND) D vs. ND 
Panel A: Australia  N=2,615 N=837 N=1,778  
Tax losses D > ND 0.0089 0.0045 0.0109 0.0002*** 
Leverage D > ND 0.1591 0.2528 0.1150 0.0000*** 
Current ratio D < ND 5.5099 2.3546 6.9952 0.0000*** 
Dividends^ ? 0.3992 0.7121 0.2520 0.0000*** 
ROA D < ND 0.7432 0.0360 1.0761 0.5486 
Tangible assets D < ND 0.9402 0.9530 0.9342 0.0017*** 
R&D expenditure D > ND 1.0362 0.1270 1.4642 0.0000*** 
Capital expenditure D > ND 0.3369 0.3895 0.3121 0.0002*** 
Firm size ? 11.6389 13.3474 10.8347 0.0000*** 
Foreign income D > ND 0.2466 0.2950 0.2238 0.0015*** 
Panel B: Canada  N=1,690 N=910 N=780  
Tax losses D > ND 0.0050 0.0047 0.0053 0.5894 
Leverage D > ND 0.1901 0.2478 0.1407 0.0000*** 
Current ratio D < ND 4.0855 2.0386 5.8399 0.0000*** 
Dividends^ ? 0.4491 0.5756 0.3407 0.0000*** 
ROA D < ND -0.0441 0.0213 -0.1001 0.0000*** 
Tangible assets D < ND 0.9405 0.9462 0.9355 0.0629* 
R&D expenditure D > ND 0.3664 0.0421 0.6444 0.0049*** 
Capital expenditure D > ND 0.4723 0.5309 0.4221 0.0014*** 
Firm size ? 12.9812 13.6365 12.4195 0.0000*** 
Foreign income D > ND 0.3744 0.3901 0.3609 0.1334 
Note: This table presents the differences in means for derivatives users (Derivative users) and firms that do not use 
derivatives (No derivatives) for the independent variables. The t-test on Dividends^ compares the differences in 
proportions between derivatives users (Derivative users) and firms that do not use derivatives (No derivatives).  
The column Exp. relationship describes the expected relationship between firms that use derivatives and those that 
do not. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
It can also be observed that for both country samples derivative users tend to be 
significantly larger than non-users, which is consistent with the results of previous 
research that larger firms hedge more due to economies of scale (Nance et al. 1993). 
Australian derivative users have a size ratio of 13.3474 compared to 10.8347 for non-
derivative users, with a difference in means that is statistically different at p<0.001. 
For Canadian firms, a size ratio of 13.6365 compared to 12.4195 can be observed for 
derivative users and firms that do not use derivatives, respectively. Again, this 
difference is statistically significant at p<0.001. 
 
 
	 113 
For Canadian firms, no significant statistical difference can be observed for foreign 
income between derivative users or non-users (p>0.1). However, for the Australian 
sample, the expected relationship can be confirmed with derivative users reporting a 
foreign income ratio of 0.2950 per cent compared to 0.2238 for firms that do not hedge, 
respectively, which is significantly different at p<0.01.  
Finally, Tables 3.14 and 3.15 report average pairwise correlations between variables 
for the total period 2009 to 2013 for Australia and Canada, respectively. For the 
Australian sample, the highest correlation over the total period is between firm size 
and the dependent derivative dummy variable. The correlation coefficient is 0.55, 
which is statistically significant at p<0.05. All other correlations are less than 0.50. 
Year-by-year correlation matrices for the Australian sample are provided in Appendix 
F Correlation matrices F.1 to F.5, where it can be observed that this correlation 
between firm size and derivative use is also consistently above 0.5 from 2009 to 2013 
(0.5873, p<0.05; 0.5452, p<0.05; 0.5050, p<0.05; 0.05446, p<0.05; 0.5755 p<0.05; for 
2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2013, respectively). In addition, two correlations are 
above 0.5 in 2013 for the Australian sample. The correlation between firm size and the 
dividend dummy is 0.5153 and the correlation between capital expenditure and 
Tobin’s Q is -0.5167, respectively. Both correlations are statistically significant at the 
at p<0.05. 
Table 3.15 presents the pairwise correlations for the Canadian sample. Further year-
by-year correlation can be found in Appendices F.6 to F.10. All correlations between 
variables are below 0.5. A correlation coefficient greater than 0.8 commonly indicates 
a strong linear association between variables (Panaretou, 2014), which is likely to 
impact parameter estimates in the subsequent analysis. Based on the correlation 
matrices presented here, no such problem exists.  
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Table 3.14 Correlation matrix Australia 2009 - 2013 
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Derivative ratio   0.2457**            
Tobin’s Q -0.1467** -0.1201**           
Tax losses -0.0723**   0.0024   0.1536**          
Leverage  0.3023**   0.1766** -0.3531** -0.0564**         
Current ratio -0.1311** -0.0379* -0.0294 -0.0173 -0.1723**        
Dividends   0.4383**   0.0111 -0.1020* -0.1289**   0.1743** -0.1344**       
ROA -0.0117 -0.0031  0.0175 -0.0121 -0.0174 -0.0061 -0.0131      
Tangible assets   0.0612** -0.0020 -0.0550** -0.0367*   0.0213   0.0684**   0.0752**  0.0097     
R&D expenditure -0.0878** -0.0210  0.1692**   0.0522** -0.0949**   0.0116 -0.1177**  0.0338* -0.0254    
Capital expenditure   0.0721**   0.1987** -0.4347** -0.0331*   0.2319** -0.0722** -0.0341* -0.0131   0.1533** -0.0665**   
Firm size    0.5510**   0.0852**  0.0907** -0.1175**   0.1758** -0.0773**   0.4712** -0.0277   0.1048** -0.0863**  0.0679**  
Foreign income   0.0619*   0.0099  0.0067   0.0012 -0.0424** -0.0473** -0.0336* -0.0094 -0.0210 -0.0434**  0.0329*  0.1065** 
Note: This table presents pairwise correlations between independent and derivative variables. Statistical significance at the 10% and 5% levels is indicated by * and **, respectively.  
  
 
 
	115 
Table 3.15 Correlation matrix Canada 2009 - 2013 
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Derivative ratio   0.2378**            
Tobin’s Q -0.1943** -0.1126**           
Tax losses -0.0131 -0.0059 -0.0463*          
Leverage   0.2447**   0.1457** -0.3694**  0.0165         
Current ratio -0.1679** -0.0402   0.0881** -0.0165 -0.1873**        
Dividends   0.2355** -0.0026 -0.0687** -0.0522**   0.1481** -0.1487**       
ROA   0.1498**   0.0760** -0.2267** -0.0008   0.0305 -0.0067  0.2243**      
Tangible assets   0.0453*   0.0324 -0.0234 -0.0130 -0.1749**   0.0881** -0.0880**   0.0323     
R&D expenditure -0.0685** -0.0166   0.0609** -0.0040   0.0336 -0.0002 -0.0618** -0.1730** -0.0259    
Capital expenditure   0.0776**  0.0448* -0.4282**  0.0584**   0.1888** -0.0683** -0.0522**   0.0435*   0.1793** -0.0349   
Firm size   0.3306** -0.0233   0.1284** -0.0724**   0.0588** -0.0316   0.4294**   0.2394**   0.0808** -0.0801**   0.0302  
Foreign income   0.0365 -0.0591**   0.0981**  0.0052 -0.1547** -0.0588** -0.0244    0.0669**   0.0307 -0.0000 -0.0782**  0.1046** 
Note: This table presents pairwise correlations between independent and derivative variables. Statistical significance at the 10% and 5% levels is indicated by * and **, respectively.  
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3.7 Overview of empirical analysis 
The research problem examined in this thesis is described in a numerical context. 
Therefore, quantitative research methods are used to investigate the hedging practices 
and value implications among Australian and Canadian firms.  
This chapter has analysed the data using descriptive statistics to probe relationships 
between variables, using total year-firm observations as well as year-by-year data to 
identify trends over time. The examinations were first conducted on a country level, 
testing the hypotheses for the Australian and the Canadian samples, respectively. The 
sample was then divided by industry classification to compare results from industries 
across both countries.  
To test the hypotheses from Section 3.1 this thesis tests for significant differences 
between country and industry sub-samples and uses panel data probit and tobit models 
to test the determinants of hedging decisions in Chapter Four, and fixed effect 
regressions as well as instrumental-variable regressions to examine the value effect of 
hedging in Chapter Five.  
Panel datasets combine cross-section and time series characteristics to analyse firm 
characteristics for different corporate entities over a specific timeframe (Brooks, 
2008). The main advantage is that individual differences are held constant to examine 
the marginal effects of each independent variable included in the model. Panel data 
have several advantages for analysing more complicated data sets. For example, the 
ability to control for individual heterogeneity, being able to study dynamic 
relationships and deriving more information from the data with less risk of collinearity 
between the examined variables (Baltagi, 2008). The data for the five-year period were 
grouped together by firms to create a panel data set with a total of 2,615 firm-year 
observations for Australian and 1,690 firm-year observations for Canadian firms.  
Chapter Four conducts various levels of analysis to examine derivative practices. First, 
univariate tests examine the differences in derivative practices in both countries. For 
example, two-sided t-tests and ANOVA models test Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3, which 
examine whether statistically significant differences in hedging practices across both 
countries and between industries exist. Second, this chapter uses multivariate analysis 
including probit and tobit models to examine hedging determinants including the 
importance of industry on the hedging decision.  
 
 
 117 
A rank test as part of probit and tobit analyses tests the overall industry effect, which 
is proposed by Hypothesis 4.   
Hypothesis 5 is tested by tabulating the ‘within’ variation of the decision to use 
derivatives by country. 
Probit models are developed to test Hypothesis 6 which states that cross-sectional 
differences in hedging decision can be related to a reduction in costs associated with 
taxes, underinvestment, financial distress and economies of scale. Probit analyses test 
the likelihood of a firm to use derivatives, and to use foreign exchange, interest rate 
and commodity derivatives, respectively. As these decisions are dichotomous, 
multiple linear regression is not appropriate and probit or logit models are preferred 
(Hair et al., 2010). Previous research testing various propositions as to what motivates 
hedging decisions has employed both probit or tobit models (Berkman et al., 2002; 
Heaney and Winata, 2005; Jalilvand, 1999; Nguyen and Faff, 2002). Although scaling 
differences exist between both models, Heaney and Winata (2005) report that there is 
little difference in the statistical test results from either model. Due to the simplicity in 
running the regression, a probit model was selected for this part of the analysis 
examining the determinants of derivatives, which is presented in Chapter Four. The 
way in which individual coefficients in a probit regression can be interpreted are 
limited, in that they do not tell us how much an increase in a predictor variable changes 
the outcome, but rather what the direction of influence of the independent variable is 
on the binary decision. For example, when modelling the decision to hedge, a positive 
coefficient for a dependent variable indicates that an increase in this variable leads to 
an increase in the predicted probability, in this case, the likelihood to use derivatives.  
Tobit models are used to examine cross-sectional differences relating to the extent of 
derivative use and to provide further evidence relating to Hypothesis 6. The extent of 
derivative use is proxied by the fair value of derivatives ratio as described in Table 
3.7. Tobit regressions are appropriate to examine the extent of hedging as they can be 
censored to zero (Hair et al., 2010). This accounts for the fact that the dependent 
variable, derivative usage, cannot be negative, which means that linear regression 
analysis cannot be used. For all tobit models in this thesis the data have been left-
censored, this means the lower limits have been set as zero. Firms that do not use 
derivatives are treated as zero. Tobit regressions have been commonly used in the 
empirical literature (Carneiro and Sherris, 2008; Nguyen and Faff, 2002; Tufano, 
1996), which allows for a comparison of findings from this thesis with previous results.  
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Results from both probit and tobit estimations will provide results on Hypothesis 6, 
which examines whether cross-sectional differences in hedging decisions can be 
explained using economic hedging rationales as discussed in Chapter Two.  
In Chapter Five, this thesis tests the direct value of derivatives in the following ways. 
First, univariate analysis is used to test for differences in firm value between firms that 
hedge and those that do not, which provides initial evidence relating to Hypothesis 7, 
which proposes that hedging creates value based on common hedging theories. 
Fixed effects panel data models are used in this thesis to examine the influence of 
variables which vary over time. In this case, the influence of hedging decisions on firm 
value is examined by itself (Hypothesis 7) and conditional on higher debt levels 
(Hypothesis 8) and for firms with increasing debt (Hypothesis 9). To address 
endogeneity concerns regarding hedging variables a Wu-Hausman test has been 
performed for all country and industry sub-samples. The results from these tests 
confirm that endogeneity issues exist on a country level. Therefore, an instrumental-
variable (IV) approach is appropriate to examine the value of hedging for Australian 
and Canadian firms. For the industry level analysis, results from both IV fixed effects 
and ordinary least square (OLS) fixed effects models are presented.  
 
3.8 Chapter conclusion  
This chapter develops the research hypotheses and discusses the research design of 
this thesis, which is used to investigate current hedging practices and the value effect 
of hedging decisions for Australian and Canadian non-financial firms.  
The data for this investigation have been collected from the top 100 listed firms from 
six industries, representing a large cross-section of each economy for a five-year 
period 2009 to 2013. The rationale for selecting this sample is that a broader cross-
section of firms will allow for more detailed conclusions to be made about current 
hedging practices and the direct value effect of derivatives in various industry 
environments. The two countries are suitable, based on comparable corporate 
governance and capital market environments that should provide similar country level 
incentives for managers to hedge with derivatives.  
This timeframe has been chosen for several reasons. First, the sample period follows 
a time of financial volatility which should have prompted firms to review their risk 
management practices and make conscious decisions about whether the use of 
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derivatives is a valuable hedging strategy. Given that current empirical studies on 
derivative practices after the GFC are sparse, this study closes an important gap in the 
empirical literature.  
Examining a five-year period following the events of the GFC also provides a robust 
number of years to examine whether corporate hedging choices are stable over time 
using panel data analysis, and whether direct benefits hedging decisions can be 
identified that create value. Also, derivative reporting practices have significantly 
improved and the reporting of fair values of outstanding derivatives at balance date 
has been mandatory in Australia since 2007. IFRS reporting practices were fully 
implemented in Australia by 2009 and Canadian firms have been in transition since 
2005, which makes their reporting of derivative usage more comparable among firms 
within each country.  
All derivative and financial data for the identified firms in the sample have been 
collected from published annual reports and the collated panel data are analysed with 
univariate and multivariate approaches, including tobit, logit, fixed effect and 
instrument-variable fixed effect regression models.  
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Chapter Four:  Industry Hedging Practices 
4.1 Chapter introduction 
This chapter explores how financial managers across non-financial industries in 
Australia and Canada choose to reduce risks through hedging with derivatives from 
2009 to 2013. To do so industry derivative practices, cross-sectional differences and 
determinants of hedging decisions will be examined for 523 Australian and 338 
Canadian firms from the Energy, Industrials, Materials, Consumer Discretionary, 
Health Care and IT industries.  
To address the overall research question of this thesis, whether hedging creates firm 
value, it is necessary to first examine whether firms hedge with derivatives, what type 
of market risks are addressed and what drives the decision to hedge and the extent of 
hedging, respectively. Most empirical evidence on these questions dates to a pre-GFC 
period with limited scope or with focus on specific industries or instruments (e.g. 
Nguyen and Faff, 2003a; Birt et al., 2013; Jalilvand et al. 2000; Smistad and 
Pustylnick, 2012), which has been presented in Chapter Two. Consequently, it is 
important to examine current hedging practices for Australian and Canadian firms to 
ascertain whether these decisions are consistent across countries and industries and 
remain stable over time before turning to the value of derivative use in Chapter Five.   
This chapter investigates the reported use of derivatives for hedging foreign exchange, 
interest rate and commodity risks in Australia and Canada from 2009 to 2013. It is 
expected that firms from the same industry in both countries make similar hedging 
decisions based on industry-specific hedging incentives (Hahnenstein and Röder, 
2006). Cross-sectional differences regarding the decision to hedge and the extent of 
hedging are examined, to test which hedging motives drive derivative decisions and 
whether consistencies can be identified that explain how hedging can be justified in 
light of the theoretical criticism of hedging irrelevance (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). 
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4.2 Methodology 
4.2.1 Hedging practices  
To examine hedging practices across Australia and Canada and across firms from the 
Energy, Industrials, Materials, Consumer Discretionary, Health Care and IT industry 
six research hypotheses developed in Chapter Three apply.  
Recall that Hypothesis 1 states that derivative use is not significantly different for non-
financial firms across Australia and Canada. Furthermore, Hypothesis 2 states that 
derivative use and types of risks hedged are not significantly different for firms in the 
same industry. To test these hypotheses about differences in country (Hypothesis 1) 
and industry hedging practices (Hypothesis 2), two-tailed t-tests for the difference in 
derivative use and extent of derivative use are conducted.  
These t-tests are conducted on a country and an industry level for the use of derivatives, 
the extent of derivative use, the use foreign exchange, interest rate and commodity risk 
derivatives, respectively. The t-tests compare whether differences in means between 
Australian and Canadian firms are zero. If the estimated p-values are less than pre-
specified confidence levels it can be concluded that the mean difference between 
grouped samples is statistically significantly greater than zero. This means that the 
estimated difference is significant and not caused by chance. For each statistical test 
the null and alternative hypotheses are: 
H0: pAUS - pCAN =0 
H1: pAUS - pCAN ≠0 
Hypothesis 3 proposes that derivative use is significantly different between industries. 
To test for differences in proportions of firms that use derivatives across Australian 
and Canadian industries, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) is conducted for 
each country sample (Hypothesis 3).  
The null and alternative hypotheses are: 
H0: µIndustry1 = µIndustry2 = µIndustry3 = µIndustry4   
= µIndustry5 = µIndustry6 
H1: at least two industry means are different 
These tests will provide evidence on whether observed differences in hedging practices 
between countries and industries are statistically significant.  
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Recall that Hypothesis 5 states that derivative activity is stable over time. To examine 
whether firms have significantly changed their hedging practices and moved between 
derivative policies, Hypothesis 5 is tested by examining the ‘variation within’ the 
decisions to hedge with derivatives, to not use derivatives or to use some derivatives 
across the investigated five-year time period by country. This is done by performing 
one-way tabulations on the panel data, which decompose variable counts of panel data 
into between and within components, providing a measure of overall stability of the 
examined variable.  
 
4.2.2 Hedging determinants: The hedging decision 
To examine the industry effect on the decision to hedge with derivatives and whether 
similar hedging motives can be identified, Hypothesis 4 and 6 are tested on a country 
level from 2009 to 2013. 
Recall that Hypothesis 4 proposes that the type of industry a firm belongs to 
significantly influences the decision to use derivatives. Based on common hedging 
theories, Hypothesis 6 states that cross-sectional differences in hedging are related to 
a reduction in costs associated with taxes, underinvestment, financial distress and 
economies of scale. These propositions are tested for firms in both countries to provide 
evidence on whether common hedging determinants can be identified. The firm’s 
likelihood to hedge, to hedge foreign exchange risks, interest rate risks, and 
commodity risks are examined using probit regression (Wolf et al., 2017). To ensure 
consistency with previous research examining the motivations behind the hedging 
decision, firms that have been initially classified as using ‘some’ derivatives have been 
included as non-hedging firms for all further analysis.  
 Accordingly, four panel data probit models are developed with which to conduct these 
analyses and to examine Hypotheses 4 and 6. There are limited ways in which probit 
regression coefficients can be interpreted. A positive coefficient indicates that an 
increase in the predictor variable leads to an increase in the likelihood to use 
derivatives, foreign exchange, interest rate or commodity risk derivatives, 
respectively. A negative coefficient means that an increase in the predictor results in a 
decrease of the predicted probability. 
To examine the influence of industry type on hedging decisions (Hypothesis 4), 
Models (1) to (4) presented below include industry dummies for the Energy, 
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Industrials, Materials, Consumer Discretionary and Health Care industries, which 
equal ‘1’ if a firm is from this industry, otherwise zero. A Chi2 -test is conducted on 
the overall industry effect on the examined hedging decisions.  
Model (1) tests Hypotheses 4 and 6 and considers the firm’s likelihood to hedge with 
derivatives, or with foreign exchange, interest rate or commodity risk derivatives, 
respectively. It is represented by Equation 1 as follows:   
LDFICit = a0 + b1 LEVit + b2 TAXL it + b3 CURit + b4DIVit +b5  ROA it + b6 TANG it +b7  RD it + 
b8CAPXit + b9  SIZE it + b10 FINCit + b11 ENERGYit + b12INDUSit + b13 MAT it +b14 CONSD it  + 
b15 HEALTHit ++eit 
 (1) 
Model (2) tests Hypotheses 4 and 6 and considers the firm’s likelihood to hedge using 
foreign exchange derivatives, and is represented by Equation 2 as follows: 
FXDit = a0 + b1  IRD it + b2  CDit + b3 LEV it + b4TAXL it + b5 CURit +b6  DIV it + b7  ROA it 
 +b8  TANG it + b9 RD it + b10  CAPX it + b11 SIZE it + b12  FINC it +  b13ENERGYit + b14  
INDUS it +b15  MAT it + b16  CONSD it +b15  HEALTH it  + eit  
 (2) 
Model (3) tests Hypotheses 4 and 6 and considers the firm’s likelihood to hedge using 
interest rate derivatives, and is represented by Equation 3 as follows: 
IRDit = a0 + b1 FXD it + b2 CDit + b3LEVit + b4TAXLit + b5 CURit +b6 DIV it + b7 ROA it +b8  
TANG it + b9 RD it + b10  CAPX it + b11 SIZE it + b12  FINC it +  b13ENERGYit +b14 
INDUS it +b15  MAT it + b16  CONSD it +b17 HEALTH it  + eit  
 (3) 
Model (4) tests Hypotheses 4 and 6 and considers the firm’s likelihood to hedge using 
commodity risk derivatives, and is represented by Equation 4 as follows: 
CDit = a0 + b1 FXD it + b2  IRDit + b3LEVit + b4TAXLit + b5 CURit +b6  DIV it + b7  ROA t 
 +b8  TANG it + b9RD + b10 CAPX it + b11  SIZE it + b12  FINC it + b13 ENERGY it +b14  
INDUS it +b15  MAT it + b16 CONSD it +b15  HEALTH it  + eit  
 (4) 
Where, LDFIC = likelihood of using derivatives, or using foreign exchange, interest 
rate, or commodity risk derivatives, respectively, FXD = likelihood of using foreign 
exchange derivatives, IRD = likelihood of using interest rate derivatives, CD = 
likelihood of using commodity risk derivatives, LEV = Leverage, TAXL = Tax losses, 
CUR = Current ratio, DIV = Dividends, ROA = Return on assets,  TANG = Tangible 
assets, RD = R&D expenditure, CAPX = Capital expenditure, SIZE = Firm size, FINC 
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= Foreign income, ENERGY = Energy, INDUS = Industrial, MAT = Materials, 
CONSD = Consumer Discretionary, and HEALTH = Health Care.  
LDFICit, is the hedging dummy variable used in Model (1) and equals ‘1’ if a company 
uses derivatives, or foreign exchange, interest rate or commodity risk derivatives for 
firm i in year t, otherwise zero. FXDit, IRDit and CDit represent hedging dummy 
variables used in Models (2), (3) and (4) which equal ‘1’ if a company uses foreign 
exchange, interest rate or commodity risk derivatives for firm i in year t, otherwise 
zero. Detailed definitions of the hedging variables are provided in Table 3.7 in Chapter 
Three.  
Industry dummies are included for firms from the Energy, Industrials, Materials, 
Consumer Discretionary and Health Care industry which equal ‘1’ if the firm is from 
this industry, otherwise zero. The IT industry has been omitted as the reference 
category. DIV it is a Dividend dummy variable and equals ‘1’ if a dividend is paid for 
firm i in year t, otherwise zero. Detailed definitions for Leverage, Tax losses, Current 
ratio, Dividends, Return on assets, Tangible assets, R&D expenditure, Capital 
expenditure, Firm size, and Foreign income are provided in Table 3.8 in Chapter 
Three. These variables are included to examine whether hedging theories related to 
taxes, underinvestment costs, financial distress and economies of scale influence the 
hedging decisions (Hypothesis 6). 
For an industry level examination of firm-specific hedging determinants, four 
additional probit models are developed with which to conduct these analyses and to 
further examine Hypothesis 6. 
Model (1a) tests Hypothesis 6 and considers the firm’s likelihood to hedge with 
derivatives, or with foreign exchange, interest rate or commodity risk derivatives, 
respectively. It is represented by Equation 1a as follows:   
LDFICit = a0 + b1 LEVit + b2  TAXL it + b3 CURit + b4DIVit +b5  ROA it + b6 TANG it +b7  RD it + 
b8CAPXit + b9  SIZE it + b10 FINCit ++eit 
 (1a) 
Model (2a) tests Hypothesis 6 and considers the firm’s likelihood to hedge using 
foreign exchange derivatives, and is represented by Equation 2a as follows: 
FXDit = a0 + b1  IRD it + b2 CDit + b3 LEV it + b4TAXL it + b5 CURit +b6  DIV it + b7  ROA it 
 +b8  TANG it + b9 RD it + b10  CAPX it + b11 SIZE it + b12  FINC it  + eit  
 (2a) 
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Model (3a) tests Hypothesis 6 and considers the firm’s likelihood to hedge using 
interest rate derivatives, and is represented by Equation 3a as follows: 
IRDit = a0 + b1 FXD it + b2 CDit + b3LEVit + b4TAXL it + b5 CURit +b6 DIV it + b7ROA it 
 +b8 TANG it + b9RD it + b10 CAPX it + b11 SIZE it + eit  
 (3a) 
Model (4a) tests Hypothesis 6 and considers the firm’s likelihood to hedge using 
commodity risk derivatives, and is represented by Equation 4a as follows: 
CDit = a0 + b1 FXD it + b2 IRDit + b3LEVit + b4TAXL it + b5 CURit +b6  DIV it + b7  ROA it 
 +b8  TANG it + b9RDit + b10  CAPX it + b11 SIZE it + b12  FINC it + eit  
 (4a) 
Where, LDFIC = likelihood of using derivatives, or using foreign exchange, interest 
rate, or commodity risk derivatives, respectively, FXD = likelihood of using foreign 
exchange derivatives, IRD = likelihood of using interest rate derivatives, CD = 
likelihood of using commodity risk derivatives, LEV = Leverage, TAXL = Tax losses, 
CUR = Current ratio, DIV = Dividends, ROA = Return on assets,  TANG = Tangible 
assets, RD = R&D expenditure, CAPX = Capital expenditure, SIZE = Firm size, FINC 
= Foreign income.  
LDFICit, is the hedging dummy variable used in Model (1a) and equals ‘1’ if a 
company uses derivatives, or foreign exchange, interest rate or commodity risk 
derivatives for firm i in year t, otherwise zero. FXDit, IRDit and CDit represent hedging 
dummy variables used in Models (2a), (3a) and (4a) and equal ‘1’ if a company uses 
foreign exchange, interest rate or commodity risk derivatives for firm i in year t, 
otherwise zero. Detailed definitions of all hedging variables are provided in Table 3.7 
in Chapter Three. 
DIV it is a dummy variable and equals ‘1’ if a dividend is paid for firm i in year t, 
otherwise zero. Detailed definitions for Leverage, Tax losses, Current ratio,  
Dividends, Return on assets, Tangible assets, R&D expenditure, Capital expenditure, 
Firm size, and Foreign income are provided in Table 3.8 in Chapter Three. These 
variables are included to investigate hedging theories which propose that taxes, 
underinvestment costs, financial distress and economies of scale influence the decision 
to hedge (Hypothesis 6). 
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4.2.3 Hedging determinants: The extent of hedging 
The last hedging decision examined in this chapter relates to the extent of hedging 
which is proxied by the ratio of derivative fair value presented in Table 3.7 in Chapter 
Three. This variable has been used previously to proxy how active firms hedge their 
risk exposures (Graham and Rogers, 2002; Nguyen and Faff, 2010).  
Similar to the analyses of binary hedging decisions, Hypothesis 4 and 6 are tested on 
a country level from 2009 to 2013 to examine whether consistent hedging motives 
including an overall industry effect for Australian and Canadian firms can be 
identified. It is expected that the same hedging motivations from the theoretical 
literature provide explanations for cross-sectional differences except for firm size. A 
panel data tobit model is developed to examine Hypotheses 4 and 6.  
To examine the influence of industry type on hedging decisions (Hypothesis 4), 
Models (1) to (4) presented below include industry dummies for the Energy, 
Industrials, Materials, Consumer Discretionary and Health Care industries, which 
equal ‘1’ if a firm is from this industry, otherwise zero. A Chi2-test is conducted on the 
overall industry effect on the examined hedging decisions.  
Model (5) tests Hypotheses 4 and 6 and considers the determinants on the extent of 
derivative use. It is represented by Equation 5 as follows: 
DFVit =  a0 + b1 LEVit + b2 TAXLit + b3CURit + b4DIVit + b5 ROA it +b6 TANG it + b7 RD it  + 
b8 CAPX it + b9 SIZE it + b10 FINC it + b11 ENERGYit + b12  NDUSit  + b13MAT it  
 + b14  CONSD it +b15 HEALTH it  ++eit  
                     (5) 
Where, DFV=extent of derivative use, LEV = Leverage, TAXL = Tax losses, CUR = 
Current ratio, DIV = Dividends, ROA = Return on assets,  TANG = Tangible assets, 
RD = R&D expenditure, CAPX = Capital expenditure, SIZE = Firm size, FINC = 
Foreign income, ENERGY = Energy, INDUS = Industrial, MAT = Materials, CONSD 
= Consumer Discretionary, and HEALTH = Health Care.  
DFVit is the hedging variable in Model (5) and describes the extent of derivative use 
for firm i in year t. A detailed definition is provided in Table 3.7 in Chapter Three.  
Industry dummies are included for firms from the Energy, Industrials, Materials, 
Consumer Discretionary and Health Care industries which equal ‘1’ if the firm is from 
this industry, otherwise zero. The IT industry has been omitted as the reference 
category.  
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DIVit is a dummy variable and equals ‘1’ if a dividend is paid for firm i in year t, 
otherwise zero. Variables for Leverage, Tax losses, Current ratio, Dividends, Return 
on assets, Tangible assets, R&D expenditure, Capital expenditure, Firm size and 
Foreign income are included to investigate hedging determinants proposed in 
Hypothesis 5. Detailed definitions for Leverage, Tax losses, Current ratio, Dividends, 
Return on assets, Tangible assets, R&D expenditure, Capital expenditure, Firm size, 
and Foreign income are provided in Table 3.8 in Chapter Three. The dependent 
variables are included to investigate hedging theories related to taxes, underinvestment 
costs, financial distress and economies of scale influences (Hypothesis 6). 
Finally, a probit model was developed which to test Hypothesis 6 on an industry level. 
Model (5a) tests Hypothesis 6 and considers the determinants on the extent of 
derivative use. It is represented by Equation 5a as follows: 
DFVit =  a0 + b1 LEV it + b2 TAXLit + b3CURit + b4DIVit + b5 ROA it +b6 TANG it + b7 RD it +
 b8 CAPX it + b9 SIZE it + b10 FINCit  ++eit  
                      (5a) 
Where, DFV=extent of derivative use, LEV = Leverage, TAXL = Tax losses, CUR = 
Current ratio, DIV = Dividends, ROA = Return on assets, TANG = Tangible assets, 
RD = R&D expenditure, CAPX = Capital expenditure, SIZE = Firm size, FINC = 
Foreign income.  
DFVit is the hedging variable in Model (5a) and describes the extent of derivative use 
for firm i in year t. A detailed definition is provided in Table 3.7 in Chapter Three. 
Detailed definitions for Leverage, Tax losses, Current ratio, Dividends, Return on 
assets, Tangible assets, R&D expenditure, Capital expenditure, Firm size, and Foreign 
income are provided in Table 3.8 in Chapter Three.  
All probit and tobit models use the same independent firm-level variables related to 
theories that describe how hedging reduces costs associated with taxes, 
underinvestment costs, financial distress and economies of scale (Hypothesis 6).  All 
predictions for the relationships between independent variables on the decision to use 
derivatives, or on the extent of hedging are expected to be the same except for firm 
size which is expected to have a negative relationship with the extent of hedging as 
discussed by Nguyen and Faff (2002). This is because once a hedging program has 
been implemented, smaller firms are expected to gain more from derivative use. 
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4.3 Results: Hedging practices 
4.3.1 Hedging practices in Australia and Canada 
This section presents univariate results for the country analyses that examine 
Hypotheses 1,2,3 and 5.  
Panel A in Table 4.1 shows results of univariate comparisons of hedging activity for 
Australian and Canadian firms. These results show that 32.0 per cent of Australian 
firms and 46.6 of Canadian firms use derivatives. This difference in means is 
statistically significant at p<0.001. This is surprising as derivative use was expected to 
be not significantly different across Australia and Canada (Hypothesis 1).   
These results might be explained by the fact that Canadian firms in the sample are 
larger, more leveraged and report higher tax losses and a higher percentage of foreign 
income than Australian firms as reported earlier in Table 3.12 in Chapter Three. For 
example, Canadian firms report a leverage ratio of 19.0 per cent compared to 15.9 per 
cent of Australian firms, and a foreign income ratio of 37.4 per cent compared to 24.6 
per cent for Canadian and Australian firms, respectively (Table 3.12).  
Table 4.1 Country level hedging practices across 2009-2013  
 Australia (N=2,615) 
Canada 
(N=1,690) 
Difference in 
means p-Value 
Panel A: Average derivative use 
No derivatives 0.5739 0.4514 0.1225 0.0000*** 
Some derivative use 0.1059 0.0870 0.0189 0.0417** 
Derivative users 0.3201 0.4615 -0.1415 0.0000*** 
Derivative users incl. some  0.4260 0.5485 -0.1225 0.0000*** 
Panel B: Extent of derivative use 
Derivatives fair value  0.0270 0.0143 0.0126 0.0004*** 
Panel C: Market risks hedged  
FX derivatives 0.2990 0.3674 -0.06841 0.0000*** 
IR derivatives 0.1985 0.1917 0.0067 0.5856 
Commodity derivatives 0.0784 0.2124 -0.1340 0.0000*** 
Note: This table presents country level hedging activity for Australian and Canadian firms proxied by the use of 
derivatives. No derivatives, Some derivative use and Derivative users represent the different hedging decisions for 
firms in each country sample. Extent of derivative use refers to the decision on how much firms hedge with 
derivatives once the decision has been made to use derivative instruments (Australia N=831, Canada N=749). This 
is proxied by Derivatives fair value scaled by total assets. FX derivatives, IR Derivatives and Commodity 
derivatives indicate the use of foreign exchange, interest rate derivatives and commodity risk derivatives, 
respectively. Differences in means are tested using two-tailed t-tests. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
Results on the overall proportions of derivative use are also considerably lower than 
previously reported in the academic literature (Table 2.8). For example, Nguyen and 
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Faff (2002) have reported that 74.2 per cent of sampled firms in 1990 and 2000 use 
derivatives. Bartram et al. (2009; 2011) examine Australian and Canadian firms using 
pooled data from 2000 to 2001. These studies report that derivative usage is 66.6 per 
cent and 66.4 per cent in Australia, and 59.9 per cent and 60.3 per cent in Canada, 
respectively.  
Nelson et al. (2005) investigate the impact of hedging by publicly listed US firms on 
equity from 1995 to 1999 and state that only 21.6 per cent of firms in their sample use 
derivatives, which is significantly lower than reported previously. The authors point 
out that this might be due to the fact that most empirical hedging studies focus on 
samples of larger firms (Géczy et al., 1997; Hentschel and Kothari, 2001), which have 
an increased propensity to use derivatives due to economies of scale (Nance et al., 
1993). As a robustness test, a univariate comparison of derivative use has been 
conducted to verify whether firm size might explain the relatively low proportions of 
derivative use presented in Panel A in Table 4.1. For this purpose, firms have been 
partitioned by median firm size. Unreported results show that among larger firms 50.9 
per cent of Australian firms and 60.4 per cent of Canadian firms use derivatives which 
is more consistent with earlier results. This difference in means is statistically 
significant at p<0.001. 
Panel A in Table 4.1 also includes a test for the difference in means for firms that have 
stated to either use or to have used derivatives throughout the financial year. If firms 
report to have used derivatives for hedging throughout the year but have closed their 
outstanding positions they are classified as firms with Some derivative use for the 
purpose of this research. A univariate comparison shows that the proportions of 
derivatives users increases to 42.6 per cent and 54.9 per cent for Australian and 
Canadian firms, respectively, when the hedging classification is extended to include 
some derivative use. The difference in means between countries is statistically 
significant at p<0.001.  
This is closer to previous results on hedging practices, however, overall current 
hedging practices in Australia and Canada seem relatively low in comparison with 
earlier research. This is especially the case considering the experience of the global 
market turmoil following the onset of the GFC in 2008-2009. One might expect an 
increased propensity for firms in open economies to use derivatives for risk 
management purposes due to heightened awareness of risk exposures, which is not the 
case.  
 
 
 130 
Overall, results presented in Panel A in Table 4.1 indicate that statistically significant 
differences exist between the proportions of firms in each country that decide to use 
derivatives, which is also robust to firm size and alternative specifications for 
derivative users.  
Panel B in Table 4.1 reports results on differences in means of the extent of hedging, 
which is measured by the derivatives fair value ratio. Interestingly, when comparing 
the extent to which derivatives are used, Australian firms hedge to a larger extent 
compared to Canadian ones. Results show that Australian derivative users report a 2.7 
per cent total fair value derivative ratio compared to 1.4 per cent of Canadian firms. 
The difference in means is statistically significant at p<0.001.  
Finally, differences in means between the use of derivative instruments that hedge 
foreign exchange, interest and commodity risk derivatives are reported in Panel C in 
Table 4.1.  
Differences exist for the use of foreign exchange and commodity risk instruments. On 
average, 29.9 per cent of Australian and 36.7 per cent of Canadian firms use foreign 
exchange derivatives. Similarly, a smaller percentage of Australian firms use 
commodity risk derivatives with 7.8 per cent compared to 21.2 per cent of Canadian 
firms. Both differences in means are statistically significant at p<0.001. 
On the other hand, no statistically significant difference exists for the use of interest 
rate derivatives across countries. According to Panel C in Table 4.1, 19.9 per cent of 
Australian firms and 19.2 per cent of Canadian firms in the 2009 to 2013 sample use 
interest rate derivatives, respectively.  
Again, these figures are low compared to previous research. Bartram et al. (2009) 
report that 45.4 percent of Canadian firms use foreign exchange, 27.2 per cent use 
interest rate and 18.7 per cent use commodity risk derivatives, respectively. For the 
Australian sample, they report that 51.5 per cent, 42.3 per cent and 14.1 per cent of 
firms use foreign exchange, interest rate, and commodity risk derivatives, respectively.  
In both countries, foreign exchange derivatives are the most common hedging 
instruments, which is consistent with previous results by Bartram et al. (2009; 2011) 
and Nguyen and Faff (2002), as presented in Table 2.7 in Chapter Two.  Further figures 
on country level hedging activity by year can be found in Appendices H.1 to H.3.  
To summarise, statistically significant differences between Australia and Canada can 
be observed for most hedging decisions, including the decision to use derivatives, the 
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extent to which they are used, and for the use of foreign exchange and commodity risk 
derivatives. Canadian firms report a higher propensity to hedge, whereas Australian 
derivative users hedge to a larger extent.  
These results provide evidence to reject Hypothesis 1 which proposes that derivative 
use is not significantly different across Australia and Canada. One possible 
explanation is that two countries are not as comparable as initially thought.   
 
Industry hedging practices  
Tables 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 report industry hedging practices, the extent of derivative use 
and derivative instruments by industry, respectively. Hedging practices are 
investigated for firms from the Energy, Industrials, Materials, Consumer 
Discretionary, Health Care and IT industries for the total sample period. As significant 
differences between derivative use for Australia and Canada are reported in Table 4.1, 
this raises the question of whether or not fundamental differences in derivative 
practices exist per se, or whether the dissimilarity across countries is driven by specific 
industries in our sample with significant differences in derivative usage.  
 Table 4.2 includes results on the univariate comparison of hedging practices, 
including the decision to use derivatives, to use some derivatives and not to use 
derivatives, by industry. Statistically significant differences exist for firms from the 
Energy, Industrials, Health Care and IT industry, with Canadian industries reporting 
higher usage of derivative use over the total sample period. For example, Panel A in 
Table 4.2 includes differences in means of derivative users in the Australian and 
Canadian Energy industry. Results show that 19.1 per cent of Australian and 53.1 per 
cent of Canadian Energy firms use derivatives. This difference is statistically 
significant at p<0.001. Moreover, Panel F in Table 4.3 reports that only16.4 per cent 
of Australian compared to 44.5 per cent of Canadian IT firms hedge, which is 
statistically significant different at p<0.001.  
Similarities in the propensity to use derivatives can be observed across both countries 
for Materials and Consumer Discretionary. For example, differences in mean 
derivative use are reported for Materials firms in Panel C in Table 4.2. Results show 
that 35.2 per cent and 36.8 per cent of Australian and Canadian firms operating in this 
industry use derivatives. No statistically significant differences are indicated (p> 0.10).    
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Table 4.2 Industry hedging practices 2009-2013  
 Australia  Canada  Difference in means p-Value 
Panel A: Energy  (N=445) (N=420)  
No derivatives 0.7236 0.4310  0.2926 0.0000*** 
Some derivative use 0.0854 0.0381  0.0473 0.0040*** 
Derivative users 0.1910 0.5310 -0.3399 0.0000*** 
Panel B: Industrials (N=455) (N=315)   
No derivatives 0.3824 0.3079  0.0745 0.0334** 
Some derivative use 0.1275 0.1270  0.0005 0.9841 
Derivative users 0.4901 0.5651 -0.0750 0.0407** 
Panel C: Materials (N=420) (N=435)   
No derivatives 0.5667 0.5241  0.0425 0.2123 
Some derivative use 0.0809 0.1080 -0.0271 0.1766 
Derivative users 0.3524 0.3678 -0.0154 0.6388 
Panel D: Consumer Discretionary (N=460) (N=235)   
No derivatives 0.3717 0.3702  0.0015 0.0000*** 
Some derivative use 0.0935 0.1191 -0.0257 0.2911 
Derivative users 0.5348 0.5106  0.0241 0.5471 
Panel E: Health Care  (N=475) (N=130)   
No derivatives 0.7115 0.6923  0.0193 0.6693 
Some derivative use 0.1284 0.0769  0.0515 0.1063 
Derivative users 0.1600 0.2308 -0.0708 0.0602* 
Panel F: IT (N=360) (N=155)   
No derivatives 0.7167 0.5161  0.2005 0.0000*** 
Some derivative use 0.1194 0.0387  0.0807 0.0041 
Derivative users 0.1638 0.4452 -0.2813 0.0000*** 
Note: This table presents average hedging activity for Australian and Canadian Energy firms proxied by the use of 
derivatives. No derivatives, Some derivative use and Derivative users represent the different hedging decisions for 
the industry sample. Differences in means are tested using two-tailed t-tests. Statistical significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
The lowest levels of derivative use are reported amongst Health Care firms. Only 16.0 
per cent of Australian and 23.1 per cent of Canadian firms choose to hedge with 
derivatives in this industry from 2009 to 2013. The highest levels of derivatives use 
over the five-year time period can be observed for Australian Consumer Discretionary 
(53.5 per cent) and Canadian Industrials (56.6 per cent) firms.  
Further year-by-year figures on industry derivative activity are included in Appendices 
I.1 to I.6. Statistically significant differences in means only exist between Australian 
and Canadian Energy (Appendix I.1) and IT (Appendix I.6) firms. In both cases, a 
significantly higher proportion of Canadian firms use derivatives compared to 
Australian firms from the same industry.  
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Table 4.3 shows the differences in derivative fair values for hedging firms by industry. 
This ratio measures the extent of hedging for the purpose of this research. Differences 
in the extent of derivative use exist between Australian and Canadian Energy, 
Industrials, Materials and IT firms. These differences are statistically significant at 
p<0.05. Four of the industries show significant differences in derivative fair values, 
with Australian firms reporting higher levels of derivative use. Results show that firms 
from the Australian Energy (0.0214), Industrials (0.0278), Materials (0.0557) and IT 
(0.0147) industries, that have decided to hedge, do so to a larger extent than their 
Canadian counterparts (0.0124; 0.0126; 0.0190; 0.0061, respectively). Year-by-year 
summary statistics for the derivatives fair value ratio by industry are included in 
Appendices D.1 and D.2. 
 
Table 4.3 Extent of industry derivative use by industry 2009 - 2013 
Derivative fair values Australia Canada Difference in means 
 
Mean SD Mean SD p-Value 
Energy  0.0214 0.0395 0.0124 0.0513 0.0090 0.000*** 
Industrials  0.0278 0.0605 0.0126 0.0346 0.0152 0.005*** 
Materials 0.0557 0.1856 0.0190 0.0039 0.0368 0.017** 
Consumer Discretionary 0.0192 0.0369 0.0205 0.0483 -0.0014 0.767 
Health Care 0.0112 0.0215 0.0091 0.0214 0.0021 0.648 
IT 0.0147 0.0225 0.0061 0.0093 0.0085 0.005*** 
Note: This table presents the extent of derivative use by industry over the total sample period 2009 to 2013. The 
extent of derivative use is proxied by the ratio of derivatives fair values scaled by total assets. Differences in means 
are tested using two-tailed t-tests. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and 
***, respectively.  
Next, industry derivative instruments across both countries are examined to verify 
whether firms in the same industry make similar market risk hedging choices due to 
industry-specific risk factors (Shin and Soenen, 1999; Carter et al., 2006; Birt et al., 
2013). If this is the case, on average, no statistically significant differences in 
instrument use should be observed for firms from the same industry across countries. 
Table 4.4 includes differences in means for the use of foreign exchange, interest rate 
and commodity derivatives by industry over the total sample period 2009 to 2013. 
Again, significant differences in derivative use exist for Energy firms between both 
countries. Panel A shows differences in means between the use of foreign exchange, 
interest rate and commodity rate risk derivatives for Energy firms from Australia (13.3 
per cent; 10.8 per cent; 13.7 per cent, respectively) and Canada (23.6 per cent; 19.5 
per cent; 47.9 per cent, respectively) with a larger proportion of Canadian firms using 
derivatives. These differences are statistically significant at p<0.001. Panel B reports 
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the use of derivative instruments for Industrials and shows that Canadian firms from 
this industry have a higher propensity to use foreign exchange derivatives with 56.2 
per cent compared to 44.0 per cent of Australian firms, which is statistically significant 
at p<0.01. On the other hand, 40.4 per cent of Australian Industrials report the use of 
interest rate derivatives compared to only 27.3 per cent of Canadian firms. This 
difference is statistically significant at p<0.001.  
 
Table 4.4 Derivative instruments by industry 2009 -2013 
 Australia Canada   
 Mean SD Mean SD 
Difference in 
means p-Value 
Panel A: Energy  (N=445) (N=420)   
FX derivatives 0.1326 0.3395 0.2357 0.4250 -0.1031 0.000*** 
IR derivatives 0.1079 0.3106 0.1952 0.3969 -0.0874 0.000*** 
Com derivatives 0.1370 0.3443 0.4786 0.5001 -0.3429 0.000*** 
Panel B: Industrials (N=455) (N=315)   
FX instruments 0.4396 0.4969 0.5619 0.4969 -0.1223 0.001*** 
IR derivatives 0.4044 0.4913 0.2730 0.4462 0.1314 0.000*** 
Com derivatives 0.0440 0.2052 0.0698 0.2553 -0.0259 0.120 
Panel C: Materials (N=420) (N=435)   
FX derivatives 0.2500 0.4335 0.3219 0.4677 -0.0719 0.020** 
IR derivatives 0.1190 0.3242 0.1494 0.3569 -0.0304 0.194 
Com derivatives 0.2810 0.4500 0.3012 0.4546 -0.0220 0.516 
Panel D: Consumer Discretionary (N=460) (N=235)   
FX derivatives 0.5087 0.5004 0.4510 0.4987 0.05763 0.151 
IR derivatives 0.3609 0.4808 0.2979 0.4583 0.0630 0.097* 
Com derivatives 0.0065 0.0806 0.0213 0.1446 -0.0148 0.085* 
Panel E: Health Care (N=475) (N=130)   
FX derivatives 0.2000 0.4004 0.1846 0.3895 0.0154 0.696 
IR derivatives 0.0905 0.2872 0.1154 0.3207 -0.0249 0.395 
Com derivatives 0.0063 0.0793 0.0000 0.0000 0.0063 0.365 
Panel F: IT (N=360) (N=155)   
FX derivatives 0.2472 0.4320 0.4839 0.5014 -0.2366 0.000*** 
IR derivatives 0.0778 0.2682 0.0387 0.1935 0.0391 0.102 
Note: This table presents the derivative instruments used by industry over the total sample period 2009 to 2013. 
FX, IR and Com derivatives denote foreign exchange, interest rate and commodity derivative instruments, 
respectively. No commodity derivative instruments are used in the IT industry. Differences in means are tested 
using two-tailed t-tests. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, 
respectively. 
For Materials firms (Panel C), the only statistically significant difference at p<0.05 
exists for the use of foreign exchange derivatives with 32.2 per cent of Canadian and 
25.0 per cent of Australian firms hedging with these instruments. Canadian firms from 
this industry most commonly hedge currency risks (32.2 per cent) whereas Australian 
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Materials firms report the highest propensity to use commodity risk instruments (28.1 
per cent) closely followed by foreign exchange instruments (25.0 per cent). This 
finding for the Australian sample is consistent with Birt et al. (2013), who discuss the 
need for commodity and foreign exchange derivatives for firms operating in the 
Australian extractives industry.  
Canadian Consumer Discretionary firms (Panel D) hedge less with interest rate (29.8 
per cent) but more with commodity risk (2.1 per cent) derivatives compared to 
Australian firms (36.1 per cent; 0.7 per cent, respectively). These differences are 
statistically significant at p<0.1. 
On the other hand, no statistically significant differences in the use of foreign 
exchange, interest and commodity risk instruments can be observed between 
Australian (20.0 per cent; 9.1 per cent; 0.6 per cent, respectively) and Canadian (18.5 
per cent; 11.5 per cent; 0.0 per cent, respectively) Health Care firms in Panel E. This 
indicates that firms from both countries face similar industry-specific risks and hedge 
in similar ways (Neelankavil and Alaganar, 2003). Finally, Panel F reports the use of 
derivative instruments for IT firms and shows a statistically significant difference at 
p<0.001 in the use of foreign exchange derivatives with 48.4 per cent of Canadian 
compared to 24.7 per cent of Australian IT firms using this type of instrument. 
Results in Table 4.4 also show that a significantly higher proportion of Canadian firms 
hedge foreign exchange risks across four of the sampled industries. For example, firms 
from the Canadian Energy, Industrials, Materials and IT industries (23.6 per cent; 56.2 
per cent; 32.2 per cent; 48.4 per cent, respectively) report a higher propensity to hedge 
foreign exchange risks compared to Australian firms from the same industries (13.3 
per cent; 44.0 per cent; 25.0 per cent; 24.7 per cent, respectively). The differences are 
statistically significant at p<0.001, p<0.01, p<0.05 and p<0.001, respectively.  
Interest rate derivatives are significantly different between Energy, Industrials, and 
Consumer Discretionary firms. Here, only Canadian Energy firms report a higher 
usage of interest rate instruments with 23.6 per cent compared to 13.3 per cent for 
Australian Energy firms at p<0.001. Interestingly, Australian Industrials and 
Consumer Discretionary firms hedge more with interest rate derivatives (40.4 per cent; 
36.1 per cent, respectively) than Canadian firms from the same industries (27.3 per 
cent; 29.8 per cent, respectively), which is statistically significant at p< 0.001 and 
p<0.1, respectively).   
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The use of commodity risk derivatives is only significantly different for two of the 
examined industries. Panels A and D in Table 4.4 present the differences in means 
Energy and Consumer Discretionary firms. It can be observed that, on average 13.7 
per cent and 0.7 per cent of Australian firms, and 47.9 per cent and 2.1 per cent of 
Canadian firms hedge commodity risks across these industries, respectively. These 
differences are statistically different at p<0.001 and p<0.100, respectively.  
Overall, Table 4.4 also shows that foreign exchange risk is the most commonly hedged 
risk exposure in four of the examined industries. Industrials, Consumer Discretionary, 
Health Care and IT firms in both countries report a higher propensity to use foreign 
exchange derivatives compared to other instruments.  
What is also interesting is that there are no differences in means for the Health Care 
Industry and that these firms in both countries have the highest propensity to use 
foreign exchange instruments and the lowest propensity to use commodity risk 
derivatives. For example, Panel E shows that 20.0 per cent of Australian Health Care 
firms use foreign exchange derivatives, but only 9.1 per cent of firms and 0.6 per cent 
of firms use interest rate and commodity risk derivatives, respectively. Similarly, 18.5 
per cent of Canadian firms use foreign exchange, 11.5 per cent use interest rates 
derivatives and no firms hedge commodity risks, respectively. According to Lewent 
and Kearney (1990), this industry is vulnerable to foreign exchange volatility, which 
explains why this type of risk is most commonly hedged with derivatives for Health 
Care firms. Further detailed industry information on derivative instruments used by 
risk type can be found in Appendices G.1 to G.6.  
In summary, the propensity to use derivatives is observed to be higher for Canadian 
Energy, Industrials, Health Care and IT firms (Table 4.2). Differences in the extent of 
derivative use show that Australian firms hedge to a larger extent with derivatives in 
the Energy, Industrials, Materials, and IT industry (Table 4.3). Results presented in 
Table 4.4 show that statistically significant differences exist for the proportions of 
derivative use by risk instruments between countries. For example, a statistically 
significant higher proportion of Canadian Energy (23.6 per cent), Industrials (56.2 per 
cent), Materials (32.2 per cent) and IT (48.4 per cent) firms hedge with foreign 
exchange derivatives compared to Australian firms from the same industries (13.3 per 
cent; 44.0 per cent; 25.0 per cent; 24.7 per cent, respectively). These results provide 
evidence that statistically significant differences exist between the derivative use for 
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firms from the same industry across Australia and Canada, which leads to a rejection 
of Hypothesis 2.  
 
Comparing hedging practices between industries  
To test Hypothesis 3 which proposes that derivative use is significantly different 
between industries, a one-way ANOVA and multiple comparison test is used to 
ascertain whether statistically significant differences between industry derivative use 
can be observed.  
The results of the ANOVA test are shown in Table 4.5. With a test-statistic of F(5, 
2,609)= 65.15 with p<0.001 for Australia and of F(5, 1,684)= 13.99 with p<0.001 for 
Canada, the null hypothesis is rejected.  
This suggests that there is a statistically significant difference in derivatives usage 
between industries for both countries, as proposed by Hypothesis 3. This may possibly 
be explained by the industry-specific differences in the respective market 
environments and financial distress costs, which result in distinctive hedging 
incentives (Hahnenstein and Röder, 2006).  
 
Table 4.5 Analysis of variance between industry groups  
 Analysis of Variance   
Source SS df MS F Prob > F 
Panel A: Australia 
Between groups 63.1648 5 12.6330 65.15       0.000*** 
Within groups 505.9311 2,609     0.1939   
Total 569.0960 2,614     0.2177   
Bartlett's test for equal variances:  Chi2 (5) = 95.4272  Prob >Chi2 = 0.00*** 
Panel B: Canada 
Between groups 16.7529 5 3.3506 13.99 0.0000*** 
Within groups 403.2471 1,684    0.2395   
Total 420.0000 1,689      0.2487   
Bartlett's test for equal variances:  Chi2 (5) =   6.009  Prob >Chi2 = 0.3050 
Note: This table presents a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) of derivative use between industry groups. 
Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
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Industry hedging activity over time 
Hypothesis 5 states that derivative activity is stable over time. To this purpose, Figures 
4.1 and 4.2 illustrate the trends in industry derivative practices over the five-year time 
frame from 2009 until 2013 for both countries. Over the five-year period, only 32.0 
per cent of Australian firms in the pooled sample have used derivatives, compared to 
46.2 per cent of Canadian firms. Further details are in Appendices G.1 to G.6.  
 
Figure 4.1 Industry hedging practices over time Australia 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Industry hedging practices over time Canada 
Table 4.6 shows the variation in hedging practices over time. Here, the variation 
‘within’ and ‘between’ derivative practices is tabulated to examine whether firms have 
consistently decided to hedge with derivatives, to hedge some risks with derivatives 
or not to hedge from 2009 to 2013.  
Results from Panel A in the ‘Between’ columns report the variation across firms and 
show that 41.9 per cent of Australian firms have derivatives outstanding at balance 
date at least once during the examined period, compared to 60.4 per cent of Canadian 
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firms (Panel B). This indicates that some variation between firm hedging decisions 
exists over time which makes the dataset suitable for multivariate analysis.  
Table 4.6 Country hedging practices over time  
  Overall Between Within % 
   # firm-years % # firms % 
Panel A: Australia           
No derivatives 1,501 57.4 358 68.45 83.9 
'Some' derivatives 277 10.6 114 21.8 48.6 
Derivative users 837 32.0 219 41.9 76.4 
Panel B: Canada      
No derivatives 763 45.15 197 58.28 79.53 
'Some' derivatives 147 8.7 72 21.3 40.84 
Derivative users 780 46.2 204 60.4 76.5 
Note: This table presents the variation in hedging practices over time. No derivatives, Some derivatives and 
Derivative users represent the different hedging decisions for the sampled firms across Australia and Canada.  
 
These figures also provide a measure of stability of hedging policy decisions. The 
‘Within’ column in Panel A reports that 76.4 per cent of Australian firms consistently 
use derivatives. For Canadian firms, results in Panel B show that 76.5 per cent of firms 
have consistently used derivatives throughout the sample period. Results from the 
ANOVA also indicate that the decision not to hedge is the most consistent one, as 83.9 
per cent of Australian firms and 79.5 per cent of Canadian firms in the sample never 
hedge, which is shown in the ‘Within’ columns for Panels A and B, respectively.  
These findings showing that hedging decisions remain mostly stable over time suggest 
that derivative practices in Australia and Canada are consistent over the examined 
period, as proposed by Hypothesis 5. In line with arguments by Chernenko and 
Faulkender (2011), these results provide evidence that derivative instruments are 
likely to be employed for long-term, strategic hedging purposes rather than 
speculative, one-off activities for Australian and Canadian firms.  
 
 
4.3.2 Hedging determinants: The hedging decision  
The next section presents multivariate results from probit analyses that examine 
hedging determinants which influence Australian and Canadian firms to hedge with 
derivatives. This will provide insights into what explains the cross-sectional 
differences in derivative use reported in Table 4.1, which shows that Canadian firms 
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have a significantly higher propensity to use derivatives (46.2 per cent) than Australian 
firms (32.0 per cent), which is a statistically significant difference at p<0.001.  
Results in this section reported in Tables 4.7 and 4.8 will present results on Hypotheses 
4, which states derivative use is significantly determined by industry type, and on 
Hypothesis 6, which proposes that cross-sectional differences in hedging decisions are 
related to a reduction in costs associated with taxes, underinvestment, financial distress 
and economies of scale.  
Table 4.7 shows the results from Model (1) which considers the firm’s likelihood to 
use derivatives for Australian firms. The coefficients show the direction of influence 
that the included variables have on the decision to hedge with derivatives.  
As it has been argued that larger firm size is an important factor in explaining 
derivative use (Heaney and Winata, 2005, Nance etc al., 1993) Model (1) is estimated 
for all Australian firms (Panel A), for small Australian firms (Panel B) and for large 
Australian firms (Panel C).  
Panel A in Table 4.7 shows that leverage, capital expenditure and firm size provide 
incentives for firms to hedge with derivatives. The coefficient for leverage is 1.6779 
with an associated p-value of <0.001, which means that an increase in leverage leads 
to an increase in the firm’s likelihood to use derivatives. At p<0.001 it can be 
concluded that the impact of leverage is statistically different from zero. Similarly, 
coefficients for capital expenditure (0.9984) and firm size (1.0675) are positive and 
statistically significant at p<0.001, which indicates that increases in capital 
expenditures and firm size result in an increased likelihood for Australian firms to use 
derivatives. These results also hold for firms, which are smaller or larger than their 
industry median. Results on small and large firms in Panels B and C confirm that 
leverage (1.9338, p<0.001; 2.1654, p<0.001), capital expenditure (0.8478, p<0.001; 
1.0002, p<0.01) and firm size (1.0330, p<0.001; 0.9031, p<0.001) have a positive 
influence on the decision to use derivatives, respectively. 
These results regarding a positive relationship between leverage, capital expenditure 
and firm size are consistent with theoretical predictions that derivative decisions are 
determined by a reduction in financial distress, underinvestment costs and benefits 
related to economies of scale. Results for the leverage variable (1.6779, p<0.001) 
indicate that firms with higher levels of debt are more likely to use derivatives to avoid 
financial distress (Smith and Stulz, 1985), which has been confirmed by previous 
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research (Berkman et al. 2002; Heaney and Winata, 2005; Jalilvand 1999; Nguyen and 
Faff 2002). The positive relationship between capital expenditure (0.9984, p<0.001) 
and the decision to hedge with derivatives implies that hedging creates value by 
reducing underinvestment costs, thereby ensuring that firms can take on positive NPV-
projects (Géczy et al., 1997). However, most other empirical studies have failed to 
confirm this positive relationship on the likelihood to hedge (Bartram et al., 2009; 
Dionne and Garand 2003; Haushalter, 2000). No statistically significant results are 
observed for the influence of tax losses on the decision to hedge (1.3339, p>0.1).  
The positive relationship between firm size (1.0675, p<0.001) and derivative use can 
be seen as evidence that Australian firms benefit from economies of scale when 
implementing hedging programs, which is similar to what has been reported by 
Nguyen and Faff (2002) and in line with empirical results supporting the hypothesis 
that larger firms are more likely to hedge, based on significant transaction costs which 
might outweigh hedging benefits for smaller firms (Bartram et al., 2009; Nguyen and 
Faff, 2002).  
These results provide some support for Hypothesis 6 that the decision to hedge is 
related to underinvestment, financial distress and economies of scale. No evidence 
exists to support the notion that tax losses increase the likelihood to use derivatives. 
This is consistent with findings by Berkman et al. (2002), who argue that the tax saving 
incentive might not be as strong due to Australia’s imputation system, as corporate tax 
savings can lead to increases in personal tax, mitigating the tax loss argument. 
The overall industry effect of derivative use is statistically significant for all Australian 
firms (Panel A, 37.34, p<0.001), smaller firms (Panel B, 12.30, p<0.05) and larger 
firms (Panel C, 28.51, p<0.001). For the country sample, industry classification of 
Energy, Materials and Consumer Discretionary significantly influences the hedging 
decision. Negative relationships between Energy (-1.5621, p<0.01) and Materials 
(1.5514, p<0.01) and the hedging decision are reported in Panel A. However, a positive 
and statistically significant relationship between the Consumer Discretionary industry 
and hedging exists (1.0055, p<0.05) which indicates that being in this industry 
significantly influences the decision to hedge.  
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Table 4.7 Derivative determinants: Australia 
Model 1 Predicted sign Panel A: All firms (N=2,615) Panel B: Small firms (N=1,315) Panel C: Large firms (N=1,300) Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value 
Leverage + 1.6779 0.0000*** 1.9338 0.0009*** 2.1654 0.0002*** 
Tax losses + 1.3339 0.5419 3.6782 0.1352 -2.8564 0.4532 
Current ratio - -0.0022 0.6647 0.0002 0.9758 -0.0498 0.0168** 
Dividends -/+ 0.2865 0.1498 0.1738 0.6012 0.3300 0.1940 
ROA - 0.0000 0.9979 -0.0001 0.9900 0.7866 0.0677* 
Tangible assets - 0.6312 0.4767 2.1304 0.2601 -0.0240 0.9817 
R&D expenditure + -0.0210 0.1533 -0.0106 0.5444 -0.0171 0.6040 
Capital expenditure + 0.9984 0.0000*** 0.8478 0.0001*** 1.0002 0.0041*** 
Firm size +/- 1.0675 0.0000*** 1.0330 0.0000*** 0.9031 0.0000*** 
Foreign income  + 0.0647 0.4055 0.6944 0.1224 0.0389 0.6565 
Energy   -1.5621 0.0037*** -1.8179 0.0305** -0.8165 0.2048 
Industrials  -0.0538 0.9124 -0.9410 0.2480 1.1775 0.0594 
Materials  -1.5514 0.0038*** -1.5904 0.0833* -0.9066 0.1748 
Consumer Discretionary  1.0055 0.0404** 0.4140 0.5825 1.9009 0.0026** 
Health Care  0.0369 0.9411 -0.6513 0.4626 0.7034 0.2115 
Constant  -15.1230 0.0000*** -16.1007 0.0000*** -12.8624 0.0000*** 
Log likelihood  -698.46  -280.88  -426.96  
LR-Chi2  369.03 0.0000*** 99.14 0.0000*** 235.56 0.0000*** 
Industry effect Chi2   37.34 0.0000*** 12.30 0.0309** 28.51 0.0000*** 
Note: This table shows the results of a probit regression which tests the likelihood to use derivatives. Small firms present results for a sub-sample of firms with Firm size smaller than their industry median, 
Large firms present results for firms with Firm size larger than their industry median. The Likelihood Ratio LR-Chi2 tests that at least one of the coefficients is not equal to zero. A p-value of less than 0.05 
indicates that the model as a whole fits better than an empty model. Energy, Industrials, Materials, Consumer Discretionary and Health Care dummy variables take ‘1’ if the firm belongs to this industry. 
The omitted set consists of firms in the IT industry. Industry effect Chi2 shows the results of testing the overall industry effect on the binary hedging decision. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.  
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Table 4.8 shows the results from Model (1) which considers the firm’s likelihood to 
use derivatives. Results are reported for all (Panel A), smaller (Panel B) and larger 
Canadian firms (Panel C). 
Similar to the findings from Table 4.7, results for Canadian firms in Table 4.8 show 
that leverage and size influence the hedging decision. It can be observed that firm size 
has a positive relationship with the likelihood to hedge for all (0.6153, p<0.001), 
smaller (0.6412, p<0.001) and larger firms (0.9448, p<0.001), which is shown in 
Panels A, B and C.  
The evidence in support of the financial distress hypothesis is mixed. For example, 
Table 4.8 reports that leverage has a positive and statistically significant relationship 
on the likelihood to use derivatives for all Canadian firms (1.9025, p<0.001), as well 
as for smaller (0.9677, p<0.1) and larger firms (4.2679, p<0.001) which is shown in 
Panels A, B and C, respectively. Contrary to predictions, results on ROA (0.9802, 
p<0.05) and tangible assets (3.0382, p<0.05) have a positive relationship on the 
likelihood to hedge for all Canadian firms (Panel A). These results also hold for ROA 
and tangible assets for smaller firms shown in Panel B (1.0532, p<0.05; 4.2356, 
p<0.01, respectively). 
This is inconsistent with theoretical predictions that more profitable firms and firms 
with higher tangible assets are less likely to benefit from hedging. However, a positive 
relationship between ROA and derivative use has been reported in previous results 
(Bartram et al., 2009; Fok et al., 1997; Gay and Nam, 1998; Nance et al., 1993).  
Therefore, results on Canadian firms present mixed results on Hypothesis 6. Cross-
sectional differences for Canadian firms can be attributed to economies of scale, which 
supports Hypothesis 6. However, conflicting results exist for proxies of financial 
distress. 
The overall industry effect is statistically significant for the overall Canadian sample 
(14.30, p<0.05) as well as for smaller firms (9.76, p<0.1) providing some support for 
Hypothesis 4. For the Canadian sample, only the Materials industry dummy has a 
significant impact on the decision to use derivatives. In line with results for Australian 
firms, belonging to the Materials industry reduces the likelihood to use derivatives 
which is consistent for all Canadian, smaller Canadian and larger Canadian firms          
(-1.8901, p<0.01; -2.1479, p<0.05; -2.5153, p<0.05, respectively).  
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Therefore, industry classification significantly impacts the decision to hedge in 
Canada, as proposed by Hypothesis 4.  
In summary, results presented from Model (1) in Tables 4.7 and 4.8 provide evidence 
in support of Hypothesis 4 that derivative use is significantly determined by industry. 
The most consistent explanation for cross-sectional hedging decisions can be 
attributed to economies of scale. For Australian firms, there is strong evidence that 
firms hedge to reduce financial distress, which is also supported by the relationship 
shown for the leverage variable for Canadian firms. This means that firms with higher 
debt levels and larger firm size are more likely to use derivatives in both countries, 
which is consistent with previous empirical studies that have examined the 
determinants of derivative use in both countries (Berkman et al. 2002; Heaney and 
Winata, 2005; Jalilvand, 1999; Nguyen and Faff 2002). For Australian firms, 
underinvestment costs proxied by capital expenditure also provide a hedging incentive 
(see Table 4.7). No evidence can be found to support the hypothesis that tax losses 
influence firms to hedge and recoup these credits. Results in Tables 4.7 and 4.8 do not 
show statistically significant results.  
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Table 4.8 Derivative determinants: Canada 
Model 1 Predicted sign Panel A: All firms (N=1,690) Panel B: Small firms (N=855) Panel C: Large firms (N=835) Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value 
Leverage + 1.9025 0.0000*** 0.9677 0.0920* 4.2679 0.0000*** 
Tax losses + -1.8590 0.5546 -3.7242 0.4365 8.8946 0.2706 
Current ratio - -0.1191 0.0002*** -0.1892 0.0004*** -0.0763 0.0809* 
Dividends -/+ 0.1260 0.5891 -0.1301 0.6775 0.3900 0.2764 
ROA - 0.9802 0.0158** 1.0532 0.0249** 1.0062 0.3078 
Tangible assets - 3.0382 0.0118** 4.2356 0.0072*** 1.5769 0.4288 
R&D expenditure + -0.4905 0.0548* -0.4494 0.1629 -0.3788 0.2059 
Capital expenditure + 0.1690 0.1431 0.0716 0.6462 0.7487 0.0967* 
Firm size +/- 0.6153 0.0000*** 0.6412 0.0000*** 0.9448 0.0000*** 
Foreign income  + 0.3508 0.3005 -0.2147 0.6003 1.2692 0.0307** 
Energy   -1.0117 0.1162 -1.2368 0.1208 -1.7419 0.1034 
Industrials  -0.2585 0.6906 -0.4833 0.5347 -0.9215 0.3716 
Materials  -1.8901 0.0031*** -2.1479 0.0105** -2.5153 0.0111** 
Consumer Discretionary  -0.6086 0.3739 -0.4236 0.6070 -1.9881 0.0744* 
Health Care  -0.9869 0.2187 -1.0044 0.3148 -0.6705 0.5686 
Constant  -10.4007 0.0000*** -10.9586 0.0000*** -14.3508 0.0000*** 
Log likelihood  -613.19  -330.06  -298.04  
LR-Chi2  150.08 0.0000*** 77.92 0.0000*** 87.80 0.0000*** 
Industry effect Chi2   14.30 0.0138** 9.76 0.0824* 8.87 0.1145 
Note: This table shows the results of a probit regression which tests the likelihood to use derivatives. Small firms present results for a sub-sample of firms with Firm size smaller than their industry median, 
Large firms present results for firms with Firm size larger than their industry median. The Likelihood Ratio LR-Chi2 tests that at least one of the coefficients is not equal to zero. A p-value of less than 
0.05 indicates that the model as a whole fits better than an empty model. Energy, Industrials, Materials, Consumer Discretionary and Health Care dummy variables take ‘1’ if the firm belongs to this 
industry. The omitted set consists of firms in the IT industry. Industry effect Chi2 shows the results of testing the overall industry effect on the binary hedging decision. Statistical significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. .  
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4.3.3 Hedging determinants: Hedging market risks  
This section presents further results from probit estimations that investigate the 
determinants of derivative use. Four models are estimated to test the industry effect on 
market risk hedging decisions proposed by Hypotheses 4 and the explanation of cross-
sectional differences as tested by Hypotheses 6. Three market risk hedging decisions are 
investigated, which include the decisions to use foreign exchange, interest rate, and 
commodity risk derivatives. Results are shown in Tables 4.9, 4.10 and 4.11 respectively.  
Foreign exchange derivatives   
Table 4.9 shows results of the likelihood to use foreign exchange derivatives for 
Australian (Panel A) and Canadian (Panel B) firms. The results are based on estimating 
Model (1) and Model (2) as discussed in Section 4.2.2.  
Model (1) in Table 4.9 estimates the binary decision to use foreign exchange derivatives 
based on common theories related to taxes, underinvestment, financial distress and 
economies of scale. Model (2) also includes dummy variables for the use of interest rate 
and commodity risk derivatives. The existence of other derivative instruments is 
predicted to have a positive influence on the decision to use foreign exchange 
derivatives. This is because firms that already use derivatives have greater managerial 
expertise with hedging instruments and lower additional transaction costs (Géczy et al., 
1997). In line with economies of scale arguments, it is expected that if a firm already 
hedges against specific market risks, this activity will reduce the implementation and 
transaction costs associated with implementing additional hedging programs. 
Results on the decision to use foreign exchange derivatives for Australian firms 
estimated with Model (1) and Model (2) are shown in Panel A in Table 4.9. In both 
model specifications leverage, capital expenditure and firm size significantly influence 
the decision to use foreign exchange derivatives. For example, Model (1) for Australian 
firms indicates a positive relationship between leverage (1.6679, p<0.001), capital 
expenditure (0.9567, p<0.001) and firm size (0.9566, p<0.001) and the decision to use 
derivatives. These relationships on the hedging decision are confirmed by Model (2), 
which shows that leverage (1.5988, p<0.001), capital expenditure (0.9364, p<0.001) and 
firm size (0.9307, p<0.001) have a statistically significant influence on the decision to 
use foreign exchange derivatives. Findings on financial distress costs confirm earlier 
results by Nguyen and Faff (2003c). Unexpected results are shown for tangible assets 
(1.8188, p<0.05). This is inconsistent with theories of financial distress which posit that 
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firms with higher tangible assets can liquidate assets in times of distress and have less 
incentives to hedge (Géczy et al., 1997). Overall, results show that theories of financial 
distress (proxied by leverage), underinvestment and economies of scale provide 
rationale for hedging foreign exchange risks for Australian firms. This is consistent with 
earlier results reported in Table 4.7. 
Results in Panel A in Table 4.9 on Model (2) show no statistical significance for interest 
rate or commodity risk derivatives on the decision to use foreign exchange derivatives 
for Australian firms (Model (2)). However, results for Canadian firms (Table 4.9 Panel 
B) show that the use of interest rate (0.5044, p<0.05) and commodity risk derivatives 
(0.9866, p<0.01) provide incentives to use foreign exchange derivatives, which is 
consistent with economies of scale arguments. In Model (1) and Model (2), leverage 
(1.1160, p<0.1; 0.9848, p<0.1, respectively) and firm size (0.4150, p<0.001; 0.3494, 
p<0.01, respectively) have a positive and significant effect on the use of derivatives for 
Canadian firms. 
The overall industry effect is statistically significant in Model (1) and Model (2) for 
Australian (54.83, p<0.001; 49.19, p<0.001, respectively) and Canadian firms (34.78, 
p<0.001; 41.57, p<0.001, respectively). Consistency in coefficient relationships on 
foreign exchange derivative use can also be observed for Energy and Materials firms. 
For example, results in Panel A in Table 4.9 for Models (1) and (2) show that firms 
operating in the Australian Energy industry (-3.2729, p<0.001; -3.1909, p<0.001, 
respectively) have a disincentive to hedge with foreign exchange derivatives for Models. 
Similar results are shown in Panel B for Models (1) and (2) on Canadian Energy firms 
(-3.6767, p<0.001; -4.1231, p<0.001, respectively). 
Overall, results on the decision to use foreign exchange derivatives show that hedging 
is significantly influenced by firm leverage and size, providing support for Hypothesis 
6. Moreover, the overall industry effect is statistically significant across countries 
supporting Hypothesis 4.  
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Table 4.9 Foreign exchange derivative determinants 
 Predicted 
sign 
Panel A: Australia (N=2,615) Panel B: Canada (N= 1,690) 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (1) Model (2) 
Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value 
Interest rate derivatives +   0.3884 0.1795   0.5044 0.0455** 
Commodity derivatives +   -0.2706 0.4751   0.9866 0.0025*** 
Leverage + 1.6679 0.0003*** 1.5988 0.0006*** 1.1160 0.0512** 0.9848 0.0873* 
Tax losses + -1.1432 0.7001 -1.1609 0.6962 0.9748 0.7745 0.5910 0.8663 
Current ratio - -0.0132 0.2610 -0.0132 0.2586 -0.0599 0.0644** -0.0555 0.0859* 
Dividends -/+ 0.0295 0.8946 0.0484 0.8282 1.0063 0.0015*** 1.0505 0.0010*** 
ROA - -0.0001 0.9819 -0.0001 0.9791 0.4747 0.3388 0.5057 0.3110 
Tangible assets - 1.7593 0.0545 1.8188 0.0466** 1.4433 0.2873 1.5295 0.2610 
R&D expenditure + -0.0003 0.9813 -0.0002 0.9895 -0.6385 0.0315** -0.6242 0.0319** 
Capital expenditure + 0.9567 0.0000*** 0.9364 0.0000*** 0.2190 0.1347 0.1832 0.2182 
Firm size +/- 0.9566 0.0000*** 0.9307 0.0000*** 0.4150 0.0001*** 0.3494 0.0010*** 
Foreign income  + 0.1871 0.3065 0.1967 0.2876 0.6993 0.0908* 0.7311 0.0785* 
Energy   -3.2729 0.0000*** -3.1909 0.0000*** -3.6767 0.0001*** -4.1231 0.0000*** 
Industrials  -0.3005 0.6504 -0.3426 0.6077 -0.2805 0.7780 -0.3669 0.7139 
Materials  -3.0855 0.0000*** -2.9370 0.0000*** -2.5664 0.0061*** -2.7782 0.0036*** 
Consumer Disc.  0.8330 0.2430 0.7719 0.2775 -1.3971 0.1896 -1.4321 0.1735 
Health Care  -0.3902 0.4954 -0.3823 0.5074 -2.2786 0.0315** -2.3239 0.0288** 
Constant  -14.7703 0.0000*** -14.5952 0.0000*** -6.8941 0.0004*** -6.2728 0.0014*** 
Log likelihood  -706.46 0.0000*** -705.62 0.0000*** -539.38 0.0000*** -533.40 0.0000*** 
LR-Chi2  201.29 0.0000*** 202.97 0.0000*** 88.34 0.0000*** 100.30 0.0000*** 
Industry effect Chi2   54.83 0.0000*** 49.19 0.0000*** 34.78 0.0000*** 41.57 0.0000*** 
Note: This table shows the results of a probit regression which tests the likelihood to use foreign exchange derivatives. The Likelihood Ratio LR-Chi2 tests that at least one of the coefficients is not equal 
to zero. A p-value of less than 0.05 indicates that the model as a whole fits better than an empty model. Energy, Industrials, Materials, Consumer Discretionary and Health Care dummy variables take ‘1’ 
if the firm belongs to this industry. The omitted set consists of firms in the IT industry. Industry effect Chi2 shows the results of testing the overall industry effect on the binary hedging decision. Statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively 
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Interest risk derivatives   
Table 4.10 shows results of the likelihood to use interest risk derivatives for Australian 
(Panel A) and Canadian (Panel B) firms. These results are based on estimating Models 
(1) and (3) as discussed in Section 4.2.2.  
For Table 4.10 Model (1) estimates the binary decision to use interest rate derivatives 
based on common theories related to taxes, underinvestment, financial distress and 
economies of scale. Model (3) also includes dummy variables for the use of foreign 
exchange and commodity risk derivatives.  
Results for Canadian firms from Model (3) show that the use of foreign exchange 
derivatives (0.3801, p<0.1) has a positive impact on the decision to use interest rate 
derivatives (Panel B).  
For both countries (Panels A and B) the coefficients for leverage and firm size are 
statistically significant for both model specifications. For example, results on 
Australian firms from Panel A in Table 4.10 for Models (1) and (3) show a positive 
relationship for leverage (3.111, p<0.001; 3.1200, p<0.001, respectively) and firm size 
(1.3158, p<0.001; 1.2953, p<0.001, respectively) on the decision to use interest rate 
derivatives.  
Results for Canadian firms in Panel B also indicate that financial distress significantly 
affects the decision to use interest rate derivatives. Results shown for Models (1) and 
(3) show a positive relationship for leverage (1.5604, p<0.01; 1.5456, p<0.01, 
respectively) on the likelihood to use interest rate derivatives. Similarly, the 
coefficients for firm size are positive (0.5212, p<0.001; 0.5288, p<0.001, respectively) 
for the Canadian sub-sample.  
The overall industry effect on interest rate derivative use is significant for Australian 
firms for Models (1) and (3) (37.16, p<0.001; 34.09, p<0.001, respectively), but only 
statistically significant for Model (1) for the Canadian sample (10.73, p<0.001; 8.72, 
p<0.1, respectively).  
Again, firm size and leverage provide the most consistent explanations as to why firms 
hedge in Australia and Canada. 
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Table 4.10 Interest rate derivative determinants 
 
Predicted 
sign 
Panel A: Australia (N=2,615) Panel B: Canada (N= 1,690) 
Model (1) Model (3) Model (1) Model (3) 
Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value 
Foreign exchange derivatives    +   0.2016 0.4139   0.3801 0.0942* 
Commodity derivatives +   0.8540 0.1033   -0.2667 0.3613 
Leverage  + 3.1111 0.0000*** 3.1200 0.0000*** 1.5604 0.0028*** 1.5456 0.0033*** 
Tax losses + -10.8828 0.1306 -11.3997 0.1203 -4.7295 0.4172 -5.4211 0.3677 
Current ratio - -0.0356 0.2709 -0.0336 0.2997 -0.3028 0.0005*** -0.3030 0.0005*** 
Dividends -/+ -0.0891 0.7176 -0.1163 0.6400 0.0503 0.8455 0.0117 0.9642 
ROA - -0.0127 0.3755 -0.0127 0.3622 0.7052 0.2710 0.6730 0.2966 
Tangible assets - -0.9601 0.4075 -1.0012 0.3928 -0.5397 0.6695 -0.5274 0.6790 
R&D expenditure + -0.0326 0.7121 -0.0335 0.7090 -2.1273 0.1539 -1.9972 0.1651 
Capital expenditure + 0.7129 0.0189** 0.6134 0.0608* 0.1695 0.2002 0.1721 0.1949 
Firm size +/- 1.3158 0.0000*** 1.2953 0.0000*** 0.5312 0.0000*** 0.5288 0.0000*** 
Foreign income  + -0.1497 0.7439 -0.1931 0.6788 0.1618 0.6869 0.0755 0.8524 
Energy   -1.2412 0.1141 -1.3585 0.0980* 0.8007 0.3904 1.1071 0.2620 
Industrials  1.0301 0.1240 1.0742 0.1145 1.8069 0.0585* 1.8843 0.0580* 
Materials  -2.8687 0.0003*** -3.1118 0.0003*** 0.7298 0.4291 0.9387 0.3315 
Consumer Discretionary  1.3295 0.0508* 1.3562 0.0500* 1.9390 0.0475** 2.0445 0.0443** 
Health Care  0.2055 0.7869 0.2011 0.7941 2.3559 0.0375** 2.4654 0.0351** 
Constant  -18.4472 0.0000*** -18.2569 0.0000*** -9.8002 0.0000*** -10.0064 0.0000*** 
Log likelihood  -447.03  -445.14  -445.45  -443.65  
LR-Chi2  283.86 0.0000*** 287.63 0.0000*** 108.14 0.0000*** 111.74 0.0000*** 
Industry effect Chi2   37.16 0.0000*** 34.09 0.0000*** 10.73 0.0000*** 8.72 0.1209 
Note: This table shows the results of a probit regression which test the likelihood to use interest rate derivatives. The Likelihood Ratio LR-Chi2 tests that at least one of the coefficients is not equal to zero. 
A p-value of less than 0.05 indicates that the model as a whole fits better than an empty model. Energy, Industrials, Materials, Consumer Discretionary and Health Care dummy variables take ‘1’ if the 
firm belongs to this industry. The omitted set consists of firms in the IT industry. Industry effect Chi2 shows the results of testing the overall industry effect on the binary hedging decision. Statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.  
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Commodity risk derivatives   
Table 4.11 shows results of the likelihood to use commodity risk derivatives for 
Australian (Panel A) and Canadian (Panel B) firms. Results are based on estimating 
Model (1) and Model (4) as discussed in Section 4.2.2.  
For Table 4.11 Model (1) estimates the binary decision to use commodity risk 
derivatives based on common theories related to taxes, underinvestment, financial 
distress and economies of scale. Model (4) includes dummy variables for the use of 
foreign exchange and interest rate derivatives.  
Statistically significant relationships between the use of other derivatives on the 
decision to use commodity risk derivatives can be observed for both countries. Results 
in Table 4.11 (Panel A) for Model (4) on Australian firms show that the use of interest 
rate derivatives has a significant influence on the decision to hedge with commodity 
risk instruments (1.1047, p<0.1), indicating that an existing risk management program 
provides an incentive for Australian firms to hedge other risk exposures. For Canadian 
firms (Panel B), the decision to use commodity risk instruments is significantly 
influenced by the use of foreign exchange derivatives (0.8376, p<0.01).  
The only consistent explanation for Hypothesis 6 based on results presented in Table 
4.11 relates to the influence of firm size on the likelihood to hedge with commodity 
risk derivatives. Panel A in Table 4.11. Models (1) and (2) shows a positive influence 
of firm size (0.6838, p<0.001; 0.674, p<0.001, respectively) on the hedging decision 
for Australian firms. Furthermore, results for Canadian firms from estimating Models 
(1) and (2) in Panel B support the finding that increases in firm size (0.7831, p<0.001; 
0.7803, p<0.001, respectively) have a positive effect on the likelihood to hedge with 
commodity risk derivatives.  
The overall industry effect for Models (1) and (2) on commodity risk use is statistically 
significant for Australian (27.17, p<0.001; 30.79, p<0.001, respectively) and Canadian 
firms (39.24, p<0.001; 43.08, p<0.001, respectively) as reported in Panels A and B, 
respectively.  
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Table 4.11 Commodity derivative determinants 
 
Predicted 
sign 
Panel A: Australia (N=1,560) Panel B: Canada (N= 1,560) 
Model (1) Model (4) Model (1) Model (4) 
Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value 
Foreign exchange derivatives    +   -0.5710 0.1535   0.8376 0.0078*** 
Interest rate derivatives +   1.1047 0.0609*   -0.4512 0.1361 
Leverage  + 0.6975 0.3302 0.7067 0.3390 2.4233 0.0002*** 2.4443 0.0003*** 
Tax losses + 3.8938 0.1713 3.8783 0.1759 3.0437 0.2171 3.0256 0.2241 
Current  - 0.0047 0.3735 0.0045 0.3919 -0.1307 0.0007*** -0.1264 0.0011*** 
Dividends -/+ 0.4304 0.2630 0.4255 0.2748 -0.5160 0.1329 -0.6064 0.0835 
ROA - 0.0017 0.8536 0.0018 0.8416 0.2968 0.5284 0.3483 0.4824 
Tangible assets - 2.1329 0.2177 2.6430 0.1540 1.4855 0.3948 1.7502 0.3252 
R&D expenditure + -0.0137 0.3374 -0.0124 0.3559 -0.3042 0.2758 -0.2837 0.3189 
Capital expenditure + 0.8568 0.0002*** 0.8841 0.0002*** 0.2041 0.1126 0.2028 0.1260 
Firm size +/- 0.6838 0.0000*** 0.6741 0.0000*** 0.7831 0.0000*** 0.7803 0.0000*** 
Foreign income  + 1.2618 0.0081*** 1.3496 0.0060*** -0.8368 0.0624* -0.9041 0.0445** 
Energy   4.2936 0.0009*** 4.3557 0.0004*** 16.3062 0.9862 16.1147 0.9652 
Industrials  1.9807 0.1408 1.7699 0.1669 12.6041 0.9893 12.0814 0.9739 
Materials  5.2381 0.0001*** 5.4539 0.0000*** 15.2981 0.9870 14.9511 0.9677 
Consumer discretionary  -0.9009 0.6569 -0.2022 0.8992 10.8948 0.9908 10.3353 0.9777 
Constant  -19.8551 0.0000*** -20.5515 0.0000*** -28.4123 0.9759 -28.4907 0.9385 
Log likelihood  -267.92  -264.81  -334.76  -330.48  
LR-Chi2  160.48 0.0000*** 166.71 0.0000*** 179.72 0.0000*** 188.28 0.0000*** 
Industry effect Chi2   27.17 0.0000*** 30.79 0.0000*** 39.24 0.0000*** 43.08 0.0000*** 
Note: This table shows the results of a probit regression which tests the likelihood to use commodity derivatives. The Likelihood Ratio LR-Chi2 tests that at least one of the coefficients is not equal to zero. 
A p-value of less than 0.05 indicates that the model as a whole fits better than an empty model. Energy, Industrials, Materials and Consumer Discretionary dummy variables take ‘1’ if the firm belongs to 
this industry. The IT industry has been dropped as it predicts commodity derivative use perfectly. Health Care has been omitted as a reference group. Industry effect Chi2 shows the results of testing the 
overall industry effect on the binary hedging decision. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
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Overall, the industry effect has a significant influence on the decision to use foreign 
exchange, interest rate and commodity risk instruments.  
A review of the other variable coefficients by type of market risks suggests that several 
factors are important for some hedging decisions, but not for others. Consistent with 
the findings on derivative use presented in Table 4.7, firm size is the most influential 
factor on the likelihood to hedge specific market risks derivatives. Results are 
consistent with Nguyen and Faff (2003c) who report that the decision to use foreign 
exchange and interest rate derivatives in Australia is significantly influenced by 
financial distress costs and economies of scale.  
In summary, results from the probit analyses for both countries provide evidence that 
industry classification affects the decision to hedge, and to hedge specific risk types, 
such as foreign exchange, interest rate and commodity risk derivatives, which supports 
Hypothesis 4.  
Moreover, common hedging theories relating to financial distress, underinvestment 
and economies of scale arguments provide further explanations for cross-sectional 
differences in derivative use, supporting Hypothesis 6. The most consistent 
explanations as to why firms decide to use foreign exchange, interest rate and 
commodity risk derivatives relate to firm size and economies of scale arguments. 
Existing hedging programs also seem to support the decision to hedge further market 
risks for Canadian firms (Panels B in Table 4.9, Table 4.10 and Table 4.11).  
 
4.3.4 Hedging determinants: The extent of hedging 
The final hedging decision investigated in this Chapter is the decision on the extent of 
hedging. This decision is proxied by the fair value of derivatives outstanding at balance 
date scaled by total assets. Summary statistics on the derivative fair value ratio in Table 
3.10 shows that, on average, Australian firms hedge to a larger extent (0.0086) than 
Canadian firms (0.0066) from 2009 to 2013. 
Hedging theory proposes that the same firm level incentives drive both decisions, i.e. 
the decision to hedge and the decision on the extent of hedging. However, Haushalter 
(2000) concludes that there are substantial differences in the determinants that drive 
the decision to use derivatives and the factors that determine the extent of derivative 
usage. Nguyen and Faff (2002) propose that firm size has a different relationship with 
the decision to hedge and the decision on how much to hedge. Based on the argument 
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that costs of implementing a derivatives program will have to be weighed against 
substantial transaction costs, they argue that hedging should be related to firm size, 
with larger firms being more likely to hedge. On the other hand, the relationship with 
the extent of derivative usage should be negative with size. Thus, once the hedging 
decision has been made, smaller firms gain more from higher levels of derivative 
usage.   
Table 4.12 shows the determinants on the extent of derivative use for Australian firms 
across all (Panel A), smaller (Panel B) and larger (Panel C) firms. Results are based on 
estimating Model (5) as discussed in Section 4.2.2.  
Results in Panel A, B and C in Table 4.12 show that leverage (0.0458, p<0.05; 0.1004, 
p<0.10; 0.0794, p<0.001, respectively) and capital expenditure (0.0723, p<0.001; 
0.0571, p<0.05; 0.0258, p<0.001, respectively) are statistically significant across all 
sub-samples by size. This supports common hedging rationales and show that firm 
leverage and capital expenditure not only determine whether to hedge or not (see Table 
4.7), but also influence the extent of hedging. Therefore, once the hedging decision has 
been made, firms are also likely to use more derivatives if they carry higher debt levels 
and expect to increase investments.  
Table 4.13 shows the determinants on the extent of derivative use for Canadian firms 
across all (Panel A), smaller (Panel B) and larger (Panel C) firms. It is based on 
estimating Model (5) as discussed in Section 4.2.2. Results show that leverage has a 
positive influence on the extent of hedging for all (0.022, p<0.05) and for larger (0.0547, 
p<0.001) firms, respectively.  
Interestingly the direction of the relationship between firm size and the extent of 
derivative use has reversed. The coefficient for firm size is negative for all Australian 
firms (Table 4.12 Panel A, -0.005, p<0.05) as well as for all Canadian companies and 
the sub-sample of smaller Canadian firms (Table 4.13 Panels A and B; -0.0092, 
p<0.001; -0.0298, p<0.001). This means that once the decision has been made to use 
derivatives smaller firms benefit from hedging to a larger extent.   
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Table 4.12 Determinants of the hedging extent: Australia 
Model (5) Predicted sign Panel A: All hedging firms (N=831) Panel B: Small hedging firms (N=171) Panel C: Large hedging firms (N=660) Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value 
Leverage + 0.0458 0.0128** 0.1004 0.0939* 0.0794 0.0000*** 
Tax losses + 0.1263 0.4230 0.7651 0.1737 0.0888 0.3508 
Current ratio - 0.0018 0.1304 0.0073 0.2668 0.0004 0.5840 
Dividends -/+ -0.0046 0.5983 0.0237 0.4464 -0.0104 0.0310** 
ROA - -0.0197 0.3604 -0.0285 0.6369 0.0224 0.1267 
Tangible assets - -0.1148 0.0013*** -1.3920 0.0000*** -0.0080 0.6373 
R&D expenditure + -0.0002 0.8814 -0.0008 0.8034 0.0071 0.0041*** 
Capital expenditure + 0.0723 0.0000*** 0.0571 0.0133** 0.0258 0.0000*** 
Firm size +/- -0.0050 0.0452** -0.0202 0.2441 -0.0023 0.1243 
Foreign income  + -0.0066 0.5794 -0.0349 0.4005 0.0010 0.8767 
Energy   -0.0176 0.4061 0.0203 0.7839 -0.0112 0.3045 
Industrials  -0.0028 0.8785 -0.0174 0.7893 -0.0051 0.5808 
Materials  0.0285 0.1666 0.1226 0.1112 0.0040 0.7011 
Consumer Discretionary  0.0131 0.4628 0.0270 0.6272 0.0017 0.8594 
Health Care  -0.0029 0.8821 -0.0950 0.1968 -0.0077 0.4273 
Constant  0.1604 0.0006*** 1.5368 0.0000*** 0.0381 0.1167 
Log likelihood  944.03  95.83  1222.59  
LR-Chi2  134.49 0.0000*** 65.57 0.0000*** 138.30 0.0000*** 
Industry effect Chi2   11.50 0.0423** 11.17 0.0481** 6.19 0.2882 
Note: This table shows the results of a tobit regression which tests the determinants for the extent of derivative use.  The Likelihood Ratio LR-Chi2 tests that at least one of the coefficients 
is not equal to zero. A p-value of less than 0.05 indicates that the model as a whole fits better than an empty model. Energy, Industrials, Materials, Consumer Discretionary and Health 
Care dummy variables take ‘1’ if the firm belongs to this industry. The omitted industry used as a reference group is the IT industry. Industry effect Chi2 shows the results of testing 
the overall industry effect on the decision of how much to hedge. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
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Table 4.13 Determinants of the hedging extent: Canada 
Model (5) Predicted sign Panel A: All hedging firms (n=749) Panel B: Small hedging firms (n=266) Panel C: Large hedging firms (n=483) Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value 
Leverage + 0.0222 0.0464** 0.0005 0.9827 0.0547 0.0000*** 
Tax losses + 0.0197 0.8147 -0.0009 0.9957 0.0698 0.4190 
Current ratio - -0.0015 0.0887* -0.0043 0.0511* -0.0002 0.8114 
Dividends -/+ 0.0038 0.4298 -0.0038 0.6904 -0.0032 0.3419 
ROA - 0.0661 0.0000*** 0.1351 0.0000*** 0.0007 0.9672 
Tangible assets - 0.0090 0.7389 0.0258 0.6395 0.0225 0.1551 
R&D expenditure + -0.0043 0.4399 0.0015 0.8613 0.0016 0.9182 
Capital expenditure + -0.0057 0.2868 -0.0199 0.0418** -0.0074 0.1303 
Firm size +/- -0.0092 0.0000*** -0.0298 0.0000*** -0.0007 0.6215 
Foreign income  + -0.0013 0.8560 -0.0057 0.6404 -0.0062 0.1969 
Energy   0.0276 0.8560 0.0849 0.0002*** -0.0035 0.6379 
Industrials  0.0043 0.7412 0.0431 0.0290** -0.0109 0.1180 
Materials  0.0338 0.0107** 0.1101 0.0000*** 0.0044 0.5197 
Consumer Discretionary  0.0165 0.2325 0.0387 0.0638* 0.0039 0.6054 
Health Care  0.0026 0.8932 -0.0098 0.7582 -0.0068 0.4585 
Constant  0.1114 0.0020*** 0.3166 0.0002*** -0.0042 0.8616 
Log likelihood  1429.07  420.54  1152.20  
LR-Chi2  47.20 0.0000*** 53.05 0.0000*** 53.07 0.0000*** 
Industry effect Chi2   12.69 0.0265** 27.85 0.0000*** 11.06 0.0503 
Note: This table shows the results of a tobit regression which tests the determinants for the extent of derivative use.  The Likelihood Ratio LR-Chi2 tests that at least one of the coefficients is not equal to 
zero. A p-value of less than 0.05 indicates that the model as a whole fits better than an empty model. Energy, Industrials, Materials, Consumer Discretionary and Health Care dummy variables take ‘1’ if 
the firm belongs to this industry. The omitted industry used as a reference group is the IT industry. Industry effect Chi2 shows the results of testing the overall industry effect on the decision of how much 
to hedge. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
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Industry level determinants 
To review whether the hedging theories tested by Hypothesis 6 explain firm 
differences in hedging decisions across industries, industry level probit and tobit 
models have been developed in Section 4.2.2 and 4.2.3 to investigate hedging 
decisions, including the decision to hedge with derivatives, with foreign exchange, 
interest rate and commodity risk derivatives as well as the extent of hedging. For 
brevity the results from these analyses are presented in Appendices J.1 to J.9. 
Results show that in most cases there is little consistency in what motivates firms 
across industries to hedge. Across countries, some similarities exist. For example, 
firms from the Energy industry report positive relationships between firm leverage and 
the decision to use derivatives for Australian (2.7426, p<0.01) and Canadian (2.2887, 
p<0.05) firms, respectively (Appendices J.1 and J.2). Similarly, leverage has a positive 
influence on the extent of hedging for Australian (0.0433, p<0.10) and Canadian 
(0.0226, p<0.05) Energy firms (Appendices J.8 and J.9). This indicates that financial 
distress costs are a significant factor for firms in this industry that influence not only 
the decision to hedge but also the extent to which risks should be hedged.  
These results suggest that industries have different motivations that determine the 
likelihood of using derivatives, specific market risk derivatives or the extent of 
hedging. However, these incentives need to be examined more closely and might 
require consideration of other factors suggested in the literature to reconcile 
differences in industry derivative determinants in Australia and Canada. For example, 
considering the influence of managerial risk aversion (Smith and Stulz, 1985; Géczy 
et al., 2007) or corporate governance structures (Allayannis et al., 2012; Lel, 2012) 
might provide more consistent rationales explaining hedging decisions across 
industries.  
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4.4 Chapter conclusion 
This chapter addresses the first two research questions of this thesis: What are the 
current hedging practices in Australia and Canada? Are there significant differences 
between countries? Hypotheses 1 to 6 developed in Chapter Three are tested on a 
sample of six non-financial industries from Australia and Canada from 2009 to 2013. 
The hedging decisions that are examined in this context include the decision to hedge 
with derivatives, to use foreign exchange, interest rate or commodity derivatives and 
the extent of hedging.  
Results from testing Hypothesis 1 show that significant differences exist between the 
proportions of derivative users in both countries. Previous research has reported a 
higher propensity for Australian firms to use derivatives than Canadian firms. On the 
contrary, this thesis finds that 46.6 per cent of Canadian firms use derivatives 
compared to 32.0 per cent for Australian firms (p<0.01). This result does not support 
Hypothesis 1 that overall hedging activity is not significantly different in each country.  
Hypothesis 2 proposes that derivative use and types of risks hedged are not 
significantly different for firms from the same industry. However, results show that 
significant differences for firms from the same industries across Australia and Canada 
exist. For example, Canadian Energy, Industrials, Health Care and IT firms have 
statistically significant higher proportions of derivative use than Australian firms from 
the same industry. Once the decision to hedge has been made, Australian derivative 
users from the Energy, Industrials, Materials, and IT industry hedge to a larger extent 
than Canadian firms from the same industries. Moreover, statistically significant 
differences in proportions of risk instrument use exist between countries. These 
findings provide evidence that derivative use and types of risk hedged are significantly 
different for firms from the same industry in both countries.  
Whether derivative practices are different between industries is tested by Hypothesis 
3. Results show that statistically significant differences in derivatives usage between 
industries for both countries exist. This provides support for the theoretical framework 
examined in Chapter Five, that the value of hedging is related to industry-specific 
distress costs (Hahnenstein and Röder, 2006).  
Furthermore, derivative usage is stable over the investigated timeframe, supporting 
Hypothesis 5. This finding also supports the assumption that derivatives investigated 
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in this thesis have been primarily used for risk management purposes by firms 
investigated in this research (Chernenko and Faulkender, 2011). 
Two further hypotheses relate to cross-sectional differences in hedging decisions, 
including the decision to hedge, the type of market risk to hedge, and how much to 
hedge. Results in Tables 4.7 to 4.13. provide evidence on these two hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 6 proposes that cross-sectional differences in hedging behaviour relates to 
four commonly cited hedging incentives from the theoretical literature. These 
propositions justify the use of derivatives for hedging based on reduced taxes, financial 
distress, underinvestment costs and economies of scale (Froot et al., 1993; Géczy et 
al., 1997; Smith and Stulz, 1985).  
Whereas no support exists for the tax hypothesis and conflicting results arise for the 
underinvestment hypothesis, financial distress and economies of scale provide 
reasonable explanations as to why and to what extent firms in Australia and Canada 
decide to hedge, which is consistent with results in the empirical literature (Bartram et 
al., 2009, Nguyen and Faff, 2002).  
Finally, an overall industry effect on the decision to hedge can be observed, which is 
statistically significant for all investigated hedging decisions. This supports 
Hypothesis 4 which proposes that derivative use is significantly influenced by a firm’s 
industry environment. This is an important finding for this thesis, as it is proposed that 
the value of hedging is closely related to industry-specific distress costs which is 
examined in Chapter Five.  
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Chapter Five:  Hedging and Firm Value 
5.1 Chapter introduction 
Hedging theories explain how hedging with derivatives creates firm value by reducing 
economic costs including expected taxes, financial distress or underinvestment (Froot 
et al., 1993; Géczy et al., 1997; Smith and Stulz, 1985). Chapter Four examines 
whether commonly cited hedging theories can explain differences in derivative use 
across a sample of 523 Australian and 338 Canadian firms across six industries. 
Results show that cross-sectional differences in hedging decisions are most 
consistently explained by a reduction in financial distress costs and firm size. 
Moreover, a firm’s industry is a significant determinant of the likelihood to hedge, to 
hedge specific market risks, and it also influences the extent of derivative use. This 
suggests that industry context is likely to influence the value derived from hedging 
decisions.  
Whether hedging creates firm value per se is still debated in the academic literature. 
A more recent line of enquiry has investigated the direct value effect of hedging and 
reports conflicting results and modest gains (Allayannis et al., 2012; Allayannis and 
Ofek, 2001; Bartram et al., 2011; Jin and Jorion, 2006; MacKay and Moeller, 2007). 
One of the challenges of reported results is that most studies investigate different 
hedging decisions in specific industry contexts or country settings which limits the 
generalisability of findings.  
This thesis addresses these shortcomings in the following ways. First, this chapter 
examines the value effect of hedging more comprehensively by including a broader 
range of hedging decisions and wide cross-section of firms from two countries to 
enable cross-validation of results. Second, the hypotheses developed in Chapter Three 
draw on propositions by Hahnenstein and Röder (2006) that hedging decisions need 
to be evaluated in the context of a firm’s capital structure and industry environment. 
To test these propositions this thesis examines the value of hedging decisions across 
six Australian and Canadian industries to cross-validate results beyond a particular 
country or industry setting.  
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5.2 Methodology 
5.2.1 Hedging and firm value across Australia and Canada 
Three research hypotheses developed in Chapter Three are tested. Hypothesis 7 
extends the analysis from Chapter Four and proposes that hedging creates firm value 
by reducing costs associated with taxes, underinvestment, financial distress and 
economies of scale.  Moreover, as the value of hedging is closely related to financial 
distress costs, which have been found to have a significant influence on hedging 
decisions for Australian and Canadian firms in Chapter Four, Hypothesis 8 states that 
hedging creates firm value for firms with higher leverage in relation to their industry 
peers. The final hypothesis examined in this thesis states that hedging creates firm 
value with increasing firm leverage (Hypothesis 9). 
To test the unconditional value effect of derivative use (Hypothesis 7), two-tailed t-
tests are conducted to examine differences in means of firm value between derivative 
users and non-users. For the purpose of the analysis presented in this chapter, firms 
that have been initially identified as employing ‘some’ hedging are classified as having 
No derivatives to ensure methodological comparability with previous research.  
Firm value is proxied by Tobin’s Q, which is defined as the ratio of firm market value 
to the replacement costs of its assets - a definition commonly used to measure the 
hedging premium (Allayannis and Weston, 2001; MacKay and Moeller, 2007; 
Allayannis et al., 2012; Panaretou, 2014). This allows results from this thesis to be 
compared with previous findings.  
The t-tests compare whether differences in means are zero. If the estimated p-values 
are less than pre-specified confidence levels it can be concluded that the mean 
difference is statistically significantly greater than zero and not caused by chance. For 
each statistical test the null and alternative hypotheses are:  
H0: means (ND) -  means( D) = 0 
H1: means (ND) -  means( D) ≠0       
And: 
H0: means (AUS)  -  means( CAN) = 0 
H1: means (AUS)  -  means( CAN) ≠0 
To further examine the value of hedging decisions, fixed effect and instrumental-
variable fixed effect panel data models are proposed. In a fixed effect model, time-
invariant characteristics are controlled for and individual differences will be captured 
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by differences in the intercept parameter for each cross-section in the panel (Hill et al., 
2008). This is appropriate in the context of this research, as firm choices about 
derivative use are likely to be correlated over time and managers will decide on 
whether to use derivatives or not, depending on expected firm-specific hedging 
benefits, which makes their decision non-random (Allayannis et al., 2012). All 
suggested panel data models were originally estimated using fixed and random effects 
and a Hausman test of robustness was conducted. For brevity results are not reported, 
but, the Hausman test produced a p-value of less than 0.05 for all model specifications 
for the Australian and the Canadian sample, which indicates that fixed effect models 
are appropriate. 
To control for other factors that impact firm value, the same variables that are used to 
test hedging theories in Chapter Four are included as controls. These variables have 
shown to affect firm value in previous research (Allayannis and Weston, 2001; Jin and 
Jorion, 2006). Year dummy variables are included in the country level analysis to 
control for any time trends. For brevity the relationships between included control 
variables and Tobin’s Q are not discussed when results are presented.   
The same set of hedging decisions that is investigated in Chapter Four is considered 
examined in this Chapter. These decisions include the decision to use derivatives, to 
use foreign exchange, interest rate or commodity risk derivatives, and the decision on 
the extent of hedging.  
To mitigate potential endogeneity problems between hedging variables and Tobin’s 
Q, a Wu-Hausman test was conducted to test for endogeneity between Tobin’s Q and 
the hedging variables examined. Results show that Tobin’s Q and hedging variables 
are endogenously determined.  
Various methodological approaches from the empirical literature have been 
considered to address the endogeneity problems that have been identified between 
hedging variables and Tobin’s Q. As discussed in Chapter Two (p.75), previous 
research has employed simultaneous equation models, propensity score matching 
(PSM) or used instrumental variable (IV) approaches to address endogeneity issues. 
For example, Bartram et al. (2011), who examine the influence of derivative use on 
firm risk and value, and Panaretou (2014), who test the hedging premium of UK firms 
use propensity score matching (PSM). On the other hand, two seminal papers by Lel 
(2012) and Allayannis et al. (2012) examine the link between corporate governance 
and derivative use and the impact of derivatives on firm value. Both studies employ 
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an instrumental variable (IV) approach to mitigate the potential endogeneity issues. 
After considering the different methods discussed above, it was decided to use an 
instrumental variable approach for the examination of the value effect of hedging in 
this thesis to ensure methodological comparability with the findings by Allayannis et 
al. (2012) and Lel (2012) and allow for a comparison of results.  
The challenge in the IV estimation is to find appropriate IVs that satisfy the relevance 
condition, i.e. that the IVs are correlated with firm derivative use, and the exclusion 
condition, that the IVs are uncorrelated with firm value (Allayannis et al., 2012). 
Various instrumental variables have been tested to identify instruments that satisfy 
both the relevance condition (i.e. related with the type of derivative use being 
examined) and the exclusion condition (i.e. not related to Tobin’s Q) and which can 
be used to examine the hedging decisions across the various sub-samples examined in 
this chapter (i.e. for smaller firms, high debt firms, different industry samples). After 
a review of the relevant literature, it was decided to follow Allayannis et al. (2012) and 
to instruments the use of derivatives and the derivative fair value ratio with variables 
that are not likely to affect firm value. These instruments include a variable indicating 
the percentage of firms in the same industry which use the relevant derivative type, 
such as the percentage of firms using derivatives, foreign exchange, interest rate or 
commodity risk derivatives, or the mean industry derivative fair value ratio, 
respectively. Instruments are validated using various specification tests, of which 
results are shown in corresponding results tables.  
Six models are developed that examine the value of hedging decisions on Tobin’s Q 
for Australian and Canadian firms in Chapter Five. The results based on estimating 
Models (1) to (6) for Australian and Canadian firms will provide evidence on whether 
hedging creates firm value.  
Model (1) tests Hypotheses 7 and 8 and considers influence of derivative use on 
Tobin’s Q. It is represented by Equation 1 as follows: 
TQit = a0 + b1 DER it + b2 LEV it + b3 TAXL it + b4 CURit + b5 DIV it +b6ROAit + b7 TANGit +b8 
RD it + b9 CAPX + b10 SIZE it + b11 FINC it ++eit 
                       (1) 
Model (2) tests Hypotheses 7 and 8 and considers the influence of the extent of hedging 
on Tobin’s Q. It is represented by Equation 2 as follows: 
TQit = a0 + b1 DVF it + LEV b2 it + b3 TAXL it + b4 CURit + b5 DIV it +b6ROAit + b7 TANGit +b8 
RD it + b9 CAPX + b10 SIZE it + b11 FINC it ++eit 
(2) 
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Model (3) tests Hypotheses 7 and 8 and considers the influence of the use foreign 
exchange, interest rate and commodity risk derivatives on Tobin’s Q. It is represented 
by Equation 3 as follows: 
TQit = a0 + b1 FXD it + b2 IRDit + b3 CDit + b4 LEV it + b5 TAXL it +b6 CUR it + b7 DIV it +b8 ROA 
it + b9 TANG + b10 RD it + b11 CAPX it + b12 SIZE it + b13 FINCit ++e    
(3) 
Model (4) tests Hypothesis 9 and considers the influence of the interaction between 
leverage and derivative use on Tobin’s Q. It is represented by Equation 4 as follows: 
TQit = a0 + b1 (DER*LEV) it + b2 LEVit + b3 TAXL it + b4 CUR it + b5 DIV it +b6 ROA it +b7 
TANG it +b8 RD it + b9CAPX + b10 SIZE it + b11 FINC it ++eit  
                     (4) 
Model (5) tests Hypothesis 9 and considers the influence of the interaction between 
leverage and the extent of derivative use on Tobin’s Q. It is represented by Equation 
5 as follows: 
TQit = a0 + b1 (DVF*LEV) it + b2 LEV it + b3 TAXL it + b4 CUR it + b5 DIV it +b6 ROA it +b7 
TANG it +b8 RD it + b9CAPX + b10 SIZE it + b11 FINC it ++eit    
                     (5) 
Model (6) tests Hypothesis 9 and considers the influence of the interactions between 
foreign exchange, interest rate, and commodity risk derivatives with leverage, 
respectively, on Tobin’s Q. It is represented by Equation 6 as follows: 
TQit = a0 + b1 (FXD* LEV) it + b2 (IRD* LEV)it + b3 (CD* LEV)it + b4LEV it + b5TAXLit +b6 
CUR it + b7 DIV it +b8 ROA it + b9TANG it + b10 RD it + b11 CAPX it +b12SIZE it  + b13 FINCit 
++eit 
               (6) 
Where, TQit = Tobin’s Q for firm i in year t, DER = derivative dummy, FXD = foreign 
exchange derivative dummy, IRD = interest rate derivative dummy, CD = commodity 
derivative dummy, DFV = total net fair value of derivatives to total assets, TAXL = 
tax losses, LEV = leverage, CUR = current ratio, DIV = Dividend dummy, ROA = 
return on assets, TANG = tangible assets, RD = R&D expenditure, CAPX = capital 
expenditure, SIZE = firm size, FINC = foreign income.  
DERit, FXDit, IRDit and CDit represent hedging dummy variables used in Models (1), 
(3), (4) and (6) and equal ‘1’ if a company uses derivatives, uses foreign currency 
derivatives, interest rates derivatives or commodity derivatives for firm i in year t, 
 
 
 165 
otherwise zero. Detailed definitions of hedging variables are provided in Table 3.7 in 
Chapter Three. Detailed definitions for Leverage, Tax losses, Current ratio, 
Dividends, Return on assets, Tangible assets, R&D expenditure, Capital expenditure, 
Firm size, and Foreign income are provided in Table 3.8 in Chapter Three. 
Furthermore, several robustness checks have been undertaken and alternative 
measures suggested in the literature for leverage and firm value have been tested, 
including industry-adjusted debt (Géczy et al., 1997; Clark and Judge, 2008) and 
industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q (Panaretou, 2014). However, the selected variables have 
yielded the best results across country and industry model estimations.  
To estimate Models (1) to (6) in Chapter Five a two-stage least square (2SLS) 
approach has been used, which is further explained in Appendix L. Moreover, a brief 
discussion on why the derivative variables are only included as interaction variables 
in Models (4), (5) and (6) is provided in Appendix L.  
 
5.2.2 Hedging and firm value across industries 
Models (1) to (6) are first estimated on a country level to verify whether the hypotheses 
developed in Chapter Three testing the value proposition of hedging hold for large 
samples of non-financial firms in Australia and Canada.  
To assess the value of hedging decisions in the context of industry-specific distress 
costs (Hahnenstein and Röder, 2006), all six models developed above are also 
estimated for the six industry sub-samples to investigate research Hypotheses 7, 8 and 
9 on an industry level. This will enable conclusions as to whether hedging creates 
value as proposed by Hypothesis 7, creates value for firms with higher leverage 
(Hypothesis 8), or whether hedging creates value with increasing firm leverage 
(Hypothesis 9) in specific industry environments.  
A Wu-Hausman test was conducted, but in most cases endogeneity problems could 
not be established for the industry level model estimations. For the industry results, IV 
fixed effect estimations and OLS fixed effect estimations are presented.  Results of the 
Davidson-McKinnon F-test are included in the industry level result tables, which 
indicate whether an OLS estimation is preferred.  
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5.3 Results: Hedging and firm value 
5.3.1 Hedging and firm value across Australia and Canada 
This section presents univariate and multivariate country level results which examine 
Hypotheses 7, 8 and 9 that address the research question whether hedging creates firm 
value in Australia and Canada.  
Table 5.1 shows differences in means for Tobin’s Q over the sample period. Panel A 
in Table 5.1 presents results on the difference in means for Tobin’s Q between 
Australia and Canada. No statistically significant difference exists in Tobin’s Q for the 
total sample, for no derivative users or derivative users between Australian and 
Canadian firms. Panel A in Table 5.1 also reports the difference in means for Tobin’s 
Q between derivative users and non-users.  
These results show that Tobin’s Q is significantly lower for derivative users than for 
firms that do not hedge. For example, for Australian firms, Tobin’s Q is 0.2532 for 
derivative users and 0.5716 for firms that do not hedge. For Canadian firms, Tobin’s 
Q is 0.2702 compared to 0.5723 for derivative users and non-users, respectively. Both 
difference in means are statistically significant at p<0.001.  
To check the robustness of these results, Tobin’s Q is also compared between firms 
that do not hedge and a sub-set of large firms, which are hypothesised to benefit more 
from hedging due to economies of scale. Results in Panel A for Australian firms show 
that even though Tobin’s Q is higher for a sub-sample of large derivative users, it is 
still significantly smaller (0.3608) than for firms that do not hedge (0.5716). Similarly, 
for the Canadian sub-sample, Tobin’s Q for large derivatives users is 0.3826 compared 
to 0.5723 for non-hedging firms. These differences are significant at p<0.001. 
Results in Panel B Table 5.1 show that non-users have higher Tobin’s Q for Australian 
Energy (0.3836), Materials (0.5891), Consumer Discretionary (0.4735) and IT firms 
(0.8151), compared to derivative users (0.1751, p<0.05; 0.2197, p<0.001; 0.2470, 
p<0.001; 0.4704, p<0.1, respectively).  
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Table 5.1 Differences in means Tobin’s Q 2009-2013  
Note: Difference ND-D describes the difference in means between firms that have no derivatives and firms that 
use derivatives. Difference Aus- Can describes the difference in means between Australian and Canadian firms. 
Large derivative user describes Tobin’s Q for a sub-sample of firms with firm size larger than the country median 
size. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
For the Canadian sample, higher Tobin’s Q can be observed for non-hedging firms 
from the Materials (0.6235), Consumer Discretionary (0.2848), Health Care (1.6930) 
and IT industries (0.7477), compared to firms that hedge with derivatives (0.3605, 
p<0.001; 0.0414, p<0.05; 0.3972, p<0.001; 0.4363, p<0.05). No statistically 
significant differences in Tobin’s Q exist for Australian Industrials and Health Care, 
and Canadian Energy and Industrials firms at p>0.10. 
 Australia Canada Difference 
Aus - Can  N mean N mean 
Panel A: Tobin’s Q across countries and derivative users 
Total  2,585 0.4685 1,672 0.4315  0.0370 
No derivatives 1,748 0.5716 893 0.5723 -0.0007 
Derivative user 837 0.2532 779 0.2702 -0.0170 
    Difference ND-D  0.3184***  0.3021***  
Large derivatives user 667 0.3608 512 0.3826 -0.0219 
   Difference ND-Large 0.2108***  0.1896***  
Panel B: Tobin’s Q across industries   
Energy 443 0.3436 420 0.2899  0.0537 
No derivatives  358 0.3836 197 0.2988  0.0848 
Derivatives user 85 0.1751 223 0.2821 -0.1070* 
Difference ND -D  0.2085**  0.0167  
Industrials  455 0.0846 315 0.2563 -0.1716*** 
No derivatives 232 0.0692 137 0.2735 -0.2042 
Derivatives user 223 0.1007 178 0.2430 -0.1423*** 
Difference ND -D   -0.0315  0.0304  
Materials 416 0.4577 434 0.5272 -0.0695 
No derivatives 268 0.58911 275 0.6235 -0.0344 
Derivatives user 148 0.2197 159 0.3605 -0.1408** 
Difference ND -D  0.3693***  0.2630***  
Consumer Disc. 460 0.3524 235 0.1605  0.1918** 
No derivatives 214 0.4735 115 0.2848  0.1886* 
Derivatives user 246 0.2470 120 0.0414  0.2055** 
Difference ND -D  0.2265***  0.2434**  
Health Care 463 0.8738 119 1.3664 -0.4926*** 
No derivatives 387 0.9070 89 1.6930 -0.7861*** 
Derivatives user 76 0.7049 30 0.3972  0.3077* 
Difference ND -D  0.2021  1.2958***  
IT 348 0.7567 149 0.6036  0.1531 
No derivatives 289 0.8151 80 0.7477  0.0673 
Derivatives user 59 0.4704 69 0.4363  0.0341 
Difference ND -D  0.3447*  0.3114**  
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Overall, these univariate results are consistent with Nelson et al. (2005) and support 
the theoretical argument that hedging does not create value (Modigliani and Miller, 
1958). Yet, these findings must be interpreted with caution as they are univariate 
comparisons and do not include other firm and industry factors that influence firm 
value. The fact that firms do hedge suggests that additional factors make hedging 
valuable, which are not considered here. For example, as hedging reduces financial 
distress costs, it is hypothesised that firm leverage influences the value of hedging 
decisions which is tested in this thesis (Hahnenstein and Röder, 2006).  
 
Hypothesis 7: Hedging creates firm value  
Tables 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 relate to the first hypothesis which proposes that hedging 
creates firm value by reducing costs associated with taxes, underinvestment, financial 
distress and economies of scale.  
Table 5.2 shows the relationship between the use of derivatives on Tobin’s Q for 
Australian firms. For Table 5.2 Model (1) estimates the binary decision to use 
derivatives and considers the influence of hedging on Tobin’s Q. Model (2) estimates 
the influence of the extent of hedging on Tobin’s Q. The results are based on estimating 
Model (1) and Model (2) as discussed in Section 5.2.1 The complete first- and second-
stage results for estimating Model (1) for Australian firms is included in Appendix L.1. 
Results from estimating Model (1) show a negative coefficient for the decision to use 
derivatives (-0.8886, p<0.10). This indicates that the decision to use derivatives does 
not have a positive effect on firm value for Australia firms. In fact, the estimated 
coefficient of -0.0.886 indicates that the decision to use derivatives decreases Tobin’s 
Q by 58.8 per cent for Australian firms8. Despite theoretical arguments that explain how 
hedging creates firm value by alleviating market frictions (Froot et al., 1993; Géczy et 
al., 1997; Smith and Stulz, 1985), and international findings by Bartram et al. (2011) 
and Panaretou (2014), who report positive value effects of hedging on Tobin’s Q, the 
prediction that derivatives create firm value cannot be confirmed here. Australian 
investors have a negative perception of the decision to use derivatives and seem to 
discount hedging firms accordingly, which is in line with earlier findings for Australian 
firms by Nguyen and Faff (2003a).  
                                               
8 As the dependent varibale Tobin’s Q is log transformed, the decision to hedge with derivatives leads 
to a decrease of Tobin’s Q of e -0.8886 – 1= -0.5876.  
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Table 5.2 Firm value of hedging: Australia 
Tobin’s Q  
Model (1)  Model (2)  
All firms (N=2,585) Small firms (N=1,289) Large firms (N=1,296) All firms (N= 2,579) Small firms (N=1,286) Large firms (N=1,293) 
Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value 
Derivatives -0.8886 0.0815* -2.3934 0.1153 -0.3017 0.3503       
DFV       2.9951 0.1852 2.4478 0.4350 2.4324 0.3357 
Leverage -0.6011 0.0000*** -0.2494 0.3563 -0.7951 0.0000*** -0.8062 0.0000*** -0.5492 0.0006*** -0.9530 0.0000*** 
Tax losses 1.2535 0.0002*** 1.6422 0.0094*** 0.2549 0.5521 1.1868 0.0003*** 1.2783 0.0066*** 0.3703 0.3805 
Current ratio -0.0040 0.0000*** -0.0037 0.0060*** -0.0058 0.0066*** -0.0038 0.0000*** -0.0035 0.0043*** -0.0054 0.0097*** 
Dividends -0.0501 0.3323 -0.1511 0.2029 -0.0039 0.9225 -0.0819 0.1025 -0.1443 0.1382 -0.0071 0.8589 
ROA 0.0003 0.2684 0.0003 0.4978 -0.2523 0.0000*** 0.0003 0.3027 0.0003 0.4417 -0.2691 0.0000*** 
Tangible assets 0.0638 0.7280 0.2157 0.5654 0.1196 0.4841 0.1689 0.3929 0.3739 0.3581 0.1137 0.5095 
R&D expenditure 0.0044 0.0212** 0.0051 0.1917 -0.0020 0.2703 0.0059 0.0004*** 0.0076 0.0048*** -0.0012 0.4745 
Capital expenditure -0.4526 0.0000*** -0.4069 0.0010*** -0.5101 0.0000*** -0.6099 0.0000*** -0.6689 0.0000*** -0.5917 0.0000*** 
Firm size 0.4850 0.0000*** 0.4353 0.0000*** 0.5466 0.0000*** 0.4337 0.0000*** 0.3809 0.0000*** 0.5129 0.0000*** 
Foreign income  -0.0218 0.4080 -0.1294 0.4122 0.0014 0.9261 -0.0287 0.2636   -0.1606 0.2246 0.0012 0.9379 
Constant -4.5390 0.0000*** -3.7117 0.0000*** -6.0515 0.0000*** -4.2642 0.0000*** -3.4531 0.0000*** -5.7563 0.0000*** 
Year dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
F-test IV-FE model 88.11 0.0000*** 16.45 0.0000*** 86.43 0.0000*** 94.37 0.0000*** 26.23 0.0000*** 84.88 0.0000*** 
Wu-Hausman F-test 19.1203 0.0000*** 6.5741 0.0105*** 1.10879 0.2925 23.3364 0.0000*** 7.4937 0.0063*** 7.25 0.0072*** 
Anderson LM statistics 18.81 0.0000*** 6.11 0.0134** 11.33 0.0008*** 21.248 0.0000*** 8.919 0.0028** 17.33 0.0000*** 
Cragg-Donald Wald F-test               18.84  6.11  11.28  21.31  8.861  17.37  
Note: This table shows the results of fixed effects instrumental variable regressions of the decision to use derivatives (Model 1) and the extent of derivative use (Model 2) on Tobin’s Q for Australian 
firms. Derivatives is a dummy variable that takes ‘1’ if the firm uses derivatives. DFV denotes the extent of derivative use is proxied by the derivative fair values scaled by total assets. Small firms indicate 
a subset of firms with firm size smaller than the industry median. Large firms indicate a subset of firms with firm size larger than the industry median. The Wu-Hausman F-test examines whether the 
instrumented derivative variables are exogenous. Statistically significant p-value indicate that the null hypothesis should be rejected and that the variable is endogenous. The Anderson LM statistics is a 
test of underidentification, i.e. it tests that the excluded instruments are ‘relevant’ and correlated with the endogenous variable. The null hypothesis states that the model is underidentified, a rejection of 
the null indicates that the model is identified. The Cragg-Donald Wald F-test provides a test statistic to evaluate weak identification, which may arise when excluded instruments are only weakly correlated 
with endogenous variables. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.  
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Recall that Chapter Four has concluded that large firms are more likely to hedge as they 
benefit more from economies of scale. For example, as significant set-up and transaction 
costs of derivative programs exist, this diminishes the value derived from hedging for 
smaller firms (Géczy et al., 2000; Arias et al., 2000). For robustness, Models (1) and (2) 
are estimated for sub-samples of smaller and larger firms. However, results based on 
estimated Model (1) for smaller or larger firms do not present statistically significant 
results. Therefore, it can be concluded that the decision to use derivatives for Australian 
firms is not associated with higher firm value as proposed by Hypothesis 7.  One 
possible explanation for the observed hedging discount relates to information 
asymmetries between finance managers and shareholders, who cannot be sure about the 
purpose behind corporate derivative use, as well as details of risk management 
exposures and hedging contracts (Nguyen and Faff, 2003c; Allayannis et al., 2012). 
First, investors are not able to differentiate between the alternative uses of derivatives 
for hedging, managerial self-interest or for speculative purposes (Géczy et al., 2007, 
Lel, 2012). Accordingly, investors will place lower values on hedging firms if they 
suspect that derivative usage is driven by other than value-enhancing motives 
(Allayannis et al., 2012). Second, whether hedging effectively alleviates market risks 
depends on a firm’s hedging program which will be customised to its unique risk 
exposures, underlying operations and financing requirements. Specific details of 
corporate hedging programs are generally privileged and hedging information reported 
at year end might only provide a brief snapshot of underlying derivative activity 
(Nguyen and Faff, 2003c). Consequently, investors face several uncertainties related to 
derivative use, which can impact the value they assign to hedging firms. The results 
based on estimating Model (1) suggest that Australian investors do not value the 
decision to use derivatives. Furthermore, results from estimating Model (2) have no 
statistically significant influence on Tobin’s Q.  
Table 5.3 shows results for the value effect of using derivatives for Canadian firms. 
For Table 5.3 Model (1) estimates the binary decision to use derivatives and considers 
the influence of hedging on Tobin’s Q. Model (2) estimates the influence of the extent 
of hedging on Tobin’s Q. For robustness, results from estimating Model (1) and (2) in 
Table 5.3 are also shown for sub-samples by firm size.  
Results presented in Table 5.3 from estimating Model (1) for Canadian firms show a 
positive relationship between the decision to use derivatives (1.4437) on Tobin’s Q, 
which is statistically significant at p<0.01. This result is also confirmed for a sub-set 
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of smaller Canadian firms (1.0187), which statistically significant at p<0.05. Nguyen 
and Faff (2002) state that this might be due to that smaller firms benefit more from 
hedging once they decided to do so.  
Table 5.4 shows results on the value of hedging with specific market risk derivative 
instruments for Australian and Canadian firms. For Table 5.4 Model (3) estimates the 
influence of hedging with foreign exchange, interest rate and commodity risk 
derivatives on Tobin’s Q. Results show that the use of commodity risk derivatives has 
a negative influence on Tobin’s Q for all Australian (-8.3632, p<0.001) and all 
Canadian (-1.1691, p<0.10) firms. On the other hand, the use of interest rate 
derivatives by small Canadian firms is positively related to Tobin’s Q (0.8425, 
p<0.10). For larger Australian firms, the use of foreign exchange derivatives has a 
positive influence on Tobin’s Q (0.6733, p<0.10).  
Overall results from estimating Models (1), (2) and (3) do not provide consistent 
results across both countries. The only consistent result is the negative relationship 
between commodity risk derivatives for Australian (-8.3632, p<0.01) and Canadian 
firms (-1.1691, p<0.0814) which might be explained by the fact that investors value 
commodity price exposure and might hedge these in their own portfolios.  
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Table 5.3 Firm value of hedging: Canada 
Tobin’s Q  
Model (1)  Model (2)  
All firms (N=1,672) Small firms (N=844) Large firms (N=828) All firms (N=1,641) Small firms (N=827) Large firms (N=814) 
Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value 
Derivatives 1.4437 0.0039*** 1.0187 0.0177** 0.9738 0.1977       
DFV       -3.8656 0.1427 -0.6808 0.7822 -11.6645 0.1116 
Leverage -1.2312 0.0000*** -0.9805 0.0177** -1.4045 0.0003*** -0.9072 0.0000*** -0.7986 0.0000*** -0.6470 0.0197** 
Tax losses 0.5506 0.4676 0.4650 0.0000*** -2.4135 0.1521 -0.6819 0.3291 -0.2705 0.7387 -0.9545 0.4773 
Current ratio -0.0005 0.8084 -0.0007 0.7547 -0.0025 0.3508 -0.0015 0.2487 -0.0014 0.4102 -0.0024 0.2943 
Dividends 0.0171 0.8220 0.0895 0.3867 -0.0463 0.5676 -0.0209 0.6894 0.0215 0.7976 -0.0269 0.7152 
ROA -0.3278 0.0000*** -0.2333 0.0005*** -0.7396 0.0000*** -0.2262 0.0000*** -0.1761 0.0020*** -0.8083 0.0000*** 
Tangible assets -0.1842 0.5612 -0.6151 0.1271 0.0530 0.9049 -0.0356 0.8680 -0.4349 0.1743 0.1568 0.6825 
R&D expenditure -0.0003 0.9393 -0.0048 0.4192 0.0009 0.8124 -0.0017 0.4779 -0.0062 0.1978 -0.0003 0.9412 
Capital expenditure -0.2137 0.0000*** -0.1945 0.0000*** -0.7395 0.0000*** -0.1991 0.0000*** -0.1746 0.0000*** -0.6530 0.0000*** 
Firm size 0.3526 0.0000*** 0.3107 0.0000*** 0.2272 0.0172** 0.4034 0.0000*** 0.3709 0.0000*** 0.3503 0.0000*** 
Foreign income  -0.0686 0.6098 0.0058 0.9682 -0.1712 0.5680 -0.0710 0.5139 -0.0457 0.7579 0.1333 0.4064 
Constant -4.1927 0.0000*** -2.8042 0.0000*** -2.5114 0.0542* -4.3853 0.0000*** -3.3579 0.0000*** -4.0316 0.0000*** 
Year dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
F-test IV-FE model 39.68 0.0000*** 25.09 0.0000*** 19.16 0.0000*** 82.58 0.0000*** 36.80 0.0000*** 24.86 0.0000*** 
Wu-Hausman F-test 52.6091 0.0000*** 46.7771 0.0000*** 3.267 0.0711* 24.0391 0.0000*** 10.3718 0.0013*** 7.5098 0.0063*** 
Anderson LM statistics 15.60 0.0001*** 15.94 0.0001*** 4.19 0.0407** 26.52 0.0000*** 20.90 0.0000*** 8.120 0.0044*** 
Cragg-Donald Wald F-test               15.61  15.97  4.12  26.76  21.11  8.03  
Note: This table shows the results of fixed effects instrumental variable regressions of the decision to use derivatives (Model 1) and the extent of derivative use (Model 2) on Tobin’s Q for Canadian firms. 
Derivatives is a dummy variable that takes ‘1’ if the firm uses derivatives. DFV denotes the extent of derivative use is proxied by the derivative fair values scaled by total assets. Small firms indicate a 
subset of firms with firm size smaller than the industry median. Large firms indicate a subset of firms with firm size larger than the industry median. The Wu-Hausman F-test examines whether the 
instrumented derivative variables are exogenous. Statistically significant p-value indicate that the null hypothesis should be rejected and that the variable is endogenous. The Anderson LM statistics is a 
test of underidentification, i.e. it tests that the excluded instruments are ‘relevant’ and correlated with the endogenous variable. The null hypothesis states that the model is underidentified, a rejection of 
the null indicates that the model is identified. The Cragg-Donald Wald F-test provides a test statistic to evaluate weak identification, which may arise when excluded instruments are only weakly correlated 
with endogenous variables. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.  
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Table 5.4 Firm value of hedging: Market risk instruments  
Tobin’s Q  
Model (3) – Australia  Model (3) – Canada  
All firms (N=2,585) Small firms (N=1,289) Large firms (N=1,296) All firms (N=1,672) Small firms (N=844) Large firms (N=828) 
Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value 
FX derivatives -0.0695 0.9482 -0.8747 0.7325 0.6733 0.0587* -0.5774 0.2352 -0.1756 0.7190 0.0458 0.9616 
IR derivatives -0.0821 0.9632 13.9049 0.2964 0.2428 0.4882 0.5291 0.2441 0.8425 0.0919* 0.5531 0.6814 
Com derivatives -8.3632 0.0082*** -6.9094 0.1003 -0.4220 0.5635 -1.1691 0.0814* -0.9657 0.1309 -1.2112 0.3936 
Leverage -0.5250 0.1329 -1.2486 0.2239 -0.9977 0.0000*** -0.8317 0.0000*** -0.7726 0.0000*** -0.9983 0.0769* 
Tax losses 1.6418 0.0438** 2.0368 0.1908 0.2511 0.6289 0.7686 0.2575 0.4844 0.5315 -1.2535 0.5234 
Current ratio -0.0026 0.1898 -0.0033 0.3421 -0.0036 0.1736 -0.0018 0.2929 -0.0022 0.3102 -0.0009 0.7659 
Dividends 0.0519 0.6853 -0.5652 0.2399 0.0029 0.9614 0.0201 0.8041 0.1247 0.3330 -0.0649 0.4673 
ROA 0.0004 0.5693 0.0002 0.8949 -0.3329 0.0000*** -0.1979 0.0008*** -0.1494 0.0261** -0.6503 0.0004*** 
Tangible assets 0.5576 0.2841 -0.0067 0.9954 0.1950 0.5317 0.0185 0.9474 -0.2432 0.5369 -0.2788 0.6345 
R&D expenditure -0.0050 0.3883 -0.0013 0.8937 -0.0015 0.4506 -0.0034 0.2769 -0.0086 0.1533 0.0006 0.8852 
Capital expenditure -0.1363 0.5425 -0.4576 0.1769 -0.6532 0.0000*** -0.1884 0.0000*** -0.1742 0.0000*** -0.5069 0.0002*** 
Firm size 0.5837 0.0000*** 0.3162 0.1890 0.4783 0.0000*** 0.4372 0.0000*** 0.4101 0.0000*** 0.3472 0.0226 
Foreign income  0.2079 0.0672 -0.0837 0.8381 0.0106 0.7027 -0.0669 0.5810 -0.2464 0.1510 0.2114 0.4150 
Constant -6.0109 0.0000*** -2.7420 0.2758 -5.6762 0.0000*** -4.6148 0.0000*** -3.8814 0.0000*** -3.5641  
Year dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
F-test IV-FE model 14.10 0.0000*** 2.43 0.0010*** 23.63 0.1298 47.57 0.0000*** 23.36 0.0000*** 15.64 0.1708 
Wu-Hausman F-test 45.2542 0.0000*** 8.75055 0.0000*** 18.231 0.0000*** 8.6222 0.0000*** 14.3013 0.0000*** 2.679 0.0427*** 
Anderson LM statistic 19.06 0.0000*** 10.99 0.0000*** 13.9 0.0086 11.70 0.0000*** 5.52 0.0002*** 4.89 0.007*** 
Sargan statistic Chi2 0.066 0.7976 0.328 0.5668 3.521 0.0616* 15.599 0.0001*** 8.386 0.0380** 5.279 0.0216** 
Note: This table shows the results of instrumental variable regressions for panel data of the decision to use foreign exchange (FX derivatives), interest rate (IR derivatives) and commodity derivatives (Com 
derivatives) on Tobin’s Q (Model 3). FX derivatives, IR derivatives and Com derivatives are dummy variables that take ‘1’ if the firm uses foreign exchange, interest rate and commodity derivatives, 
respectively. Small firms indicate a subset of firms with firm size smaller than the industry median. Large firms indicate a subset of firms with firm size larger than the industry median. The Wu-Hausman 
F-test examines whether the instrumented derivative variables are exogenous. Statistically significant p-value indicate that the null hypothesis should be rejected and that the variable is endogenous. The 
Anderson LM statistics is a test of underidentification, i.e. it tests that the excluded instruments are ‘relevant’ and correlated with the endogenous variable. The null hypothesis states that the model is 
underidentified, a rejection of the null indicates that the model is identified. The Sargan statistic Chi2  provides a test of overidentifying restrictions. The joint null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid 
instruments, i.e., uncorrelated with the error term, and that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated 
by *, **, and ***, respectively.  
 
 
 174 
Hypothesis 8: Hedging creates firm value for firms with higher leverage 
Table 5.5 shows results for the relationship between the use of derivatives on Tobin’s 
Q for Australian firms across different debt levels. For this estimation the sample was 
partitioned into low debt, above industry median and high debt firms to explore whether 
hedging is valuable in the context of specific capital structure settings.  
Based on theories citing financial distress as a key rationale for hedging, and the 
theoretical framework proposed by Hahnenstein and Röder (2006), it is hypothesised 
that hedging is more valuable for firms that carry more debt than industry peers, i.e. 
above the median industry debt levels. However, hedging may no longer be valuable 
when a firm enters financial distress or even possible bankruptcy (Graham and Rogers, 
2002; Smith and Stulz, 1985). Once firms carry too much debt and are in financial 
distress, derivatives no longer add firm value and shareholders might place a discount 
on hedging firms. To verify whether this is the case for Australian and Canadian firms, 
Hypothesis 8 is also tested on a sub-sample of very high debt firms, which are firms 
with leverage ratios above the 75 percentile of industry debt for a given year.  
For Table 5.5 Model (1) estimates the binary decision to use derivatives and considers 
the influence of hedging on Tobin’s Q for Australian low debt, above industry median 
debt and for high debt firms. Model (2) estimates the influence of the extent of hedging 
on Tobin’s Q for the same sub-samples. The results are based on estimating Model (1) 
and Model (2) as discussed in Section 5.2.1. Results from Table 5.5. show that contrary 
to expectations, no statistically significant results exist for the use of derivatives (Model 
1), nor for the extent of hedging (Model 2) for Australian firms. This also holds for 
results presented in Tables 5.6 and 5.7.  
Table 5.6 presents the results from estimating Model (1) for low, above median and for 
high debt Canadian firms. For Table 5.6 Model (1) estimates the binary decision to use 
derivatives and considers the influence of hedging on Tobin’s Q for low debt, above 
industry median debt and for high debt Canadian firms. Model (2) estimates the 
influence of the extent of hedging on Tobin’s Q for the same sub-samples.  
Table 5.7 shows the value effect of using foreign exchange, interest rate and commodity 
risk derivatives. For Table 5.7 Model (3) estimates the influence of foreign exchange, 
interest rate and commodity risk derivatives on Tobin’s Q for low, above median and 
for high debt Australian and Canadian firms. The results are based on estimating Model 
(3) as discussed in Section 5.2.1.  
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Table 5.5 Firm value of hedging across debt levels: Australia 
Tobin’s Q  
Model (1)  Model (2)  
Low debt firms (N=963) Above industry median 
(N=1,263) 
High debt firms (N=637) Low debt firms (N= 960) Above industry median 
(N=1,260) 
High debt firms (N=636) 
Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value 
Derivatives 0.0444 0.9707 -0.4625 0.4816 -0.2270 0.8070       
DFV       45.8122 0.5531 -0.6319 0.7700 0.1672 0.8943 
Leverage -5.2835 0.1056 -0.7123 0.0000*** -0.5206 0.0246 -4.7035 0.2353 -0.7019 0.0000*** -0.4732 0.0011 
Tax losses 1.8902 0.0001*** 0.1374 0.8506 -0.7409 0.5020 2.1204 0.0008 0.4465 0.5185 -0.6988 0.5186 
Current ratio -0.0037 0.0001*** -0.0098 0.0279 -0.0111 0.2560 -0.0037 0.0021 -0.0078 0.0270 -0.0092 0.1094 
Dividends 0.1299 0.3180 -0.0942 0.0622 -0.0554 0.4048 0.1036 0.5452 -0.0976 0.0531 -0.0581 0.3781 
ROA 0.0004 0.2365 -0.1330 0.0000*** -0.0929 0.0000*** 0.0003 0.3935 -0.1334 0.0000*** -0.0921 0.0000*** 
Tangible assets 0.8459 0.0273** -0.2156 0.4834 -0.9069 0.0739 0.7621 0.0845 -0.3491 0.1955 -0.9614 0.0260 
R&D expenditure 0.0100 0.0002*** -0.0017 0.6505 0.1607 0.0000*** 0.0119 0.0159 0.0002 0.9352 0.1593 0.0000*** 
Capital expenditure -0.6057 0.0000*** -0.4391 0.0000*** -0.3773 0.0857 -0.6929 0.0000*** -0.4738 0.0000*** -0.4369 0.0001 
Firm size 0.4356 0.0000*** 0.3905 0.0000*** 0.3100 0.0076 0.4513 0.0000*** 0.3566 0.0000*** 0.2840 0.0000*** 
Foreign income  -0.0126 0.6607 -0.3518 0.0032 -0.0660 0.7228 -0.0298 0.5249 -0.3748 0.0038 -0.0621 0.7549 
Constant -4.5901 0.0000*** -3.4685 0.0000*** -2.3369 0.0730 -4.7752 0.0000*** -3.1177 0.0000*** -2.0841 0.0038 
Year dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
F-test IV-FE model 34.49 0.0000*** 42.52 0.0000*** 16.87 0.0000*** 20.33 0.0000*** 45.32 0.0000*** 16.92 0.0000*** 
Wu-Hausman F-test 5.31563 0.0214 ** 16.1017 0.0001*** 6.9123 0.0088*** 13.1501 0.0003*** 6.6393 0.0101*** 0.0353 0.8510 
Anderson LM statistics 6.31 0.0120** 5.63 0.0176** 2.201 0.1379 0.987 0.3206 8.163 0.0043*** 12.428 0.0004*** 
Cragg-Donald Wald F-test               6.22  5.57  2.134  0.966  8.100  12.350  
Note: This table shows the results of instrumental variable regressions for Australian panel data of the decision to use derivatives (Model 1) and the extent of derivative use (Model 2) on Tobin’s Q across 
different debt levels. Derivatives is a dummy variable that takes ‘1’ if the firm uses derivatives. DFV denotes the extent of derivative use is proxied by the derivative fair values scaled by total assets. Low 
debt firms indicate a subset of firms that have leverage below the 25 percentile of industry leverage for a given year. Above industry median indicate a subset of firms that have leverage above the industry 
median leverage for a given year. High debt firms indicate a subset of firms that have leverage above the 75 percentile of industry debt for a given year. The Wu-Hausman F-test examines whether the 
instrumented derivative variables are exogenous. Statistically significant p-value indicate that the null hypothesis should be rejected and that the variable is endogenous. The Anderson LM statistics is a 
test of underidentification, i.e. it tests that the excluded instruments are ‘relevant’ and correlated with the endogenous variable. The null hypothesis states that the model is underidentified, a rejection of 
the null indicates that the model is identified. The Cragg-Donald Wald F-test provides a test statistic to evaluate weak identification, which may arise when excluded instruments are only weakly correlated 
with endogenous variables. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.  
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Table 5.6 Firm value of hedging across debt levels: Canada 
Tobin’s Q  
Model (1)  Model (2)  
Low debt firms (N=509) Above industry median 
(N=827) 
High debt firms (N=401) Low debt firms (N= 503) Above industry median 
(N=808) 
High debt firms (N=395) 
Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value 
Derivatives 6.6432 0.5743 0.2538 0.4549 0.1231 0.7193       
Derivative fair value       1.3595 0.5964 -2.0094 0.5909 -1.5838 0.4900 
Leverage 3.6345 0.7595 -1.0722 0.0000*** -0.3100 0.0322 -2.2250 0.0515 -0.9657 0.0000*** -0.2602 0.0983 
Tax losses 1.3352 0.7791 0.5251 0.6022 -0.4295 0.7262 -0.4184 0.6255 0.5810 0.5623 -0.6942 0.5281 
Current ratio -0.0034 0.6420 -0.0129 0.2233 0.0103 0.6082 -0.0014 0.2819 -0.0178 0.0745 0.0065 0.7139 
Dividends -0.4375 0.5563 -0.0665 0.3397 -0.0392 0.6726 -0.2437 0.0514 -0.0596 0.3950 -0.0105 0.8984 
ROA -0.6571 0.2976 -0.1466 0.0247 -0.1496 0.0272 -0.4056 0.0000*** -0.1061 0.1081 -0.1217 0.0704 
Tangible assets -1.4986 0.6788 -0.1443 0.6826 0.9899 0.0630 -0.5806 0.3705 -0.0965 0.7828 1.0234 0.0554 
R&D expenditure -0.0063 0.7924 0.0012 0.6530 -0.0008 0.7209 -0.0039 0.4195 0.0010 0.7096 -0.0010 0.6747 
Capital expenditure -0.1796 0.7183 -0.1645 0.0000*** -0.0956 0.0000*** -0.3701 0.0000*** -0.1510 0.0000*** -0.0911 0.0000*** 
Firm size 0.6601 0.0103** 0.2616 0.0000*** 0.2870 0.0000*** 0.5821 0.0000*** 0.2991 0.0000*** 0.3120 0.0000*** 
Foreign income  0.5186 0.6847 0.2551 0.0725 -0.1292 0.4047 -0.0232 0.9170 0.2837 0.0465 -0.1124 0.4753 
Constant -7.3326 0.1246 -2.8206 0.0000*** -4.4900 0.0000*** -5.6334 0.0000*** -3.2454 0.0000*** -4.7888 0.0000*** 
Year dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
F-test IV-FE model 1.75 0.0412*** 25.41 0.0000*** 9.82 0.0000*** 40.55 0.0000*** 24.74 0.0000*** 9.81 0.0000*** 
Wu-Hausman F-test 5.56535 0.0170*** 62.067 0.0000*** 17.794 0.0000*** 5.3001 0.0217** 20.6606 0.0000*** 12.3094 0.0004*** 
Anderson LM statistics 0.35 0.5561 13.66 0.0002*** 9.49 0.0021 12.74 0.0004*** 16.62 0.0000*** 17.06 0.0000*** 
Cragg-Donald Wald F-test               0.33  13.63  16.38  12.66  16.67  17.21  
Note: This table shows the results of instrumental variable regressions for Canadian panel data of the decision to use derivatives (Model 1) and the extent of derivative use (Model 2) on Tobin’s Q across 
different debt levels. Derivatives is a dummy variable that takes ‘1’ if the firm uses derivatives. DFV denotes the extent of derivative use is proxied by the derivative fair values scaled by total assets. Low 
debt firms indicate a subset of firms that have leverage below the 25 percentile of industry leverage for a given year. Above industry median indicate a subset of firms that have leverage above the industry 
median leverage for a given year. High debt firms indicate a subset of firms that have leverage above the 75 percentile of industry debt for a given year. The Wu-Hausman F-test examines whether the 
instrumented derivative variables are exogenous. Statistically significant p-value indicate that the null hypothesis should be rejected and that the variable is endogenous. The Anderson LM statistics is a 
test of underidentification, i.e. it tests that the excluded instruments are ‘relevant’ and correlated with the endogenous variable. The null hypothesis states that the model is underidentified, a rejection of 
the null indicates that the model is identified. The Cragg-Donald Wald F-test provides a test statistic to evaluate weak identification, which may arise when excluded instruments are only weakly correlated 
with endogenous variables. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.
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Table 5.7 Firm value of hedging: Market risk instruments across debt levels  
Tobin’s Q  
Model (3) – Australia  Model (3) – Canada  
Low debt firms (N=963) Above industry median 
(N=1,263) 
High debt firms (N=637) Low debt firms (N= 509) Above industry median 
(N=827) 
High debt firms (N=401) 
Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value 
FX derivatives -0.4951 0.9365 -0.2269 0.7178 0.3087 0.5905 3.2476 0.4352 -1.2101 0.0340 -2.1229 0.2447 
IR derivatives -16.4402 0.4970 0.5737 0.4067 0.0259 0.9605 2.7587 0.3760 0.2257 0.4824 -0.4368 0.5797 
Com derivatives -8.4438 0.3615 -2.6382 0.4067 -0.8867 0.5268 -1.4883 0.5552 0.1354 0.8382 -0.5769 0.6210 
Leverage 0.7147 0.9506 -0.7955 0.0000*** -0.4908 0.0130 -0.5763 0.9070 -1.1109 0.0000 -0.4730 0.1984 
Tax losses 2.2041 0.1896 -0.4648 0.6873 -0.8776 0.4773 -1.1635 0.4966 1.7299 0.2871 5.5234 0.3303 
Current ratio -0.0004 0.9211 -0.0118 0.0636* -0.0156 0.1535 -0.0013 0.6904 -0.0194 0.1736 -0.0360 0.5021 
Dividends 0.0780 0.8649 0.0049 0.9638 -0.0163 0.8831 -1.0957 0.2312 0.0221 0.8263 -0.0793 0.6710 
ROA 0.0005 0.6323 -0.1301 0.0000*** -0.0927 0.0000 -0.3282 0.1560 -0.0962 0.2750 0.0814 0.7309 
Tangible assets -1.2451 0.7088 0.4153 0.5497 -1.3863 0.0955 0.6182 0.7377 0.1387 0.7938 0.8607 0.4745 
R&D expenditure 0.0126 0.1480 -0.0121 0.2170 0.1458 0.0002 -0.0043 0.7150 0.0005 0.8870 -0.0024 0.6277 
Capital expenditure -0.4372 0.1741 -0.3246 0.0470** -0.3217 0.2549 -0.4145 0.0816 -0.1614 0.0000 -0.1193 0.0126 
Firm size 0.5562 0.0392 0.3897 0.0000*** 0.3136 0.0107 0.5724 0.0002 0.2284 0.0015 0.1117 0.5673 
Foreign income  0.2710 0.4175 -0.4491 0.0178** -0.1389 0.5574 -0.4531 0.4163 0.1967 0.2963 -0.6083 0.2417 
Constant -3.4003 0.1770 -4.0744 0.1053 -2.0983 0.0810 -7.0208 0.0427 -2.1224 0.0212 -0.6474 0.8627 
Year dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
F-test IV-FE model 3.12 0.0000*** 17.93 0.0000*** 11.92 0.0000*** 6.19 0.0000 13.56 0.0000*** 2.06 0.0094 
Wu-Hausman F-test 27.3754 0.0000*** 7.9088 0.0000*** 2.9488 0.0322 2.82635 0.0382 15.4139 0.0000*** 10.2323 0.0000*** 
Anderson LM statistics 10.04 0.0000*** 3.335 0.1887 2.679 0.2620 3.14 0.0149** 8.37 0.0152** 1.546 0.4617 
Sargan statistic Chi2 0.589 0.4430 1.198 0.2738 1.073 0.3002 0.705 0.4012 0.341 0.5593 0.026 0.8718 
Note: This table shows the results of instrumental variable regressions for Australian and Canadian panel data of the decision to use foreign exchange (FX derivatives), interest rate (IR derivatives) and 
commodity derivatives (Com derivatives) on Tobin’s Q (Model 3). FX derivatives, IR derivatives and Com derivatives are dummy variables that takes ‘1’ if the firm uses foreign exchange, interest rate 
and commodity derivatives, respectively. Low debt firms indicate a subset of firms that have leverage below the 25 percentile of industry leverage for a given year. Above industry median indicate a subset 
of firms that have leverage above the industry median leverage for a given year. High debt firms indicate a subset of firms that have leverage above the 75 percentile of industry debt for a given year. The 
Wu-Hausman F-test examines whether the instrumented derivative variables are exogenous. Statistically significant p-value indicate that the null hypothesis should be rejected and that the variable is 
endogenous. The Anderson LM statistics is a test of underidentification, i.e. it tests that the excluded instruments are ‘relevant’ and correlated with the endogenous variable. The null hypothesis states that 
the model is underidentified, a rejection of the null indicates that the model is identified. The Sargan statistic Chi2  provides a test of overidentifying restrictions. The joint null hypothesis is that the 
instruments are valid instruments, i.e., uncorrelated with the error term, and that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.  
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It can be observed that none of the regression coefficients are statistically significant for 
the hedging variables in Tables 5.5, 5.6 and 5.7. This provides no support for Hypothesis 
8. There is also no evidence that supports the view that derivatives are value destroying 
for firms with very high debt levels relative to their industry.  
 
Hypothesis 9: Hedging creates firm value with increasing firm leverage 
Table 5.8 shows results of the testing the relationship between the interaction of leverage 
with derivative decisions and Tobin’s Q using Models (4), (5) and (6).  
Including an interaction variable changes the interpretation of the hedging decisions and 
assumes that the value effect of hedging changes with different degrees of firm debt. 
Hedging is expected to be more valuable as leverage increases (Hypothesis 9), because 
the use of derivatives allows firms to reduce financial distress costs from leverage and 
increases the net present value of the tax shield (Smith and Stulz, 1985). Again, it has 
to be pointed out that once firms enter financial distress derivatives may no longer be 
value-enhancing. However, it is hypothesised that positive relationships between the 
interaction of debt and hedging decisions with Tobin’s Q exist. Results from estimating 
these relationships provide evidence on whether hedging is valuable for financially 
constrained firms.  
Results presented in Table 5.8 provide some support for this hypothesis, based on 
results from Model (4) for Canadian firms. Model (4) tests Hypothesis 9 by 
considering the influence of the interaction between the decision to hedge and 
increasing leverage. Here, the interaction between the use of derivatives and leverage 
(5.3568, p<0.05) shows a positive relationship on Tobin’s Q. This finding supports 
Hypothesis 9, which states that hedging is valuable with increasing leverage. This is 
because hedging enables firms to ease financing constraints and to reduce costs 
associated with higher leverage, including direct and indirect financial distress costs 
(Froot et al, 1993; Smith and Stulz, 1985).  
However, this is the only interaction hedging variable that shows a statistically 
significant result in Table 5.8. This means that overall there is little support for 
Hypothesis 9 based on the Australian and Canadian country level data.  
Models (4), (5) and (6) have also been tested on a sub-sample of high debt firms to 
examine whether derivatives are in fact value-destroying. However, no statistically 
significant relationships have been observed in unreported results.  
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Table 5.8 Firm value of hedging with increasing leverage 
  Australia  Canada  
Tobin’s Q Model (4) (N=2,585) Model (5) (N=2,579) Model (6) (N=2,585) Model (4) (N=1,672) Model (5) (N=1,641) Model (6) (N=1,672) Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value 
Derivatives *Leverage -3.4324 0.1049     5.3568 0.0128**     
DVF *Leverage   7.9903 0.1856     -13.5716 0.1542   
FX derivatives* Leverage     0.4571 0.9357     -3.0683 0.5532 
IR derivatives* Leverage     -1.5429 0.8053     -0.3019 0.8178 
Com derivatives* Leverage     12.3960 0.6568     -3.7731 0.2936 
Leverage 0.5492 0.4806 -0.9843 0.0000*** -1.8830 0.5328 -3.6275 0.0008*** -0.7295 0.0000*** 1.3165 0.2641 
Tax losses 1.1670 0.0011*** 1.1695 0.0004*** 1.2171 0.0203** 1.1732 0.2263 -0.0175 0.9732 0.9858 0.2149 
Current ratio -0.0040 0.0000*** -0.0039 0.0000*** -0.0035 0.0173** -0.0012 0.5981 -0.0013 0.3291 -0.0007 0.7324 
Dividends -0.0432 0.4436 -0.0903 0.0821* -0.1589 0.5593 -0.0408 0.6401 -0.0034 0.9512 0.0165 0.8410 
ROA 0.0003 0.2928 0.0003 0.3093 0.0003 0.4707 -0.2979 0.0001*** -0.2427 0.0000*** -0.2628 0.0084*** 
Tangible assets 0.2894 0.2405 0.1167 0.5251 -0.4137 0.5343 -0.5567 0.1817 0.0061 0.9783 0.5354 0.1860 
R&D expenditure 0.0060 0.0011*** 0.0057 0.0006*** 0.0060 0.0212** 0.0084 0.1403 -0.0022 0.3765 -0.0112 0.0507* 
Capital expenditure -0.4543 0.0000*** -0.5853 0.0000*** -0.7326 0.0957* -0.2624 0.0000*** -0.1863 0.0000*** -0.1403 0.0000*** 
Firm size 0.4694 0.0000*** 0.4306 0.0000*** 0.4001 0.0076** 0.2793 0.0000*** 0.4268 0.0000*** 0.4846 0.0000*** 
Foreign income  -0.0197 0.4881 -0.0274 0.2852 -0.0153 0.7193 -0.2728 0.1583 0.0343 0.7101 0.0568 0.6853 
Constant -4.7264 0.0000*** -4.1606 0.0000*** -3.1904 0.1997 -2.3168 0.0288** -4.7989 0.0000*** -6.0566 0.0000*** 
Year dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
F-test IV-FE model 76.34 0.0000*** 94.18 0.0000*** 34.08 0.0000*** 29.50 0.0000*** 98.09 0.0000*** 37.02 0.0000*** 
Wu-Hausman F-test 20.0246 0.0000*** 23.7933 0.0000*** 21.7366 0.0000*** 58.9568 0.0000*** 25.7264 0.0000*** 31.6387 0.0000*** 
Anderson LM statistics 9.86 0.0017*** 20.05 0.0000*** 19.06 0.0000*** 9.674 0.0019*** 15.00 0.0001*** 11.70 0.0000*** 
Cragg-Donald Wald F-test            9.840  20.10    9.635  15.00    
Sargan statistic Chi2    26.527 0.0000***     6.905 0.0860* 
Note: This table shows the results of instrumental variable regressions for Australian panel data of the interaction between Leverage and the decision to use derivatives (Model 4), the interaction between 
Leverage and DFV (Model 5) and the interaction between Leverage and FX, IR and Com derivatives (Model 6), respectively. Derivatives, FX derivatives IR derivatives and Com derivatives are dummy 
variables that take ‘1’ if the firm uses derivatives or foreign exchange, interest rate and commodity derivatives, respectively. DFV denotes the extent of derivative use is proxied by the derivative fair values 
scaled by total assets. The Wu-Hausman F-test examines whether the instrumented derivative variables are exogenous. Statistically significant p-value indicate that the null hypothesis should be rejected 
and that the variable is endogenous. The Anderson LM statistics is a test of underidentification, i.e. it tests that the excluded instruments are ‘relevant’ and correlated with the endogenous variable. The 
null hypothesis states that the model is underidentified, a rejection of the null indicates that the model is identified. The Cragg-Donald Wald F-test provides a test statistic to evaluate weak identification, 
which may arise when excluded instruments are only weakly correlated with endogenous variables. The Sargan statistic Chi2  provides a test of overidentifying restrictions. The joint null hypothesis is that 
the instruments are valid instruments, i.e., uncorrelated with the error term, and that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
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5.3.2 Hedging and firm value across industries 
Hahnenstein and Röder (2006) propose that cross-sectional differences in shareholder 
value from hedging are due to industry-specific distress costs. To investigate whether 
valuable hedging decisions in different industry contexts can be observed, all six 
models developed in Section 5.2.1 testing Hypotheses 7, 8 and 9 are also estimated on 
an industry level. Tables 5.9 to 5.14 show the results. As an endogeneity issue could 
not be confirmed with a Wu-Hausman test for most industries, both IV regressions and 
fixed effect models are presented. Results of a Davidson-McKinnon F-test are 
included in the industry level result which indicate when OLS estimation is preferred.  
Hypothesis 7: Hedging creates firm value  
Table 5.9 shows a summary of variable coefficients for estimated Models (1), (2) and 
(3) across all Australian industries. IV and OLS estimates are presented for all 
industries for consistency. Full model estimations are provided in Appendices K.1 to 
K.18. 
Table 5.9 Panel A shows the value effect of derivatives. For Table 5.9 Model (1) 
estimates the influence of derivatives on Tobin’s Q for Australian firms. The results are 
based on estimating Model (1) as discussed in Section 5.2.1. Two statistically significant 
results exist: The use of derivatives (1.9786, p<0.10) has a positive influence on Tobin’s 
Q for Australian Energy firms. However, the use of derivatives (-0.2430, p<0.001) has 
a negative relationship with Tobin’s Q for Australian Health Care firms. 
For Table 5.9 Panel B Model (2) estimates the influence of the extent of hedging on 
Tobin’s Q for Australian industries. The results are based on estimating Model (2) as 
discussed in Section 5.2.1. Results show that the extent of hedging has a positive 
influence on Tobin’s Q for the Materials industry (9.2644, p<0.10), but show a 
negative relationship with Tobin’s Q for Health Care firms (-8.0027, p<0.05).  
For Table 5.9 Panel C Model (3) estimates the influence of foreign exchange, interest 
rate and commodity derivatives on Tobin’s Q. The results are based on estimating 
Model (3) as discussed in Section 5.2.1. Results show that the use of foreign exchange 
instruments (-0.2970, p<0.05) is again negatively associated with Tobin’s Q for Health 
Care firms. This is surprising as research intensive industries with high R&D 
expenditure, such as firms operating in the Health Care and IT industries, are expected 
to benefit more from hedging to protect their cash flows (Nance et al., 1993).  
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Table 5.9 Summary of variable coefficients for Australian industries: Hypothesis 7 
Tobin’s Q 
Energy  Industrials  Materials  Consumer Discretionary Health Care  IT  
IV estimate 
coefficients 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Panel A: Model (1)             
Derivatives    1.9786*    0.0339   -0.1018    0.0111   49.4810    0.0389   -1.0721   -0.1107   -0.9006   -0.2430***   -0.9713   -0.1449 
Davidson-MacK. F-test    5.4375**     0.0497    45.662***      1.0476     0.5545     0.6076  
Panel B: Model (2)             
DVF    33.9220   -0.5954    3.2479    0.1253    9.2644*    0.4898*    4.0856    0.9219  22.6697   -8.0027**  -14.1283    0.7325 
Davidson-MacK. F-test   5.3924**     1.536    11.1153***     0.5750     2.1471     0.7703  
Panel C: Model (3)             
FX derivatives   -5.5016   -0.1146    0.8341   -0.0296   23.1416    0.0814   -0.9802   -0.1369    2.1817   -0.2970**   -0.7758   -0.0783 
IR derivatives    2.9161   -0.0273    2.2030   -0.0050  -28.1018   -0.1899    0.0414   -0.1238    5.8409   -0.0180   -0.7758    0.1506 
Com derivatives  -12.3298   -0.0317    0.9485   -0.0424   -2.6669   -0.0574   -0.3489    0.0001    5.6417   -0.1951    omitted    omitted 
Davidson-MacK. F-test   34.062***     2.2674*    24.7422***     1.0757     0.5139     0.3942  
Note: This table shows an overview of the derivative variable coefficients of fixed effects panel data regressions of the decision to use derivatives (Model 1), the extent of derivative use (Model 2), and the 
decision to use foreign exchange (FX derivatives), interest rate (IR derivatives) and commodity derivatives (Com derivatives; Model 3) on Tobin’s Q for Australian firms. IV estimate coefficients and OLS 
estimate coefficients represent the results for instrumental-variable and ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions, respectively. The same set of control variables have been used as in Tables 5.2 to 5.8 but 
are not shown here for brevity. The full results for each model can be found in Appendix K. Derivatives is a dummy variable that takes ‘1’ if the firm uses derivatives. DFV denotes the extent of derivative 
use is proxied by the derivative fair values scaled by total assets. FX derivatives, IR derivatives and Com derivatives are dummy variables that take ‘1’ if the firm uses foreign exchange, interest rate and 
commodity derivatives, respectively. Commodity derivatives have been omitted for IT firms due to collinearity. The Davidson-MacKinnon F-test (Davidson-MacK. F-test) computes a test of exogeneity 
for a panel regression estimated via instrumental variables. The null hypothesis states that an OLS estimator of the same equation would yield consistent estimates, a rejection of the null indicates that 
endogenous regressors' effects on the estimates are meaningful. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.  
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Table 5.10 Panel B estimates the influence of the extent of hedging on Tobin’s Q for 
Canadian industries. The results are based on estimating Model (2) as discussed in 
Section 5.2.1. Results show that the extent of hedging (-0.9760, p<0.05) has a negative 
relationship with Tobin’s Q for Energy firms and a positive relationship for Materials 
(12.8997, p<0.1). This means that hedging to a larger extent for Energy firms is value 
diminishing but it increases Tobin’s Q for Materials firms.  
Table 5.10 Panel C estimates the influence of foreign exchange, interest rate and 
commodity risk derivatives on Tobin’s Q. The results are based on estimating Model 
(3) as discussed in Section 5.2.1. Results show that foreign exchange derivatives 
(0.3100, p<0.001) have a positive but that interest rate derivatives (-0.4940 p<0.001) 
have a negative relationship on Tobin’s Q. This means that the use of derivative 
instruments can have different value implications, depending on the type of instruments, 
within a particular industry. 
In summary, the influence of derivatives on Tobin’s Q varies greatly between firms 
from different industries. Value implications are also mostly not consistent for firms 
from the same industries across countries. Only the extent of hedging has a positive 
relationship with Tobin’s Q for Energy firms from both countries.  
This might be caused by the fact that, despite strong similarities in country level 
corporate governance between Australia and Canada, firms face different risk exposures 
and economic conditions based on their regional market environment, which requires 
further study. Overall, the findings from the industry level analysis do not provide 
sufficient support to state that hedging creates firm value for firms within an industry 
across countries.  
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Table 5.10 Summary of variable coefficients for Canadian industries: Hypothesis 7 
 Tobin’s Q 
Energy  Industrials  Materials  Consumer Discretionary Health Care  IT  
IV estimate 
coefficients 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Panel A: Model (1)             
Derivatives   -0.6275   -0.0275    1.0639   -0.0747    1.1349   -0.0963    0.0155   -0.0040   -1.1288   -0.3130   -0.2836    0.0750 
Davidson-MacK. F-test    3.3758*     1.9242     2.2666     0.0035     0.3287     0.2670  
Panel B: Model (2)             
DVF    -1.9406   -0.9760**   -7.9027    0.0666   12.8997*   -0.1560    4.3403   -0.0554   -9.2502   -5.2576  -45.2188   -6.5751 
Davidson-MacK. F-test    0.2696     2.3857     5.2681**     1.6278     0.0133     0.5299  
Panel C: Model (3)             
FX derivatives    3.0282   -0.0669    1.3183   -0.0574  -10.7162   -0.1092    1.0509   -0.0294   -5.2481   -0.3280   -0.0576    0.3100*** 
IR derivatives    0.6461    0.0598    1.6777   -0.0146    5.5573   -0.0168    0.2349   -0.0319  -59.0728   -0.2858   -1.0974   -0.4940*** 
Com derivatives   -4.0789    0.0112   -2.2160   -0.0331   14.4973   -0.0649   -0.2486    0.3813***    omitted    omitted    omitted    omitted 
Davidson-MacK. F-test    7.2528***     0.7957    30.9399***     3.8922**     4.06     9.9015  
Note: This table shows an overview of the derivative variable coefficients of fixed effects panel data regressions of the decision to use derivatives (Model 1), the extent of derivative use (Model 2), and the 
decision to use foreign exchange (FX derivatives), interest rate (IR derivatives) and commodity derivatives (Com derivatives; Model 3) on Tobin’s Q for Canadian firms. IV estimate coefficients and OLS 
estimate coefficients represent the results for instrumental-variable and ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions, respectively. The same set of control variables have been used as in Tables 5.2 to 5.8 but 
are not shown here for brevity. The full results for each model can be found in Appendix K. Derivatives is a dummy variable that takes ‘1’ if the firm uses derivatives. DFV denotes the extent of derivative 
use is proxied by the derivative fair values scaled by total assets. FX derivatives, IR derivatives and Com derivatives are dummy variables that take ‘1’ if the firm uses foreign exchange, interest rate and 
commodity derivatives, respectively. Commodity derivatives have been omitted for Health Care and IT firms due to collinearity. The Davidson-MacKinnon F-test (Davidson-MacK. F-test) computes a test 
of exogeneity for a panel regression estimated via instrumental variables. The null hypothesis states that an OLS estimator of the same equation would yield consistent estimates, a rejection of the null 
indicates that endogenous regressors' effects on the estimates are meaningful. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.  
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Hypothesis 8: Hedging creates value for firms with higher leverage 
Results presented in Tables 5.11 and 5.11 show results on the value of derivative use 
for Australian and Canadian firms with higher than median industry debt levels.  
Table 5.11 Panel A estimates the value of hedging on Tobin’s Q for Australian firms 
with higher debt. The results are based on estimating Model (1) as discussed in Section 
5.2.1 and show that the decisions to hedge (0.0940, p<0.001) increases Tobin’s Q for 
Australian Industrials firms that carry higher than average leverage ratios. Moreover, 
the use of interest rate derivatives (0.0852, p<0.05) has a positive impact on Tobin’s Q 
for firms from this industry (Panel C).  
No other statistically significant relationships can be observed. This does not support 
the hypothesis that hedging with derivatives creates firm value for firms with higher 
debt levels across Australian industries. 
Table 5.12 presents the value of derivatives for Canadian firms that carry higher 
leverage than their industry peers. The results are based on estimating Model (1) as 
discussed in Section 5.2.1. Two statistically significant relationships can be observed in 
Panel A, which shows that the decision to hedge has a negative relationship for higher 
debt firms from the Materials (-0.1326, p<0.05) and Consumer Discretionary (-0.0913, 
p<0.1) industry. Results in Panel C from Model (3) show mixed results. The use of 
foreign exchange derivatives has a negative impact on Tobin’s Q for Industrials firms 
(-0.2122, p<0.1). Furthermore, hedging with interest rate derivatives has a negative 
relationship on firm value for IT firms (-2.0097, p<0.10) but a positive effect for 
Consumer Discretionary firms (0.3702, p<0.1) from the higher debt sub-sample.  
Overall, the lack of statistical significance and mixed results from testing the value 
effect of derivatives on an industry level presented in Tables 5.11 and 5.12 does not 
support Hypothesis 8, which states that hedging creates value for higher debt firms. For 
Canadian Materials and Consumer Discretionary firms, hedging with derivatives has 
shown to have value-diminishing effects for firms facing financial distress. 
 
 
 
185 
Table 5.11 Summary of variable coefficients for Australian industries (higher debt firms): Hypothesis 8 
Tobin’s Q 
Energy  Industrials  Materials  Consumer Discretionary Health Care  IT  
IV estimate 
coefficients 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Panel A: Model (1)             
Derivatives    0.0128    0.0421  -16.5902    0.0940***   -7.8816    0.0735    1.3615   -0.0711   -1.5697   -0.1425   -1.8240   -0.1592 
Davidson-MacK. F-test    0.0025     2.4429    22.829***  2.7959*     0.5812     3.0052*  
Panel B: Model (2)             
DVF     5.9848   -1.8720    1.4875    0.1530   2.6770    0.0304   -6.9138   -0.5377   26.6404   -6.4223*    3.5670    1.7527 
Davidson-MacK. F-test    0.5824  1.0096    0.6684    -5.5965     4.0715**     0.0609  
Panel C: Model (3)             
FX derivatives    4.5965   -0.1012   -0.4890   -0.0538   -2.7051    0.0163   -0.1178    0.0421    0.1416   -0.2303    0.4888   -0.0747 
IR derivatives    2.5211    0.0634   -0.0661    0.0852**    2.7356   -0.0834   -2.0146  -0.0279    2.1721    0.0433   -2.1924    0.0615 
Com derivatives    5.1416   0.0053 -0.4882   -0.0370    1.4679    0.0495   -0.1992   -0.0360    2.6114   -0.1795    omitted    omitted 
Davidson-MacK. F-test   12.30***     1.17    10.01***     0.9843     0.8551     1.277  
Note: This table shows an overview of the derivative variable coefficients of fixed effects panel data regressions of the decision to use derivatives (Model 1), the extent of derivative use (Model 2), and the 
decision to use foreign exchange (FX derivatives), interest rate (IR derivatives) and commodity derivatives (Com derivatives; Model 3) on Tobin’s Q for a subset of Australian firms with “higher debt”. 
Firms are classified as having higher debt if they have leverage above their industry median leverage for a given year. IV estimate coefficients and OLS estimate coefficients represent the results for 
instrumental-variable and ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions, respectively. The same set of control variables have been used as in Tables 5.2 to 5.8 but are not shown here for brevity. The full results 
for each model can be found in Appendix K. Derivatives is a dummy variable that takes ‘1’ if the firm uses derivatives. DFV denotes the extent of derivative use is proxied by the derivative fair values 
scaled by total assets. FX derivatives, IR derivatives and Com derivatives are dummy variables that take ‘1’ if the firm uses foreign exchange, interest rate and commodity derivatives, respectively. 
Commodity derivatives have been omitted for IT firms due to collinearity. The Davidson-MacKinnon F-test (Davidson-MacK. F-test) computes a test of exogeneity for a panel regression estimated via 
instrumental variables. The null hypothesis states that an OLS estimator of the same equation would yield consistent estimates, a rejection of the null indicates that endogenous regressors' effects on the 
estimates are meaningful. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.   
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Table 5.12 Summary of variable coefficients for Canadian industries (higher debt firms): Hypothesis 8 
Tobin’s Q 
Energy  Industrials  Materials  Consumer Discretionary Health Care  IT  
IV estimate 
coefficients 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Panel A: Model (1)             
Derivatives    0.1034    0.0618    1.2199   -0.0085    0.1576  -0.1326**   -0.3845   -0.0913*   -8.0928    0.1376   -0.8321   -0.0198 
Davidson-MacK. F-test    0.0111     0.8030     0.6906     2.2926     0.4923     1.2110  
Panel B: Model (2)             
DVF   -13.9352    1.2185   -4.1025   -0.1017    1.4598  -0.5331    4.6178    0.2857 -29.5679   -0.1385 -77.0380   -5.3143 
Davidson-MacK. F-test    0.8012     0.4902     0.6142  1.2258     0.4095     1.2424  
Panel C: Model (3)             
FX derivatives   0.0325   -0.0229    0.1262   -0.2122*   -7.0408  -0.0962   -0.3815   -0.0569    omitted    omitted    0.2968    0.0318 
IR derivatives  -0.1865    0.0347   0.3585    0.0764   -1.6631   0.0306    0.3702*    0.0045   -0.0124   -0.2350   -2.0097*   -0.4240** 
Com derivatives  -0.2472    0.0478   -2.1696    0.0261    7.9885  -0.0758    omitted    omitted    omitted    omitted    omitted    omitted 
Davidson-MacK. F-test    0.1527     1.27     4.63***     9.91***        4.10**  
Note: This table shows an overview of the derivative variable coefficients of fixed effects panel data regressions of the decision to use derivatives (Model 1), the extent of derivative use (Model 2), and 
the decision to use foreign exchange (FX derivatives), interest rate (IR derivatives) and commodity derivatives (Com derivatives; Model 3) on Tobin’s Q for a subset of Canadian firms with “higher debt”. 
Firms are classified as having higher debt if they have leverage above their industry median leverage for a given year. IV estimate coefficients and OLS estimate coefficients represent the results for 
instrumental-variable and ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions, respectively. The same set of control variables have been used as in Tables 5.2 to 5.8 but are not shown here for brevity. The full results 
for each model can be found in Appendix K. Derivatives is a dummy variable that takes ‘1’ if the firm uses derivatives. DFV denotes the extent of derivative use is proxied by the derivative fair values 
scaled by total assets. FX derivatives, IR derivatives and Com derivatives are dummy variables that take ‘1’ if the firm uses foreign exchange, interest rate and commodity derivatives, respectively. Foreign 
exchange derivatives have been omitted for Health Care firms due to collinearity. Commodity derivatives have been omitted for IT firms due to collinearity. The Davidson-MacKinnon F-test (Davidson-
MacK. F-test) computes a test of exogeneity for a panel regression estimated via instrumental variables. The null hypothesis states that an OLS estimator of the same equation would yield consistent 
estimates, a rejection of the null indicates that endogenous regressors' effects on the estimates are meaningful. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, 
respectively.
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Hypothesis 9: Hedging creates value with increasing firm leverage 
The final hypothesis to be tested states that hedging creates value with increasing form 
leverage (Hypothesis 9). Statistically significant results are discussed below.  
Table 5.13 Panel A estimates the value of the interaction between leverage and the use 
of derivatives on Tobin’s Q. The results are based on estimating Model (4) as discussed 
in Section 5.2.1. Results show that hedging decreases firm value for IT firms                    
(-13.1065, p<0.05) when firms are financially constrained.  
Table 5.13 Panel B estimates the influence of the interaction between leverage and the 
extent of hedging on Tobin’s Q based on Model (5). Results show that hedging to a 
greater extent with increasing debt levels increases Tobin’s Q for Materials (29.366, 
p<0.1) and for Consumer Discretionary firms (1.9042, p<0.05).  
Table 5.14 Panel A estimates the value of the interaction between leverage and 
derivatives on Tobin’s Q for Canadian firms. The results are based on estimating 
Model (4) as discussed in Section 5.2.1. Results also show that hedging decreases firm 
value for IT firms (-2.2673, p<0.01) when firms are financially constrained. Table 5.14 
Panel B estimates the interaction variable between leverage and hedging extent, which 
is shown to be positive for Materials firms (28.9850, p<0.1) but negative for IT firms 
(-37.1738, p<0.1). Also, results from Panel C report negative relationship between the 
interaction of foreign exchange and leverage for Industrials (-0.4869, p<0.001) and 
between interest rate derivatives and leverage for IT firms (-2.5241, p<0.001).  
Overall, these results do not support the hypothesis that hedging becomes valuable 
with increasing firm leverage.  
Moreover, both hypotheses that relate the value of hedging to firm capital structure 
contexts, Hypotheses 8 and 9, cannot be supported by results obtained from an industry 
levels analysis.  
A conclusion that can be drawn is that the value of hedging varies greatly between 
industries, between countries, and even by instrument type for the same industry. 
Further research is needed to investigate what drives the value of hedging decisions 
across industries.
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Table 5.13 Summary of variable coefficients for Australian industries: Hypothesis 9 
Tobin’s Q 
Energy  Industrials  Materials  Consumer Discretionary Health Care  IT  
IV estimate 
coefficients 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Panel A: Model (4)             
Derivatives * Leverage    7.6261    0.1024   -0.7618   0.0888 -125.8727   0.0283   -9.4498  -0.2027 -32.9135  -0.2475 -13.1065**  -0.6520 
Davidson-MacK. F-test 6.0498**     0.0273  45.32***     1.27     1.90  7.26***  
Panel B: Model (5)             
DVF *Leverage 63.8707   -1.4980    6.0600   0.2570   29.3661*   1.5309    6.1642    1.9042**  85.7209  -18.4533 -18.0103    2.8068 
Davidson-MacK. F-test    5.3488**  1.2159    10.74***     0.4891     1.6046  3.4418**  
Panel C: Model (6)             
FX derivatives* Leverage  -45.7500   -0.5489  -0.4773   -0.0580   33.4237   0.2660   -1.7254  -0.2097   -0.2944   -0.9629 -41.3469    0.2421 
IR derivatives* Leverage    0.7321  -0.1928  -0.0235    0.0915  -25.0616  -0.6665    0.7476  -0.1102    4.9279    0.0341 114.6325   -0.5341 
Com derivatives* Leverage    1.4981    0.3318    3.3932   -0.1343    3.3031  -0.2593    1.6490  -0.0134  -12.6907   -0.3496    omitted    omitted 
Davidson-MacK. F-test   20.5078***     3.2847*    22.674***     1.094     0.9257  14.861***  
Note: This table shows the results of the interaction between the decision to use of derivatives and leverage (Model 4), the interaction between the extent of derivative use and leverage (Model 5) and the 
interaction between the decision to use foreign exchange (FX derivatives), interest rate (IR derivatives) and commodity derivatives (Com derivatives; Model 6) on Tobin’s Q for Australian firms. IV 
estimate coefficients and OLS estimate coefficients represent the results for instrumental-variable and ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions, respectively. The same set of control variables have been 
used as in Tables 5.2 to 5.8 but are not shown here for brevity. The full results for each model can be found in Appendix K. Derivatives is a dummy variable that takes ‘1’ if the firm uses derivatives. DFV 
denotes the extent of derivative use is proxied by the derivative fair values scaled by total assets. FX derivatives, IR derivatives and Com derivatives are dummy variables that take ‘1’ if the firm uses 
foreign exchange, interest rate and commodity derivatives, respectively. Commodity derivatives have been omitted for IT firms due to collinearity. The Davidson-MacKinnon F-test (Davidson-MacK. F-
test) computes a test of exogeneity for a panel regression estimated via instrumental variables. The null hypothesis states that an OLS estimator of the same equation would yield consistent estimates, a 
rejection of the null indicates that endogenous regressors' effects on the estimates are meaningful. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
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Table 5.14 Summary of variable coefficients for Canadian industries: Hypothesis 9 
Tobin’s Q 
Energy  Industrials  Materials  Consumer Discretionary Health Care  IT  
IV estimate 
coefficients 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Panel A: Model (4)             
Derivatives * Leverage   -4.8018   0.4167** -10.3193   -0.2118  12.1286   -0.3156    0.0523   -0.1119   -5.9692   -0.3909    5.1488   -2.2673*** 
Davidson-MacK. F-test    4.37**     1.60     2.01     0.02     0.52     0.3656  
Panel B: Model (5)             
DVF *Leverage  -31.3590   3.7623 -14.5761    0.2350   28.9850*    0.1331 10.6896    0.5756 -11.7454   -5.5402 -46.1066 -37.1738* 
Davidson-MacK. F-test    1.3086     2.402     5.0822**     1.425     0.0200     0.6168  
Panel C: Model (6)             
FX derivatives* Leverage   -6.5022    0.0045    1.8698   -0.4869***    7.3086  -0.0238    5.3400   -0.0256  13.9328    0.8085   -6.2920    0.5971 
IR derivatives* Leverage    2.8570   0.0737   2.1571    0.1259  -16.6801  -0.0752    1.6533    0.0308    1.3813   -0.8508    3.6438   -2.5241*** 
Com derivatives* Leverage   4.1888   0.5862*** -7.7762   0.0369  -33.4837  -0.0278 -19.7456    7.6014**    omitted    omitted    omitted    omitted 
Davidson-MacK. F-test    4.382***     1.1736    38.08***     3.3142**     0.53     1.0845  
Note: This table shows the results of the interaction between the decision to use of derivatives and leverage (Model 4), the interaction between the extent of derivative use and leverage (Model 5) and the 
interaction between the decision to use foreign exchange (FX derivatives), interest rate (IR derivatives) and commodity derivatives (Com derivatives; Model 6) on Tobin’s Q for Australian firms. IV 
estimate coefficients and OLS estimate coefficients represent the results for instrumental-variable and ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions, respectively. The same set of control variables have been 
used as in Tables 5.2 to 5.8 but are not shown here for brevity. The full results for each model can be found in Appendix K. Derivatives is a dummy variable that takes ‘1’ if the firm uses derivatives. DFV 
denotes the extent of derivative use is proxied by the derivative fair values scaled by total assets. FX derivatives, IR derivatives and Com derivatives are dummy variables that take ‘1’ if the firm uses 
foreign exchange, interest rate and commodity derivatives, respectively. Commodity derivatives have been omitted for Health Care and IT firms due to collinearity. The Davidson-MacKinnon F-test 
(Davidson-MacK. F-test) computes a test of exogeneity for a panel regression estimated via instrumental variables. The null hypothesis states that an OLS estimator of the same equation would yield 
consistent estimates, a rejection of the null indicates that endogenous regressors' effects on the estimates are meaningful. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and 
***, respectively. 
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5.4 Chapter conclusion 
This chapter examines the relationship between hedging decisions and firm value. 
Academic research acknowledges the importance of firm leverage on the likelihood to 
hedge, but empirical testing of the direct value of hedging does not specifically 
evaluate hedging decisions in the context of capital structures and industry-specific 
contexts.  This Chapter addresses this research gap and examines value effects of 
hedging across industry and capital structure settings aiming to cross-validate results 
between both countries. 
Three hypotheses are tested on a country and industry level to examine the value of 
hedging decisions. Hypothesis 7 proposes that hedging creates shareholder value by 
reducing costs associated with taxes, underinvestment, financial distress and 
economies of scale. Hypothesis 8 suggests that hedging creates shareholder value for 
firms with higher leverage, and Hypothesis 9 argues that hedging creates value for 
shareholders as firm leverage increases.  
Country level results provide only limited evidence that hedging creates value, based 
on theoretical predictions related to reducing taxes, underinvestment, financial 
distress, and economies of scale proposed by Hypothesis 7. The binary decision to use 
derivatives is not associated with higher firm value for Australian firms. On the 
contrary, the relationship between derivative use by Australian firms and Tobin’s Q is 
negative, implying that the use of derivatives destroys firm value. This might be 
explained by the fact that investors might not be able to assess whether derivatives are 
used for value-enhancing risk management purposes, out of managerial self-interest 
or to take a view on market movements. However, a positive and statistically 
significant relationship between derivative use and Tobin’s Q can be observed for 
Canadian derivate users. These conflicting results indicate that the evidence on the 
value proposition cannot be separated from its country setting. While Australian 
investors might not value the use of derivatives for corporate risk management, this 
cannot be said for the Canadian context. The result on the decision to hedge cannot be 
cross-validated across countries.  
The investigation of hedging decisions across debt levels as proposed by Hypothesis 
8 does not provide evidence that hedging creates firm value for firms with higher levels 
of debt relative to their industry peers. Also, testing the interaction between leverage 
and hedging decisions to examine hedging value for financially constrained firms does 
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not yield sufficient evidence to support Hypothesis 9. Therefore, the value of hedging 
cannot be confirmed across Australia and Canada, with contradictory results on 
hedging decisions and evidence of diminishing firm value for the use of commodity 
derivatives for firms in both countries.  
On an industry level, vast differences between the value effect of derivatives can be 
observed across industries. Differences in firm value from hedging decisions between 
industries suggest that derivative policies need to be set according to the firm’s 
industry context as proposed by Hahnenstein and Röder (2006). However, based on 
the results presented in this chapter, further research into what drives the value of 
hedging for specific industries is needed.  
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Chapter Six:  Conclusion  
6.1 Chapter introduction 
This thesis investigates hedging practices for Australian and Canadian firms and 
examines whether hedging creates shareholder value, which has been questioned by 
theoretical arguments based on Modigliani and Miller (1958) and inconclusive 
empirical results (Belghitar et al., 2013; Jin and Jorion, 2006; Nguyen and Faff, 
2003a).  
This area of research is important because risk management is a crucial task for 
corporate managers to ensure that future investment needs can be met. Nevertheless, 
finance theory does not provide clear guidance as to whether or not firms should hedge, 
which market risks should be hedged, and how much hedging is appropriate given a 
firm’s specific capital structure and industry context.   
According to Modigliani and Miller (1958), financial contracts do not change firm 
value in perfect capital markets. This means that hedging with financial derivatives 
cannot create firm value. The existence of capital market frictions enables finance 
theory to propose several alternative explanations as to how hedging creates firm 
value, for example, by decreasing financial distress, by mitigating underinvestment 
and agency costs and by reducing taxes (Froot et al., 1993; Graham and Rogers, 2002; 
Smith and Stulz, 1985).  
Empirical research has tested the hedging determinants in various country and industry 
settings, confirming that hedging alleviates costs of financial distress (Bartram et al., 
2009; Graham and Rogers, 2002; Howton and Perfect, 1998; Lel, 2012; Mian, 1996) 
and underinvestment (Allayannis and Ofek, 2001; Fok et al., 1997; Gay and Nam, 
1998; Géczy et al., 1997; Nance et al., 1993). Results on the tax saving hypothesis are 
mixed (Chen-Miao and Smith, 2007; Fok et al., 1997; Géczy et al., 1997), which might 
be mitigated by the fact that tax benefits from hedging are more likely to result from 
an increased debt capacity and additional interest deductions (Graham and Rogers, 
2002). Hedging is also proposed to be influenced by economies of scale, which is 
supported by findings that large firms are more likely to hedge (Nguyen and Faff, 
2002; Bartram et al., 2009; Nelson et al., 2005).  
However, information on current hedging practices and determinants in Australia and 
Canada following the GFC is sparse, which is the first empirical research gap this 
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thesis addresses by examining industry derivative practices and determinants in 
Chapter Four. This analysis provides the necessary background to examine the direct 
value effect of hedging decisions on shareholder value in Chapter Five.  
Results from empirical studies testing the direct hedging premium are mixed at best 
(Adam and Fernando, 2006; Allayannis et al., 2012; Belghitar et al., 2013; Carter et 
al., 2006; Jin and Jorion, 2006). Also, little research effort has been directed towards 
providing evidence on the value effect of a wider range of hedging decisions, as most 
studies are limited to specific market risks (Jin and Jorion, 2006; MacKay and Moeller, 
2007) or industries (Adam and Fernando, 2006; Carter et al., 2006).  
Only two empirical studies have examined hedging and firm value using a broader 
range of hedging decisions, including the use of foreign exchange, interest rate and 
commodity risk derivatives (Nguyen and Faff, 2003a; Panaretou, 2014). Even though 
Panaretou (2014) reports a positive relationship between derivative use and firm value, 
only the use of foreign exchange instruments creates significant economic value. On 
the other hand, results from Nguyen and Faff (2003a), do not support the value 
proposition of hedging.  
To revisit the question of whether hedging creates shareholder value, this thesis 
examines the propositions made by Hahnenstein and Röder (2006), that industry-
specific distress costs determine the value of hedging decisions.  
In the following sections, this chapter discusses the results from investigating the 
research questions in Chapters Four and Five and presents the research contribution 
made. Next, the limitations of this research are summarised. Finally, the thesis 
concludes with an outline of the direction of future research.   
 
6.2 Summary of findings 
6.2.1 Industry derivative practices 
Chapter Four examines current industry hedging practices in Australia and Canada and 
tests whether significant differences exist between firms from both countries and 
across industries. Six hypotheses have been examined which provide comprehensive 
results on how firms hedge with derivatives, with foreign exchange, interest rate or 
commodity derivatives, and to what extent firms decide to use derivatives.   
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The first set of results from examining Hypothesis 1 show that significant differences 
in derivative usage exist between firms from Australia and Canada despite the notion 
that firms in both countries are expected to have comparable motivations to hedge. 
Although, previous research has reported that the level of derivative users is higher for 
Australian than Canadian firms, this thesis finds that only 32.0 per cent of sampled 
Australian firms use derivatives compared to 46.6 per cent of Canadian firms, which 
is significantly different at p<0.001. Therefore, this result provides no support for 
Hypothesis 1 that overall hedging activity is not significantly different across both 
countries.  
Moreover, Hypothesis 2 states that derivative use and types of risks hedged are not 
significantly different for firms from the same industry. Results presented in Chapter 
Four show that significant industry differences across Australia and Canada exist. 
Firms from Canadian Energy, Industrials, Health Care and IT industries have 
statistically significant higher proportions of derivative use than relevant Australian 
firms. Nonetheless, Australian derivative users from the Energy, Industrials, Materials, 
and IT industry hedge to a larger extent than Canadian ones. In addition, statistically 
significant differences in the use of market risk instruments can be observed across 
countries. These results demonstrate that derivative usage and types of risk hedged 
differ significantly for firms from the same industry in across Australia and Canada. 
Next, results for Hypothesis 3 show that statistically significant differences in 
derivatives use between industries for both countries exist. This is important for this 
research and provides support to the theoretical framework examined in Chapter Five, 
that the value of hedging is influenced by industry-specific distress costs (Hahnenstein 
and Röder, 2006). 
Moreover, Hypothesis 4 suggests that these industry-specific distress costs 
significantly influence hedging decisions. This is examined by testing the overall 
industry effect on the decision to hedge, to use different market risk instruments and 
on the decision to hedge to a larger extent. Results show that the overall industry effect 
is statistically significant for all investigated hedging decisions, which supports 
Hypothesis 4. This is a significant finding, as it indicates that the value of hedging 
might be closely related to industry-specific distress costs which is further examined 
in Chapter Five.  
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Hypothesis 5 states that derivative usage is stable over the investigated timeframe, 
supporting the view that the examined hedging decisions represent long-term risk 
management policies and not speculative positions (Chernenko and Faulkender, 
2011). Results presented in Chapter Four support Hypothesis 5 and indicate that the 
hedging decisions investigated in this thesis have been used for risk management 
purposes.  
Hypothesis 6 proposes that cross-sectional differences in hedging behaviour relate to 
the four commonly cited hedging rationales from the theoretical literature. These lines 
of thoughts propose that hedging despite the theoretical irrelevance proposition by 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) can be justified based on a reduction in taxes, financial 
distress, underinvestment costs and based on economies of scale (Froot et al., 1993; 
Géczy et al., 1997; Smith and Stulz, 1985).  
Results from this investigation provide no support for the tax hypothesis and only 
conflicting results can be observed for the underinvestment hypothesis. On the other 
hand, results on firm leverage and economies of scale support arguments of financial 
distress and economies of scale and provide the most consistent explanations as to why 
and to what extent firms in Australia and Canada decide to use derivatives, which is 
consistent with previous results in the empirical literature (Bartram et al., 2009, 
Nguyen and Faff, 2002).  
 
6.2.2 Hedging and firm value  
Chapter Five focuses on the value effect of derivatives as measured by Tobin’s Q as a 
proxy for firm value and examines three hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 7 proposes that derivative use is value-enhancing based on market frictions 
discussed in the hedging literature. Results from the country level analysis that 
examine the influence of hedging on Tobin’s Q show that the decision to hedge is not 
associated with higher firm value across Australia and Canada. In fact, it can be 
observed that the decision to use derivatives has a negative influence on firm value for 
Australian firms, which confirms earlier findings by Nguyen and Faff (2003a). 
However, for Canadian firms the decision to hedge has a positive effect on Tobin’s Q, 
which also holds for a sub-sample of smaller firms. This might be explained by the 
argument that these companies benefit more from using risk management instruments 
(Nguyen and Faff, 2002).  
 
 
 196 
Therefore, the hypothesis that derivatives are value-enhancing per se cannot be 
confirmed and the conflicting results between countries do not allow for a cross-
validation of results. Results found in favour of hedging seem to be industry- and 
country-specific and cannot be extended beyond their scope. Moreover, the use of 
commodity derivatives is observed to have a negative impact on Tobin’s Q across both 
countries, which suggests that the decision to use of derivatives to hedge commodity 
price fluctuations is not valued by investors.  
Hypotheses 8 and 9 are based on propositions by Hahnenstein and Röder (2006), who 
suggest that the value-enhancing effect of derivatives is driven by industry-specific 
distress costs and needs to be examined in the context of capital structure decisions 
and industry settings.  
Hypothesis 8 states that hedging is valuable for firms with higher leverage in relation 
to their industry peers. However, the investigation of hedging decisions across debt 
levels, including sub-samples of Australian and Canadian firms with low debt, above 
industry median and higher debt, does not produce statistically significant results. This 
provides no evidence that hedging creates firm value for firms with higher levels of 
debt relative to their industry peers.  
The final hypothesis investigated in this thesis states that hedging creates firm value 
with increasing leverage (Hypothesis 9), as the use of derivatives allows firms to 
decrease financial distress costs associated with increasing debt levels (Smith and 
Stulz, 1985). Results from the analysis examining the interaction between hedging 
decisions and leverage show that the interaction between derivative use and leverage 
has a positive effect on firm value for Canadian firms. However, no other significant 
nor positive relationships can be observed, which provides little evidence to support 
Hypothesis 9 on a country level.  
Therefore, a value-enhancing effect of hedging with derivatives cannot be confirmed 
from the country level analysis for Australian and Canadian firms. This is because of 
conflicting results about the value of hedging across both countries as well as due to 
the findings that investors in both countries seem to place a discount on commodity 
derivatives use. 
On an industry level, noteworthy differences between the value effect of hedging 
decisions can be observed across industries that also show little consistency.  
For example, a positive relationship between the use of derivatives and firm value can 
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be observed for Australian Energy firms, but the same hedging decision is associated 
with a hedging-discount for Australian Health Care firms. No statistically significant 
results on the impact of the decision to use derivatives can be observed across 
Canadian industries. On the other hand, hedging to a larger extent has a positive impact 
on firm value for firms from the Materials industry from both countries.  
Results from examining Hypotheses 8 and 9 on an industry level provide little evidence 
suggesting that hedging is valuable for higher debt firms or with increasing leverage 
for a particular industry setting. On the contrary, it can be observed that hedging with 
increasing leverage (Hypothesis 9) is value-diminishing for firm from the IT industry 
in both countries. On the other hand, results show a positive relationship between the 
interaction of hedging extent, proxied by the fair derivative ratio, and leverage for 
Materials firms in both countries.  
Overall, these results confirm some of the propositions made by Hahnenstein and 
Röder (2006) that industry settings are of great significance due to industry-specific 
financial distress costs, which need to be considered carefully by financial managers 
when evaluating whether firms should hedge or not, which instruments they should 
use and to what extent these should be employed.  
However, further research is needed to investigate the value of hedging under varying 
industry-specific distress costs and capital structures as results from country- and 
industry level analyses do not provide consistent results. Overall, the notion that 
hedging creates firm value for Australian and Canadian firms cannot be confirmed or 
cross-validated. Whether hedging creates firm value depends on the model 
specification and the industry in question.   
 
6.3 Research contribution  
This thesis extends previous research in two directions. First, this thesis examines 
hedging practices in six industries in Australia and Canada, to identify whether 
differences between countries and between industries can be identified.  
It also investigates whether hedging decisions, including the binary decision to use 
derivatives, to use foreign exchange, interest rate and commodity rate derivatives, and 
the decision on how much to hedge, create shareholder value.  
This investigation of hedging practices differs from previous approaches in the 
following ways. First, it documents a broad range of current risk management practices 
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reported by firms in six Australian and Canadian industries, which represents a robust 
cross-section of data. Being able to observe industry hedging practices and value 
implications in two distinct but similar economies enables researchers and financial 
managers to assess corporate derivative choices in the context of industry 
environments, which encourages the optimal use of derivative instruments (Panaretou 
et al., 2013).  
Previous research has often focused on examining hedging behaviour and associated 
firm value for specific derivative instruments, such as derivatives used to hedge 
foreign exchange or commodity risks (Belghitar et al., 2013; Clarke and Judge, 2009; 
Jin and Jorion, 2006; MacKay and Moeller, 2007), and selected industries with a high 
level of market risk exposures, i.e. mining or airline industries (Adam and Fernando, 
2006; Carter at al. 2006). This limits the generalisability of their findings.  
This thesis provides a broader set of results based on examining firms in the Energy, 
Industrials, Materials, Consumer Discretionary, Health Care and IT industries. Results 
from Chapter Four suggest that hedging decisions across all the examined industries 
and both countries are influenced by industry classification, financial distress and 
economies of scale factors. Other economic hedging theories examined in this context, 
related to reducing tax and underinvestment costs do not provide consistent rationales 
to why firms hedge or how much they decide to hedge with. This is a significant 
finding that emphasises the importance of leverage for value-enhancing hedging 
decisions across different industries.  
Second, previous research classifies firms as either hedgers or non-hedgers. The 
dichotomous classification underestimates the extent of derivative usage within 
industries, as firms which have used derivatives throughout the year, but cleared all 
positions at financial year-end, are commonly categorised as non-hedging firms. 
To address this problem, this thesis takes advantage of improved derivative disclosure 
reporting practices and introduces a third category of hedging practices for firms that 
hedge some risks during the financial year but have no outstanding derivative positions 
at reporting date. Introducing a third category of using some derivatives provides a 
better picture, which is closer to the actual extent of derivative usage. It also aligns 
results on the proportions of hedging firms more closely to what has been previously 
documented in the academic literature. However, it is not possible to determine the 
intensity of derivative usage for this category of hedgers from annual reports. 
Therefore, they cannot be included for subsequent analysis.  
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Third, the sample period investigated in this thesis covers a five-year period from 2009 
to 2013. This is a period during which firms had strong incentives to hedge in the face 
of financial market volatilities. Also, using a longer timeframe should provide a better 
picture of long-term derivative policies, compared to single-year snapshots, which 
could represent unusual policy choices or market timing.  
The finding that only 32.0 per cent of Australian and 46.2 per cent of Canadian non-
financial firms hedge market risks, and that these practices have remained stable over 
the examined period indicates that firms employ derivatives for risk mitigation rather 
than for speculative purposes (Chernenko and Faulkender, 2011). It also proposes that 
operating in different regional markets might influence the propensity to hedge, which 
should be further investigated by future research.  
Finally, this thesis informs the academic literature by providing an empirical 
exploration of propositions made by Hahnenstein and Röder (2006) and more careful 
consideration of hedging in the context of varying capital structures across firms and 
their industry environment. 
One of the key issues with previous research on the value of hedging is that studies 
rarely ask comparable questions. Thus, this thesis examines the value of hedging using 
a comprehensive sample of firms from several industries with exposures to various 
risk factors, including foreign exchange, interest rate and commodity rate risks which 
is missing from the existing literature.  
No other paper has systematically examined the value effect of various hedging and 
capital structure decisions on firm value for firms in different industry settings, which 
is the most significant research contribution this thesis makes to the academic 
literature.  
The evidence presented in this thesis suggests that investors value hedging decisions 
differently across industries and countries and that the hedging question remains to be 
investigated further. The aim to cross-validate the value of hedging has not been 
reached, results for the country level analysis are inconclusive and on an industry level, 
few statistically significant value effects can be measured to generalise findings –
further investigations into what drives differences in hedging value between industries 
are required.  
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6.4 Limitations and direction of future research 
This examination of derivative usage has several limitations. First, this study which 
investigates the value of hedging decisions is based on derivative disclosures made in 
the accompanying notes to the annual financial statements of public companies. It can 
be argued that this might not fully reflect the actual derivative activity throughout the 
year  and does not take into consideration other operational risk management activities.  
Second, while all Australian firms sampled for this thesis have reported according to 
IFRS throughout the period under investigation, Canadian firms have only been fully 
IFRS compliant since January 2011. However, no significant differences in derivative 
reporting by Canadian firms across the investigated timeframe have been observed and 
derivatives usage by all sample firms has been stable, indicating long-term policies 
rather than results from accounting treatments.  
Finally, this thesis assumes that examined derivatives are employed for hedging 
purposes, not for speculation. Even though Géczy et al. (1997) explain that it is not 
possible to distinguish between hedging or speculative motives, the consistency of 
their results indicates that derivative use by non-financial firms is driven by hedging 
motivations. Similarly, the results from examining industry hedging practices in 
Chapter Four show that derivative use remains stable over the five-year sample period, 
which suggests that derivative instruments employed by the sampled firms are 
indicative of hedging motives (Chernenko and Faulkender, 2011).  
Three directions for future research are suggested. First, the findings that derivative 
use and industry hedging values decisions differ across Australia and Canada suggest 
that hedging decisions and associated firm value might be influenced by economic 
market factors not considered here, which requires further investigation.  
Second, the differences in industry value effects across countries could be explained 
by differences in corporate governance structures which should be explored in more 
detail. In this context, Allayannis et al. (2012) find a significant hedging premium for 
firms with strong internal or external corporate governance structures. The authors 
criticise the unconditional tests commonly conducted on the value of hedging, and 
explain that, due to information asymmetries, investors cannot easily identify whether 
firms use derivatives for hedging or speculative reasons. However, the existence of 
strong corporate governance structures allows investors to infer that derivatives are 
used for hedging, and not for speculative or self-serving managerial purposes. If this 
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is the case, investors are more likely to assign a hedging premium to firms that use 
derivatives.  
Thus, examining economic market factors and incorporating additional corporate 
governance aspects should provide further explanations, as to why firms hedge and 
how the differences in hedging practices and value effects that have been reported 
here, between Australian and Canadian firms and across industries, can be reconciled.  
Moreover, the sample timeframe covered a post-GFC period, which provides a suitable 
backdrop to examine the use of derivatives at a point in time where there is likely to 
be an increased demand for risk management instruments. Yet, the experience of the 
GFC has widely impacted firm values, corporate risk management policies and 
investor perceptions about the value of hedging. Therefore, another interesting area of 
future research might be to compare whether derivative use was more consistently 
value-enhancing across Australian and Canadian industries prior and during the GFC.  
In summary, the results from this thesis demonstrate that the question of whether 
hedging creates firm value remains complicated. Based on the results presented in 
Chapter Five the proposition that hedging creates value cannot be supported. It was 
the aim of this thesis to cross-validate findings beyond a particular region, however, 
Australian and Canadian investors seem to value hedging programs differently. 
Positive results on the relationship between the decision to hedge and Tobin’s Q for 
Canadian firms cannot be cross-validated to the Australian context.  
Moreover, this thesis has examined the interactions between hedging policies and 
capital structure decisions and concludes that the value proposition of hedging in 
specific industry environments require further investigation.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A.  Definitions of derivatives 
Derivative instruments can be classified as binding (e.g. options, forwards/ futures), 
which means that they assist in creating pricing relationships that bind future prices to 
the present, or a place to another, or as blending. Blending derivatives such as swaps 
convert between different asset types by establishing pricing relationships (Bryan and 
Rafferty, 2006).  
Forward and future contracts constitute very similar agreements to buy or to sell 
commodities or financial instruments at a determined price and at a specified future 
date. There are however some transactional differences. Futures are standardised 
contracts that can realise gains and losses daily and are settled through clearinghouses, 
which regulate the transactions. Forwards on the other hand are customised 
agreements that are settled in cash at future delivery between the counterparties. 
Forwards and futures are generally discussed together in the empirical literature and 
for the purpose of this research they will be classified as one instrument category.  
Swap instruments represent an agreement to exchange a series of payment streams on 
a specified notional amount for a determined time period. Depending on the terms of 
the agreements, the cash payments can be calculated on fixed or floating interest rates 
and are based on agreed notional principal amounts. Option contracts can be 
standardised or customised agreements that specify the right (purchaser) or obligation 
(writer) to buy or to sell a financial instrument or commodity. A call option provides 
the purchaser the right to buy an instrument or commodity at an agreed price (exercise 
price) at or before a certain future date (expiration date). Likewise, the put option gives 
the purchaser of the option the right to sell a certain quantity at a specified price on or 
before the expiration date. In a European-style option, the contract has to be settled on 
the expiration date. The option premium is paid by the buyer to the option writer for 
the right to buy or sell the underlying asset. If the options are not exercised no assets 
are actually bought or sold (von Kleist, 2012).  
The following definitions are taken from the publication ‘Statistical release: OTC 
derivative statistics at year end 2012’ the Bank of International Settlements (Bank of 
International Settlement, 2013). 
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Appendix A.1 Derivative definitions 
1. Definitions for foreign exchange transactions 
Outright forward 
Transaction involving the exchange of two currencies at a rate 
agreed on the date of the contract for value or delivery (cash 
settlement) at some time in the future (more than two business 
days later). This category also includes forward foreign 
exchange agreement transactions, non-deliverable forwards and 
other forward contracts for differences. 
Foreign exchange swap 
Transaction involving the actual exchange of two currencies 
(principal amount only) on a specific date at a rate agreed at the 
time of the conclusion of the contract (the short leg), and a 
reverse exchange of the same two currencies at a date further in 
the future at a rate (generally different from the rate applied to 
the short leg) agreed at the time of the contract (the long leg). 
Both spot/forward and forward/forward swaps should be 
included. Short-term swaps carried out as tomorrow/next day 
transactions should also be included in this category. 
Currency swap 
Contract which commits two counterparties to exchange 
streams of interest payments in different currencies for an 
agreed period and to exchange principal amounts in different 
currencies at a pre-agreed exchange rate at maturity. 
Currency option 
Option contract that gives the right to buy or sell a currency 
with another currency at a specified exchange rate during a 
specified period. This category also includes exotic foreign 
exchange options such as average rate options and barrier 
options. 
2. Definitions for single currency interest rate derivatives 
Forward rate agreement 
Interest rate forward contract in which the rate to be paid or 
received on a specific obligation for a set period, beginning at 
some time in the future, is determined at contract initiation. 
Interest rate swap 
Agreement to exchange periodic payments related to interest 
rates on a single currency; can be fixed for floating, or floating 
for floating based on different indices. This group includes 
those swaps whose notional principal is amortised according to 
a fixed schedule independent of interest rates. 
Interest rate option Option contract that gives the right to pay or receive a specific interest rate on a predetermined principal for a set period. 
3. Definitions for commodity derivatives 
Commodity forward Forward contract to exchange a commodity or commodity index at a set price at a future date. 
Commodity swap 
Contract with one or both payments linked to the performance 
of a commodity price or a commodity index. It involves the 
exchange of the return on one commodity or commodity index 
for another and the exchange of a commodity or commodity 
index for a floating or fixed interest rate. 
Commodity option 
Option contract that gives the right to deliver or receive a 
specific commodity or commodity index at an agreed price at a 
set date in the future 
Source: Bank of International Settlement (2013)
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Appendix B. Empirical hedging studies  
Appendix B.1 List of empirical studies 1993-2016 
Study Year of Data Country Sample size  Sample type Scope  P
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1. Batten et al. (1993) n/a Australia 72 Across industries FX derivatives  - - -  - - - 
2. Nance et al. (1993) 1986 USA 169 Fortune 500, S&P400-535 FX derivatives  - - -   - - 
3. Jesswein et al. (1995) n/a USA 168 Non-banking (Fortune 500, Fortune Service500)  FX derivatives  - - -   - - 
4. Berkman and Bradbury (1996) 1994 New Zealand 116 Non-financial Derivatives   - - -  - - 
5. Downie et al. (1996) 1995 Canada 243 Non-financial Derivatives  - - -  - - - 
6. Mian (1996) 1992 USA 771 Non-financial FX, IR & commodity derivatives -  - - -  - - 
7. Samant (1996) 1990-1992 USA 331 Non-financial IR derivatives   - - -  - - 
8. Tufano (1996) 1991-1993 USA & Canada 48 Gold-mining industry Commodity derivatives   - -   - - 
9. Berkman et al. (1997) 1997 New Zealand 79 Across industries FX, IR & commodity derivatives  - - -  - -  
10. Fok et al. (1997) 1990-1992 USA 240, 331 S&P500  Derivatives -  - - -  - - 
11. Géczy et al. (1997) 1990 USA 372 Non-financial (S&P500) FX derivatives -  - - -  - - 
12. Hakkarainen et al. (1997) 1994 Finland 84 Across industries FX derivatives  - - -  - - - 
 
 
 217 
Study Year of Data Country Sample size  Sample type Scope  P
ra
cti
ce
s  
 D
ete
rm
ina
nt
s 
 V
alu
e e
ffe
ct 
 O
th
er
 
 Su
rv
ey
 
 F
S d
ata
 
 C
as
e s
tu
dy
 
 C
om
pa
ra
tiv
e s
tu
dy
 
13. Bodnar et al. (1998) 1997 USA 399 Non-financial FX, IR & commodity derivatives  - - -  - - - 
14. Gay and Nam (1998) 1995 USA 486 Non-financial FX, IR & commodity derivatives -  - - -  - - 
15. Hakkarainen et al. (1998) 1995; 1989-1994 Finland 71 Industrial firms FX derivatives  - - -  - - - 
16. Howton and Perfect (1998) 1994 USA 461 Non-financial, no utilities FX & IR derivatives   - - -  - - 
17. Visvanathan (1998) 1992 -1993 USA 338, 410 Non-financial (S&P500)  IR derivatives -  - - -  - - 
18. Alkebäck and Hagelin (1999) 1996 Sweden 163 Non-financial FX & IR derivatives   - -  - -  
19. Bodnar and Gebhardt (1999) 1995; 1997 USA & Germany 355, 126 Non-financial FX, IR & commodity derivatives   - -  - -  
20. Fehle (1999) 1993-1997 USA 2,528 Non-financial, no utilities Derivatives -  - - -  - - 
21. Graham and Rogers (1999) 1995 USA 531 Across industries FX & IR derivatives -  - - -  - - 
22. Jalilvand (1999) 1992-1994 Canada 77 Non-financial Derivatives   - -   -  
23. De Ceuster et al. (2000) 1997 Belgium 73 Non-financial FX, IR & commodity derivatives   - -   - - 
24. Fatemi and Glaum (2000) 1997 Germany 71 Non-financial FX & IR derivatives  - - -   - - 
25. Géczy et al. (2000) 1978 - 1995 USA 39 Natural gas industry FX, IR & commodity derivatives  - - -   - - 
26. Haushalter (2000) 1992-1994 USA 100 Oil and gas  Commodity derivatives -  - - -  - - 
27. Jalilvand et al. (2000) 1996 Canada 154 Non-financial Derivatives  - - -  - -  
28. Marshall (2000) 1998 UK, USA, Asia Pacific 179 Multinational firms FX derivatives  - - -  - -  
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29. Prevost et al. (2000) 1998 New Zealand 155 Listed and unlisted Derivatives  - - -  - -  
30. Allayannis and Ofek (2001) 1993 USA 378 Non-financial (S&P500)  FX derivatives -  - SP -  - - 
31. Allayannis and Weston (2001) 1990-1995 USA 720 Non-financial, no utilities FX derivatives  -  - -  - - 
32. Brown (2001) 1998 USA 1 Manufacturing FX derivatives    - - -  - 
33. Mallin et al. (2001) 1997 UK 231 Non-financial Derivatives  - - -  - -  
34. Sheedy (2001) 1999; 2000 Hong Kong & Singapore 131 Non-financial Derivatives  - - -  - -  
35. Berkman et al. (2002) 1995 Australia 158 Industrial and mining Derivatives   - - -  - - 
36. Callahan (2002) 1996-2000 USA & Canada 20 Gold-mining industry  Commodity derivatives  - - - -  - - 
37. Glaum (2002) 1998-1999; 1996-1998 Germany 74 Non-financial FX derivatives   - -   - - 
38. Graham and Rogers (2002) 1995 USA 442 Non-financial Derivatives -  - - - - - - 
39. Nguyen and Faff (2002) 1999-2000 Australia 230, 239 Non-banking Derivatives -  - - -  - - 
40. Bailly et al. (2003) 1998 UK 234 Non-financial Derivatives  - - -  - - - 
41. Bodnar et al. (2003) 1998 USA & Netherlands 399, 84 Non-financial FX, IR & commodity derivatives  - - -  - -  
42. Guay and Kothari (2003) 1997 USA 234 Non-financial FX, IR & commodity derivatives   - - -  - - 
43. Nguyen and Faff (2003a) 1999-2000 Australia 217, 211 Non-financial FX, IR & commodity derivatives  -  - -  - - 
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44. Nguyen and Faff (2003c) 1999-2000 Australia 469 Non-financial FX & IR derivatives -  - - -  - - 
45. Shu and Chen (2003) 1997-1999 Taiwan 348 Non-financial FX, IR & commodity derivatives -  - - -  - - 
46. Benson and Oliver (2004) 2000 Australia 100 Across industries FX, IR & commodity derivatives -  - -  - - - 
47. Borokhovich et al. (2004) 1995 USA 284 Non-financial IR derivatives -  - CG -  - - 
48. Pramborg (2004) 1997-2001 Sweden 101, 130, 128 Non-financial FX derivatives - -  -  - - - 
49. Deshmukh and Vogt (2005) 1992-1996 USA 312 Manufacturing FX & IR derivatives -  - - -  - - 
50. Heaney and Winata (2005) 1999 Australia  374 Non-financial Derivatives -  - - -  - - 
51. Marsden and Prevost (2005) 1994 & 1997 New Zealand 94 & 91 Non-financial FX & IR derivatives   - CG -  - - 
52. Nelson et al. (2005) 1996-1999 USA 5,770 Non-financial FX, IR & commodity derivatives - -  - -  - - 
53. Pramborg (2005) 2000 Sweden & Korea 163 Non-financial FX derivatives  - - -  - -  
54. Adam and Fernando (2006) 1989-1999 USA & Canada 92 Gold-mining industry Commodity derivatives - -  - -  - - 
55. Alkebäck et al. (2006) 2003 Sweden 134 Non-financial Derivatives  - - -  - -  
56. Brown et al. (2006) 1999-1998 USA & Canada 44 Gold-mining industry Commodity derivatives - -  SH -  - - 
57. Carter et al. (2006) 1992-2003 USA 29 Airline industry Commodity derivatives - -  - -  - - 
58. Davies et al. (2006) 2001 Norway 81 Exporters FX derivatives   - - -  - - 
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59. El-Masry (2006) 2001 UK 173 Non-financial Derivatives   - -  - - - 
60. Hagelin and Pramborg (2006) 1998-2001 Sweden 130 & 128 Non-financial FX derivatives -  - -  - - - 
61. Jin and Jorion (2006) 1998-2001 USA 119 Oil and gas Commodity derivatives - -  - -  - - 
62. Judge (2006) 1995 UK 412 &186 Non-financial (FT500)  FX & IR derivatives   - -   - - 
63. Batten and Hettihewa (2007) 2002 Australia  135 Non-financial Derivatives -  - -  - - - 
64. Chen-Miao and Smith (2007) 1992-1996 USA 644 Non-financial FX, IR & commodity derivatives -  - - -  - - 
65. MacKay and Moeller (2007) 1985-2004 USA 34 Oil-refiners Commodity derivatives - -  - -  - - 
66. Naylor et al. (2007) 2002 New Zealand 129 Non-financial FX derivatives -  - CG  - - - 
67. Al-Momani and Gharaibeh (2008) n/a Jordan 310 Commercial, manufacturing, other FX derivatives   - -  - - - 
68. Carneiro and Sherris (2008) 1998-2003 Australia  1102, 465 S&P/ ASX 300 IR derivatives -  - - -  - - 
69. Clark and Judge (2008) 1995 UK 366 Non-financial FX derivatives & foreign debt -  - - -  - - 
70. Fazillah et al. (2008) 2001-2005 Malaysia 101 Non-financial Derivatives -  - CS -  - - 
71. Naylor and Greenwood (2008) 2002; 2003 NZ, USA, Asia & Europe 360 Non-financial FX derivatives  - - -  - -  
72. Purnanandam (2008) 1996-1997 USA 1781 Non-financial FX & commodity derivatives -  - - -  - - 
73. Bartram et al. (2009) 2000- 2001 50 countries 7,319 Non-financial FX, IR & commodity derivatives   - - -  -  
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74. Clark and Judge (2009) 1995 UK 412 Non-financial FX derivatives - -  - -  - - 
75. Schiozer and Saito (2009) 2001-2004 Argentina, Brazil, Chile & Mexico 55 Non-financial FX derivatives -  - - -  -  
76. Servaes et al. (2009) 2005 49 countries 344 Non-financial Derivatives   - -  - - - 
77. Ameer (2010) 2003-2007 Malaysia 112 Across industries FX & IR derivatives -  - - -  - - 
78. Nguyen and Faff (2010) 1999-2000 Australia 239, 230 Non-financial FX & IR derivatives -  - SH -  - - 
79. Bartram et al. (2011) 2000-2001 47 countries 6,888 Non-financial FX, IR & commodity derivatives - -  - -  -  
80. Campello et al. (2011) 1996-2002 USA 1,185 Non-financial FX & IR derivatives - -  - -  - - 
81. Allayannis et al. (2012) 1990-1999 39 countries 372 Non-financial (ADRs)  FX derivatives - -  CG -  -  
82. Gómez-González et al. (2012) 1995-2008 Colombia 81 Non-financial FX derivatives - -  - -  - - 
83. Iatridis (2012) 2004-2008 UK 369 Non-financial (FTSE All Share Index LSE) Derivatives   - - -  - - 
84. Kozarević et al. (2012) 2011 -2012 Bosnia and Herzegovina 28 Banks & non-financial Derivatives  - - -  - -  
85. Lantara (2012) 2005-2009 Indonesia 315 Non-financial Derivatives   - - -  - - 
86. Lel (2012) 1990-1999 30 countries 253 Non-financial (ADRs)  FX derivatives -  - CG -  - - 
87. Smistad and Pustylnick (2012) 2010 Canada 12 Oil and gas Derivatives   - SH -  - - 
88. Belghitar et al. (2013) 2002-2005 France 211 Non-financial (SBF240) Derivatives - -  - -  - - 
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89. Birt et al. (2013) 2008 Australia 341  Extractive firms Derivatives   - - -  - - 
90. Bodnar et al. (2013) 2008 Italy 86 Non-financial FX & IR derivatives    - -  - - - 
91. Boulter and Wongchan (2013) 2008 Thailand 113 Non-financial Derivatives  - - -  - - - 
92. Zhou and Wang (2013) 1999 UK 148 Non-financial (FTUK500) Derivatives  - - - -  - - 
93. Nguyen and Liu (2014) 1994-2004 Australia 180 Resources firms FX derivatives - -  - -  - - 
94. Panaretou (2014) 2003- 2010 UK 186 Non-financial (FTSE350) Derivatives - -  - -  - - 
95. Carroll et al. (2015) 2009-2010 11 countries (Eurozone) 1209 Non-financial FX & IR derivatives -  - - -  - - 
96. Nova et al. (2015) 2005-2013 UK 130 Non-financial (FTSE350) FX & IR derivatives - -  - -  - - 
97. Lau (2016) 2003-2012 Malaysia 680 Non-financial FX, IR & commodity derivatives -   - -  - - 
Note: SP denotes that the focus of the study is on Hedging versus speculation. CG denotes that the focus of the study is on the relationship of corporate governance and hedging. CS denotes that 
the focus of the study is on the relationship between hedging and corporate capital structure. SH denotes that the focus of the study is on selective hedging and firm risk.  
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Appendix C. Full list of companies in the study 
Appendix C.1 Sample Australian Energy firms 
Panel A: Osiris database search results - 28/08/2014 
Selected search criteria Specified values or options Step result 
Search 
result 
1. Listed / Unlisted Listed 47,780 47,780 
2. IPO date Before 30/06/2008 excluding delisted companies 36,829 35,909 
3. World Region/Country Trading address: Australia (AU) 2,877 1,596 
4. Main stock exchange Australian Securities Exchange (2167) 2,167 1,537 
5. Accounting standard IFRS 17,781 1,515 
6. GICS classification 10 - Energy 3,437 204 
7. Market Cap. (‘000s AUD) Last available year, Top 100 100 100 
Panel B: Osiris database company list 
 Selected companies Ticker  Stata ID Comments 
1 African Energy Resources Limited AFR 10101  
2 Antares Energy Limited AZZ 10102  
3 Awe Limited AWE 10103  
4 Bandanna Energy Limited BND 10104  
5 Bannerman Resources Limited BMN 10105  
6 Beach Energy Limited BPT 10106  
7 Berkeley Resources Limited BKY 10107  
8 Blue Energy Limited BUL 10108  
9 Buccaneer Energy Limited BCC 10109 Suspended in Feb 2014 
10 Caltex Australia Limited CTX 10110   
11 Carbon Energy Limited CNX 10111   
12 Carbon Minerals Limited CRM 10112   
13 Carnarvon Petroleum Limited CVN 10113   
14 Central Petroleum Limited CTP 10114   
15 Coalbank Limited CBQ 10115   
16 Coalspur Mines Limited CPL 10116   
17 Cockatoo Coal Limited COK 10117   
18 Comet Ridge Limited COI 10118   
19 Cooper Energy Limited COE 10119   
20 Cue Energy Resources Limited CUE 10120   
21 Deep Yellow Limited DYL 10121   
22 Drillsearch Energy Limited DLS 10122   
23 Empire Oil & Gas Nl EGO 10123   
24 Energy Metals Ltd EME 10124   
25 Energy Resources Of Australia Limited ERA 10125   
26 Entek Energy Ltd ETE 10126   
27 Exoma Energy Limited EXE 10127   
28 Far Limited FAR 10128   
29 Fitzroy River Corporation Limited FZR 10129   
30 Global Petroleum Limited GBP 10130   
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31 Hawkley Oil And Gas Limited HOG 10131   
32 Horizon Oil Limited HZN 10132   
33 Icon Energy Limited ICN 10133   
34 Indo Mines Limited IDO 10134   
35 Intra Energy Corporation Limited IEC 10135   
36 Jupiter Energy Limited JPR 10136   
37 Karoon Gas Australia Limited KAR 10137   
38 Lakes Oil Nl LKO 10138   
39 Liquefied Natural Gas Limited LNG 10139   
40 Meo Australia Limited MEO 10140   
41 Metgasco Limited MEL 10141   
42 Molopo Energy Limited MPO 10142   
43 Neon Energy Limited NEN 10143   
44 Neptune Marine Services Limited NMS 10144   
45 New Hope Corporation Limited NHC 10145   
46 New Standard Energy Limited NSE 10146   
47 Nexus Energy Limited NXS 10147   
48 Nido Petroleum Limited NDO 10148   
49 Northern Minerals Limited NTU 10149   
50 Norwest Energy Nl NWE 10150   
51 Origin Energy Limited ORG 10151   
52 Otto Energy Limited OEL 10152   
53 Paladin Energy Ltd. PDN 10153   
54 Pan Pacific Petroleum Nl PPP 10154   
55 Pancontinental Oil & Gas Nl PCL 10155   
56 Range Resources Limited RRS 10156   
57 Red Emperor Resources Nl RMP 10157   
58 Red Fork Energy Limited RFE 10158   
59 Resource Generation Limited RES 10159   
60 Rey Resources Limited REY 10160   
61 Roc Oil Company Limited ROC 10161   
62 Samson Oil & Gas Limited SSN 10162   
63 Santos Ltd STO 10163   
64 Senex Energy Limited SXY 10164   
65 Strike Energy Limited STX 10165   
66 Summit Resources Limited SMM 10166   
67 Sun Resources Nl SUR 10167   
68 Sundance Energy Australia Limited SEA 10168   
69 Tangiers Petroleum Limited TPT 10169   
70 Tap Oil Limited TAP 10170   
71 Toro Energy Limited TOE 10171   
72 Washington H Soul Pattinson & Company Limited SOL 10172   
73 White Energy Company Limited WEC 10173   
74 Whitehaven Coal Limited WHC 10174   
75 Whl Energy Limited WHN 10175   
76 Woodside Petroleum Limited WPL 10176   
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77 Worleyparsons Limited WOR 10177   
78 A-Cap Resources Limited ACB 10178   
79 Acacia Coal Limited AJC 10179   
80 Australian Renewable Fuels Limited ARW 10180   
81 Baraka Energy & Resources Limited BKP 10181   
82 East Energy Resources Limited EER 10182   
83 Empire Energy Group Limited EEG 10183   
84 Gas2grid Limited GGX 10184   
85 Oilex Ltd. OEX 10185   
86 Petsec Energy Limited PSA 10186   
87 Transerv Energy Limited TSV 10187   
88 Continental Coal Limited CCC  10188 Suspended since Jan 2014 
89 Linc Energy Ltd LNC  10189 Delisted in Dec 2013; included 
# Excluded companies Ticker Comments 
1 Westside Corporation Limited WCL Reports N/A 
2 Acer Energy Limited CAN Delisted in Oct 2013 
3 AED Oil Limited AED  Suspended in 2011, in administration 
4 Natural Fuel Limited NFL Suspended, in administration 
5 Texon Petroleum Ltd TXN Delisted in March 2013 
6 Amadeus Energy Limited LNR  M&A 
7 Golden Gate Petroleum Limited OGI  M&A 
8 Rialto Energy Limited APY  M&A 
9 Uranex Limited UNX  Reports N/A 
10 Aurora Oil & Gas Limited AUT  Delisted in June 201; reports N/A 
11 Aquila Resources Limited AQA Delisted (30/07/2014); reports N/A 
 
Appendix C.2 Sample Canadian Energy firms 
 
 
  
Panel A: Osiris database search results - 28/08/2014 
Selected search criteria Specified values or options Step result 
1. Listed / Unlisted Listed 47,780 
2. IPO date Before 1/01/2008 excl. delisted companies 35,990 
3. World Region/Country Trading address: Canada (CA) 5,451 
4. Main stock exchange Toronto Stock Exchange (1393) 1,393 
5. Accounting standard  IFRS 17,781 
6. GICS classification 10 - Energy 3,437 
7. Market Cap. (‘000s CAD) Last available year, Top 100 100 
 Total number of companies  100 
 
 
 226 
Panel B: Osiris database company list 
# Selected companies Ticker Stata ID Comments 
1 Advantage Oil & Gas Ltd. AAV 20101   
2 Antrim Energy Inc AEN 20102   
3 Bankers Petroleum Ltd. BKN 20103   
4 Baytex Energy Corp BTE 20104   
5 Birchcliff Energy Ltd BIR 20104   
6 Blackpearl Resources Inc. PXX 20106   
7 Bonavista Energy Corp BNP 20107   
8 Calfrac Well Services Ltd. CFW 20108   
9 Calvalley Petroleum Inc CVI 20109   
10 Cameco Corporation CCO 20110   
11 Canacol Energy Ltd. CNE 20111   
12 Canadian Energy Services & Technology Corp. CEU 20112   
13 Canadian Natural Resources Limited CNQ 20113   
14 Canadian Oil Sands Ltd. COS 20114   
15 Canyon Services Group Inc. FRC 20115   
16 Cequence Energy Ltd. CQE 20116   
17 Connacher Oil And Gas Limited CLL 20117   
18 Crescent Point Energy Corp. CPG 20118   
19 Crew Energy Inc CR 20119   
20 Delphi Energy Corp. DEE 20120   
21 Denison Mines Corp. DML 20121   
22 Encana Corporation ECA 20122   
23 Enerplus Corporation ERF 20123   
24 Ensign Energy Services Inc. ESI 20124   
25 Essential Energy Services Ltd. ESN 20125   
26 Freehold Royalties Ltd FRU 20126   
27 Husky Energy Inc. HSE 20127   
28 Imperial Oil Limited IMO 20128   
29 Inter Pipeline Fund IPL 20129   
30 Ithaca Energy Inc. IAE 20130   
31 Ivanhoe Energy Inc. IE 20131   
32 Keyera Corp KEY 20132   
33 Legacy Oil + Gas Inc. LEG 20133   
34 Long Run Exploration Ltd. LRE 20134   
35 Mullen Group Ltd. MTL 20135   
36 Niko Resources Ltd NKO 20136   
37 Nuvista Energy Ltd NVA 20137   
38 Pacific Rubiales Energy Corp. PRE 20138   
39 Paramount Resources Ltd POU 20139   
40 Parkland Fuel Corporation PKI 20140   
41 Pason Systems Inc. PSI 20141   
42 Pembina Pipeline Corporation PPL 20142   
43 Pengrowth Energy Corporation PGF 20143   
44 Penn West Petroleum Ltd PWT 20144   
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45 Perpetual Energy Inc. PMT 20145   
46 Peyto Exploration & Development Corp. PEY 20146   
47 PHX Energy Services Corp PHX 20147   
48 Rmp Energy Inc. RMP 20148   
49 Savanna Energy Services Corp. SVY 20149   
50 Shawcor Limited SCL 20150   
51 Southern Pacific Resource Corp. STP 20151   
52 Southgobi Resources Ltd. SGQ 20152   
53 Sprott Resource Corporation SCP 20153   
54 Suncor Energy Inc. SU 20154   
55 Surge Energy SGY 20155   
56 Tag Oil Ltd TAO 20156   
57 Talisman Energy Inc. TLM 20157   
58 Transglobe Energy Corporation TGL 20158   
59 Trican Well Service Ltd TCW 20159   
60 Trinidad Drilling Ltd. TDG 20160   
61 Vermilion Energy Inc. VET 20161   
62 Western Energy Services Corp. WRG 20162   
63 Whitecap Resources Inc. WCP 20163   
64 Xtreme Drilling And Coil Services Corp XDC 20164   
65 Zargon Oil & Gas Ltd. ZAR 20165   
66 Akita Drilling Ltd AKT.A 20166   
67 Anderson Energy Ltd AXL 20167   
68 Arsenal Energy Inc. AEI 20168   
69 Corridor Resources Inc. CDH 20169   
70 Epsilon Energy Limited EPS 20170   
71 Exall Energy Corporation EE 20171   
72 Forsys Metals Corp. FSY 20172   
73 IC Potash Corp. ICP 20173   
74 Logan International Inc. LII 20174   
75 Mccoy Corporation MCB 20175   
76 Prophecy Coal Corp. PCY 20176   
77 Pulse Seismic Inc. PSD 20177   
78 Questerre Energy Corporation QEC 20178   
79 Rock Energy Inc. RE 20179   
80 Sonde Resources Corp. SOQ 20180   
81 Tesla Exploration Ltd. TXL 20181   
82 UEX Corporation UEX 20182   
83 Valeura Energy Inc. VLE 20183   
84 ZCL Composites Inc. ZCL 20184   
# Excluded Companies Ticker Comments 
1 Surge Energy Inc. SGY  Reports N/A 
2 Uranium One Inc. UUU  Reports N/A 
3 Fairborne Energy Ltd. FEL   Reports N/A 
4 Crocotta Energy Inc. CTA   Reports N/A 
5 Petrobank Energy And Resources Ltd PBG   Reports N/A 
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6 Second Wave Petroleum Inc. SCS   Reports N/A 
7 Wenzel Downhole Tools Ltd WZL  Reports N/A 
8 Torc Oil & Gas Ltd. TOG   Reports N/A 
9 MGM Energy Corp. MGX  Reports N/A 
10 Dundee Energy Limited DEN   Reports N/A 
11 Artek Exploration Ltd. RTK M&A 
12 Avenex Energy Corp. AVF M&A 
13 Celtic Exploration Ltd CLT M&A 
14 Nexen Inc. NXY M&A 
15 Pace Oil & Gas Ltd. PCE M&A 
16 Winstar Resources Limited WIX 2013 report N/A 
 
Appendix C.3 Sample Australian Industrials firms 
Panel A: Osiris database search results - 28/08/2014 
Selected search criteria Specified values or options Step result Search result 
1. Listed / Unlisted Listed 47,780 47,780 
2. IPO date Before 30/06/2008 excl. delisted companies 36,829 35,909 
3. World Region/Country Trading address: Australia (AU) 2,877 1,596 
4. Main stock exchange Australian Securities Exchange (2167) 2,167 1,537 
5. Accounting standard  IFRS 17,781 1,515 
6. GICS classification 20 - Industrials 11,534 163 
7. Market Cap. (‘000s AUD) Last available year, Top 100 100 100 
  Total number of companies 100  
Panel B: Osiris database company list 
# Selected companies Ticker  Stata ID Comments 
1 AJ Lucas Group Limited AJL 10201   
2 ALS Limited ALQ 10202   
3 Ariadne Australia Limited ARA 10203   
4 Asciano Limited AIO 10204   
5 Ausdrill Limited ASL 10205   
6 Ausenco Limited AAX 10206   
7 Austal Limited ASB 10207   
8 Austin Engineering Limited ANG 10208   
9 Boart Longyear Limited BLY 10209   
10 Boom Logistics Limited BOL 10210   
11 Bradken Limited BKN 10211   
12 Brambles Limited BXB 10212   
13 BSA Limited BSA 10213   
14 Cabcharge Australia Limited CAB 10214   
15 Cardno Limited CDD 10215   
16 Ceramic Fuel Cells Limited CFU 10216   
17 Chandler Macleod Group Limited CMG 10217   
18 Clarius Group Limited CND 10218   
19 CMI Limited CMI 10219   
20 Co2 Group Limited COZ 10220   
21 Coffey International Limited COF 10221   
22 Collection House Limited CLH 10222   
23 Coventry Group Limited CYG 10223   
24 Credit Corp Group Limited CCP 10224   
 
 
 229 
25 CSR Limited CSR 10225   
26 CTI Logistics Limited CLX 10226   
27 Decmil Group Limited DCG 10227   
28 Brierty Limited BYL 10228   
29 Downer Edi Limited DOW 10229   
30 Emeco Holdings Limited EHL 10230   
31 Engenco Limited EGN 10231   
32 Environmental Clean Technologies Ltd ESI 10232   
33 Global Construction Services Ltd GCS 10233   
34 GWA Group Limited GWA 10234   
35 Hills Holdings Limited HIL 10235   
36 Hughes Drilling Limited HDX 10236   
37 K & S Corporation Limited KSC 10237   
38 Korvest Limited KOV 10238   
39 Leighton Holdings Limited LEI 10239   
40 Lindsay Australia Limited LAU 10240   
41 Logicamms Limited LCM 10241   
42 Lycopodium Limited LYL 10242   
43 Chalmers Limited CHR 10243   
44 Macmahon Holdings Limited MAH 10244   
45 Maxitrans Industries Limited MXI 10245   
46 Mcmillan Shakespeare Limited MMS 10246   
47 Mermaid Marine Australia Limited MRM 10247   
48 Mineral Resources Limited MIN 10248   
49 Monadelphous Group Limited MND 10249   
50 NRW Holdings Limited NWH 10250   
51 Paperlinx Limited PPX 10251   
52 PMP Limited PMP 10252   
53 Programmed Maintenance Services Ltd PRG 10253   
54 Qantas Airways Limited QAN 10254   
55 Quickstep Holdings Limited QHL 10255   
56 Rcr Tomlinson Limited RCR 10256   
57 Reece Australia Limited REH 10257   
58 Regional Express Holdings Limited REX 10258   
59 Resource Equipment Limited RQL 10259   
60 Rungepincockminarco Limited RUL 10260   
61 SAI Global Limited SAI 10261   
62 Salmat Limited SLM 10262   
63 Sedgman Limited SDM 10263   
64 Seek Limited SEK 10264   
65 Electro Optic Systems Holdings Limited EOS 10265   
66 Silver Chef Limited SIV 10266   
67 Skilled Group Limited SKE 10267   
68 Southern Cross Electrical Engineering Ltd SXE 10268   
69 Structural Systems Limited STS 10269   
70 Swick Mining Services Ltd SWK 10270   
71 Sydney Airport SYD 10271   
72 Toll Holdings Limited TOL 10272   
73 Tox Free Solutions Limited TOX 10273   
74 Transfield Services Limited TSE 10274   
75 Transpacific Industries Group Ltd TPI 10275   
76 Transurban Group TCL 10276   
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77 UGL Limited UGL 10277   
78 VDM Group Limited VMG 10278   
79 Virgin Australia Holdings Limited VAH 10279   
80 Watpac Limited WTP 10280   
81 WDS Limited WDS 10281   
82 Wellcom Group Limited WLL 10282   
83 WHK Group Limited  CRH 10283 Now Crowe Horwarth (2013) 
84 XRF Scientific Limited XRF 10284   
85 HGl Limited HNG 10285   
86 John Shearer (Holdings) Limited SHR 10286   
87 Nomad Building Solutions Limited NOD 10287   
88 Saunders International Limited SND 10288   
89 Sterihealth Limited STP 10289   
90 Viento Group Limited VIE 10290   
91 Zicom Group Limited ZGL 10291   
#  Excluded companies  Ticker Comments 
1 Alesco Corporation Limited ALS  Delisted in 2013 
2 Service Stream Limited SSM Reports N/A 
3 CMA Corporation Limited CMV Reports N/A 
4 Forge Group Limited FGE  Reports N/A 
5 Hastie Group Limited HST Reports N/A 
6 Norfolk Group Limited NFK Reports N/A 
7 Clough Limited CLO  Delisted in Dec 2013; reports N/A 
8 Scott Corporation Limited SCC  M&A 
9 Future Generation Investment Fund Limited FGX 
M&A; previously called Australian 
Infrastructure Fund 
Appendix C.4 Sample Canadian Industrials firms 
Panel A: Osiris database search results - 28/08/2014 
Selected search criteria Specified values or options Step result 
1. Listed / Unlisted Listed 47,780 
2. IPO date Before 1/01/2008 excluding delisted companies 35,990 
3. World Region/Country Trading address: Canada (CA) 5,451 
4. Main stock exchange Toronto Stock Exchange (1393) 1,393 
5. Accounting standard  IFRS 17,781 
6. GICS classification 20 - Industrials 11,534 
7. Market Cap. (‘000s CAD) Last available year, Top 100 69 
Panel B: Osiris database company list 
# Selected companies Ticker Stata ID Comments 
1 Aecon Group Inc. ARE 20201   
2 Ag Growth International Inc. AFN 20202   
3 Air Canada AC 20203   
4 Algoma Central Corporation ALC 20204   
5 Armtec Infrastructure Inc. ARF 20205   
6 ATS Automation Tooling Systems Inc. ATA 20206   
7 Avcorp Industries Inc. AVP 20207   
8 Badger Daylighting Ltd BAD 20208   
9 Bird Construction Inc. BDT 20209   
10 Black Diamond Group Ltd. BDI 20210   
11 Bombardier Inc. BBD 20211   
12 Boyd Group Income Fund BYD 20212   
13 Bri-Chem Corp. BRY 20213   
14 Buhler Industries Inc. BUI 20214   
15 CAE Inc. CAE 20215   
16 Caldwell Partners International Inc.  CWL 20216   
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17 Canwel Building Materials Group Ltd. CWX 20217   
18 Cargojet Inc. CJT 20218   
19 Carmanah Technologies Corp. CMH 20219   
20 Ceres Global Ag Corp CRP 20220   
21 Churchill Corporation SOX 20221 Changed to Stuart Olson Inc. in 2014 
22 Clarke Inc. CKI 20222   
23 Contrans Group Inc. CSS 20223   
24 Data Group Inc. DGI 20224   
25 Directcash Payments Inc. DCI 20225   
26 Discovery Air Inc. DA 20226   
27 Electrovaya Inc. EFL 20227   
28 Exchange Income Corporation EIF 20228   
29 Exco Technologies Limited XTC 20229   
30 Finning International Inc. FTT 20230   
31 GLV Inc. GLV 20231   
32 Goodfellow Inc. GDL 20232   
33 Hammond Manufacturing Company ltd. HMM 20233   
34 Hammond Power Solutions Inc. HPS 20234   
35 Hardwoods Distribution Inc. HWD 20235   
36 Heroux-Devtek Inc. HRX 20236   
37 HNZ Group Inc. HNZ 20237   
38 Horizon North Logistics Inc. HNL 20238   
39 IBI Group Inc. IBG 20239   
40 Inscape Corporation INQ 20240   
41 K-Bro Linen Inc. KBL 20241   
42 Logistec Corporation LGT 20242   
43 Magellan Aerospace Corporation MAL 20243   
44 PFB Corporation PFB 20244   
45 Ritchie Bros. Auctioneers Incorporated RBA 20245   
46 Rocky Mountain Dealerships Inc. RME 20246   
47 Russel Metals Inc. RUS 20247   
48 Savaria Corporation SIS 20248   
49 Snc-Lavalin Group Inc. SNC 20249   
50 Stantec Inc. STN 20250   
51 Strongco Corporation SQP 20251   
52 Synex International Inc. SXI 20252   
53 Taiga Building Products Ltd. TBL 20253   
54 Toromont Industries Ltd TIH 20254   
55 Transcontinental Inc. TCL 20255   
56 Transforce Inc. TFI 20256   
57 Tree Island Steel Ltd. TSL 20257   
58 Trimac Transportation Ltd TMA 20258   
59 Velan Inc. VLN 20259   
60 Vicwest Inc. VIC 20260   
61 Wajax Corp WJX 20261   
62 Westjet Airlines Ltd. WJA 20262   
63 Xebec Adsorption Inc. XBC 20263   
#  Excluded Companies  Ticker Comments 
1 Benev Capital Inc. BEV Reports N/A 
2 Chorus Aviation Inc. CHR Share prices N/A 
3 General Donalee Canada Inc. GDI M&A 
4 H. Paulin & Co. Limited PAP.A M&A in 2013 
5 Commercial Solutions Inc. CSA Delisted in Jan 2014; reports N/A 
6 Cvtech Group Inc. CVT Reports N/A 
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Appendix C.5 Sample Australian Materials firms 
Panel A: Osiris database search results - 28/08/2014 
Selected search criteria Specified values or options Step result Search result 
1. Listed / Unlisted Listed 47,780 47,780 
2. IPO date Before 30/06/2008 excl. delisted companies 36,829 35,909 
3. World Region/Country Trading address: Australia (AU) 2,877 1,596 
4. Main stock exchange Australian Securities Exchange (2167) 2,167 1,537 
5. Accounting standard  IFRS 17,781 1,515 
6. GICS classification 15 - Materials 8,835 552 
7. Market Cap. (‘000s AUD) Last available year, Top 100 100 100 
  Total number of companies 100  
 Panel B: Osiris database company list 
# Selected companies Ticker Stata ID Comments 
1 Adelaide Brighton Limited ABC 10301   
2 Aditya Birla Minerals Limited ABY 10302   
3 Alkane Resources Limited ALK 10303   
4 Alumina Limited AWC 10304   
5 Amcor Limited AMC 10305   
6 Aquarius Platinum Limited AQP 10306   
7 Arrium Limited ARI 10307   
8 Atlas Iron Limited AGO 10308   
9 Bathurst Resources Limited BRL 10309   
10 BC Iron Limited BCI 10310   
11 Beadell Resources Limited BDR 10311   
12 BHP Billiton Limited BHP 10312   
13 Blackthorn Resources Limited BTR 10313   
14 Bluescope Steel Limited BSL 10314   
15 Boral Limited BLD 10315   
16 Brickworks Limited BKW 10316   
17 Cape Lambert Resources Limited CFE 10317   
18 Coal Of Africa Limited CZA 10318   
19 Cudeco Limited CDU 10319   
20 Discovery Metals Limited DML 10320   
21 Dragon Mountain Gold Limited DMG 10321   
22 Elemental Minerals Limited ELM 10322   
23 Equatorial Resources Limited EQX 10323   
24 Evolution Mining Limited EVN 10324   
25 Flinders Mines Limited FMS 10325   
26 Focus Minerals Limited FML 10326   
27 Fortescue Metal Group Limited FMG 10327   
28 Galaxy Resources Limited GXY 10328   
29 Gindalbie Metals Ltd. GBG 10329   
30 Grange Resources Limited GRR 10330   
31 Greenland Minerals And Energy 
Limited GGG 10331   
32 Gryphon Minerals Limited GRY 10332   
33 Hillgrove Resources Limited HGO 10333   
34 Iluka Resources Limited ILU 10334   
35 Imdex Limited IMD 10335   
36 Incitec Pivot Limited IPL 10336   
37 Independence Group Nl IGO 10337   
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38 Indophil Resources Nl IRN 10338   
39 Intrepid Mines Limited IAU 10339   
40 Iron Ore Holdings Limited IOH 10340   
41 Kangaroo Resources Limited KRL 10341   
42 Kingsgate Consolidated Limited KCN 10342   
43 Kingsrose Mining Limited KRM 10343   
44 Lynas Corporation Limited LYC 10344   
45 Medusa Mining Limited MML 10345   
46 Metals X Limited MNC 10346   
47 Metminco Limited MDL 10347   
48 Mineral Deposits Limited MDL 10348   
49 Mirabela Nickel Limited MBN 10349   
50 Mount Gibson Iron Limited MGX 10350   
51 Murchison Metals Ltd MMX 10351   
52 Newcrest Mining Limited NCM 10352   
53 Northern Iron Limited NFE 10353   
54 Northern Star Resources Ltd NST 10354   
55 Norton Gold Fields Limited NGF 10355   
56 Nucoal Resources Limited NCR 10356   
57 Nufarm Ltd. NUF 10357   
58 Orica Limited ORI 10358   
59 Orocobre Limited ORE 10359   
60 Oz Minerals Limited OZL 10360   
61 Panaust Limited PNA 10361   
62 Perseus Mining Limited PRU 10362   
63 Ramelius Resources Limited RMS 10363   
64 Red 5 Limited RED 10364   
65 Regis Resources Limited RRL 10365   
66 Resolute Mining Limited RSG 10366   
67 Rex Minerals Limited RXM 10367   
68 Rio Tinto Limited RIO 10368   
69 Sandfire Resources Nl SFR 10369   
70 Saracen Mineral Holdings Limited SAR 10370   
71 Silver Lake Resources Limited SLR 10371   
72 Sims Metal Management Limited SGM 10372   
73 Sphere Minerals Limited SPH 10373   
74 St Barbara Limited SBM 10374   
75 Sundance Resources Limited SDL 10375   
76 Syrah Resources Limited SYR 10376   
77 Tanami Gold Nl TAM 10377   
78 Tiger Resources Limited TGS 10378   
79 Troy Resources Limited TRY 10379   
80 Western Areas Nl WSA 10380   
81 Western Desert Resources Limited WDR 10381   
82 Zimplats Holdings Limited ZIM 10382   
83 Windimurra Vanadium Limited WVL 10383   
84 ABM Resources Nl ABU 10384   
# Excluded companies Ticker Comments 
1 Kagara Ltd   Reports N/A 
2 Platinum Australia Limited   Reports N/A 
3 Jupiter Mines Limited   Reports N/A 
4 Kentor Gold Limited   Reports N/A 
5 Panoramic Resources Limited   Reports N/A 
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6 Perilya Limited   Reports N/A 
7 TFS Corporation Limited   Reports N/A 
8 Integra Mining Limited   Reports N/A 
9 CGA Mining Limited   Reports N/A 
10 Marengo Mining Limited   Reports N/A 
11 Altona Mining Limited   Reports N/A 
12 Azimuth Resources Limited   Reports N/A 
13 Gujarat NRE Coking Coal Limited   Reports N/A 
14 Ampella Mining Limited   Reports N/A 
15 Papillon Resources Limited   Reports N/A 
16 Gunns Limited   Reports N/A 
 
Appendix C.6 Sample Canadian Materials firms 
# Selected companies Ticker Stata ID Comments 
1 Agrium Inc. AGU 20301   
2 Alamos Gold Inc. AGI 20302   
3 Alexco Resource Corp. AXR 20303   
4 Altius Minerals Corporation ALS 20304   
5 Tembec Inc. TMB 20305   
6 Augusta Resource Corporation AZC 20306   
7 Aura Minerals Inc. ORA 20307   
8 Aurico Gold Inc. AUQ 20308   
9 B2gold Corp. BTO 20309   
10 Baja Mining Corp. BAJ 20310   
11 Banro Corporation BAA 20311   
12 Canexus Corporation CUS 20312   
13 Canfor Corporation CFP 20313   
14 Canfor Pulp Products Inc. CFX 20314   
15 Capstone Mining Corp. CS 20315   
16 Carpathian Gold Inc. CPN 20316   
17 Cascades Inc. CAS 20317   
18 CCL Industries Inc. CCL 20318   
19 Centerra Gold Inc. CG 20319   
20 Chemtrade Logistics Income Fund CHE.UN 20320   
21 Copper Mountain Mining Corporation CUM 20321   
22 Detour Gold Corporation DGC 20322   
23 Duluth Metals Limited DM 20323   
24 Dundee Precious Metals Inc. DPM 20324   
25 Eastern Platinum Ltd. ELR 20325   
26 Eldorado Gold Corp ELD 20326   
27 Endeavour Silver Corp. EDR 20327   
28 First Majestic Silver Corp. FR 20328   
29 First Quantum Minerals Ltd FM 20329   
Panel A: Osiris database search results - 28/08/2014 
Selected search criteria Specified values or options Step result 
1. Listed / Unlisted Listed 47,780 
2. IPO date Before 1/01/2008 excluding delisted companies 35,990 
3. World Region/Country Trading address: Canada (CA) 5,451 
4. Main stock exchange Toronto Stock Exchange (1393) 1,393 
5. Accounting standard  IFRS 17,781 
6. GICS classification 15 - Materials 8,835 
7. Market Cap. (‘000s CAD) Last available year, Top 100 100 
  Total number of companies 100 
Panel B: Osiris database company list 
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30 Fortress Paper Ltd. FTP 20330   
31 Fortuna Silver Mines Inc. FVI 20331   
32 Franco-Nevada Corporation FNV 20332   
33 Gabriel Resources Ltd. GBU 20333   
34 Goldcorp Inc. G 20334   
35 Great Panther Silver Limited GPR 20335   
36 Harry Winston Diamond Corporation DDC 20336 Now Dominion Diamond Corp. 
37 Hudbay Minerals Inc. HBM 20337   
38 Iamgold Corporation IMG 20338   
39 Imperial Metals Corporation III 20339   
40 Interfor Corporation IFP 20340 Formerly International Forest Products 
41 International Tower Hill Mines Ltd. ITH 20341   
42 Asanko Gold Inc. AKG 20342 Formerly Keegan Resources Inc. 
43 Kinross Gold Corporation K 20343   
44 Kirkland Lake Gold Inc. KGI 20344   
45 Labrador Iron Mines Holdings Limited LIM 20345   
46 Lake Shore Gold Corp LSG 20346   
47 Lucara Diamond Corp. LUC 20347   
48 Lundin Mining Corporation LUN 20348   
49 Mag Silver Corp MAG 20349   
50 Major Drilling Group International 
Inc. MDI 20350   
51 Mercator Minerals, Ltd ML 20351   
52 Methanex Corporation MX 20352   
53 Mountain Province Diamonds Inc. MPV 20353   
54 Nautilus Minerals Inc. NUS 20354   
55 Nevsun Resources Ltd NSU 20355   
56 New Gold Inc. NGD 20356   
57 New Millennium Iron Corp NML 20357   
58 Ngex Resources Inc. NGQ 20358   
59 Norbord Inc. NBD 20359   
60 North American Palladium Ltd PDL 20360   
61 Northern Dynasty Minerals Ltd. NDM 20361   
62 Orbite Aluminae, Inc. ORT 20362   
63 Pan American Silver Corp PAA 20363   
64 Potash Corporation of Sasketchewan POT 20364   
65 Premier Gold Mines Ltd. PG 20365   
66 Primero Mining Corp. P 20366   
67 Richmont Mines Inc RIC 20367   
68 Romarco Minerals Inc R 20368   
69 Rubicon Minerals Corporation RMX 20369   
70 San Gold Corporation SGR 20370   
71 Scorpio Mining Corporation SPM 20371   
72 Seabridge Gold, Inc. SEA 20372   
73 Semafo Inc SMF 20373   
74 Sherritt International Corporation S 20374   
75 Silver Standard Resources Inc SSO 20375   
76 Silver Wheaton Corp SLW 20376   
77 Silvercorp Metals Inc. SVM 20377   
78 Stella-Jones Inc SJ 20378   
79 Sulliden Gold Corporation Ltd. SUE 20379   
80 Tanzanian Royalty Exploration 
Corporation TNX 20380   
81 Taseko Mines Ltd TKO 20381   
82 Teck Resources Limited TCK.B 20382   
83 Timmins Gold Corp. TMM 20383   
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84 Virginia Mines Inc. VGQ 20384   
85 West Fraser Timber Co Ltd WFT 20385   
86 Winpak Ltd WPK 20386   
87 Yamana Gold Inc. YRI 20387   
# Excluded companies Ticker Comments 
1 Aurizon Mines Ltd ARZ Delisted, reports N/A 
2 Brigus Gold Corp. BRD Delisted, reports N/A 
3 Inmet Mining Corporation IMN No 2013 report available 
4 Osisko Mining Corporation OSK Reports N/A 
5 Rainy River Resources Ltd. RR  Reports N/A 
6 Torex Gold Resources Inc. TXG Share data 2009 N/A 
7 Veris Gold Corp. VG  No 2013 report available 
8 High River Gold Mines Ltd. HRG Reports N/A 
9 Claude Resources Inc. CJR Reports N/A 
10 Noranda Income Fund NIF_UN Reports N/A 
11 Exeter Resource Corporation XRA Reports N/A 
12 Gran Colombia Gold Corp. GCM Reports N/A 
13 Colossus Minerals Inc. CSI No 2013 report available 
 
Appendix C.7 Sample Australian Consumer Discretionary firms 
Panel A: Osiris database search results - 28/08/2014 
Selected search criteria Specified values or options Step result Search result 
1. Listed / Unlisted Listed 47780 47780 
2. IPO date Before 30/06/2008 excluding 
delisted companies 
36829 35909 
3. World Region/Country Trading address: Australia (AU) 2877 1596 
4. Main stock exchange Australian Securities Exchange 
(2167) 
2167 1537 
5. Accounting standard  IFRS 17781 1515 
6. GICS classification 25 - Consumer Discretionary 11470 126 
7. Market Cap. (‘000s AUD) Last available year, Top 100 100 100 
  Total number of companies  100   
Panel B: Osiris database company list 
# Selected companies Ticker Stata ID Comments 
1 Academies Australasia Group Limited AKG 10401   
2 Adcorp Australia Limited AAU 10402   
3 Advanced Braking Technology 
Limited 
ABV 10403   
4 Ainsworth Game Technology Limited AGI 10404   
5 AMA Group Limited AMA 10405   
6 Amalgamated Holdings Limited AHD 10406   
7 AP Eagers Limited APE 10407   
8 APN News & Media Limited APN 10408   
9 ARB Corporation Limited ARP 10409   
10 Ardent Leisure Group AAD 10410   
11 Aristocrat Leisure Limited ALL 10411   
12 Aspermont Limited ASP 10412   
13 Atlas South Sea Pearl Limited ATP 10413   
14 Audio Pixels Holdings Limited AKP 10414   
15 Automotive Holdings Group Limited AHE 10415   
16 Beyond International Limited BYI 10416   
17 Billabong International Limited BBG 10417   
18 Breville Group Limited BRG 10418   
19 Brisbane Broncos Limited BBL 10419   
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20 Vmoto Limited VMT 10420   
21 Crown Limited CWN 10421   
22 David Jones Limited DJS 10422   
23 Disruptive Investment Group Limited  DVI 10423 Previously Allied 
Consolidated Limited 
24 Domino's Pizza Enterprises Limited DMP 10424   
25 Ebet Limited EBT 10425   
26 Enero Group Limited EGG 10426   
27 Eumundi Group Limited EBG 10427   
28 Fairfax Media Limited FXJ 10428   
29 Fantastic Holdings Limited FAN 10429   
30 Fleetwood Corporation Limited FWD 10430   
31 Flight Centre Limited FLT 10431   
32 Funtastic Limited FUN 10432   
33 G8 Education Limited GEM 10433   
34 Gale Pacific Limited GAP 10434   
35 Gazal Corporation Limited GZL 10435   
36 GLG Corp Ltd GLE 10436   
37 Globe International Limited GLB 10437   
38 GUD Holdings Limited GUD 10438   
39 Harvey Norman Holdings Limited HVN 10439   
40 Ilh Group Limited IAW 10440   
41 Invigor Group Limited IVO 10441   
42 Invocare Limited IVC 10442   
43 JB Hi-Fi Limited JBH 10443   
44 Helloworld Ltd HLO 10444 Previously Jetset 
Travelworld Ltd (JET)  
45 Joyce Corporation Limited JYC 10445   
46 Jumbo Interactive Limited JIN 10446   
47 Kresta Holdings Limited KRS 10447   
48 Macquarie Radio Network Limited MRN 10448   
49 Mcpherson's Limited MCP 10449   
50 Merchant House International Limited MHI 10450   
51 Navitas Limited NVT 10451   
52 Newhaven Hotels Limited NHH 10452   
53 Nick Scali Limited NCK 10453   
54 Noni B Limited NBL 10454   
55 Orbital Corporation Limited OEC 10455   
56 Orotongroup Limited ORL 10456   
57 Pacific Brands Limited PBG 10457   
58 Pacific Star Network Limited PNW 10458   
59 Premier Investments Limited PMV 10459   
60 Prime Media Group Limited PRT 10460   
61 Quantum Energy Limited QTM 10461   
62 Quickflix Limited QFX 10462   
63 REG Corporation Limited RCG 10463   
64 Rea Group Ltd REA 10464   
65 Reef Casino Trust RCT 10465   
66 Reject Shop Limited (The) TRS 10466   
67 Retail Food Group Limited RFG 10467   
68 Ruralco Holdings Limited RHL 10468   
69 Schaffer Corporation Ltd SFC 10469   
70 Seven West Media Limited SWM 10470   
71 Site Group International Limited SIT 10471   
 
 
 238 
72 Slater & Gordon Ltd SGH 10472   
73 Southern Cross Media Group Limited SXL 10473   
74 Specialty Fashion Group Limited SFH 10474   
75 Sprintex Limited SIX 10475   
76 STW Communications Group Limited SGN 10476   
77 Super Retail Group Limited SUL 10477   
78 Supply Network Limited SNL 10478   
79 Tabcorp Holdings Limited TAH 10479   
80 Tamawood Limited TWD 10480   
81 Tatts Group Limited TTS 10481   
82 Ten Network Holdings Limited TEN 10482   
83 Thorn Group Limited TGA 10483   
84 Transmetro Corporation Limited TCO 10484   
85 Vealls Limited VELCP 10485   
86 Village Roadshow Limited VRL 10486   
87 Vita Group Limited VTG 10487   
88 Waterco Limited WAT 10488   
89 Webjet Limited WEB 10489   
90 Wotif.Com Holdings Limited WTF 10490   
91 Country Road Limited CTY 10491   
92 Datadot Technology Limited DDT 10492   
# Excluded companies Ticker Comments 
1 Hire Intelligence International Limited HII Delisted in Feb 2013 27/02/2013 
2 Mothercare Australia Limited MLC  Delisted in Aug 2013; 2013 reports N/A 
3 Digital Performance Group Limited DIG M&A 
4 Arafura Pearls Holdings Limited APB Delisted in Aug 2013; 2013 reports N/A 
5 Ocean Capital Limited OCE Delisted in Jan 2013 
6 Planet Platinum Limited PPN Suspended in Oct 2013 
7 Sino Strategic International Limited SSI Suspended in 2011 
8 Advanced Engine Components 
Limited 
ACE  Reports N/A 
 
Appendix C.8 Sample Canadian Consumer Discretionary firms 
# Selected companies Ticker Stata ID Comments 
1 Airboss Of America Corporation BOS 20401   
2 Autocanada Inc. ACQ 20402   
3 Automodular Corporation AM 20403   
4 Ballard Power Systems Inc. BLD 20404   
5 BMTC Group Inc. GBT 20405   
Panel A: Osiris database search results - 28/08/2014 
Selected search criteria Specified values or options Step result 
1. Listed / Unlisted Listed 47,780 
2. IPO date Before 1/01/2008 excluding delisted companies 
35,990 
3. World Region/Country Trading address: Canada (CA) 5,451 
4. Main stock exchange Toronto Stock Exchange (1393) 1,393 
5. Accounting standard  IFRS 17,781 
6. GICS classification 25 – Consumer Discretionary 11470 
7. Market Cap. (‘000s CAD) Last available year, Top 100 55 
  Total number of companies 55 
Panel B: Osiris database company list 
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6 Canadian Satellite Radio Holdings Inc. XSR 20406 
Now Sirius XM Canada 
Holdings Inc. 
7 Canadian Tire Corporation, Limited CTC 20407   
8 Canlan Ice Sports Corp ICE 20408   
9 Chesswood Group Limited CHW 20409   
10 CIBT Education Group Inc. MBA 20410   
11 TWC TWC 20411 Previously Clublink Enterprises Limited  
12 Coast Wholesale Appliances Inc. CWA 20412   
13 Coastal Contacts Inc. COA 20413   
14 Cogeco Cable Inc. CCA 20414   
15 Cogeco Inc. CGO 20415   
16 Corus Entertainment Inc. CJR 20416   
17 D-Box Technologies Inc. DBO 20417   
18 Danier Leather Inc. DL 20418   
19 DHX Media Ltd. DHX 20419   
20 Dorel Industries Inc. DII.B 20420   
21 Easyhome Ltd. EH 20421   
22 Enercare Inc. ECI 20422   
23 FP Newspapers Inc. FP 20423   
24 Gildan Activewear Inc. GIL 20424   
25 Glacier Media Inc. GVC 20425   
26 Glentel Inc. GLN 20426   
27 Great Canadian Gaming Corporation GC 20427   
28 Groupe Bikini Village Inc. GBV 20428   
29 GVIC Communications Corp. GCT 20429   
30 Indigo Books & Music, Inc. IDG 20430   
31 Keg Royalties Income Fund (The) KEG 20431   
32 Le Chateau Inc. CTU.A 20432   
33 Leon's Furniture Limited LNF 20433   
34 Linamar Corporation LNR 20434   
35 Magna International Inc. MG 20435   
36 Martinrea International Inc. MRE 20436   
37 Mcgraw-Hill Ryerson Limited MHR 20437   
38 Newfoundland Capital Corporation Ltd NCC 20438   
39 Pacific Insight Electronics Corp PIH 20439   
40 Quebecor Inc. QBR 20440   
41 Reitmans (Canada) Ltd RET.A 20441   
42 Rona Inc. RON 20442   
43 Sears Canada Inc. SCC 20443   
44 Shaw Communications Inc. SJR 20444   
45 Torstar Corporation TS 20445   
46 TVA Group Inc. TVA 20446   
47 Uni-Select Incorporated UNS 20447   
# Excluded companies Ticker Comments 
1 MTY Food Group Inc. MTY  2009 share price N/A 
2 Rainmaker Entertainment Inc. RNK  2013 share price N/A 
3 Brick Ltd BRK  M&A; then delisted in March 2013 
4 Wescast Industries Incorporated WCS  M& A in 2013 
5 Mega Brands Inc. MB  M&A 
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6 MBAC Fertilizer Corp. MBC  2009 share price N/A 
7 Astral Media Inc. ACM  Reports NA 
8 Cineplex Inc. CGX  N/A for 2009/10 
 
Appendix C.9 Sample Australian Health Care firms 
Panel A: Osiris database search results - 28/08/2014 
Selected search criteria Specified values or options Step result Search result 
1. Listed / Unlisted Listed 47,780 47,780 
2. IPO date Before 30/06/2008 excluding delisted companies 36,829 35,909 
3. World Region/Country Trading address: Australia (AU) 2,877 1,596 
4. Main stock exchange Australian Securities Exchange (2167) 2,167 1,537 
5. Accounting standard  IFRS 17,781 1,515 
6. GICS classification 30 – Health care 4,228 111 
7. Market Cap. (‘000s AUD) Last available year, Top 100 100 100 
  Total number of companies  100  
 Panel B: Osiris database company list 
# Selected companies Ticker Stata ID Comments 
1 1300 Smiles Limited ONT 10501   
2 Acrux Limited ACR 10502   
3 Actinogen Limited ACW 10503   
4 Acuvax Limited ACU 10504   
5 Advanced Surgical Design & Manufacture Ltd. AMT 10505   
6 Agenix Limited AGX 10506   
7 Alchemia Limited ACL 10507  
8 Icsglobal Limited ICS 10508   
9 Analytica Limited ALT 10509   
10 Ansell Limited ANN 10510   
11 Anteo Diagnostics Limited ADO 10511   
12 Antisense Therapeutics Limited ANP 10512   
13 Atcor Medical Holdings Limited ACG 10513   
14 Australian Pharmaceutical Industries Limited API 10514   
15 Avexa Limited AVX 10515   
16 Avita Medical Ltd AVH 10516   
17 Benitec Biopharma Limited BLT 10517   
18 Biodiem Limited BDM  10518 Delisted 18/11/2013; included  
19 Bionomics Limited BNO 10519   
20 Bioprospect Limited BPO 10520   
21 Biotech Capital Limited BTC 10521   
22 Biotron Limited BIT 10522   
23 Bph Energy Limited BPH 10523   
24 Brain Resource Limited BRC 10524   
25 Calzada Limited CZD 10525   
26 Capitol Health Limited CAJ 10526   
27 Cellmid Limited CDY 10527   
28 Circadian Technologies Limited CIR 10528   
29 Clinuvel Pharmaceuticals Limited CUV 10529   
30 Clover Corporation Limited CLV 10530   
31 Cochlear Limited COH 10531   
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32 Cogstate Ltd CGS 10532   
33 Compumedics Limited CMP 10533   
34 Rhinomed  RNO 10534 Previously Consegna Group Limited 
35 Life Corporation Ltd  LFC 10535 Previously Cordlife Limited 
36 Cryosite Limited CTE 10536   
37 CSL Limited CSL 10537   
38 Cyclopharm Limited CYC 10538   
39 Ellex Medical Lasers Limited ELX 10539   
40 Genera Biosystems Limited GBI 10540   
41 Genetic Technologies Limited GTG 10541   
42 IDT Australia Limited IDT 10542   
43 IM Medical Limited IMI 10543   
44 Immuron Limited IMC 10544   
45 Impedimed Limited IPD 10545   
46 ITL Limited ITD 10546   
47 Konekt Limited KKT 10547   
48 LBT Innovations Limited LBT 10548   
49 Living Cell Technologies Limited LCT 10549   
50 Mayne Pharma Group Limited MYX 10550   
51 Medical Australia Limited MLA 10551   
52 Medical Developments International Limited MVP 10552   
53 Medtech Global Limited MDG 10553   
54 Mesoblast Limited MSB 10554   
55 Nanosonics Limited NAN 10555   
56 Narhex Life Sciences Limited NLS 10556   
57 Oncosil Medical Limited OSL 10557 Previously Neurodiscovery Limited 
58 Novogen Ltd NRT 10558   
59 Nusep Holdings Limited NSP 10559   
60 OBJ Limited OBJ 10560   
61 Omi Holdings Limited OMIDA 10561   
62 Optiscan Imaging Limited OIL 10562   
63 Paragon Care Limited PGC 10563   
64 Patrys Limited PAB 10564   
65 Pharmanet Group Limited PNO 10565   
66 Pharmaust Limited PAA 10566   
67 Pharmaxis Ltd PXS 10567   
68 Phosphagenics Limited POH 10568   
69 Phylogica Limited PYC 10569   
70 PLD Corporation Limited PLD 10570   
71 Prana Biotechnology Limited PBT 10571   
72 Prima Biomed Ltd PRR 10572   
73 Primary Health Care Limited PRY 10573   
74 Pro Medicus Limited PME 10574   
75 Probiotec Limited PBP 10575   
76 Pulse Health Limited PHG 10576   
77 Qrxpharma Ltd QRX 10577   
78 Ramsay Health Care Limited RHC 10578   
79 Resonance Health Limited RHT 10579   
80 Safety Medical Products Limited SFP 10580   
81 SDI Limited SDI 10581   
82 Sigma Pharmaceuticals Limited SIP 10582   
83 Sirtex Medical Limited SRX 10583   
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84 Somnomed Limited SOM 10584   
85 Sonic Healthcare Limited SHL 10585   
86 Starpharma Holdings Limited SPL 10586   
87 Suda Limited SUD 10587   
88 Sun Biomedical Limited SBN 10588   
89 Tissue Therapies Limited TIS 10589   
90 Universal Biosensors Inc. UBI 10590   
91 Uscom Limited UCM 10591   
92 Viralytics Limited VLA 10592   
93 Virax Holdings Limited VHL 10593   
94 Vision Eye Institute Limited VEI 10594   
95 Vita Life Sciences Limited VSC 10595   
# Excluded companies Ticker Comments 
1 Solagran Limited SLA  Suspended since Feb 2012 
2 Stirling Products Limited STI  Suspended since June 2011 
3 Allied Healthcare Group Limited AHZ M&A in 2011 
4 Asian Centre For Liver Diseases And Transplantation Limited AJJ M&A in 2009 and 2013 
5 Giaconda Limited GIA Delisted (30/08/2013), reports N/A 
 
Appendix C.10 Sample Canadian Health Care firms 
Panel A: Osiris database search results - 28/08/2014 
Selected search criteria Specified values or options Step result 
1. Listed / Unlisted Listed 47,780 
2. IPO date Before 1/01/2008 excluding 
delisted companies 
35,990 
3. World Region/Country Trading address: Canada (CA) 5,451 
4. Main stock exchange Toronto Stock Exchange (1393) 1,393 
5. Accounting standard  IFRS 17,781 
6. GICS classification 35 – Health care 4,228 
7. Market Cap. (‘000s CAD) Last available year, Top 100 55  
Total number of companies 55 
Panel B: Osiris database company list 
# Selected companies Ticker Stata ID Comments 
1 Aeterna Zentaris, Inc. AEZ 20501   
2 Amica Mature Lifestyles Inc. ACC 20502   
3 Amorfix Life Sciences Ltd. AMF 20503   
4 Bioniche Life Sciences Inc. BNC 20504   
5 Cangene Corporation CNJ 20505   
6 Centric Health Corporation CHH 20506   
7 Cipher Pharmaceuticals Inc. DND 20507   
8 Genenews Limited GEN 20508   
9 Helix Biopharma Corp HBP 20509   
10 Imaging Dynamics Company Ltd. IDL 20510   
11 Aptose Biosciences Inc. LOR 20511 Previously Lorus Therapeutics Inc. 
12 Medical Facilities Corporation DR 20512   
13 New Look Eyewear Inc. BCI 20513   
14 Novadaq Technologies Inc. NDQ 20514   
15 Nuvo Research Inc. NRI 20515   
16 Oncolytics Biotech Inc. ONC 20516   
17 Paladin Labs Inc. PLB 20517   
18 Prometic Life Sciences Inc. PLI 20518   
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19 Response Biomedical Corporation RBM 20519   
20 Resverlogix Corp RVX 20520   
21 Spectral Diagnostics Inc. SDI 20521   
22 Tekmira Pharmaceuticals Corporation TKM 20522   
23 Theratechnologies Inc. TH 20523   
24 Transition Therapeutics Inc. TTH 20524   
25 Tso3 Inc. TOS 20525   
26 Trimel Pharmaceuticals Corporation TRL 20526   
# Excluded companies Ticker Comments 
1 YM Biosciences Inc. CA M&A, delisted 
2 Noveko International Inc. EKO Delisted, 2013 FS NA 
3 Opmedic Group Inc. OMG Delisted in Sept 2013 
4 CML Healthcare Inc. CLC Delisted in Oct 2013 
5 Sophiris Bio Inc. SHS Delisted in Nov 2013 
6 Medicago Inc. MDG Delisted in Oct 2013 
 
Appendix C.11 Sample Australian IT firms 
Panel A: Osiris database search results - 28/08/2014 
Selected search criteria Specified values or options Step result Search result 
1. Listed / Unlisted Listed 47,780 47780 
2. IPO date Before 30/06/2008 excluding delisted companies 
36,829 35909 
3. World Region/Country Trading address: Australia (AU) 2,877 1596 
4. Main stock exchange Australian Securities Exchange (2167) 
2,167 1537 
5. Accounting standard  IFRS 17,781 1515 
6. GICS classification 45 – Information technology 9,130 95 
7. Market Cap. (‘000s AUD) Last available year, Top 100 88 88 
  Total number of companies  88   
Panel B: Osiris database company list 
# Selected companies Ticker Stata ID Comments 
1 Adacel Technologies Limited ADA 10601   
2 Adslot Limited ADJ 10602   
3 Altium Limited ALU 10603   
4 Ambertech Limited AMO 10604   
5 Anittel Group Limited AYG 10605   
6 ASG Group Limited ASZ 10606   
7 Azure Healthcare Limited AZV 10607   
8 Bluglass Limited BLG 10608   
9 Car Parking Technologies Limited SPZ 10609   
10 Cellnet Group Limited CLT 10610   
11 Clarity Oss Limited CYO 10611   
12 Codan Limited CDA 10612   
13 Comops Limited COM 10613   
14 Computershare Limited CPU 10614   
15 Corum Group Limited COO 10615   
16 Cpt Global Limited CGO 10616   
17 CSG Limited CSV 10617   
18 Data#3 Limited DTL 10618   
19 DWS Limited DWS 10619   
20 Dyesol Limited DYE 10620   
21 E-Pay Asia Limited EPY 10621   
22 Empired Limited EPD 10622   
23 Energy One Limited EOL 10623   
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24 Entellect Limited ESN 10624   
25 Eservglobal Limited ESV 10625   
26 Gbst Holdings Limited GBT 10626   
27 Goconnect Limited GCN 10627   
28 Hansen Technologies Limited HSN 10628   
29 Icash Payment Systems Limited ICP 10629   
30 Infomedia Limited IFM 10630   
31 Integrated Research Limited IRI 10631   
32 Iproperty Group Limited IPP 10632   
33 Iress Limited IRE 10633   
34 Now Primary Opinion Limited POP 10634 Previously Jumbuck Entertainment Ltd.  
35 Kollakorn Corporation Limited KKL 10635   
36 Legend Corporation Limited LGD 10636   
37 Maxsec Group Limited MSP 10637   
38 MDS Financial Group Limited MWS 10638   
39 Melbourne It Limited MLB 10639   
40 MGM Wireless Limited MWR 10640   
41 Mint Wireless Limited MNW 10641   
42 Mobile Embrace Limited MBE 10642   
43 Nearmap Limited NEA 10643   
44 Netcomm Wireless Limited NTC 10644   
45 Oakton Limited OKN 10645   
46 Objective Corporation Limited OCL 10646   
47 Panorama Synergy Limited PSY 10647   
48 Pienetworks Limited NWZ 10648 Now NWZ since Aug 2014 
49 Praemium Limited PPS 10649   
50 Prophecy International Holdings Limited PRO 10650   
51 Q Technology Group Limited QTG 10651   
52 Qanda Technology Ltd QNA 10652   
53 Reckon Limited RKN 10653   
54 Redflex Holdings Limited RDF 10654   
55 Rubik Financial Limited RFL 10655   
56 Scantech Limited SCD 10656   
57 Senetas Corporation Limited SEN 10657   
58 Silex Systems Limited SLX 10658   
59 Smarttrans Holdings Ltd SMA 10659   
60 SMS Management & Technology Limited SMX 10660   
61 Stratatel Limited JCS 10661   
62 Technology One Limited TNE 10662   
63 TTA Holdings Limited TTA 10663   
64 Two Way Limited DNA 10664 Now Donaco Limited 
65 UXC Limited UXC 10665   
66 World Reach Limited WRR 10666   
67 World.Net Services Limited WNS 10667   
68 Xtek Limited XTE 10668   
69 Montech Holdings Limited  MOQ 10669 Previously Sirius Corporation Limited 
70 Lemarne Corporation Limited LMC 10670   
71 Intermoco Limited INT 10671   
72 Transol Corporation Limited AJR 10672   
# Excluded companies Ticker Comments 
1 3q Holdings Limited TQH Delisted -13/02/2013 
2 AAT Corporation Limited AAT Suspended since Jan 2010 
3 CCK Financial Solutions Limited CCK Delisted 31/12/2012 
4 Cl Asset Holdings Limited CLS Delisted 11/03/2013 
5 Longreach Group Limited LRX Delisted 29/11/2006 
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6 Synergy Plus Limited SNR Suspended since Sept 2012 
7 Imagine Un Limited IUL Reports N/A 
8 ISS Group Limited ISS Delisted 12/08/2013 - 2013 FS N/A 
9 MOV Corporation Limited MOV Data N/A 
10 On Q Group Limited ONQ Data N/A and long-term suspended 
11 Reeltime Media Limited RMA Data N/A and long-term suspended 
12 Bravura Solutions Limited BVA Delisted 14/10/2013 - not included as  
13 Facilitate Digital Holdings Limited FAC Delisted 27/12/2013 - not included  
14 Mooter Media Limited MMZ Now a resources company; excluded 
15 Arasor International Ltd LHB M&A 
16 Kingston Resources Limited KSN  M&A 
 
Appendix C.12 Sample Canadian IT firms 
Panel A: Osiris database search results - 28/08/2014 
Selected search criteria Specified values or options Step result 
1. Listed / Unlisted Listed 47,780 
2. IPO date Before 1/01/2008 excluding 
delisted companies 
35,990 
3. World Region/Country Trading address: Canada 
(CA) 
5,451 
4. Main stock exchange Toronto Stock Exchange 
(1393) 
1,393 
5. Accounting standard  IFRS 17,781 
6. GICS classification 45 – Information technology 9,130 
7. Market Cap. (‘000s CAD) Last available year, Top 100 38 
 Total number of companies 38 
Panel B: Osiris database company list 
# Selected companies Ticker Stata ID Comments 
1 01 Communique Laboratory Inc. ONE 20601   
2 5n Plus Inc. VNP 20602   
3 Absolute Software Corporation ABT 20603   
4 Calian Technologies Ltd. CTY 20604   
5 Celestica Inc. CLS 20605   
6 CGI Group Inc. GIB 20606   
7 Com Dev International Ltd CDV 20607   
8 Computer Modelling Group Ltd CMG 20608   
9 Constellation Software Inc. CSU 20609   
10 Critical Control Solutions Corp. CCZ 20610   
11 Cyberplex Inc. EQ 20611 Name change to EQ Inc 
12 Dragonwave Inc. DWI 20612   
13 Enghouse Systems Limited ESL 20613   
14 Espial Group Inc. ESP 20614   
15 Evertz Technologies Limited ET 20615   
16 Exfo Inc. EXF 20616   
17 Hartco Inc. HCI 20617   
18 International Datacasting Corporation IDC 20618   
19 Intrinsyc Software International, Inc. ITC 20619 Now Intrinsyc Technologies Corp  
20 Macdonald, Dettwiler And Associates Ltd. MDA 20620   
21 Mediagrif Interactive Technologies Inc. MDF 20621   
22 Norsat International Inc. NIL 20622   
23 Points International Ltd PTS 20623   
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24 Pure Technologies Ltd. PUR 20624   
25 RDM Corporation RC 20625   
26 Redknee Solutions Inc. RKN 20626   
27 Redline Communications Group Inc. RDL 20627   
28 Solium Capital Inc. SUM 20628   
29 Tecsys Inc. TCS 20629   
30 Vecima Networks Inc. VCM 20630   
31 Webtech Wireless Inc. WEW 20631   
# Excluded companies Ticker Comments 
1 DDS Wireless International Inc. DD FS N/A 
2 Rutter Inc. RUT FS N/A 
3 Aastra Technologies Limited AAH M&A & delisted in Jan 2014 
4 Northcore Technologies Inc. NTI Delisted in Sept 2013? 
5 Softchoice Corporation SO Gone private in June 2013 
6 Hemisphere GPS Inc. HEM M&A with AJX 
7 Peer 1 Network Enterprises, Inc. PIX M A now CCA 
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Appendix D. Summary statistics by year  
Appendix D.1 Derivatives fair values ratio by industry and year Australia 
 N Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Panel A: 2009  
Energy  89 0.0039 0.0000 0.0149 0.0000 0.1043 
Industrials  91 0.0169 0.0004 0.0444 0.0000 0.3423 
Materials  84 0.0259 0.0000 0.1168 0.0000 0.8816 
Consumer Discretionary  92 0.0202 0.0001 0.0497 0.0000 0.2990 
Health Care  95 0.0042 0.0000 0.0190 0.0000 0.1384 
IT  72 0.0054 0.0000 0.0186 0.0000 0.1077 
All firms 523 0.0128 0.0000 0.0562 0.0000 0.8816 
Panel B: 2010  
Energy  89 0.0043 0.0000 0.0169 0.0000 0.1106 
Industrials   91 0.0097 0.0000 0.0509 0.0000 0.4827 
Materials   84 0.0345 0.0000 0.1999 0.0000 1.7844 
Consumer Discretionary   91 0.0073 0.0002 0.0204 0.0000 0.1594 
Health Care   95 0.0010 0.0000 0.0043 0.0000 0.0334 
IT   72 0.0027 0.0000 0.0101 0.0000 0.0576 
All firms 522 0.0098 0.0000 0.0841 0.0000 1.7844 
Panel C: 2011  
Energy  89 0.0053 0.0000 0.0279 0.0000 0.2532 
Industrials   91 0.0150 0.0000 0.0410 0.0000 0.2920 
Materials   83 0.0065 0.0004 0.0286 0.0000 0.2453 
Consumer Discretionary   93 0.0086 0.0000 0.0188 0.0000 0.1060 
Health Care   95 0.0017 0.0000 0.0069 0.0000 0.0495 
IT   72 0.0024 0.0000 0.0092 0.0000 0.0603 
All firms 522 0.0067 0.0000 0.0255 0.0000 0.2920 
Panel D: 2012  
Energy  89 0.0032 0.0000 0.0167 0.0000 0.1525 
Industrials   91 0.0177 0.0000 0.0576 0.0000 0.4835 
Materials   83 0.0061 0.0000 0.0162 0.0000 0.1002 
Consumer Discretionary   93 0.0084 0.0004 0.0162 0.0000 0.1676 
Health Care   95 0.0014 0.0000 0.0040 0.0000 0.0182 
IT   72 0.0009 0.0000 0.0032 0.0000 0.0208 
All firms 522 0.0065 0.0000 0.0283 0.0000 0.4835 
Panel E: 2013  
Energy  89 0.0037 0.0000 0.0167 0.0000 0.1460 
Industrials   90 0.0085 0.0000 0.0181 0.0000 0.0967 
Materials   82 0.0233 0.0000 0.0881 0.0000 0.6889 
Consumer Discretionary   92 0.0068 0.0000 0.0130 0.0000 0.0507 
Health Care   95 0.0007 0.0000 0.0020 0.0000 0.0114 
IT   72 0.0007 0.0000 0.0026 0.0000 0.0164 
All firms 520 0.0072 0.0000 0.0375 0.0000 0.6889 
Panel F: Total sample 2009 - 2013 
Energy 445 0.0041 0.0000 0.0191 0.0000 0.2532 
Industrials 454 0.0136 0.0000 0.0445 0.0000 0.4835 
Materials 416 0.0193 0.0000 0.1121 0.0000 1.7844 
Consumer Discretionary 459 0.0102 0.0003 0.0286 0.0000 0.2990 
Health Care 475 0.0018 0.0000 0.0095 0.0000 0.1384 
IT 360 0.0024 0.0000 0.0106 0.0000 0.1077 
All firms 2,609 0.0086 0.0000 0.0512 0.0000 1.7844 
Note: This table presents descriptive statistics for the ratio of derivatives fair values scaled by total assets by 
industry and year for Australian firms.   
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Appendix D.2 Derivatives fair values ratio by industry and year Canada 
 N Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Panel A: 2009  
Energy  82 0.0043 0.0000 0.0123 0.0000 0.0986 
Industrials  57 0.0088 0.0000 0.0334 0.0000 0.2442 
Materials  86 0.0035 0.0000 0.0106 0.0000 0.0645 
Consumer Discretionary  46 0.0131 0.0000 0.0352 0.0000 0.2127 
Health Care  26 0.0007 0.0000 0.0019 0.0000 0.0073 
IT  31 0.0042 0.0000 0.0112 0.0000 0.0559 
All firms 328 0.0058 0.0000 0.0213 0.0000 0.2442 
Panel B: 2010  
Energy  82 0.0044 0.0001 0.0097 0.0000 0.0703 
Industrials  59 0.0113 0.0000 0.0421 0.0000 0.2496 
Materials  87 0.0095 0.0000 0.0332 0.0000 0.1833 
Consumer Discretionary  47 0.0088 0.0000 0.0282 0.0000 0.1546 
Health Care  26 0.0008 0.0000 0.0031 0.0000 0.0157 
IT  31 0.0023 0.0000 0.0043 0.0000 0.0168 
All firms 332 0.0071 0.0000 0.0273 0.0000 0.2496 
Panel C: 2011  
Energy  83 0.0043 0.0002 0.0074 0.0000 0.0367 
Industrials  60 0.0049 0.0001 0.0162 0.0000 0.1140 
Materials  87 0.0094 0.0000 0.0347 0.0000 0.2597 
Consumer Discretionary  47 0.0142 0.0000 0.0452 0.0000 0.2824 
Health Care  26 0.0021 0.0000 0.0055 0.0000 0.0219 
IT  31 0.0017 0.0000 0.0031 0.0000 0.0097 
All firms 334 0.0067 0.0000 0.0259 0.0000 0.2824 
Panel D: 2012  
Energy  84 0.0042 0.0000 0.0083 0.0000 0.0477 
Industrials  60 0.0048 0.0001 0.0132 0.0000 0.0723 
Materials  87 0.0099 0.0000 0.0449 0.0000 0.3152 
Consumer Discretionary  46 0.0112 0.0000 0.0457 0.0000 0.2919 
Health Care  26 0.0049 0.0000 0.0222 0.0000 0.1135 
IT  31 0.0029 0.0000 0.0077 0.0000 0.0408 
All firms 334 0.0067 0.0000 0.0300 0.0000 0.3152 
Panel E: 2013  
Energy  83 0.0153 0.0008 0.0815 0.0000 0.7361 
Industrials  60 0.0043 0.0002 0.0110 0.0000 0.0548 
Materials  85 0.0018 0.0000 0.0079 0.0000 0.0636 
Consumer Discretionary  46 0.0045 0.0000 0.0164 0.0000 0.1014 
Health Care  26 0.0021 0.0000 0.0078 0.0000 0.0394 
IT  31 0.0026 0.0000 0.0054 0.0000 0.0212 
All firms 331 0.0061 0.0000 0.0420 0.0000 0.7361 
Panel F: Total sample 2009 - 2013 
Energy   414 0.0065 0.0001 0.0376 0.0000 0.7361 
Industrials   296 0.0068 0.0001 0.0261 0.0000 0.2496 
Materials   432 0.0069 0.0000 0.0302 0.0000 0.3152 
Consumer Discretionary   232 0.0104 0.0000 0.0357 0.0000 0.2919 
Health Care   130 0.0021 0.0000 0.0109 0.0000 0.1135 
IT   155 0.0027 0.0000 0.0069 0.0000 0.0559 
All firms 1,659 0.0066 0.0000 0.0301 0.0000 0.7361 
Note: This table presents descriptive statistics for the ratio of derivatives fair values scaled by total assets by 
industry and year for Canadian firms.    
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Appendix D.3 Tobin’s Q by industry and year Australia 
 N Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Panel A: 2009  
Energy 87 0.5461 0.4306 0.8935 -1.8912 2.5409 
Industrials 91 -0.0054 -0.0989 0.6170 -1.4842 1.6912 
Materials 84 0.6772 0.4857 1.2385 -1.5393 7.8761 
Consumer Discretionary 92 0.2087 0.0247 0.8056 -1.9428 2.3687 
Health Care 91 0.8949 0.6473 1.3553 -1.4741 6.2253 
IT 70 0.6900 0.2083 1.5155 -1.3084 8.3674 
All firms 515 0.4910 0.2403 1.1363 -1.9428 8.3674 
Panel B: 2010  
Energy 89 0.4772 0.4086 0.7182 -0.8800 2.4725 
Industrials 91 0.0770 -0.0512 0.6116 -1.1991 1.6572 
Materials 83 0.7123 0.7055 0.7301 -1.7665 2.3344 
Consumer Discretionary 92 0.3514 0.1842 0.7932 -1.3596 2.4822 
Health Care 90 0.8782 0.8571 1.1330 -1.3773 5.1334 
IT 70 0.8064 0.5159 1.4893 -1.1022 7.8883 
All firms 515 0.5367 0.3857 0.9746 -1.7665 7.8883 
Panel C: 2011  
Energy 89 0.5284 0.4624 0.8211 -2.1335 2.8455 
Industrials 91 0.1532 0.1331 0.5755 -1.0435 1.7295 
Materials 83 0.6898 0.6932 0.6115 -0.4922 2.0031 
Consumer Discretionary 92 0.3808 0.1506 0.8850 -1.1560 3.5972 
Health Care 94 0.8903 0.8274 1.3087 -3.8757 5.6920 
IT 70 0.7828 0.5106 1.4628 -1.5298 8.0618 
All firms 519 0.5621 0.4160 1.0127 -3.8757 8.0618 
Panel D: 2012  
Energy 89 0.2573 0.3095 0.6517 -1.0069 2.1327 
Industrials 91 0.1337 0.0589 0.5871 -1.1088 1.8432 
Materials 83 0.3578 0.2770 0.6993 -0.9828 2.7516 
Consumer Discretionary 92 0.3523 0.1397 0.9043 -1.3660 4.6661 
Health Care 94 0.7442 0.9505 1.1185 -3.2103 3.2248 
IT 70 0.6900 0.3325 1.3027 -1.3629 6.8982 
All firms 519 0.4151 0.2770 0.9236 -3.2103 6.8982 
Panel E: 2013  
Energy 89 -0.0867 -0.1642 0.8077 -1.4729 2.9526 
Industrials 91 0.0648 0.0455 0.6300 -1.2829 1.7049 
Materials 83 -0.1512 -0.1426 0.7073 -1.6118 2.0950 
Consumer Discretionary 92 0.4686 0.3255 0.8318 -1.1716 2.5395 
Health Care 94 0.9622 0.9950 1.2030 -3.0863 4.2217 
IT 68 0.8158 0.7406 1.1933 -1.4278 6.9283 
All firms 517 0.3378 0.2064 1.0073 -3.0863 6.9283 
Panel F: Total sample 2009 - 2013 
Energy   443 0.3436 0.2995 0.8149 -2.1335 2.9526 
Industrials   455 0.0846 0.0092 0.6045 -1.4842 1.8432 
Materials   416 0.4577 0.4252 0.8894 -1.7665 7.8761 
Consumer Discretionary   460 0.3524 0.1583 0.8456 -1.9428 4.6661 
Health Care   463 0.8738 0.8650 1.2240 -3.8757 6.2253 
IT   348 0.7567 0.5442 1.3924 -1.5298 8.3674 
All firms 2,585 0.4685 0.3209 1.0157 -3.8757 8.3674 
Note: This table presents descriptive statistics for Tobin’s Q by industry and year for Australian firms. Tobin’s Q 
is defined as the sum of the market value of equity, the book value of debt and preference shares, divided by the 
sum of the book values of equity, debt and preference shares. 
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Appendix D.4 Tobin’s Q by industry and year Canada 
 N Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Panel A: 2009  
Energy 84 0.2503 0.2676 0.6082 -1.4697 1.9544 
Industrials 63 0.0674 -0.0344 0.5106 -0.8588 1.8219 
Materials 87 0.5943 0.5651 0.7585 -1.5022 3.0024 
Consumer Discretionary 47 0.0360 -0.0150 0.5444 -1.1662 1.3815 
Health Care 26 1.3153 1.2003 1.3020 -0.1743 6.8947 
IT 30 0.6013 0.4535 1.2217 -1.5276 5.0271 
All firms 337 0.3885 0.2992 0.8398 -1.5276 6.8947 
Panel B: 2010  
Energy 84 0.5687 0.5017 0.4823 -0.3271 1.8636 
Industrials 63 0.2219 0.1764 0.6036 -1.3951 3.2210 
Materials 86 0.9213 0.8168 0.6670 -0.4848 2.8211 
Consumer Discretionary 47 0.1928 0.1786 0.5914 -1.3238 1.6249 
Health Care 25 1.5785 1.2511 1.2206 -0.1508 4.1108 
IT 29 0.5698 0.4824 0.7815 -0.5970 2.9005 
All firms 334 0.6169 0.4977 0.7717 -1.3951 4.1108 
Panel C: 2011  
Energy 84 0.2817 0.2188 0.4768 -1.1643 1.2647 
Industrials 63 0.3050 0.1885 0.5988 -0.6776 2.9336 
Materials 87 0.6089 0.6056 0.7336 -3.0067 2.2602 
Consumer Discretionary 47 0.1706 0.0179 0.6151 -0.8762 2.3172 
Health Care 22 1.1577 0.8394 1.1419 -0.7493 3.7993 
IT 30 0.5936 0.4098 0.9204 -0.8826 2.6258 
All firms 333 0.4419 0.3055 0.7320 -3.0067 3.7993 
Panel D: 2012  
Energy 84 0.1610 0.1372 0.4900 -1.0069 1.3938 
Industrials 63 0.2839 0.2413 0.5510 -0.5983 2.4883 
Materials 87 0.4517 0.4296 0.6803 -1.5045 3.2217 
Consumer Discretionary 47 0.1129 0.0995 0.5900 -1.0183 1.9253 
Health Care 24 1.4308 1.0198 1.3115 -0.7231 3.7433 
IT 30 0.5218 0.4785 0.9433 -1.7530 2.6261 
All firms 335 0.3762 0.2918 0.7649 -1.7530 3.7433 
Panel E: 2013  
Energy 84 0.1877 0.1736 0.5667 -1.5096 1.6346 
Industrials 63 0.4031 0.4203 0.5309 -0.5860 2.2070 
Materials 87 0.0641 -0.0122 0.7066 -1.8377 2.2822 
Consumer Discretionary 47 0.2904 0.3583 0.5917 -0.6649 2.4116 
Health Care 22 1.3240 1.2055 1.0333 -0.3426 3.2911 
IT 30 0.7300 0.6004 0.8323 -0.5034 2.7054 
All firms 333 0.3346 0.2654 0.7373 -1.8377 3.2911 
Panel F: Total sample 2009 - 2013 
Energy   420 0.2899 0.2625 0.5449 -1.5096 1.9544 
Industrials   315 0.2563 0.1885 0.5676 -1.3951 3.2210 
Materials   434 0.5272 0.5059 0.7595 -3.0067 3.2217 
Consumer Discretionary   235 0.1605 0.1024 0.5881 -1.3238 2.4116 
Health Care   119 1.3663 1.0386 1.1995 -0.7493 6.8947 
IT   149 0.6035 0.4824 0.9428 -1.7530 5.0271 
All firms 1,672 0.4315 0.3403 0.7757 -3.0067 6.8947 
Note: This table presents descriptive statistics for Tobin’s Q by industry and year for Australian firms. Tobin’s Q 
is defined as the sum of the market value of equity, the book value of debt and preference shares, divided by the 
sum of the book values of equity, debt and preference shares. 
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Appendix D.5 Descriptive statistics: Independent variables by year Australia 
All firms (N=2,615) N Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Panel A: 2009  
Tax losses 523 0.0117 0.0000 0.0554 0.0000 0.8160 
Leverage 523 0.1861 0.0604 0.2432 0.0000 0.9843 
Current ratio 523 4.9232 1.9383 10.6781 0.0323 150.0000 
Dividends 523 0.3805 0.0000 0.4860 0.0000 1.0000 
ROA 523 -1.3296 -0.0059 17.5901 -392.5171 1.1888 
Tangible assets 523 0.9426 1.0000 0.1410 0.1281 1.0000 
R&D expenditure 523 1.3454 0.0000 9.0122 0.0000 170.4103 
Capital expenditure 523 0.3370 0.1399 0.5397 0.0000 6.5509 
Firm size 523 11.3820 11.2199 2.1593 6.8024 19.0348 
Foreign income 523 0.2156 0.0000 0.3340 0.0000 1.0000 
Panel B: 2010  
Tax losses 523 0.0069 0.0000 0.0294 0.0000 0.3689 
Leverage 523 0.1530 0.0420 0.2078 0.0000 0.9388 
Current ratio 523 5.2821 2.0475 16.2768 0.0000 289.6010 
Dividends 523 0.3920 0.0000 0.4887 0.0000 1.0000 
ROA 523 -0.5588 0.0099 5.6486 -96.3304 1.6600 
Tangible assets 523 0.9407 1.0000 0.1489 0.0000 1.0000 
R&D expenditure 523 0.9637 0.0000 4.9008 0.0000 68.9885 
Capital expenditure 523 0.2887 0.1331 0.3860 0.0000 3.7231 
Firm size 523 11.6367 11.4631 2.1086 4.8714 19.1211 
Foreign income 523 0.2247 0.0000 0.3380 0.0000 1.0000 
Panel C: 2011  
Tax losses 523 0.0074 0.0000 0.0309 0.0000 0.4521 
Leverage 523 0.1407 0.0367 0.1965 0.0000 0.9003 
Current ratio 523 5.6597 1.9400 13.8547 0.0019 226.0630 
Dividends 523 0.4054 0.0000 0.4914 0.0000 1.0000 
ROA 523 1.6572 0.0078 43.8451 -50.0227 1,000.7253 
Tangible assets 523 0.9417 1.0000 0.1384 0.1125 1.0000 
R&D expenditure 523 1.4049 0.0000 10.1216 0.0000 165.5126 
Capital expenditure 523 0.2775 0.1235 0.3902 0.0000 4.5536 
Firm size 523 11.8068 11.7100 2.0909 3.3911 19.2221 
Foreign income 523 0.2742 0.0000 0.9719 0.0000 21.0054 
Panel D: 2012  
Tax losses 523 0.0077 0.0000 0.0363 0.0000 0.5526 
Leverage 523 0.1491 0.0461 0.1996 0.0000 0.9103 
Current ratio 523 6.2215 2.0319 20.2201 0.0029 230.1903 
Dividends 523 0.4207 0.0000 0.4941 0.0000 1.0000 
ROA 523 0.8950 0.0153 26.4519 -48.2105 601.8989 
Tangible assets 523 0.9418 1.0000 0.1407 0.0794 1.0000 
R&D expenditure 523 0.5756 0.0000 2.5219 -0.0478 24.6585 
Capital expenditure 523 0.3385 0.1476 0.4600 0.0000 4.6617 
Firm size 523 11.7396 11.6668 2.0920 3.8199 19.0186 
Foreign income 523 0.2529 0.0001 0.3666 0.0000 2.0667 
Note: This table presents descriptive statistics of independent variables for the total sample of Australian firms by 
year.  
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Appendix D.5 Descriptive statistics: Independent variables by year Australia (continued) 
All firms (N=2,615) N Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Panel E: 2013 
Tax losses 523 0.0106 0.0000 0.0495 0.0000 0.8306 
Leverage 523 0.1666 0.0781 0.2110 0.0000 0.9656 
Current ratio 523 5.4628 1.8429 19.6397 0.0000 294.7395 
Dividends 523 0.3977 0.0000 0.4898 0.0000 1.0000 
ROA 523 3.0522 0.0016 74.7621 -17.5383 1,709.3431 
Tangible assets 523 0.9344 1.0000 0.1499 0.0000 1.0000 
R&D expenditure 523 0.8915 0.0000 6.2075 0.0000 111.2308 
Capital expenditure 523 0.4426 0.1424 0.6607 0.0000 5.0239 
Firm size 523 11.6296 11.4946 2.1698 4.0466 19.0837 
Foreign income 523 0.2653 0.0021 0.3702 0.0000 1.7241 
Note: This table presents descriptive statistics of independent variables for the total sample of Australian firms 
by year. 
 
Appendix D.6 Descriptive statistics: Independent variables by year Canada 
All firms (N=1,690) N Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Panel A: 2009 
Tax losses 338 0.0067 0.0000 0.0188 0.0000 0.2307 
Leverage 338 0.1839 0.0946 0.2230 0.0000 0.9875 
Current ratio 338 5.0968 2.0473 16.2499 0.0797 233.8497 
Dividends 338 0.3964 0.0000 0.4899 0.0000 1.0000 
ROA 338 -0.0373 0.0086 0.2148 -1.4383 0.3459 
Tangible assets 338 0.9449 0.9972 0.1132 0.1543 1.0000 
R&D expenditure 338 0.2015 0.0000 1.3425 0.0000 20.4185 
Capital expenditure 338 0.4695 0.3367 0.4841 0.0000 3.6399 
Firm size 338 12.6556 12.4806 1.8933 6.4297 18.0359 
Foreign income 338 0.3617 0.1370 0.4001 0.0000 1.0000 
Panel B: 2010 
Tax losses 338 0.0063 0.0000 0.0323 0.0000 0.5310 
Leverage 338 0.1649 0.0906 0.2032 0.0000 0.8982 
Current ratio 338 4.1454 2.0973 8.6661 0.0390 112.0906 
Dividends 338 0.4201 0.0000 0.4943 0.0000 1.0000 
ROA 338 -0.0249 0.0280 0.2971 -3.0892 2.3148 
Tangible assets 338 0.9377 0.9943 0.1267 0.1331 1.0000 
R&D expenditure 338 0.4191 0.0000 4.5761 0.0000 81.0264 
Capital expenditure 338 0.3455 0.2505 0.3297 0.0000 2.1493 
Firm size 338 13.0761 13.0290 1.7942 8.8345 18.0401 
Foreign income 338 0.3663 0.1443 0.3974 0.0000 1.0000 
Note: This table presents descriptive statistics of independent variables for the total sample of Canadian firms by 
year. 
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Appendix D.6 Descriptive statistics: Independent variables by year Canada (continued) 
All firms (N=1,690) N Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Panel C: 2011 
Tax losses 338 0.0035 0.0000 0.0149 0.0000 0.1342 
Leverage 338 0.1856 0.1166 0.2123 0.0000 0.9444 
Current ratio 338 4.2270 2.0475 14.3229 0.0962 250.8471 
Dividends 338 0.4615 0.0000 0.4993 0.0000 1.0000 
ROA 338 -0.0107 0.0364 0.2658 -3.5730 0.9153 
Tangible assets 338 0.9382 0.9945 0.1191 0.2903 1.0000 
R&D expenditure 338 0.1497 0.0000 0.9525 0.0000 14.8383 
Capital expenditure 338 0.4928 0.3440 1.1995 0.0000 21.2879 
Firm size 338 13.0465 12.9916 1.7877 8.4772 17.8065 
Foreign income 338 0.3736 0.1942 0.3954 0.0000 1.0000 
Panel D: 2012 
Tax losses 338 0.0041 0.0000 0.0137 0.0000 0.1089 
Leverage 338 0.2014 0.1451 0.2165 0.0000 0.9470 
Current ratio 338 3.6876 1.9538 7.4377 0.1510 79.5672 
Dividends 338 0.4704 0.0000 0.4999 0.0000 1.0000 
ROA 338 -0.0585 0.0247 0.5480 -6.9072 2.6800 
Tangible assets 338 0.9391 0.9925 0.1144 0.2782 1.0000 
R&D expenditure 338 0.1961 0.0000 1.4318 -0.1486 22.4136 
Capital expenditure 338 0.4996 0.3827 0.5064 0.0000 3.5123 
Firm size 338 13.0347 12.9910 1.8170 7.2821 17.8915 
Foreign income 338 0.3843 0.2376 0.3993 0.0000 1.0000 
Panel E: 2013 
Tax losses 338 0.0045 0.0000 0.0160 0.0000 0.1661 
Leverage 338 0.2150 0.1546 0.2326 0.0000 0.9942 
Current ratio 338 3.2703 1.8301 6.0839 0.0436 76.1429 
Dividends 338 0.4970 0.0000 0.5007 0.0000 1.0000 
ROA 338 -0.0890 0.0096 0.5570 -6.9326 1.7165 
Tangible assets 338 0.9424 0.9928 0.1155 0.0997 1.0000 
R&D expenditure 338 0.8656 0.0000 8.3879 -0.1933 141.4878 
Capital expenditure 338 0.5539 0.3629 0.6232 0.0000 4.9300 
Firm size 338 13.0934 12.9418 1.8594 8.0851 17.9979 
Foreign income 338 0.3860 0.2518 0.3996 0.0000 1.0000 
Note: This table presents descriptive statistics of independent variables for the total sample of Canadian firms by 
year. 
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Appendix E. Differences in means by year  
Appendix E.1 Differences in means: Independent variables by year Australia 
 
Exp. 
relationship 
Means (Proportions) t-test p-value 
 All firms Derivative users (D) 
No derivatives 
(ND) D vs. ND 
Panel A: 2009  N=523 N=161 N=362  
Tax losses D > ND 0.0117 0.0047 0.0148 0.0554* 
Leverage D > ND 0.1861 0.3207 0.1262 0.0000*** 
Current ratio D < ND 4.9232 2.1324 6.1644 0.0001*** 
Dividends^ ? 0.3805 0.7143 0.2320 0.0000*** 
ROA D < ND -1.3296 0.0277 -1.9333 0.2396 
Tangible assets D < ND 0.9426 0.9479 0.940 0.5637 
R&D expenditure D > ND 1.3454 0.1295 1.8862 0.0395** 
Capital expenditure D > ND 0.3370 0.4102 0.3045 0.0385** 
Firm size ? 11.3820 13.2817 10.5372 0.0000*** 
Foreign income D > ND 0.2156 0.3303 0.1646 0.0000*** 
Panel B: 2010  N=523 N=170 N=353  
Tax losses D > ND 0.0069 0.0035 0.0086 0.0657* 
Leverage D > ND 0.1530 0.2367 0.1127 0.0000*** 
Current ratio D < ND 5.2821 2.0177 6.8542 0.0014*** 
Dividends^ ? 0.3920 0.6941 0.2465 0.0000*** 
ROA D < ND -0.5588 0.0478 -0.8508 0.0884* 
Tangible assets D < ND 0.9406 0.9568 0.9329 0.0865* 
R&D expenditure D > ND 0.9637 0.0614 1.3982 0.0034*** 
Capital expenditure D > ND 0.2886 0.3788 0.2453 0.0002*** 
Firm size ? 11.6367 13.2919 10.8396 0.0000*** 
Foreign income D > ND 0.2247 0.3060 0.1856 0.0001*** 
Panel C: 2011  N=523 N=164 N=359  
Tax losses D > ND 0.0074 0.0027 0.0095 0.0197** 
Leverage D > ND 0.1407 0.2288 0.1004 0.0000*** 
Current ratio D < ND 5.6597 2.0893 7.2907 0.0001*** 
Dividends^ ? 0.4054 0.7378 0.2535 0.0000*** 
ROA D < ND 1.6571 0.0475 2.3925 0.5709 
Tangible assets D < ND 0.9417 0.9637 0.9317 0.0140** 
R&D expenditure D > ND 1.4049 0.3329 1.8946 0.1017 
Capital expenditure D > ND 0.2775 0.3275 0.2546 0.0476** 
Firm size ? 11.8068 13.3676 11.0938 0.0000*** 
Foreign income D > ND 0.2742 0.2707 0.2759 0.9549 
Note: This table presents the differences in means for derivatives users (Derivative users) and firms that do not use 
derivatives (No derivatives) for the independent variables of Australian firms. The t-test on Dividends^ compares 
the differences in proportions between derivatives users (Derivative users) and firms that do not use derivatives 
(No derivatives).  The column Exp. relationship describes the expected relationship between firms that use 
derivatives and those that do not. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and 
***, respectively. 
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Appendix E.1 Differences in means: Independent variables by year Australia (continued) 
 
Exp. 
relationship 
Means (Proportions) t-test p-value 
 All firms Derivative users (D) 
No derivatives 
(ND) D vs. ND 
Panel A: 2012  N=523 N=173 N=350  
Tax losses D > ND 0.0076 0.0052 0.0089 0.2723 
Leverage D > ND 0.1491 0.2374 0.1055 0.0000*** 
Current ratio D < ND 6.2215 3.4798 7.5767 0.0291** 
Dividends^ ? 0.4207 0.7283 0.2685 0.0000*** 
ROA D < ND 0.8950 0.0428 1.3162 0.6050 
Tangible assets D < ND 0.9418 0.9485 0.9384 0.4388 
R&D expenditure D > ND 0.5756 0.0556 0.8326 0.0009*** 
Capital expenditure D > ND 0.3385 0.3825 0.3167 0.1238 
Firm size ? 11.7396 13.3584 10.9395 0.0000*** 
Foreign income D > ND 0.2529 0.2827 0.2381 0.1905 
Panel B: 2013  N=523 N=169 N=354  
Tax losses D > ND 0.0106 0.0062 0.0128 0.1528 
Leverage D > ND 0.1666 0.2433 0.1299 0.0000*** 
Current ratio D < ND 5.4628 2.0108 7.1107 0.0054*** 
Dividends^ ? 0.3977 0.0357 0.0233 0.0000*** 
ROA D < ND 3.0522 0.0137 4.5028 0.5213 
Tangible assets D < ND 0.9344 0.9485 0.9277 0.1384 
R&D expenditure D > ND 0.8915 0.0639 1.2866 0.0350** 
Capital expenditure D > ND 0.4426 0.4479 0.4401 0.8992 
Firm size ? 11.6296 13.4352 10.7676 0.0000*** 
Foreign income D > ND 0.2653 0.2863 0.2552 0.3690 
Note: This table presents the differences in means for derivatives users (Derivative users) and firms that do not use 
derivatives (No derivatives) for the independent variables of Australian firms. The t-test on Dividends^ compares 
the differences in proportions between derivatives users (Derivative users) and firms that do not use derivatives 
(No derivatives).  The column Exp. relationship describes the expected relationship between firms that use 
derivatives and those that do not. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and 
***, respectively. 
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Appendix E.2 Differences in means: Independent variables by year Canada 
 
Exp. 
relationship 
Means (Proportions) t-test p-value 
 All firms Derivative users (D) 
No derivatives 
(ND) D vs. ND 
Panel A: 2009  N=338 N=139 N=199  
Tax losses D > ND 0.0067 0.0066 0.0068 0.9285 
Leverage D > ND 0.1839 0.2551 0.1340 0.0000*** 
Current ratio D < ND 5.0968 2.0317 7.2378 0.0036*** 
Dividends^ ? 0.3964 0.5180 0.3116 0.0001*** 
ROA D < ND -0.0373 0.0182 -0.0761 0.0001*** 
Tangible assets D < ND 0.9449 0.9485 0.9424 0.6313 
R&D expenditure D > ND 0.2015 0.0699 0.2935 0.1321 
Capital expenditure D > ND 0.4695 0.5648 0.4030 0.0024*** 
Firm size ? 12.6556 13.3888 12.1434 0.0000*** 
Foreign income D > ND 0.3617 0.4039 0.3323 0.1056 
Panel B: 2010  N=338 N=155 N=183  
Tax losses D > ND 0.0063 0.0060 0.0065 0.8924 
Leverage D > ND 0.1648 0.2197 0.1184 0.0000*** 
Current ratio D < ND 4.1454 2.1478 5.8374 0.0001*** 
Dividends^ ? 0.4201 0.5355 0.3224 0.0001*** 
ROA D < ND -0.0249 0.0160 -0.0596 0.0196** 
Tangible assets D < ND 0.9377 0.9491 0.9280 0.1276 
R&D expenditure D > ND 0.4190 0.0294 0.7492 0.1499 
Capital expenditure D > ND 0.3455 0.4532 0.2544 0.0000*** 
Firm size ? 13.0761 13.6847 12.5606 0.0000*** 
Foreign income D > ND 0.3663 0.3773 0.3569 0.6388 
Panel C: 2011  N=338 N=162 N=176  
Tax losses D > ND 0.0035 0.0033 0.0037 0.8027 
Leverage D > ND 0.1856 0.2438 0.1320 0.0000*** 
Current ratio D < ND 4.2270 2.1761 6.1149 0.0113** 
Dividends^ ? 0.4615 0.5802 0.3523 0.0000*** 
ROA D < ND -0.0107 0.0302 -0.0484 0.0064*** 
Tangible assets D < ND 0.9382 0.9457 0.9314 0.2703 
R&D expenditure D > ND 0.1497 0.0618 0.2306 0.1037 
Capital expenditure D > ND 0.4928 0.5345 0.4545 0.5413 
Firm size ? 13.0465 13.6734 12.4695 0.0000*** 
Foreign income D > ND 0.3736 0.3847 0.3634 0.6204 
Note: This table presents the differences in means for derivatives users (Derivative users) and firms that do not use 
derivatives (No derivatives) for the independent variables of Canadian firms. The t-test on Dividends^ compares 
the differences in proportions between derivatives users (Derivative users) and firms that do not use derivatives 
(No derivatives).  The column Exp. relationship describes the expected relationship between firms that use 
derivatives and those that do not. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and 
***, respectively. 
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Appendix E.2 Differences in means: Independent variables by year Canada (continued) 
 
Exp. 
relationship 
Means (Proportions) t-test p-value 
 All firms Derivative users (D) 
No derivatives 
(ND) D vs. ND 
Panel A: 2012  N=338 N=162 N=176  
Tax losses D > ND 0.0041 0.0052 0.0031 0.1617 
Leverage D > ND 0.2014 0.2532 0.1536 0.0000*** 
Current ratio D < ND 3.6876 1.9631 5.2750 0.0000*** 
Dividends^ ? 0.4704 0.5988 0.3523 0.0000*** 
ROA D < ND -0.0584 0.0153 -0.1263 0.0174** 
Tangible assets D < ND 0.9391 0.9417 0.9367 0.6938 
R&D expenditure D > ND 0.1961 0.0302 0.3489 0.0408** 
Capital expenditure D > ND 0.4996 0.5707 0.4341 0.0130** 
Firm size ? 13.0347 13.5973 12.5167 0.0000*** 
Foreign income D > ND 0.3843 0.3945 0.3749 0.6515 
Panel B: 2013  N=338 N=162 N=176  
Tax losses D > ND 0.0045 0.0029 0.0060 0.0727* 
Leverage D > ND 0.2150 0.2669 0.1672 0.0001*** 
Current ratio D < ND 3.2703 1.8779 4.5520 0.0000*** 
Dividends^ ? 0.4970 0.6358 0.3693 0.0000*** 
ROA D < ND -0.0890 0.0260 -0.1950 0.0002*** 
Tangible assets D < ND 0.9423 0.9466 0.9384 0.5174 
R&D expenditure D > ND 0.8656 0.0227 1.6415 0.0763* 
Capital expenditure D > ND 0.5539 0.5326 0.5734 0.5488 
Firm size ? 13.0934 13.8053 12.4380 0.0000*** 
Foreign income D > ND 0.3860 0.3913 0.3811 0.8147 
Note: This table presents the differences in means for derivatives users (Derivative users) and firms that do not use 
derivatives (No derivatives) for the independent variables of Canadian firms. The t-test on Dividends^ compares 
the differences in proportions between derivatives users (Derivative users) and firms that do not use derivatives 
(No derivatives).  The column Exp. relationship describes the expected relationship between firms that use 
derivatives and those that do not. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and 
***, respectively. 
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Appendix F. Correlation matrices by year 
Appendix F.1 Correlation matrix Australia 2009 
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Derivative ratio  0.3424**            
Tobin’s Q -0.1848** -0.1372**           
Tax losses -0.0838* -0.0152  0.2067**          
Leverage  0.3694**  0.2680** -0.4121** -0.0650         
Current ratio -0.1745** -0.0664  0.0179  0.0036 -0.2250**        
Dividends  0.4585**  0.0201 -0.1777** -0.1287**  0.2263** -0.2024**       
ROA  0.0515  0.0171 -0.0431 -0.0199  0.0477 -0.2134**  0.0629      
Tangible assets  0.0253  0.0309 -0.0674 -0.0440 -0.0008  0.0918**  0.0651 -0.0243     
R&D expenditure -0.0901** -0.0270  0.1660**  0.0931** -0.1015**  0.0024 -0.1164** -0.0113 -0.0015    
Capital expenditure  0.0905**  0.1760** -0.3927** -0.0633  0.2772** -0.0849* -0.0164  0.0423  0.1429** -0.0461   
Firm size  0.5873**  0.1333**  0.0994** -0.1027**  0.1811** -0.0947**  0.4690**  0.0872**  0.0449 -0.0712  0.0178  
Foreign income  0.2292**  0.0441 -0.0032  0.0265 -0.0187 -0.0888**  0.0032  0.0395 -0.0514 -0.0664  0.0552  0.2003** 
Note: This table presents pairwise correlations between independent and derivative variables. Statistical significance at the 10% and 5% levels is indicated by * and **, respectively.  
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Appendix F.2 Correlation matrix Australia 2010 
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Derivative ratio  0.1685**            
Tobin’s Q -0.1710** -0.1496**           
Tax losses -0.0805* -0.0226 0.1910**          
Leverage  0.2796**  0.0862** -0.4080** -0.0788*         
Current ratio -0.1393** -0.0273 -0.0135 -0.0277 -0.1620**        
Dividends  0.4295** -0.0129 -0.1463** -0.1685**  0.2150** -0.1013**       
ROA  0.0746*  0.0112 -0.0727* -0.0035  0.0421 -0.0194  0.0908**      
Tangible assets  0.0750* -0.0622 -0.0335 -0.0572  0.0106  0.0580  0.0801* -0.0181     
R&D expenditure -0.1279** -0.0228 0.2411**  0.1190** -0.1318**  0.0289 -0.1563** -0.0188 -0.0061    
Capital expenditure  0.1622**  0.4385** -0.4327** -0.0587  0.2891** -0.0973**  0.0568  0.0678  0.1453** -0.1166**   
Firm size  0.5452**  0.0267 0.1052** -0.1436**  0.1498** -0.0886**  0.4571**  0.1460**  0.1233** -0.0956**  0.0936**  
Foreign income  0.1671**  0.0575 -0.0110  0.0254 -0.0769* -0.0653 -0.0264  0.0587 -0.0705 -0.1000**  0.0535  0.1661** 
Note: This table presents pairwise correlations between independent and derivative variables. Statistical significance at the 10% and 5% levels is indicated by * and **, respectively.  
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Appendix F.3 Correlation matrix Australia 2011 
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Derivative ratio  0.3906**            
Tobin’s Q -0.1843** -0.1433**           
Tax losses -0.1020** -0.0213  0.2298**          
Leverage  0.3035**  0.2825** -0.3453** -0.0380         
Current ratio -0.1743** -0.0569  0.0028 -0.0273 -0.2044**        
Dividends  0.4577**  0.0530 -0.1490** -0.1278**  0.1791** -0.2150**       
ROA -0.0248 -0.0100  0.0198 -0.0122 -0.0340  0.0305 -0.0296      
Tangible assets  0.1074**  0.0329 -0.0322 -0.0284  0.0099  0.0846*  0.0747*  0.0170     
R&D expenditure -0.0717 -0.0273  0.1422**  0.0042 -0.0787*  0.0293 -0.1139**  0.0135 -0.1033**    
Capital expenditure  0.0867**  0.1102** -0.4103** -0.0276  0.1861** -0.1190**  0.0341 -0.0273  0.1594** -0.0807*   
Firm size  0.5050**  0.1624**  0.1322** -0.1080**  0.1276** -0.0622  0.4372** -0.0530  0.1161** -0.0690  0.0774*  
Foreign income -0.0025 -0.0074  0.0178 -0.0245 -0.0614 -0.0232 -0.0431 -0.0110  0.0027 -0.0250 -0.0267  0.0515 
Note: This table presents pairwise correlations between independent and derivative variables. Statistical significance at the 10% and 5% levels is indicated by * and **, respectively.   
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Appendix F.4 Correlation matrix Australia 2012 
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Derivative ratio  0.3255**            
Tobin’s Q -0.1230** -0.0849*           
Tax losses -0.0481 -0.0090  0.1254**          
Leverage  0.3113**  0.2593** -0.2957** -0.0652         
Current ratio -0.0954** -0.0527 -0.0211 -0.0171 -0.1664**        
Dividends  0.4382**  0.1127** -0.0893** -0.1088**  0.1886** -0.1283**       
ROA -0.0227 -0.0076  0.0406 -0.0132 -0.0282  0.0044 -0.0262      
Tangible assets  0.0339  0.0094 -0.0277 -0.0310  0.0329  0.0674 0.0751*  0.0166     
R&D expenditure -0.1451** -0.0501  0.2647**  0.0223 -0.1475**  0.0326 -0.1913** -0.0033  0.0165    
Capital expenditure  0.0674  0.0599 -0.4139** -0.0342  0.2322** -0.1024** -0.0261 -0.0258  0.1525** -0.1337**   
Firm size  0.5446**  0.1835**  0.0825* -0.1222**  0.2145** -0.0275  0.4749** -0.0539  0.1295** -0.1041**  0.1350**  
Foreign income  0.0573 -0.0411  0.0234  0.0375 -0.0331 -0.0798* -0.0102 -0.0258 -0.0320 -0.0493  0.0760*  0.1435** 
Note: This table presents pairwise correlations between independent and derivative variables. Statistical significance at the 10% and 5% levels is indicated by * and **, respectively.  
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Appendix F.5 Correlation matrix Australia 2013 
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Derivative ratio  0.2806**            
Tobin’s Q -0.0667 -0.1234**           
Tax losses -0.0626  0.0775*  0.0548          
Leverage  0.2515**  0.1798** -0.2844** -0.0557         
Current ratio -0.1216** -0.0370 -0.1047** -0.0225 -0.1559**        
Dividends  0.4075** -0.0394  0.0603 -0.1361**  0.0702 -0.0907**       
ROA -0.0281 -0.0082  0.0431 -0.0148 -0.0336 -0.0011 -0.0324      
Tangible assets  0.0649  0.0522 -0.1153** -0.0294  0.0568  0.0615  0.0806*  0.0192     
R&D expenditure -0.0922** -0.0273  0.1783**  0.0310 -0.1044** -0.0086 -0.1153**  0.1011**  0.0150    
Capital expenditure  0.0056  0.1698** -0.5167** -0.0112  0.1900** -0.0226 -0.1506** -0.0280  0.1853** -0.0570   
Firm size  0.5755**  0.0930**  0.0342 -0.1261**  0.2335** -0.1331**  0.5153** -0.0622  0.1126** -0.1554**  0.0580  
Foreign income  0.0394 -0.0177  0.0009 -0.0171 -0.0264 -0.0759* -0.1043** -0.0302 -0.0129 -0.0739*  0.0952**  0.1477** 
Note: This table presents pairwise correlations between independent and derivative variables. Statistical significance at the 10% and 5% levels is indicated by * and **, respectively.  
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Appendix F.6 Correlation matrix Canada 2009 
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Derivative ratio  0.3385**            
Tobin’s Q -0.2546** -0.1067*           
Tax losses -0.0049 -0.0322  0.0233          
Leverage  0.2677**  0.3045** -0.3671**  0.0163         
Current ratio -0.1579** -0.0542  0.1112** -0.0314 -0.1767**        
Dividends  0.2077**  0.1332** -0.1451** -0.0725  0.2069** -0.1344**       
ROA  0.2167**  0.0573 -0.2886**  0.0738  0.0574 -0.0214 0.3402**      
Tangible assets  0.0262 -0.0156 -0.0505  0.0401 -0.2071**  0.0969* -0.0506  0.0774     
R&D expenditure -0.0821 -0.0364  0.1650** -0.0473  0.0085 -0.0215 -0.0485 -0.3430** -0.0165    
Capital expenditure  0.1647**  0.0513 -0.4993**  0.1019*  0.2701** -0.0763  0.0136  0.0305  0.2180** -0.0852   
Firm size  0.3242**  0.1256**  0.1282** -0.0865  0.0804  0.0062  0.3865**  0.3468**  0.0721 -0.0486  0.0463  
Foreign income  0.0882 -0.0281  0.1047*  0.0262 -0.1690** -0.0897* -0.0366  0.0356  0.0182 -0.0717 -0.1106**  0.1352** 
Note: This table presents pairwise correlations between independent and derivative variables. Statistical significance at the 10% and 5% levels is indicated by * and **, respectively.  
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Appendix F.7 Correlation matrix Canada 2010 
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Derivative ratio  0.2886**            
Tobin’s Q -0.2988** -0.1186**           
Tax losses -0.0074 -0.0090 -0.0872          
Leverage  0.2487**  0.1506** -0.4209** -0.0155         
Current ratio -0.2125** -0.0512  0.1436** -0.0055 -0.2308**        
Dividends  0.2151* -0.0316 -0.1975**  0.0516  0.1927** -0.1933**       
ROA  0.1269**  0.0113 -0.2628**  0.1451**  0.0169 -0.0244  0.2325**      
Tangible assets  0.0830  0.0426  0.0179  0.0073 -0.2652**  0.1284** -0.0403  0.1224**     
R&D expenditure -0.0785 -0.0225  0.1425** -0.0167 -0.0492  0.0181 -0.0644 -0.0899*  0.0288    
Capital expenditure  0.3010**  0.1604** -0.4783**  0.1566**  0.3132** -0.1784**  0.1231**  0.1417**  0.2235** -0.0751   
Firm size  0.3127**  0.0295  0.1030* -0.0706 -0.0281 -0.0379  0.4045**  0.2095**  0.1374** -0.1215**  0.1759**  
Foreign income  0.0256 -0.0081  0.0787  0.0416 -0.1726** -0.0621 -0.0334  0.0226  0.0131 -0.0667 -0.1148**  0.0894 
Note: This table presents pairwise correlations between independent and derivative variables. Statistical significance at the 10% and 5% levels is indicated by * and **, respectively.  
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Appendix F.8 Correlation matrix Canada 2011 
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Derivative ratio  0.2747**            
Tobin’s Q -0.2032** -0.1422**           
Tax losses -0.0136 -0.0063 -0.0341          
Leverage  0.2632**  0.2011** -0.3608**  0.0375         
Current ratio -0.1376** -0.0339  0.1215** -0.0285 -0.1601**        
Dividends  0.2285** -0.0453 -0.0696 -0.0749  0.1787** -0.1300**       
ROA  0.1480**  0.0115 -0.3030** -0.0867  0.0266 -0.0354  0.2818**      
Tangible assets  0.0601  0.0427  0.0671 -0.0721 -0.2119**  0.0825 -0.0751 -0.0055     
R&D expenditure -0.0887 -0.0231  0.0810 -0.0270  0.0618 -0.0096 -0.0792 -0.3030**  0.0265    
Capital expenditure  0.0333  0.0386 -0.3905**  0.0408  0.1088** -0.0536 -0.0554  0.0258  0.1192** -0.0219   
Firm size  0.3369** -0.0164  0.1359** -0.0403  0.0300 -0.0106  0.4122**  0.3271**  0.1483** -0.1567** -0.0288  
Foreign income  0.0270 -0.0661  0.0881 -0.0206 -0.1686** -0.0498 -0.0365  0.1211**  0.0218 -0.0334 -0.0814  0.0907* 
Note: This table presents pairwise correlations between independent and derivative variables. Statistical significance at the 10% and 5% levels is indicated by * and **, respectively.  
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Appendix F.9 Correlation matrix Canada 2012 
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Derivative ratio  0.2352**            
Tobin’s Q -0.1815** -0.0973*           
Tax losses  0.0763  0.0082 -0.1275**          
Leverage  0.2301**  0.1600** -0.3476**  0.0124         
Current ratio -0.2228** -0.0609  0.0600 -0.0299 -0.2486**        
Dividends  0.2467** -0.0760 -0.0231 -0.1225**  0.1097** -0.1896**       
ROA  0.1293** -0.0020 -0.2028** -0.0785  0.0526  0.0003  0.2174**      
Tangible assets  0.0215  0.0301 -0.0334  0.0217 -0.1326**  0.1066* -0.1159** -0.0271     
R&D expenditure -0.1113** -0.0284  0.1910** -0.0309 -0.0802  0.0011 -0.1016* -0.1714**  0.0070    
Capital expenditure  0.1349**  0.1167** -0.4903**  0.1405**  0.2501** -0.1291** -0.1185**  0.0944*  0.2718** -0.0773   
Firm size  0.2975** -0.0566  0.1025* -0.0426  0.0959* -0.0581  0.4383**  0.2199**  0.0585 -0.1571**  0.0914*  
Foreign income  0.0247 -0.0981*  0.1031* -0.0017 -0.1483** -0.0486 -0.0163  0.1231**  0.0575  0.0075 -0.1110**  0.1020* 
Note: This table presents pairwise correlations between independent and derivative variables. Statistical significance at the 10% and 5% levels is indicated by * and **, respectively.  
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Appendix F.10 Correlation matrix Canada 2013 
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Derivative ratio  0.1555**            
Tobin’s Q -0.0290 -0.1292**           
Tax losses -0.0977*  0.0038 -0.0341          
Leverage  0.2144**  0.0400 -0.3338**  0.0816         
Current ratio -0.2199** -0.0425 -0.0676 -0.0109 -0.2429**        
Dividends  0.2663**  0.0279  0.1243** -0.1514**  0.0459 -0.1813**       
ROA  0.1985**  0.1800** -0.1605** -0.0908*  0.0303  0.0186  0.2232**      
Tangible assets  0.0353  0.0484 -0.1123** -0.0999* -0.0708  0.0473 -0.1610**  0.0505     
R&D expenditure -0.0966* -0.0149  0.0151  0.0215  0.1053*  0.0072 -0.0982* -0.2307** -0.0889    
Capital expenditure -0.0327 -0.0045 -0.5993**  0.0118  0.2320** -0.0258 -0.1916**  0.0460  0.2712** -0.0596   
Firm size  0.3679** -0.1207**  0.1703** -0.1209**  0.0983* -0.1240**  0.4952**  0.2585** -0.0055 -0.0978*  0.0214  
Foreign income  0.0128 -0.0810  0.1298** -0.0535 -0.1296** -0.0302 -0.0085  0.0427  0.0454  0.0482 -0.0557  0.0991* 
Note: This table presents pairwise correlations between independent and derivative variables. Statistical significance at the 10% and 5% levels is indicated by * and **, respectively.  
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Appendix G. Industry hedging practices and instruments by year 
Appendix G.1 Energy firms hedging practices and instruments  
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total firm-years 
Aus Can Aus Can Aus Can Aus Can Aus Can Aus Can 
No derivatives 68 41 66 36 63 36 63 37 62 31 322 181 
Some derivatives 5 4 3 3 9 2 10 4 11 3 38 16 
Derivative user 16 39 20 45 17 46 16 43 16 50 85 223 
Total Sample 89 84 89 84 89 84 89 84 89 84 445 420 
IR derivatives 10 17 10 16 9 12 8 19 11 18 48 82 
 - Swaps 10 16 12 16 9 12 7 18 11 18 49 80 
 - Options 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 - Forwards 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
 - N/A or other 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 
FX derivatives 13 16 9 18 11 20 12 19 14 26 59 99 
 - Swaps 2 8 2 8 3 8 3 8 3 11 13 43 
 - Options 3 0 2 1 0 2 1 3 2 2 8 8 
 - Forwards 11 8 8 10 9 12 9 14 10 16 47 60 
 - N/A or other 0 3 0 2 1 4 1 3 1 6 3 18 
Com. derivatives 9 36 12 38 13 41 13 41 14 45 61 201 
 - Swaps 4 20 6 24 9 22 7 25 8 28 34 119 
 - Options 4 20 4 20 5 26 4 24 6 24 23 114 
 - Forwards 2 5 3 4 2 5 3 4 3 5 13 23 
 - N/A or other 1 1 0 3 0 3 1 2 1 2 3 11 
N/A or other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Notes: Data collection has been focused on financial derivatives used for risk management of common market risks such as interest 
rates, foreign exchange or commodity risks. Physical risk management contracts or other financial derivatives (e.g. total return, 
share options in other companies) have been excluded from this data collection. Futures and forward derivatives have been 
classified under Forwards, as they have the same function to sell specific type of assets at specific time for given price; and they 
are rarely used by the sampled companies. Options include common instruments such as puts, calls, floors, caps and collar 
instruments. Foreign exchange swaps and cross currency swaps have been summarised under Swaps. N/A indicates that no details 
have been reported to identify the actual instrument or another derivative instrument has been used.  
Figure A.1 Energy firms hedging practices 
  
 
 
	 269 
Appendix G.2 Industrial firms hedging practices and instruments 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total firm-years 
Aus Can Aus Can Aus Can Aus Can Aus Can Aus Can 
No derivatives 34 21 37 20 36 19 34 19 33 18 174 97 
Some derivatives 11 10 10 9 12 9 13 6 13 6 59 40 
Derivative user 46 32 44 34 43 35 44 38 46 39 223 178 
Total Sample 91 63 91 63 91 63 91 63 91 63 455 315 
IR derivatives 34 16 38 15 37 18 37 19 38 18 184 86 
 - Swaps 33 16 35 15 34 18 36 19 36 18 174 86 
 - Options 3 0 6 0 5 0 3 0 2 0 19 0 
 - Forwards 2 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 2 0 7 0 
 - N/A or other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
FX derivatives 42 35 36 38 38 36 42 32 42 36 200 177 
 - Swaps 3 4 2 5 3 6 7 6 9 5 24 26 
 - Options 2 6 3 8 4 3 4 3 3 3 16 23 
 - Forwards 42 34 36 35 36 31 40 31 39 34 193 165 
 - N/A or other 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 
Com. derivatives 5 6 4 5 4 5 3 3 4 3 20 22 
 - Swaps 3 2 3 2 3 1 3 0 2 0 14 5 
 - Options 2 1 3 0 3 0 2 0 2 0 12 1 
 - Forwards 3 3 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 10 10 
 - N/A or other 0 1 0 1 0 2 0 2 1 1 1 7 
N/A or other 0 5 0 3 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 14 
Notes: Data collection has been focused on financial derivatives used for risk management of common market risks such as interest 
rates, foreign exchange or commodity risks. Physical risk management contracts or other financial derivatives (e.g. total return, 
share options in other companies) have been excluded from this data collection. Futures and forward derivatives have been classified 
under Forwards, as they have the same function to sell specific type of assets at specific time for given price; and they are rarely 
used by the sampled companies. Options include common instruments such as puts, calls, floors, caps and collar instruments. 
Foreign exchange swaps and cross currency swaps have been summarised under Swaps. Other derivatives for Canada include 
inflation derivatives (2009 - 2013), total return swaps (2009 - 2013) and bond forwards (2009- 2010). 
 
Figure A.2 Industrial firms hedging practices  
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Appendix G.3 Material firms hedging practices and instruments 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total firm-years 
Aus Can Aus Can Aus Can Aus Can Aus Can Aus Can 
No derivatives 47 52 48 45 46 43 50 43 47 45 238 228 
Some derivatives 10 6 6 8 10 10 3 10 5 13 34 47 
Derivative user 27 29 30 34 28 34 31 34 32 29 148 160 
Total Sample 84 87 84 87 84 87 84 87 84 87 420 435 
IR derivatives 13 12 11 14 10 13 8 14 8 12 50 65 
 - Swaps 12 10 10 14 10 13 8 14 8 12 48 63 
 - Options 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 
 - Forwards 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
 - N/A or other 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
FX derivatives 24 26 20 26 20 30 19 29 22 29 105 140 
 - Swaps 6 2 6 4 7 5 6 3 6 4 31 18 
 - Options 6 8 2 6 2 7 5 8 5 8 20 37 
 - Forwards 21 21 20 21 19 22 18 24 21 23 99 111 
 - N/A or other 0 3 0 3 0 5 0 7 0 5 0 23 
Com. derivatives 20 23 23 27 26 29 23 26 26 26 118 131 
 - Swaps 2 6 4 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 19 23 
 - Options 11 9 11 10 11 7 8 7 9 9 50 42 
 - Forwards 14 12 17 13 18 11 16 11 18 11 83 58 
 - N/A or other 0 3 0 4 0 6 0 6 2 5 2 24 
N/A or other 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 
Notes: Data collection has been focused on financial derivatives used for risk management of common market risks such as interest 
rates, foreign exchange or commodity risks. Physical risk management contracts or other financial derivatives (e.g. total return, 
share options in other companies) have been excluded from this data collection. Futures and forward derivatives have been classified 
under Forwards, as they have the same function to sell specific type of assets at specific time for given price; and they been rarely 
used among the sampled companies. Options include common instruments such as puts, calls, floors, caps and collar instruments. 
Foreign exchange swaps and cross currency swaps have been summarised under Swaps. N/A indicates that no details have been 
reported to identify the actual instrument. 
 
Figure A.3 Materials firms hedging practices 
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Appendix G.4 Consumer Discretionary firms hedging practices and instruments 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total firm-years 
Aus Can Aus Can Aus Can Aus Can Aus Can Aus Can 
No derivatives 37 15 36 16 33 18 32 19 33 19 171 87 
Some derivatives 9 10 7 7 8 3 9 3 10 5 43 28 
Derivative user 46 22 49 24 51 26 51 25 49 23 246 120 
Total Sample 92 47 92 47 92 47 92 47 92 47 460 235 
IR derivatives 33 17 36 16 36 13 31 11 30 13 166 70 
 - Swaps 32 17 36 16 36 13 31 11 30 12 165 69 
 - Options 3 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 11 0 
 - Forwards 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 4 
 - N/A or other 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
FX derivatives 44 21 43 22 48 22 49 21 50 20 234 106 
 - Swaps 4 7 4 8 4 8 5 4 4 5 21 32 
 - Options 6 4 6 3 4 4 4 2 5 2 25 15 
 - Forwards 41 14 39 14 45 14 47 16 48 16 220 74 
 - N/A or other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Com. derivatives 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 2 3 5 
 - Swaps 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 4 
 - Options 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 - Forwards 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 2 3 4 
 - N/A or other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
N/A or other 0 2 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 6 
Notes: Data collection has been focused on financial derivatives used for risk management of common market risks such as interest 
rates, foreign exchange or commodity risks. Physical risk management contracts or other financial derivatives (e.g. total return, 
share options in other companies) have been excluded from this data collection. Futures and forward derivatives have been classified 
under Forwards, as they have the same function to sell specific type of assets at specific time for given price; and they been rarely 
used among the sampled companies. Options include common instruments such as puts, calls, floors, caps and collar instruments. 
Foreign exchange swaps and cross currency swaps have been summarised under Swaps. Other derivatives for Australia include 
inflation swap contracts (2009 - 2011) and Other derivatives for Canada include bond forwards (2009), debt forwards (2010-2013) 
and equity forwards (2013). 
 
Figure A.4 Consumer Discretionary firms hedging practices 
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Appendix G.5 Health Care firms hedging practices and instruments 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total firm-years 
Aus Can Aus Can Aus Can Aus Can Aus Can Aus Can 
No derivatives 72 20 69 19 65 17 65 17 67 17 338 90 
Some derivatives 10 1 13 2 17 2 10 2 11 3 61 10 
Derivative user 13 5 13 5 13 7 20 7 17 6 76 30 
Total Sample 95 26 95 26 95 26 95 26 95 26 475 130 
IR derivatives 11 3 10 3 8 3 7 3 7 3 43 15 
 - Swaps 10 3 8 3 8 3 7 3 7 3 40 15 
 - Options 2 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 
 - Forwards 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
 - N/A or other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
FX derivatives 16 4 18 4 20 5 21 5 20 6 95 24 
 - Swaps 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 - Options 4 0 4 0 2 0 2 0 3 0 15 0 
 - Forwards 11 4 13 4 16 5 17 5 14 6 71 24 
 - N/A or other 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 
Com. derivatives 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 3 0 
 - Swaps 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 - Options 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 - Forwards 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 3 0 
 - N/A or other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
N/A or other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Notes: Data collection has been focused on financial derivatives used for risk management of common market risks 
such as interest rates, foreign exchange or commodity risks. Physical risk management contracts or other financial 
derivatives (e.g. total return, share options in other companies) have been excluded from this data collection. Futures 
and forward derivatives have been classified under Forwards, as they have the same function to sell specific type of 
assets at specific time for given price; and they been rarely used among the sampled companies. Options include 
common instruments such as puts, calls, floors, caps and collar instruments. Foreign exchange swaps and cross 
currency swaps have been summarised under Swaps. N/A indicates that no details have been reported which identify 
the instrument type. 
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Appendix G.6 IT firms hedging practices and instruments 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total firm-years 
Aus Can Aus Can Aus Can Aus Can Aus Can Aus Can 
No derivatives 50 18 50 17 51 16 52 15 55 14 258 80 
Some derivatives 9 1 8 1 9 1 9 1 8 2 43 6 
Derivative user 13 12 14 13 12 14 11 15 9 15 59 69 
Total Sample 72 31 72 31 72 31 72 31 72 31 360 155 
IR derivatives 5 1 6 0 7 1 5 2 5 2 28 6 
 - Swaps 5 1 5 0 6 1 4 2 4 2 24 6 
 - Options 1 0 2 0 2 0 1 0 1 0 7 0 
 - Forwards 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 - N/A or other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
FX derivatives 20 13 20 14 18 15 17 16 14 17 89 75 
 - Swaps 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 2 2 
 - Options 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 3 5 
 - Forwards 20 12 20 13 17 14 17 15 14 16 88 70 
 - N/A or other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Com. derivatives 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 - Swaps 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 - Options 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 - Forwards 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 - N/A or other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
N/A or other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Notes: Data collection has been focused on financial derivatives used for risk management of common market risks such as interest 
rates, foreign exchange or commodity risks. Physical risk management contracts or other financial derivatives (e.g. total return, 
share options in other companies) have been excluded from this data collection. Futures and forward derivatives have been 
classified under Forwards, as they have the same function to sell specific type of assets at specific time for given price; and they 
been rarely used among the sampled companies. Options include common instruments such as puts, calls, floors, caps and collar 
instruments. Foreign exchange swaps and cross currency swaps have been summarised under Swaps. N/A indicates that no details 
have been reported to identify the actual instrument. 
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Appendix H. Country level hedging differences by year  
Appendix H.1 Country level average hedging activity by year 
Average hedging activity Australia (n=2,615) 
Canada 
(n=1,690) 
Difference in 
means p-Value 
Panel A: Total sample 2009-2013 
No derivatives 0.5739 0.4514 0.1225 0.0000*** 
Some derivative use 0.1059 0.0870 0.0189 0.0417** 
Derivative users 0.3201 0.4615 -0.1415 0.0000*** 
Derivative users incl. some  0.4260 0.5485 -0.1225 0.0000*** 
Panel B: 2009    
No derivatives 0.5889 0.4940 0.0948 0.0063*** 
Some derivative use 0.1032 0.0946 0.0085 0.6824 
Derivative users 0.3078 0.4112 -0.1034 0.0018*** 
Derivative users incl. some  0.4110 0.5059 -0.0948 0.0063*** 
Panel C: 2010    
No derivatives 0.5850 0.4526 0.1324 0.0001*** 
Some derivative use 0.0898 0.0888 0.0011 0.9557 
Derivative users 0.3250 0.4585 -0.1335 0.0001*** 
Derivative users incl. some  0.4149 0.5473 -0.1324 0.0001*** 
Panel D: 2011    
No derivatives 0.5621 0.4408 0.1213 0.0005*** 
Some derivative use 0.1242 0.0798 0.0444 0.0395** 
Derivative users 0.3135 0.4793 -0.1657 0.0000*** 
Derivative users incl. some  0.4379 0.5591 -0.1213 0.0005*** 
Panel E: 2012    
No derivatives 0.5659 0.4437 0.1221 0.0004*** 
Some derivative use 0.1033 0.0769 0.0263 0.1942 
Derivative users 0.3307 0.4792 -0.1485 0.0000*** 
Derivative users incl. some  0.4340 0.5562 -0.1222 0.0004*** 
Note: This table presents average hedging activity for Australian and Canadian firms proxied by the use of 
derivatives. No derivatives, Some derivative use and Derivative users represent the different hedging decisions for 
firms in each country sample. Differences in means are tested using two-tailed t-tests. Statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
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Appendix H.1 Country level average hedging activity by year (continued) 
Note: This table presents average hedging activity for Australian and Canadian firms proxied by the use of 
derivatives. No derivatives, Some derivative use and Derivative users represent the different hedging decisions for 
firms in each country sample. Differences in means are tested using two-tailed t-tests. Statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
Appendix H.2 Country level extent of derivative use by year 
Derivatives fair value Australia (n=2,615) 
Canada 
(n=1,690) 
Difference in 
means p-Value 
Total sample 2009-2013 0.0270 0.0143 0.0126 0.0004*** 
2009 0.0417 0.0147 0.0269 0.0024*** 
2010 0.03026 0.0158 0.0144 0.2428 
2011 0.0215 0.0142 0.0072 0.0993* 
2012 0.0196 0.0141 0.0055 0.2689 
2013 0.0225 0.0130 0.0094 0.1750 
Note: This table presents country level extent of derivative use for Australian and Canadian firms. Extent of 
derivative use refers to the decision how much firms hedge with derivatives once the decision has been made to use 
derivative instruments, which is proxied by Derivatives fair value scaled by total assets. Differences in means are 
tested using two-tailed t-tests. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, 
respectively. 
Average hedging activity Australia (n=2,615) 
Canada 
(n=1,690) 
Difference in 
means p-Value 
Panel F: 2013 
No derivatives 0.5678 0.4260 0.1418 0.0000*** 
Some derivative use 0.1090 0.0947 0.0143 0.5011 
Derivative users 0.3231 0.4792 -0.1561 0.0000*** 
Derivative users incl. some  0.4321 0.5740 -0.1418 0.0000*** 
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Appendix H.3 Country level market risk hedging by year 
Market risks hedged Australia (n=2,615) 
Canada 
(n=1,690) 
Difference in 
means p-Value 
Panel A: Total sample 2009-2013 
FX instruments 0.2990 0.3674 -0.06841 0.0000*** 
IR instruments 0.1985 0.1917 0.0067 0.5856 
Commodity instruments 0.0784 0.2124 -0.1340 0.0000*** 
Panel B: 2009     
FX instruments 0.3040 0.3402 -0.0362 0.2657 
IR instruments 0.2026 0.1952 0.0074 0.7909 
Commodity instruments 0.0669 0.1923 -0.1253 0.0000*** 
Panel C: 2010     
FX instruments 0.2791 0.3609 -0.0818 0.0113** 
IR instruments 0.2122 0.1893 0.0228 0.4157 
Commodity instruments 0.0765 0.2100 -0.1335 0.0000*** 
Panel D: 2011     
FX instruments 0.2963 0.3787 -0.0823 0.0120** 
IR instruments 0.2045 0.1775 0.0270 0.3271 
Commodity instruments 0.0841 0.2249 -0.1407 0.0000*** 
Panel E: 2012     
FX instruments 0.3059 0.3609 -0.0550 0.0932* 
IR instruments 0.1835 0.2011 -0.0176 0.5206 
Commodity instruments 0.0783 0.2100 -0.1317 0.0000*** 
Panel F: 2013     
FX instruments 0.3097 0.3964 -0.0866 0.0089*** 
IR instruments 0.1893 0.1953 -0.0060 0.8281 
Commodity instruments 0.0860 0.2248 -0.1388 0.0000*** 
Note: This table presents market risk hedging practices for Australian and Canadian firms. Differences in means are 
tested using two-tailed t-tests. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, 
respectively. 
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Appendix I. Industry hedging activity by year  
Appendix I.1 Industry hedging activity by year: Energy  
Average hedging activity Australia (n=445) 
Canada 
(n=420) 
Difference in 
means p-Value 
Panel A: Total sample 2009-2013  
No derivatives 0.7236 0.4310  0.2926 0.0000*** 
Some derivative use 0.0854 0.0381  0.0473 0.0040*** 
Derivative users 0.1910 0.5310 -0.3399 0.0000*** 
Panel B: 2009     
No derivatives 0.7640 0.4881  0.2759 0.0001*** 
Some derivative use 0.0562 0.0476  0.0086 0.8014 
Derivative users 0.1798 0.4643 -0.2845 0.0000*** 
Panel C: 2010     
No derivatives 0.7416 0.4286  0.3130 0.0000*** 
Some derivative use 0.0337 0.0357 -0.0020 0.9429 
Derivative users 0.2247 0.5357 -0.3110 0.0000*** 
Panel D: 2011     
No derivatives 0.7079 0.4286  0.2793 0.0002*** 
Some derivative use 0.1011 0.0238  0.0773 0.0374** 
Derivative users 0.1910 0.5476 -0.3566 0.0000*** 
Panel E: 2012     
No derivatives 0.7079 0.4405  0.2674 0.0003*** 
Some derivative use 0.1124 0.0476  0.0647 0.1200 
Derivative users 0.1798 0.5119 -0.3321 0.0000*** 
Panel F: 2013     
No derivatives 0.6966 0.3690  0.3275 0.0000*** 
Some derivative use 0.1236 0.0357 0.0809 0.0343 
Derivative users 0.1798 0.5952 -0.4155 0.0000*** 
Note: This table presents average hedging activity for Australian and Canadian Energy firms proxied by the use of 
derivatives. No derivatives, Some derivative use and Derivative users represent the different hedging decisions for 
the industry sample. Differences in means are tested using two-tailed t-tests. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
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Appendix I.2 Industry hedging activity by year: Industrials 
Average hedging activity Australia (n=455) 
Canada 
(n=315) 
Difference in 
means p-Value 
Panel A: Total sample 2009-2013  
No derivatives 0.3824 0.3079  0.0745 0.0334** 
Some derivative use 0.1275 0.1270  0.0005 0.9841 
Derivative users 0.4901 0.5651 -0.0750 0.0407** 
Panel B: 2009     
No derivatives 0.3736 0.3333  0.0403 0.6107 
Some derivative use 0.1209 0.1587 -0.0379 0.5041 
Derivative users 0.5055 0.5079 -0.0024 0.9764 
Panel C: 2010     
No derivatives 0.4066 0.3175  0.0891 0.2629 
Some derivative use 0.1099 0.1429 -0.0330 0.5438 
Derivative users 0.4835 0.5397 -0.0562 0.4963 
Panel D: 2011     
No derivatives 0.3956 0.3016  0.0940 0.2340 
Some derivative use 0.1319 0.1429 -0.0110 0.8463 
Derivative users 0.4725 0.5556 -0.0830 0.3141 
Panel E: 2012     
No derivatives 0.3736 0.3016  0.0720 0.3581 
Some derivative use 0.1429 0.0952  0.0476 0.3803 
Derivative users 0.4835 0.6032 -0.1197 0.1453 
Panel F: 2013     
No derivatives 0.3626 0.2857  0.0769 0.3218 
Some derivative use 0.1319 0.0952  0.0366 0.4899 
Derivative users 0.5055 0.6190 -0.1136 0.1657 
Note: This table presents average hedging activity for Australian and Canadian Industrials firms proxied by the use 
of derivatives. No derivatives, Some derivative use and Derivative users represent the different hedging decisions for 
the industry sample. Differences in means are tested using two-tailed t-tests. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
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Appendix I.3 Industry hedging activity by year: Materials  
Average hedging activity Australia (n=420) 
Canada 
(n=435) 
Difference in 
means p-Value 
Panel A: Total sample 2009-2013  
No derivatives 0.5667 0.5241  0.0425 0.2123 
Some derivative use 0.0809 0.1080 -0.0271 0.1766 
Derivative users 0.3524 0.3678 -0.0154 0.0000*** 
Panel B: 2009     
No derivatives 0.5595 0.5977 -0.0382 0.6157 
Some derivative use 0.1190 0.0690  0.0501 0.2635 
Derivative users 0.3214 0.3333 -0.0119 0.8692 
Panel C: 2010     
No derivatives 0.5714 0.5172  0.0542 0.4799 
Some derivative use 0.0714 0.0920 -0.0205 0.6270 
Derivative users 0.3571 0.3908 -0.0337 0.6516 
Panel D: 2011     
No derivatives 0.5476 0.4943  0.0534 0.4879 
Some derivative use 0.1190 0.1149  0.0041 0.9339 
Derivative users 0.3333 0.3908 -0.0574 0.4375 
Panel E: 2012     
No derivatives 0.5952 0.4943  0.1010 0.1871 
Some derivative use 0.0357 0.1149 -0.0792 0.0511* 
Derivative users 0.3690 0.3908 -0.0218 0.7711 
Panel F: 2013     
No derivatives 0.5595 0.5172  0.0423 0.5819 
Some derivative use 0.0595 0.1494 -0.0899 0.0560* 
Derivative users 0.3809 0.3333  0.0476 0.5186 
Note: This table presents average hedging activity for Australian and Canadian Materials firms proxied by the use 
of derivatives. No derivatives, Some derivative use and Derivative users represent the different hedging decisions for 
the industry sample. Differences in means are tested using two-tailed t-tests. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
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Appendix I.4 Industry hedging activity by year: Consumer Discretionary  
Average hedging activity Australia (n=460) 
Canada 
(n=235) 
Difference in 
means p-Value 
Panel A: Total sample 2009-2013  
No derivatives 0.3717 0.3702  0.0015 0.0000*** 
Some derivative use 0.0935 0.1191 -0.0257 0.2911 
Derivative users 0.5348 0.5106  0.0241 0.5471 
Panel B: 2009     
No derivatives 0.4022 0.3191  0.0830 0.3422 
Some derivative use 0.0978 0.2128 -0.1149 0.0627* 
Derivative users 0.5000 0.4681 0.0319 0.7241 
Panel C: 2010     
No derivatives 0.3913 0.3404  0.0509 0.5609 
Some derivative use 0.0761 0.1489 -0.0728 0.1795 
Derivative users .5326 0.5106  0.0220 0.8079 
Panel D: 2011     
No derivatives 0.3587 0.3830 -0.0242 0.7806 
Some derivative use 0.0869 0.0638  0.0231 0.6357 
Derivative users 0.5543 0.5532  0.0012 0.9897 
Panel E: 2012     
No derivatives 0.3478 0.4043 -0.0564 0.5172 
Some derivative use 0.0978 0.0638  0.0340 0.5031 
Derivative users 0.5543 0.5319  0.0224 0.8033 
Panel F: 2013     
No derivatives 0.3586 0.4043 -0.0456 0.6026 
Some derivative use 0.1087 0.1064  0.0023 0.9671 
Derivative users 0.5326 0.4894  0.0432 0.6322 
Note: This table presents average hedging activity for Australian and Canadian Consumer Discretionary firms 
proxied by the use of derivatives. No derivatives, Some derivative use and Derivative users represent the different 
hedging decisions for the industry sample. Differences in means are tested using two-tailed t-tests. Statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
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Appendix I.5 Industry hedging activity by year: Health Care  
Average hedging activity Australia (n=475) 
Canada 
(n=130) 
Difference in 
means p-Value 
Panel A: Total sample 2009-2013  
No derivatives 0.7115 0.6923  0.0193 0.6693 
Some derivative use 0.1284 0.0769  0.0515 0.1063 
Derivative users 0.1600 0.2308 -0.0708 0.0602* 
Panel B: 2009     
No derivatives 0.7579 0.7692 -0.0113 0.9055 
Some derivative use 0.1052 0.0385  0.0668 0.2977 
Derivative users 0.1368 0.1923 -0.0555 0.4854 
Panel C: 2010     
No derivatives 0.7263 0.7308 -0.0045 0.9643 
Some derivative use 0.1368 0.0769  0.0599 0.4156 
Derivative users 0.1368 0.1923  0.0555 0.4854 
Panel D: 2011     
No derivatives 0.6842 0.6538  0.0303 0.7714 
Some derivative use 0.1789 0.0769  0.1020 0.2084 
Derivative users 0.1368 0.2692 -0.1324 0.1091 
Panel E: 2012     
No derivatives 0.6842 0.6538  0.0304 0.7714 
Some derivative use 0.1053 0.0769  0.0283 0.6715 
Derivative users 0.2105 0.2692 -0.0587 0.5281 
Panel F: 2013     
No derivatives 0.7053 0.6538  0.0514 0.6176 
Some derivative use 0.1158 0.1154  0.0004 0.9955 
Derivative users 0.1789 0.2308 -0.0518 0.5545 
Note: This table presents average hedging activity for Australian and Canadian Health Care firms proxied by the use 
of derivatives. No derivatives, Some derivative use and Derivative users represent the different hedging decisions for 
the industry sample. Differences in means are tested using two-tailed t-tests. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
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Appendix I.6 Industry hedging activity by year: IT  
Average hedging activity Australia (n=360) 
Canada 
(n=155) 
Difference in 
means p-Value 
Panel A: Total sample 2009-2013  
No derivatives 0.7167 0.5161  0.2005 0.0000*** 
Some derivative use 0.1194 0.0387  0.0807 0.0041 
Derivative users 0.1638 0.4452 -0.2813 0.0000*** 
Panel B: 2009     
No derivatives 0.6944 0.5806  0.1138 0.2678 
Some derivative use 0.1250 0.0323  0.0927 0.1477 
Derivative users 0.1806 0.3871 -0.2065 0.0249** 
Panel C: 2010     
No derivatives 0.6944 0.5484  0.6505 0.1569 
Some derivative use 0.1111 0.0323  0.0789 0.1973 
Derivative users 0.1944 0.4194 -0.2249 0.0171** 
Panel D: 2011     
No derivatives 0.7083 0.5161  0.1922 0.0615 
Some derivative use 0.125 0.0323  0.0927 0.1477 
Derivative users 0.1667 0.4516  0.2849 0.0020*** 
Panel E: 2012     
No derivatives 0.7222 0.4839  0.2383 0.0198 
Some derivative use 0.125 0.0323  0.0927 0.1477 
Derivative users 0.1528 0.4839 -0.3311 0.0003*** 
Panel F: 2013     
No derivatives 0.7639 0.4516  0.3123 0.0018*** 
Some derivative use 0.1111 0.0645 0.0466 0.4687 
Derivative users 0.125 0.4839 -0.3589 0.0000*** 
Note: This table presents average hedging activity for Australian and Canadian IT firms proxied by the use of 
derivatives. No derivatives, Some derivative use and Derivative users represent the different hedging decisions for 
the industry sample. Differences in means are tested using two-tailed t-tests. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
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Appendix J. Industry derivative determinants  
Appendix J.1 Industry derivative determinants: Australia 
Model (1a) Pred. 
sign 
Energy (N=445) Industrials (N=455) Materials (N=420) Consumer Discretionary (N=460) Health Care (N=475) IT (N=360) 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Leverage  + 2.7426 0.0019*** 2.9786 0.0044*** 1.6229 0.1389 2.1865 0.1068 1.9300 0.0299** -1.7675 0.3107 
Tax losses + 8.5912 0.0270** -0.3407 0.9814 5.7142 0.1159 -7.7493 0.4328 1.5470 0.5849 -19.7319 0.0952* 
Current ratio - -0.0609 0.0808* -0.0807 0.7110 0.0026 0.6483 -0.2520 0.1993 -0.0143 0.6474 -0.0240 0.8604 
Dividends -/+ 3.2652 0.0029*** 0.1787 0.6949 -0.2226 0.5942 0.1354 0.8259 0.3393 0.4433 0.3597 0.5338 
ROA - 0.8002 0.2042 -0.0160 0.9932 0.2537 0.6469 1.2696 0.2859 -0.0006 0.9330 0.5467 0.2564 
Tangible assets - 0.7763 0.6949 -0.2074 0.9375 0.1633 0.9583 omitted 0.9964 0.3275 -1.3570 0.6703 
R&D expenditure + -0.9426 0.2400 -1.5307 0.7973 -0.0033 0.8090 -1.3565 0.6910 -0.0347 0.2821 -2.6875 0.5448 
Capital expenditure + 0.2524 0.3849 0.2921 0.6348 1.1349 0.0005*** 0.2070 0.8508 0.5091 0.5144 4.3476 0.0555* 
Firm size +/- 0.3444 0.0789* 1.6036 0.0000*** 1.0658 0.0000*** 1.5144 0.0000*** 0.6889 0.0000*** 0.8648 0.0124** 
Foreign income  + 0.0138 0.8811 -0.2675 0.8228 0.6639 0.2166 2.8475 0.0677* 0.3207 0.5390 1.1437 0.3527 
Constant  -7.1744 0.0382** -20.8330 0.0000*** -16.3374 0.0007*** -18.5696 0.0000*** -10.4462 0.0000*** -12.4512 0.0126** 
Log Likelihood  -90.86  -130.66  -133.55  -116.32  -108.87  -73.97  
LR-Chi2   70.60 0.0000*** 89.06 0.0000*** 72.33 0.0000*** 21.71 0.0098*** 63.69 0.0000*** 24.25 0.0070*** 
Note: This table shows the results of industry probit regressions which test the likelihood to use derivatives. The Likelihood Ratio LR-Chi2 tests that at least one of the coefficients is not equal to zero. A p-value of less than 
0.05 indicates that the model as a whole fits better than an empty model. Tangible assets have been omitted for Consumer Discretionary firms due to collinearity. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is 
indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
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Appendix J.2 Industry derivative determinants: Canada 
Model (1a) Pred. 
sign 
Energy (N=420) Industrials (N=315) Materials (N=435) Consumer 
Discretionary (N=460) 
Health Care (N=115) IT (N=155) 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Leverage  + 2.2887 0.0270** 0.6008 0.5402 2.2687 0.0496** 2.9377 0.0669* 3.1029 0.2326 1.7008 0.8815 
Tax losses + 0.6285 0.9040 -1.7293 0.8902 -12.3278 0.3359 -98.3354 0.0574* -7.5529 0.7495 31.5689 0.3259 
Current ratio - -0.4058 0.0003*** 0.0368 0.8473 -0.0877 0.0257** 0.2601 0.2783 -0.0629 0.7134 -0.0837 0.7606 
Dividends -/+ -0.9287 0.0564* 0.2152 0.6283 0.9859 0.0697 -0.4154 0.4588 omitted 1.2021 0.5644 
ROA - 0.1530 0.8245 1.5310 0.2736 0.4987 0.5984 1.3698 0.5985 0.9490 0.3827 6.7403 0.2156 
Tangible assets - 6.1415 0.1408 -0.9171 0.7547 -0.7885 0.8596 1.1382 0.6351 4.9770 0.3392 15.5079 0.1145 
R&D expenditure + -0.3275 0.2331 -8.3146 0.5800 -0.4387 0.5044 -5.3538 0.3590 -0.5956 0.5058 -7.4014 0.3467 
Capital expenditure + 0.1816 0.6129 1.2426 0.1754 -0.0114 0.9742 0.2676 0.6960 2.3776 0.2552 49.4528 0.0001*** 
Firm size +/- 0.6579 0.0000*** 0.6918 0.0005*** 0.5100 0.0182** 0.5537 0.0411** 0.2552 0.4461 2.9013 0.0000*** 
Foreign income  + -1.1131 0.0968* 1.5993 0.0646* 1.3147 0.0374** 1.9980 0.1361 -1.4881 0.3432 -2.9271 0.3113 
Constant  -13.6123 0.0036*** -8.6274 0.0220** -7.8302 0.1492 -9.3515 0.0319 -8.8677 0.1095 -51.0207 0.0003*** 
Log Likelihood  -141.65  -138.36  -142.85  -90.13  -22.36  -26.54  
LR-Chi2   63.73 0.0000*** 31.84 0.0000*** 53.71 0.0000*** 20.96 0.0214*** 6.24 0.7152*** 13.45 0.1995*** 
Note: This table shows the results of industry probit regressions which test the likelihood to use derivatives. The Likelihood Ratio LR-Chi2 tests that at least one of the coefficients is not equal to zero. 
A p-value of less than 0.05 indicates that the model as a whole fits better than an empty model.  For Health Care, the Dividend variable has been omitted as paying dividends predicts the use of 
derivatives perfectly. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
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Appendix J.3 Foreign exchange derivative industry determinants: Australia 
Model 2(a) Pred. sign 
Energy (N=445) Industrials (N=455) Materials (N=420) Consumer Discretionary 
(N=460) 
Health Care (N=475) IT (N= 360) 
Model (2) 
coefficient 
Model (3) 
coefficient 
Model (2) 
coefficient 
Model (3) 
coefficient 
Model (2) 
coefficient 
Model (3) 
coefficient 
Model (2) 
coefficient 
Model (3) 
coefficient 
Model (2) 
coefficient 
Model (3) 
coefficient 
Model (2) 
coefficient 
Model (3) 
coefficient 
IR derivatives +    0.4673   -0.5927  3.4341**    0.4270    0.2961    3.6304 
Com derivatives +   -0.9601    omitted  -1.3761*    omitted     omitted    omitted 
Leverage +     1.3272   1.3760   2.2957**   2.4361**  10.0645*** 11.7468***   3.1872**   3.5584**   0.5699   0.4061  -1.3232  -2.5085* 
Tax losses +     8.2630   6.3513   4.0729   1.6594   3.6364 -1.8815  -0.0075   0.3463  -0.8432  -0.9451  -0.2643   0.5595 
Current ratio -     0.0041   0.0040 -0.0659  -0.0517  -0.1062** -0.1249*  -0.0219  -0.0131   0.0024   0.0020   0.0044   0.0044 
Dividends -/+     4.8256***   4.5435***   0.0206  -0.0572  -1.5677* -1.6019*   0.3240   0.2930  -0.9549  -0.8564   0.6907   0.2264 
ROA -     1.4276   1.3517   2.2115   2.2295   4.2057** 4.4083**   0.2999   0.2370  -0.0003  -0.0003   0.3851   0.5080 
Tangible assets -     3.2458   3.2535  -0.1496   -0.5847   7.7726 14.0010*   omitted   omitted   1.6102   1.6369   0.0873  -0.2123 
R&D expenditure +   -0.0553  -0.0761  -1.5578  -1.5177   0.0853*** 0.0836**  -0.7305  -0.7885  -0.0208  -0.0215  -4.5512  -4.9237 
Capital expenditure +     0.2354   0.1958   1.8449***   1.8549***   1.3840* 1.5470*  -1.2214  -1.3684  -0.4093  -0.2965   4.1612*   4.5252 
Firm size +/-     0.2320   0.2292   1.0223***   1.0612***   2.1972*** 2.4159***   1.0938***   1.2077***   0.8950***   0.8845***   0.3298   0.3021 
Foreign income  +   -0.0024   0.0408   1.6133   1.6829  -1.4867 -1.7327   4.5589***   4.9374***   1.9307***   1.9274***   0.0308  -0.1249 
Constant    -9.9029*  -9.6763*  -14.6682***  -14.5546*** -41.1592*** -51.1214*** -14.6536*** -16.2135*** -14.1818*** -14.2050***  -7.2748**  -6.9786** 
Log likelihood    -70.88  -70.16  -131.66 -129.70  -88.27  -85.15 -133.01 -133.42 -120.60 -119.53 -101.08  -98.45 
LR-Chi2      43.25***   44.69***   41.67***   43.86**   95.39***  101.63***      9.68    10.21    39.49***    39.15***    15.72   20.99** 
Note: This table shows the results of a probit regression which tests the likelihood to use foreign exchange derivatives by industry. IR and Com derivatives denote interest rate and commodity derivatives, 
respectively. The Likelihood Ratio LR-Chi2 tests that at least one of the coefficients is not equal to zero. A p-value of less than 0.05 indicates that the model as a whole fits better than an empty model. 
Commodity derivatives has been omitted for the Model (3) specification for Industrials as it predicts the use of derivatives perfectly. Commodity derivatives has been omitted for the Model (3) specification 
for Consumer Discretionary and Health Care firms as it predicts the non-use of derivatives perfectly. Tangible assets has been omitted for both model specifications for Consumer Discretionary firms due 
to collinearity. Commodity derivatives has been omitted for the Model (3) specification for IT firms due to collinearity. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, 
respectively. 
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Appendix J.4 Foreign exchange derivative industry determinants: Canada 
Model 2(a) Pred. sign 
Energy (N=420) Industrials (N=315) Materials (N=435) Consumer Discretionary 
(N=235) 
Health Care (N=130) IT (N= 155) 
Model (2) 
coefficient 
Model (3) 
coefficient 
Model (2) 
coefficient 
Model (3) 
coefficient 
Model (2) 
coefficient 
Model (3) 
coefficient 
Model (2) 
coefficient 
Model (3) 
coefficient 
Model (2) 
coefficient 
Model (3) 
coefficient 
Model (2) 
coefficient 
Model (3) 
coefficient 
IR derivatives +    0.7291   -0.4607    2.4226***    -1.7303   -1.4956    omitted 
Com derivatives +    0.9852*   -1.4285    1.6729***    omitted    omitted    omitted 
Leverage +   2.0272   2.3242  -0.4864  -0.5434   1.5343   0.6088   1.3876   0.9185  -9.5729  -7.0364   1.5869   1.5257 
Tax losses +  -13.2030 -12.1960  31.8264**  39.2128**  -3.2727  -3.2080  29.2256  35.2401 -11.5740 -13.8056   5.7850   6.0101 
Current ratio -  -0.2203 -0.1652   0.2543   0.2974  -0.0410  -0.0351   0.1792   0.1689  -0.5730  -0.5149  -0.2618  -0.2542 
Dividends -/+   2.3087***   2.4533***   0.0108  -0.1132   1.4908**   1.4170**  -0.0724   0.0958  13.6684**  13.2556**   0.8372   0.8646 
ROA -  -0.2398   0.0402   3.5608*   3.7930*  -0.2659  -0.3641  -6.7816  -9.0278   0.7847   0.8266   0.3136   0.3238 
Tangible assets -   0.3640   0.5631  -2.6951  -3.9186  -5.2831  -4.1789   2.7940   2.6888   0.3775   2.1543   8.3886   8.1131 
R&D expenditure +  -0.6873**  -0.6808** -22.0106 -23.3364  -0.0511  -0.0247  -3.3934   2.0784  -2.3629  -2.3664  -6.6901  -6.6104 
Capital expenditure +   0.0229  -0.1655   0.9964   1.4408   0.0963   0.0835  -0.9233  -1.2706  -7.0835  -7.1099  16.7770**  16.7778** 
Firm size +/-   0.5236**   0.4026*   0.5789**   0.7003***   0.1007  -0.0657   0.8552**   0.8743**  -0.5155  -0.5246   0.8066**   0.7830* 
Foreign income  +  -1.0523  -0.7037   2.1689**   2.1171**   0.9350   0.8974   6.2895***   7.4818***   1.5518   1.7663  -1.5765  -1.5301 
Constant   -10.5223**  -9.9780**  -5.6847  -5.9399   1.4530   1.8407 -15.1024** -15.2175**   2.9010   1.4247  -16.1102* -15.6680* 
Log likelihood   -117.79 -114.92 -112.80 -111.52 -137.06 -125.03 -60.58  -59.33 -21.99  -21.75 -45.01  -44.98 
LR-Chi2     52.32***   58.07***   26.04***   28.61***    19.42**   43.48***    6.12     3.58  12.51   13.01   8.62   17.07* 
Note: This table shows the results of a probit regression which tests the likelihood to use foreign exchange derivatives by industry. IR and Com derivatives denote interest rate and commodity derivatives, 
respectively. The Likelihood Ratio LR-Chi2 tests that at least one of the coefficients is not equal to zero. A p-value of less than 0.05 indicates that the model as a whole fits better than an empty model. 
Commodity derivatives has been omitted for the Model (3) specification for Consumer Discretionary firms as it predicts the use of derivatives perfectly. Commodity derivatives has been omitted for the 
Model (3) specification for Health Care and IT firms due to collinearity. IR derivatives has been omitted for the Model (3) specification for IT firms as it predicts the use of derivatives perfectly. Statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.  
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Appendix J.5 Interest rate derivative industry determinants: Australia 
Model 3(a) Pred. sign 
Energy (N=445) Industrials (N=455) Materials (N=420) Consumer Discretionary 
(N=460) 
Health care (N=475) IT (N= 360) 
Model (2) 
coefficient 
Model (3) 
coefficient 
Model (2) 
coefficient 
Model (3) 
coefficient 
Model (2) 
coefficient 
Model (3) 
coefficient 
Model (2) 
coefficient 
Model (3) 
coefficient 
Model (2) 
coefficient 
Model (3) 
coefficient 
Model (2) 
coefficient 
Model (3) 
coefficient 
FX derivatives +    1.8479*   -0.4740    2.9314**  0.1437    2.2720    3.1442** 
Com derivatives +    2.3585*    0.2089    0.4838  omitted   omitted   omitted 
Leverage +   5.2550**   4.9956**   2.5763*   2.6507*   1.1240   2.5537   3.3523*** 3.3789***  14.7780***  16.6893***   3.6329   2.5453 
Tax losses +   3.2395   2.0539 -16.5989 -14.2054  -7.2469 -14.9140 -32.4737 -32.7651  -4.3096 -15.3624 -36.5108 -36.5794 
Current ratio -  -0.2353  -0.2482   0.4321**   0.4060**  -0.1311  -0.0665  -0.4554* -0.4480*    0.0208   0.0128 -0.6927  -0.6744 
Dividends -/+  -0.2868  -1.2891  -1.0621*  -0.9642  -0.4799  -0.3577   0.6847 0.6890    2.4475   2.6152 1.5150   1.2989 
ROA -   1.2165   1.0023  -1.5499  -1.2877  -0.0200  -0.0137   0.6922 0.6848  -0.0044  -0.0087 0.0611   0.0627 
Tangible assets -  -3.9107  -3.9956  -9.3480***  -8.4116** -16.5147** -23.7143**   omitted omitted   6.1422   7.4932 15.9335**  22.9652** 
R&D expenditure +  -1.4415  -0.2806 -46.4770 -59.0337 -57.9214 -68.0878  -0.0410 -0.0311   0.0247   0.0214 -5.9048  -3.0977 
Capital expenditure +   1.0060   1.1121   1.8625   1.7842  -0.2305  -1.5182  -0.0234 -0.0639   4.0294*   5.1148* -3.7195  -6.4669 
Firm size +/-   1.4284**  1.6358**   2.7477***   2.5404***   1.1817***   0.9967**   1.2244*** 1.1975***   1.8756***   2.0326***   1.3823***   1.5583*** 
Foreign income  +  -1.3268  -2.0334  -0.6668  -0.5991   1.0343   1.7611  -0.5819 -0.6682  -1.1810  -2.5345   1.2214   1.0256*** 
Constant   -17.7220** -21.2495** -28.2372*** -26.0697***  -3.3615   3.6315 -16.4977*** -16.2144*** -36.2192*** -40.6678*** -34.5875*** -43.4822 
Log likelihood   -45.13  41.05 -123.42 -122.87  -54.94  -51.74 -109.52 -109.19  -31.46 -30.14  -31.13 -27.76 
LR-Chi2    60.63***  68.79***   79.45***   80.53***   42.08***   48.47***    61.58***   62.49***   47.38***   51.77***   29.63   36.39*** 
Note: This table shows the results of a probit regression which tests the likelihood to use interest rate derivatives by industry. FX and Com derivatives denote foreign exchange and commodity derivatives, 
respectively. The Likelihood Ratio LR-Chi2 tests that at least one of the coefficients is not equal to zero. A p-value of less than 0.05 indicates that the model as a whole fits better than an empty model. 
Commodity derivatives has been omitted for the Model (3) specification for Consumer Discretionary and Health care firms as it predicts the non-use of derivatives perfectly. Tangible assets has been 
omitted for both model specifications for Consumer Discretionary firms due to collinearity. Commodity derivatives has been omitted for the Model 3 specification for IT firms due to collinearity. Statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.  
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Appendix J.6 Interest rate derivative industry determinants: Canada 
Model 3(a) Pred. sign 
Energy (N=420) Industrials (N=315) Materials (N=435) Consumer Discretionary (N=235) Health Care (N=130) 
Model (2) 
coefficient 
Model (3) 
coefficient 
Model (2) 
coefficient 
Model (3) 
coefficient 
Model (2) 
coefficient 
Model (3) 
coefficient 
Model (2) 
coefficient 
Model (3) 
coefficient 
Model (2) 
coefficient 
Model (3) 
coefficient 
FX derivatives +    0.8298*   -0.5762    2.0902***    -1.3203  -12.8428** 
Com derivatives +   -0.1365   -0.5925   -0.0302    omitted    omitted 
Leverage +   -1.0129  -1.0048   0.3609   0.5027   5.8857***   5.9223***    3.7132    3.9127  27.2971**    8.5664 
Tax losses + -22.1513** -23.6807**  32.9177  38.9453* -11.1790 -24.4258  -32.5565  -28.5315   -8.4178 -40.3155 
Current ratio -  -0.3753*  -0.3761*  -0.1213  -0.1116  -0.2602*  -0.2340*   -1.4245*   -1.3067*   -0.3111  -0.6384 
Dividends -/+   0.5063   0.3315  -0.6097  -0.6931   0.6441   0.2226   -0.1313   -0.1758   -1.8333   9.1491 
ROA -  -1.1024  -1.2669   2.9298   3.3162   1.3500   1.3434    4.6578    4.7055    4.0702  14.4942 
Tangible assets -   0.2834  -0.1281 -14.8281*** -15.1957***   3.8287   5.0702   -1.9882   -1.8362   22.3609 -10.8264 
R&D expenditure +  -2.2514  -2.3577  -2.6071  -2.1349  -9.4962 -12.8527 -283.5743 -330.7117   -1.6382 -14.2389 
Capital expenditure +   0.8851**   0.9216**   1.0634   1.2682  -1.6324**  -1.7084**    0.9820    0.9924   17.5380***  21.0113*** 
Firm size +/-   0.4833***   0.4567**   1.2065***   1.3280***   0.2636   0.2851   -0.0107    0.1029    5.3237***  6.6241*** 
Foreign income  +  -1.1876  -1.1701  -1.3485  -1.1629   0.8104   0.5954    6.1620*    6.0820***    0.5993   5.7721 
Constant   -8.6460**  -7.9890*  -2.7347  -3.8077 -10.1214 -12.3334**   -0.6018   -1.9468 -100.2225*** -80.9894*** 
Log likelihood  -116.79 -115.15 -102.69 -101.81  -88.07 -81.52   -72.56   -71.11   -11.55  -9.02 
LR-Chi2    34.84***    38.13***   42.28***   44.05***   27.88***  40.98***    29.78***    32.14    14.44   19.50* 
Note: This table shows the results of a probit regression which tests the likelihood to use interest rate derivatives by industry. FX and Com derivatives denote foreign exchange and commodity derivatives, 
respectively. The Likelihood Ratio LR-Chi2 tests that at least one of the coefficients is not equal to zero. A p-value of less than 0.05 indicates that the model as a whole fits better than an empty model. 
Commodity derivatives has been omitted for the Model (3) specification for Consumer Discretionary as it predicts the non-use of derivatives perfectly, and has been omitted for Health Care firms due to 
collinearity. The probit models could not be fitted to examine the likelihood of firms to use interest rate derivatives, as there are only few cases of IR derivatives used. Statistical significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
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Appendix J.7 Commodity derivative industry determinants: Australia and Canada 
  Australia Canada 
Model 4(a) Pred. sign 
Energy (N=445) Industrials (N=455) Materials (N=420) Energy (N=420) Industrials (N=315) Materials (N=435) 
Model (2) 
coefficient 
Model (3) 
coefficient 
Model (2) 
coefficient 
Model (3) 
coefficient 
Model (2) 
coefficient 
Model (3) 
coefficient 
Model (2) 
coefficient 
Model (3) 
coefficient 
Model (2) 
coefficient 
Model (3) 
coefficient 
Model (2) 
coefficient 
Model (3) 
coefficient 
FX derivatives +   -2.1523    omitted   -0.4049    0.7396   -1.9724    1.1346** 
IR derivatives +    2.2182**    7.5353    0.6888   -0.2907   -0.8048   -0.6179 
Leverage +   2.4518   2.1979   -2.5811  -8.4518  -0.1440   0.0427   3.1991**   3.2089**   8.7453*   6.4300**   1.8906*   1.7055 
Tax losses +  -3.9894  -4.3707  60.3009 228.9049   6.5522*   6.5909*   2.3026   2.3387 44.6842  38.9983 13.3726  10.2342 
Current ratio -   0.0062   0.0058  0.8578   1.1639   0.0044   0.0044  -0.5887***  -0.5612***   2.1670*   2.1155***  -0.0616  -0.0576 
Dividends -/+   0.2901   1.0681   1.9750   2.0085   0.2498   0.2442  -2.0463***  -2.2095***   1.0933   0.9693   0.0530  -0.1264 
ROA -  -0.1531  -0.0028  15.1510  27.6139   0.2162   0.2309  -0.4551  -0.3481  -1.1048  -0.5561   0.2118   0.2579 
Tangible assets -   2.3298   3.3688   2.7865**   3.0462   2.2966   3.0096   1.9006   2.0648  52.5714  34.7918 -11.8886**  -9.9006** 
R&D expenditure +  -0.1608  -0.1508   omitted omitted  -0.0085  -0.0076  -0.3079  -0.2784   omitted  omitted  -1.1304  -0.9826 
Capital expenditure +   0.7997*   0.6458   7.7167   9.2199**   1.0397***   1.1094***   0.8652*   0.8240*   6.9447*   7.2922**   0.1335   0.1055 
Firm size +/-   0.3717   0.2385   3.4697***   2.5135*   0.8995***   0.9335***   1.1629***   1.1317***   1.7017**   1.8076***   0.8105***   0.7438*** 
Foreign income  +   3.2713***  3.3199***  -6.4125  -7.3482   0.3985   0.4247  -2.9180***  -2.8287***  -4.0796  -2.8879  -0.2130  -0.1407 
Constant  -13.4798*** -12.9211** -64.2745*** -54.5929** -16.8727*** -18.1722*** -16.0601*** -15.8793*** -94.4643** -72.8640***  -1.0451  -2.2312 
Log likelihood  -72.96 -70.06   -23.61  -19.55 -134.33 -133.85 -118.35 -117.42  -35.49  -35.60  -137.80 -134.34 
LR-Chi2  29.19*** 34.99***  22.93***   21.22**   44.90***   45.87***   71.04***   72.88***   23.55**   23.33**   39.22***   46.12*** 
Note: This table shows the results of a probit regression which tests the likelihood to use commodity derivatives by industry. The Likelihood Ratio LR-Chi2 tests that at least one of the coefficients is not 
equal to zero. A p-value of less than 0.05 indicates that the model as a whole fits better than an empty model. R&D Expenses has been omitted from both specification for Australian and Canadian Industrials 
firms as it predicts the non-usage of derivatives perfectly.  FX derivatives has been omitted from the Model (3) specification for Australian Industrials firms as it predicts the non-usage of derivatives 
perfectly. The probit models could not be fitted to examine the likelihood of firms to use commodity derivatives in the Consumer Discretionary, Health Care and IT industry, due to the small number of 
commodity derivative users in these industries. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
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Appendix J.8 Determinants derivative extent by industry: Australia 
Model (5a) Pred. 
sign 
Energy (N=85) Industrials (N=222) Materials (N=144) Consumer 
Discretionary (N=245) 
Health care (N=76) IT (N=59) 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Leverage  + 0.0433 0.0875* 0.1296 0.0000*** -0.0314 0.7198 0.1149 0.0000*** 0.0150 0.1837 0.0319 0.1359 
Tax losses + -0.0482 0.7111 1.7270 0.0202** 0.1353 0.7479 0.0450 0.8658 -0.0512 0.3659 -0.2081 0.3728 
Current ratio - -0.0000 0.9770 0.0084 0.1734 0.0022 0.5270 -0.0004 0.8907 0.0017 0.0113** 0.0036 0.2433 
Dividends -/+ -0.0031 0.8645 -0.0093 0.4505 -0.0224 0.4903 0.0089 0.2561 0.0052 0.2509 0.0169 0.0489** 
ROA - 0.0040 0.8132 0.0781 0.2172 -0.0951 0.3670 0.0134 0.4087 0.0219 0.0909* 0.0276 0.2747 
Tangible assets - -0.0119 0.7981 0.0435 0.1851 -0.7209 0.0003*** omitted -0.0101 0.5868 0.0010 0.9639 
R&D expenditure + -0.0004 0.9919 0.2682 0.4761 -0.0004 0.8973 -0.0610 0.2058 0.0052 0.0039*** -0.0671 0.2042 
Capital expenditure + 0.0011 0.9219 -0.0191 0.1395 0.1329 0.0000*** -0.0163 0.1424 0.0300 0.0042*** 0.0368 0.2173 
Firm size +/- 0.0039 0.3541 0.0049 0.1515 -0.0043 0.7068 -0.0028 0.2004 -0.0014 0.5864 -0.0050 0.0211** 
Foreign income  + -0.0269 0.1065 -0.0156 0.4304 -0.0455 0.2346 0.0053 0.6889 -0.0001 0.9888 0.0240 0.0310** 
Constant  0.0930 0.2364 -0.1265 0.0691* 0.7592 0.0039** 0.0209 0.5018 0.0244 0.5266 0.0371 0.2705 
Log Likelihood  186.05  327.34  71.06  504.98  218.78  151.65  
LR-Chi2   10.81 0.3726*** 33.02 0.0002*** 52.54 0.0000*** 66.68 0.0000*** 28.15 0.0017*** 19.56 0.0337** 
Note: This table shows the results of industry tobit regressions which tests the determinants of the extent of derivative use.  The Likelihood Ratio LR-Chi2 tests that at least one of the coefficients is not 
equal to zero. A p-value of less than 0.05 indicates that the model as a whole fits better than an empty model. Tangible assets has been omitted for Consumer Discretionary firms due to collinearity. 
Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
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Appendix J.9 Determinants derivative extent by industry: Canada 
Model (5a) Pred. 
sign 
Energy (N=217) Industrials (N=159) Materials (N=157) Consumer 
Discretionary (N=117) 
Health care (N=30) IT (N=69) 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Leverage  + 0.0226 0.0109** 0.0215 0.1143 -0.0223 0.4935 0.0015 0.9647 0.0750 0.0001*** 0.0146 0.2977 
Tax losses + 0.0146 0.7536 -0.1059 0.8427 0.6256 0.1405 -2.9705 0.0030*** 0.0109 0.9177 0.0257 0.5793 
Current ratio - -0.0001 0.9040 0.0093 0.0046*** -0.0019 0.1204 -0.0018 0.7660 -0.0026 0.1749 0.0003 0.6459 
Dividends -/+ 0.0067 0.1801 0.0015 0.8291 -0.0052 0.6625 -0.0160 0.1503 -0.0139 0.1197 0.0012 0.7324 
ROA - 0.0256 0.0257** -0.0320 0.3897 -0.0283 0.3165 -0.0495 0.5412 0.0173 0.5674 -0.0264 0.0103** 
Tangible assets - -0.0367 0.2441 0.0309 0.5139 0.0335 0.6946 0.0178 0.6770 0.0475 0.4054 0.0404 0.0430** 
R&D expenditure + -0.0057 0.0149** -0.1494 0.7054 -0.0103 0.9016 0.0727 0.5432 -0.0094 0.6603 0.0307 0.3535 
Capital expenditure + -0.0008 0.8264 0.0260 0.0181** 0.0082 0.4830 -0.0009 0.9630 -0.0468 0.0887* -0.0159 0.1233 
Firm size +/- -0.0024 0.2609 -0.0036 0.0863* -0.0056 0.2404 -0.0023 0.5373 -0.0023 0.4167 0.0004 0.8368 
Foreign income  + 0.0008 0.9312 0.0061 0.5141 -0.0119 0.4198 -0.0180 0.3969 0.0371 0.0969* 0.0173 0.0947* 
Constant  0.0838 0.0885* -0.0059 0.9122 0.0822 0.4365 0.0588 0.3851 -0.0018 0.9761 -0.0499 0.2014 
Log Likelihood  529.94  325.33  290.60  212.25  85.95  245.17  
LR-Chi2   20.22 0.0272** 24.95 0.0054*** 14.68 0.1443 13.80 0.1821 22.57 0.0124** 37.30 0.0001*** 
Note: This table shows the results of industry tobit regressions which tests the determinants of the extent of derivative use.  The Likelihood Ratio LR-Chi2 tests that at least one of the coefficients is not 
equal to zero. A p-value of less than 0.05 indicates that the model as a whole fits better than an empty model. Tangible assets has been omitted for Consumer Discretionary firms due to collinearity. 
Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
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Appendix K. Firm value of industry hedging  
Appendix K.1 Value of hedging by industry: Australia Models (1)  
Tobin’s Q 
Energy  Industrials  Materials  Consumer Discretionary Health Care  IT  
Model (1) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (1) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Model (1) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (1) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Model (1) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (1) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Model (1) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (1) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Model (1) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (1) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Model (1) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (1) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Derivatives   1.9786*   0.0339  -0.1018   0.0111  49.4810   0.0389  -1.0721  -0.1107  -0.9006  -0.2430***  -0.9713  -0.1449 
Leverage -1.9309***  -1.1146***  -0.5901***  -0.5995***  -2.7619  -0.1607  -0.6984**  -0.8655***  -0.4442  -0.5368**  -0.8668  -0.6484* 
Tax losses -2.1120  -1.6569   0.1344   0.1111 -29.3251  -0.9700  -0.5169  -0.2415   0.9863   0.9389   4.0408*   4.2194*** 
Current ratio -0.0039**  -0.0042***  -0.0421***  -0.0428***  -0.0291  -0.0048***  -0.0881***  -0.0844***  -0.0056**  -0.0056**   0.0010***   0.0007 
Dividends   0.4344   0.5001*   0.0257   0.0228   3.4548  -0.1697*  -0.1763*  -0.2124***   0.1964   0.1603   0.0721   0.0162 
ROA -0.4288***  -0.4192***  -0.6205***  -0.6086***   0.0703  -0.0796***  -0.0708***  -0.0749***   0.0003   0.0003  -0.3765***  -0.3766*** 
Tangible assets -0.6786   0.1824   0.6418   0.6775*   7.8142  -1.4971*    omitted    omitted   0.2404   0.2131  -0.1096   0.0402 
R&D expenditure -0.0055  -0.0048  -0.0060**  -0.0062***   0.1928   0.0077**   0.1301*   0.1461**   0.0044   0.0050*  -0.0050  -0.0046 
Capital expenditure -0.4879***  -0.4172***  -0.6827***  -0.6871***  -5.7149  -0.7033***  -0.5076***  -0.5419***  -0.4194  -0.5108*  -0.1406  -0.2731 
Firm size   0.4161***   0.4840***   0.3304***   0.3188***  -1.7320   0.2904***   0.5481***   0.4657***   0.5134***   0.4896***   0.7685***   0.7351*** 
Foreign income    0.0205   0.0063  -0.0794  -0.0852  -6.1375  -0.3344**   0.4309   0.3486   0.0227  -0.0336  -0.5834**  -0.5987** 
Constant -3.8594  -5.2401***  -4.0415***  -3.9761***   2.3767  -1.3144  -5.0973***  -4.5458***  -4.4400*** -4.2436***  -6.8295***  -6.7505*** 
Observations  443 443 455 455 416 416 460 460 463 463 348 348 
F-test FE model   25.28***   49.73***   62.42***  64.00***  0.06  38.14***  30.36***  40.30*** 11.95*** 13.06***  24.17*** 26.26*** 
Davidson-MacK. F-test  5.4375**     0.0497  45.662***     1.0476    0.5545     0.6076  
Anderson LM statistics  5.53**     2.026    0.059     3.27*    7.62***     7.11*  
Cragg-Donald Wald F-
test                5.842     1.976    0.06     3.21    7.55     7.00  
Note: This table shows the results of fixed effects panel data regressions of the decision to use derivatives for Australian industries. Model (1) IV estimate coefficients and OLS estimate coefficients represent 
the results for instrumental-variable and ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions, respectively. Derivatives is a dummy variable that takes ‘1’ if the firm uses derivatives. Tangible assets has been omitted 
for Consumer Discretionary firms due to collinearity. The Davidson-MacKinnon F-test (Davidson-MacK. F-test) computes a test of exogeneity for a panel regression estimated via instrumental variables. 
The null hypothesis states that an OLS estimator of the same equation would yield consistent estimates, a rejection of the null indicates that endogenous regressors' effects on the estimates are meaningful. 
The Anderson LM statistics is a test of underidentification, i.e. it tests that the excluded instruments are ‘relevant’ and correlated with the endogenous variable. The null hypothesis states that the model is 
underidentified, a rejection of the null indicates that the model is identified. The Cragg-Donald Wald F-test provides a test statistic to evaluate weak identification, which may arise when excluded 
instruments are only weakly correlated with endogenous variables. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.   
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Appendix K.2 Value of hedging by industry: Australia Model (2)  
Tobin’s Q 
Energy  Industrials  Materials  Consumer Discretionary Health Care  IT  
Model (2) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (2) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Model (2) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (2) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Model (2) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (2) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Model (2) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (2) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Model (2) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (2) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Model (2) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (2) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
DVF    33.9220  -0.5954   3.2479   0.1253   9.2644*   0.4898*   4.0856   0.9219 22.6697  -8.0027** -14.1283   0.7325 
Leverage  -2.0727***  -1.0833***  -0.7648***  -0.6068***  -0.5521  -0.1834  -1.239***  -0.9649***  -0.7450**  -0.5096*  -0.6693*  -0.6070* 
Tax losses  -1.8432  -1.6456  -0.0400   0.0982  -1.4187  -0.6404  -0.0030  -0.1635   0.9238   0.9206   4.2468***   4.2509*** 
Current ratio  -0.0043**  -0.0042***  -0.0425***  -0.0431***  -0.0032  -0.0049***  -0.0895***  -0.0852***  -0.0057**  -0.0055**   0.0005   0.0007 
Dividends   0.3073   0.5047*   0.0088   0.0213  -0.1723  -0.1723*  -0.2659  -0.2278***   0.0794   0.1708   0.0801   0.0026 
ROA  -0.2807**  -0.4214***  -0.6014***  -0.6064***  -0.0762***  -0.0796***  -0.0799***  -0.0764***   0.0003   0.0003  -0.3705***  -0.3769*** 
Tangible assets  -0.1622   0.2037   0.8445*   0.7094*   7.3819  -1.0208    omitted    omitted   0.0154   0.2693   0.0944   0.0650 
R&D expenditure  -0.0076  -0.0047  -0.0062***  -0.0062***   0.0069   0.0071**   0.1548***   0.1495***   0.0065*   0.0049*  -0.0041  -0.0046 
Capital expenditure  -0.5161***  -0.4142***  -0.6461***  -0.6863***  -1.1540***  -0.7232***  -0.5327***  -0.5444***  -0.6909*  -0.4929  -0.2140  -0.3006 
Firm size   0.3774***   0.4870***   0.3199***   0.3178***   0.2743***   0.2924***   0.4341***   0.4512***   0.4831***   0.4800***   0.7156***   0.7300*** 
Foreign income    0.0098   0.0060  -0.0901  -0.0829  -0.3369  -0.3336**   0.3739   0.3466  -0.0493  -0.0561  -0.6091**  -0.6009** 
Constant  -3.5971**  -5.2934***  -4.1429***  -3.9865***  -9.7147*  -1.7906*  -4.1367***  -4.4026***  -4.0375***  -4.2182***  -6.6050***  -6.7434*** 
Observations  443 443 454 454 412 412 459 459 463 463 348 348 
F-test FE model  23.88*** 49.74***   42.67*** 63.79***  9.44*** 38.43***  38.35*** 40.08***  10.43***  13.33***  24.75***   26.13*** 
Davidson-MacK. F-test     5.3924**     1.536   11.1153***    0.5750   2.1471     0.7703  
Anderson LM statistics     4.92**   3.149*     3.494*   13.06***    9.041***    13.118***  
Cragg-Donald Wald F-
test                   5.83   3.080  3.414   13.06    8.992    13.223  
Note: This table shows the results of fixed effects panel data regressions of the extent of derivative use for Australian industries. Model (2) IV estimate coefficients and OLS estimate coefficients represent 
the results for instrumental-variable and ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions, respectively. DFV denotes the extent of derivative use is proxied by the derivative fair values scaled by total assets. 
Tangible assets has been omitted for Consumer Discretionary firms due to collinearity. The Davidson-MacKinnon F-test (Davidson-MacK. F-test) computes a test of exogeneity for a panel regression 
estimated via instrumental variables. The null hypothesis states that an OLS estimator of the same equation would yield consistent estimates, a rejection of the null indicates that endogenous regressors' 
effects on the estimates are meaningful. The Anderson LM statistics is a test of underidentification, i.e. it tests that the excluded instruments are ‘relevant’ and correlated with the endogenous variable. The 
null hypothesis states that the model is underidentified, a rejection of the null indicates that the model is identified. The Cragg-Donald Wald F-test provides a test statistic to evaluate weak identification, 
which may arise when excluded instruments are only weakly correlated with endogenous variables. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
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Appendix K.3 Value of hedging by industry: Australia Model (3)  
Tobin’s Q 
Energy  Industrials  Materials  Consumer Discretionary Health Care  IT  
Model (3) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (3) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Model (3) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (3) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Model (3) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (3) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Model (3) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (3) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Model (3) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (3) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Model (3) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (3) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
FX derivatives  -5.5016  -0.1146   0.8341  -0.0296 23.1416   0.0814  -0.9802  -0.1369   2.1817  -0.2970**  -0.7758  -0.0783 
IR derivatives    2.9161  -0.0273   2.2030  -0.0050 -28.1018  -0.1899   0.0414  -0.1238   5.8409  -0.0180  -0.7758   0.1506 
Com derivatives  -12.3298  -0.0317   0.9485  -0.0424  -2.6669  -0.0574  -0.3489   0.0001   5.6417  -0.1951    omitted    omitted 
Leverage   1.2936  -1.0669***  -0.7954  -0.5943*** -10.9182  -0.2174  -0.6440  -0.8345***  -1.6873  -0.5331*  -0.6967  -0.6416* 
Tax losses  -5.8182  -1.6064   0.1160   0.1077  -0.8489  -0.9183  -0.3607  -0.2862   0.8083   0.9106   4.2989***   4.2670*** 
Current ratio  -0.0029  -0.0042***  -0.0870  -0.0429***   0.0127  -0.0046***  -0.0745***  -0.0830***  -0.0064  -0.0055**   0.0008   0.0007 
Dividends   3.7428   0.5285*   0.1070   0.0231   0.2680  -0.1775*  -0.2012  -0.1981***   0.1716   0.1395   0.1029   0.0050 
ROA   3.7428  -0.4157***  -0.3053  -0.6077***  -0.0486  -0.0797***  -0.0726***  -0.0746***   0.0002   0.0003   0.1029***  -0.3737*** 
Tangible assets 10.2212   0.2517   0.6070   0.6866* -63.7175  -1.8566**    omitted    omitted  -0.3956   0.2550  -0.0124   0.0591 
R&D expenditure   0.0018  -0.0046  -0.0099  -0.0062***  -0.0323   0.0072**   0.1366**   0.1453***   0.0075   0.0049*  -0.0058  -0.0047 
Capital expenditure   0.1112  -0.4110***  -1.3194  -0.6826***  -2.4348  -0.7026***  -0.6958***  -0.5559***  -0.9186  -0.5019  -0.1423  -0.2729 
Firm size   0.7482   0.4893***  -0.0805   0.3200***  -0.6379   0.2909***   0.4855***   0.4678***   0.2778   0.5051***   0.7433***   0.7305*** 
Foreign income    0.3509   0.0071  -0.1631  -0.0895   4.4241  -0.3022**   0.2596   0.3445  -0.4869   0.0074  -0.5916**  -0.6061** 
Constant -17.0629  -5.3525***   0.1256  -3.9808*** 70.8582  -0.9379  -4.3790***  -4.5326***  -2.3599  -4.4215***  -6.6232***  -6.7303*** 
Observations  443 443 455 455 416 416 460 460 463 463 348 348 
F-test FE model   1.67* 41.99*** 5.11*** 53.97*** 0.23 32.33***   26.36*** 33.91*** 2.99*** 11.09*** 21.81***    23.96*** 
Davidson-MacK. F-test    34.062***  2.2674*   24.7422***    1.0757  0.5139    0.3942  
Anderson LM statistics    25.18***  2.25*   19.30***    0.84  1.77    0.29  
Sargan statistic Chi2  0.024     0.207  0.028    0.012  1.466    0.012  
Note: This table shows the results of instrumental variable regressions for panel data of the decision to use foreign exchange (FX derivatives), interest rate (IR derivatives) and commodity derivatives (Com 
derivatives) on Tobin’s Q for Australian industries. Model (3) IV estimate coefficients and OLS estimate coefficients represent the results for instrumental-variable and ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regressions, respectively. FX derivatives, IR derivatives and Com derivatives are dummy variables that take ‘1’ if the firm uses foreign exchange, interest rate and commodity derivatives, respectively. 
Tangible assets has been omitted for Consumer Discretionary firms due to collinearity. Com derivatives has been omitted for IT firms due to collinearity. The Davidson-MacKinnon F-test (Davidson-
MacK. F-test) computes a test of exogeneity for a panel regression estimated via instrumental variables. The null hypothesis states that an OLS estimator of the same equation would yield consistent 
estimates, a rejection of the null indicates that endogenous regressors' effects on the estimates are meaningful. The Anderson LM statistics is a test of underidentification, i.e. it tests that the excluded 
instruments are ‘relevant’ and correlated with the endogenous variable. The null hypothesis states that the model is underidentified, a rejection of the null indicates that the model is identified. The Sargan 
statistic Chi2  provides a test of overidentifying restrictions. The joint null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid instruments, i.e., uncorrelated with the error term, and that the excluded instruments 
are correctly excluded from the estimated equation. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.  
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Appendix K.4 Value of hedging by industry: Canada Model (1)  
Tobin’s Q 
Energy  Industrials  Materials  Consumer Discretionary Health Care  IT  
Model (1) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (1) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Model (1) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (1a) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Model (1) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (1) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Model (1) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (1) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Model (1) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (1) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Model (1) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (1) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Derivatives -0.6275  -0.0275   1.0639  -0.0747   1.1349  -0.0963   0.0155  -0.0040  -1.1288  -0.3130  -0.2836   0.0750 
Leverage -0.6330***  -0.7730***  -0.3636  -0.2523  -1.7885***  -0.0963***  -0.9645***  -0.9592***  -1.2164*  -1.3976**  -0.9748***  -0.9820** 
Tax losses -0.0922   0.1376   0.9059  -0.0037   6.2698***   5.6966***   1.5802   1.5129   0.4485   0.2154   0.9505   0.0554 
Current ratio -0.0170*  -0.0100*  -0.1249*  -0.0037**   0.0017   0.0010  -0.0692***  -0.0687***  -0.0875***  -0.0886***  -0.0252  -0.0260 
Dividends -0.2259**  -0.0100**  -0.1622  -0.0037  -0.3420**  -0.3853***   0.0207   0.0190    omitted    omitted   0.1565   0.1451 
ROA -0.1054  -0.0100  -0.5344  -0.1280  -0.2194  -0.1059  -0.3118*  -0.3099*  -0.2095  -0.1939  -0.1689  -0.2295 
Tangible assets 1.4966   1.2045***  -0.0753  -0.6340   1.0293   1.3122*   0.3005*   0.2983*  -0.0557  -0.2905   0.1167  -0.0157 
R&D expenditure -0.0055  -0.0056  -1.1061  -0.7252  -0.0188  -0.0228*  -0.1198  -0.1318  -0.0011  -0.0005  0.2350   0.2224 
Capital expenditure -0.6027***  -0.6343***  -1.1083  -0.5814***  -0.1621***  -0.1465***  -0.1452**  -0.1458**  -0.2457  -0.2736  -2.7552***  -2.8743*** 
Firm size 0.2933***   0.2499***   0.2064   0.3984***   0.3722***   0.4356***   0.5239***   0.5260***   0.2725**   0.2899**   0.4228***   0.3982*** 
Foreign income  0.0740   0.1963*  -0.7267  -0.4108*  -0.1569   0.0576  -0.4777***  -0.4736***   0.4878   0.4337   0.0352   0.0670 
Constant -4.1262***  -3.6133***  -1.7687  -3.5461***  -5.5352***   0.0576***  -6.2953***  -6.3115***  -1.0896  -1.2307  -4.0496***  -3.8061*** 
Observations  420 420 315 315 434 434 235 235 119 119 149 149 
F-test FE model 56.13***  82.45     4.80***   12.55*** 30.94*** 54.26*** 61.02*** 61.12*** 3.27***   3.49*** 10.41***    10.84 
Davidson-MacK. F-test 3.3758*    1.9242  2.2666  0.0035   0.3287  0.2670  
Anderson LM statistics 7.153***    1.234  3.06*  2.418   5.576**  6.77***  
Cragg-Donald Wald F-
test               7.069    1.186  2.99  2.306   5.294  6.51  
Note: This table shows the results of fixed effects panel data regressions of the decision to use derivatives for Canadian industries. Model (1) IV estimate coefficients and OLS estimate coefficients represent 
the results for instrumental-variable and ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions, respectively. Derivatives is a dummy variable that takes ‘1’ if the firm uses derivatives. Tangible assets has been omitted 
for Health Care firms due to collinearity. The Davidson-MacKinnon F-test (Davidson-MacK. F-test) computes a test of exogeneity for a panel regression estimated via instrumental variables. The null 
hypothesis states that an OLS estimator of the same equation would yield consistent estimates, a rejection of the null indicates that endogenous regressors' effects on the estimates are meaningful. The 
Anderson LM statistics is a test of underidentification, i.e. it tests that the excluded instruments are ‘relevant’ and correlated with the endogenous variable. The null hypothesis states that the model is 
underidentified, a rejection of the null indicates that the model is identified. The Cragg-Donald Wald F-test provides a test statistic to evaluate weak identification, which may arise when excluded 
instruments are only weakly correlated with endogenous variables. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.   
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Appendix K.5 Value of hedging: Canada Model (2)  
Tobin’s Q 
Energy  Industrials  Materials  Consumer Discretionary Health Care  IT  
Model (2) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (2) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Model (2) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (2) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Model (2) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (2) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Model (2) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (2) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Model (2) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (2) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Model (2) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (2) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
DVF  -1.9406  -0.9760**  -7.9027   0.0666  12.8997*  -0.1560   4.3403  -0.0554  -9.2502  -5.2576 -45.2188  -6.5751 
Leverage -0.7875***  -0.8024***  -0.1805  -0.2703  -1.3983***  -1.5112***  -0.9006***  -0.9692***  -1.2170  -1.3250**  -0.5955  -0.9245*** 
Tax losses -0.2507  -0.0652  -1.7524  -0.4882   5.9665***   5.7684***   2.7928   1.4910   0.0351   0.0743   1.6141   0.4421 
Current ratio -0.0121**  -0.0109**  -0.0464  -0.0836**   0.0016   0.0011  -0.0607**  -0.0687***  -0.0884***  -0.0887***  -0.0387  -0.0277 
Dividends -0.1162*  -0.1264**   0.0641  -0.0217  -0.4174**  -0.4130***   0.0314   0.0181    omitted    omitted  -0.0194   0.1232 
ROA -0.0279  -0.0607  -0.3093  -0.2086  -0.2860**  -0.1158  -0.4042  -0.3025*  -0.1929  -0.1908  -0.3627  -0.2381 
Tangible assets 1.1780***   1.1874***  -0.4694  -0.6871   1.4442   1.2818*   0.3446   0.2910*  -0.3735  -0.3766   0.6720   0.1079 
R&D expenditure -0.0073  -0.0056  -0.7588  -0.8459  -0.0236  -0.0226*   0.1456  -0.1491  -0.0011  -0.0008   0.1775   0.2181 
Capital expenditure -0.6630***  -0.6512***  -0.3183  -0.5344**  -0.1593***  -0.1468***  -0.1349  -0.1397**  -0.2106  -0.2424  -2.8855  -2.8546*** 
Firm size 0.2242***   0.2355***   0.4002***   0.3980***   0.4121***   0.4331***   0.5567***   0.5299***   0.3236**   0.3119***   0.3560   0.3965*** 
Foreign income  0.0305   0.1174  -0.4041  -0.4998*  -0.0430   0.0367  -0.4801**  -0.4837***   0.4525   0.4354   0.9339   0.1874 
Constant -3.1726***  -3.3751***  -3.9264***  -3.4891***  -6.2425***  -6.3014***  -6.8483***  -6.3638***  -1.6309  -1.4815   -4.3195  -3.9243*** 
Observations  414 414 414 414 431 431 232 232 119 119 149 149 
F-test FE model 79.61*** 81.68***  7.22*** 10.07*** 31.42*** 53.41*** 34.56*** 59.13***   3.40***    3.45***    7.36***  11.10*** 
Davidson-MacK. F-test 0.2696  2.3857  5.2681**  1.6278  0.0133    0.5299  
Anderson LM statistics  13.588***  5.727***  7.364***  2.381  4.47**    1.170  
Cragg-Donald Wald F-
test                13.699  5.595  7.285  2.269  4.192    1.071  
Note: This table shows the results of fixed effects panel data regressions of the extent of derivative use for Canadian industries. Model (2) IV estimate coefficients and OLS estimate coefficients represent 
the results for instrumental-variable and ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions, respectively. DFV denotes the extent of derivative use is proxied by the derivative fair values scaled by total assets. 
Dividends has been omitted for Health Care firms due to collinearity. The Davidson-MacKinnon F-test (Davidson-MacK. F-test) computes a test of exogeneity for a panel regression estimated via 
instrumental variables. The null hypothesis states that an OLS estimator of the same equation would yield consistent estimates, a rejection of the null indicates that endogenous regressors' effects on the 
estimates are meaningful. The Anderson LM statistics is a test of underidentification, i.e. it tests that the excluded instruments are ‘relevant’ and correlated with the endogenous variable. The null hypothesis 
states that the model is underidentified, a rejection of the null indicates that the model is identified. The Cragg-Donald Wald F-test provides a test statistic to evaluate weak identification, which may arise 
when excluded instruments are only weakly correlated with endogenous variables. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.  
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Appendix K.6 Value of hedging: Canada Model (3)  
Tobin’s Q 
Energy  Industrials  Materials  Consumer Discretionary Health Care  IT  
Model (3) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (3) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Model (3) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (3) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Model (3) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (3) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Model (3) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (3) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Model (3) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (3) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Model (3) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (3) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
FX derivatives   3.0282  -0.0669   1.3183  -0.0574 -10.7162   -0.1092   1.0509  -0.0294  -5.2481  -0.3280  -0.0576   0.3100*** 
IR derivatives   0.6461   0.0598   1.6777  -0.0146   5.5573  -0.0168   0.2349  -0.0319 -59.0728  -0.2858  -1.0974  -0.4940*** 
Com derivatives  -4.0789   0.0112  -2.2160  -0.0331  14.4973  -0.0649  -0.2486   0.3813***    omitted    omitted    omitted    omitted 
Leverage  -0.7670  -0.7617***   0.2041  -0.2577  -3.9039  -1.5119***  -0.9227***  -0.9654***   2.1010  -1.4492**  -0.5830  -0.8216*** 
Tax losses   0.0691   0.1801  -7.9039   0.4652 -17.5075   5.7333***   1.3618   0.2057 -50.2408  -0.1682   0.2256  -0.4608 
Current ratio  -0.0539  -0.0097*  -0.0611  -0.0800**   0.0002   0.0010  -0.0420  -0.0732***  -0.0732  -0.0892***  -0.0643  -0.0340* 
Dividends  -0.9262  -0.1345**   0.1857   0.0159   0.0440  -0.3908**   0.0600   0.0163    omitted    omitted  -0.0647   0.0363 
ROA  -0.3471  -0.0912  -1.0511  -0.1278  -1.7396  -0.1106  -0.0533 -0.3794**  -0.5841  -0.1890  -0.1545  -0.2973 
Tangible assets  -0.3471   1.1620***   3.1061  -0.6602  11.6803   1.2765*   0.2331   0.3231*  -2.1805  -0.3852   0.6923   0.2155 
R&D expenditure  -0.0292  -0.0062  -1.9688  -0.7111   0.0190  -0.0228*  -1.3382   0.2713  -0.0141  -0.0004   0.1821   0.2281 
Capital expenditure  -0.5392  -0.6384***  -0.7600  -0.6036***  -0.3312  -0.1464***   0.0700  -0.1385**   0.4485  -0.3536  -2.7279***  -2.8723*** 
Firm size   0.3403   0.2483***   0.1525   0.3908***  -0.7224   0.4333***   0.6029**   0.5157***   1.8814   0.2940**   0.4538***   0.4247*** 
Foreign income    0.1427   0.1970*  -1.7378  -0.4028  -0.3112   0.0305  -1.1243  -0.4062***  -1.1025   0.4116  -0.0049   0.0870 
Constant  -5.1205  -3.5736***  -4.8394  -3.4183***  -2.0044  -6.2465***  -7.7977**  -6.1929***  -9.1792  -1.1440  -4.7977***  -4.3963*** 
Observations  420 420 315 315 434 434 235 235 119 119 149 149 
F-test FE model  2.42*** 70.05***  1.51   10.42*** 0.40    45.86***   15.69***   54.16*** 0.02  3.14***  9.58***    12.97*** 
Davidson-MacK. F-test  7.2528***   0.7957   30.9399***   3.8922**  4.06   9.9015  
Anderson LM statistics  0.525   0.368  0.344   0.33  0.88   1.66  
Sargan statistic Chi2  6.24***   1.27    28.75***   2.30*  1.22   0.47  
Note: This table shows the results of instrumental variable regressions for panel data of the decision to use foreign exchange (FX derivatives), interest rate (IR derivatives) and commodity derivatives (Com 
derivatives) on Tobin’s Q for Canadian industries. Model (3) IV estimate coefficients and OLS estimate coefficients represent the results for instrumental-variable and ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regressions, respectively. FX derivatives, IR derivatives and Com derivatives are dummy variables that take ‘1’ if the firm uses foreign exchange, interest rate and commodity derivatives, respectively. 
Com derivatives has been omitted for Health Care and IT firms due to collinearity. Dividends has been omitted for Health Care firms due to collinearity. The Davidson-MacKinnon F-test (Davidson-MacK. 
F-test) computes a test of exogeneity for a panel regression estimated via instrumental variables. The null hypothesis states that an OLS estimator of the same equation would yield consistent estimates, a 
rejection of the null indicates that endogenous regressors' effects on the estimates are meaningful. The Anderson LM statistics is a test of underidentification, i.e. it tests that the excluded instruments are 
‘relevant’ and correlated with the endogenous variable. The null hypothesis states that the model is underidentified, a rejection of the null indicates that the model is identified. The Sargan statistic Chi2  
provides a test of overidentifying restrictions. The joint null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid instruments, i.e., uncorrelated with the error term, and that the excluded instruments are correctly 
excluded from the estimated equation. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.  
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Appendix K.7 Value of hedging for higher debt firms: Australia Model (1)  
Tobin’s Q 
Energy  Industrials  Materials  Consumer Discretionary Health Care  IT  
Model (1) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (1) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Model (1) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (1) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Model (1) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (1) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Model (1) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (1) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Model (1) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (1) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Model (1) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (1) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Derivatives   0.0128   0.0421 -16.5902   0.0940***  -7.8816  0.0735    1.3615  -0.0711  -1.5697  -0.1425  -1.8240  -0.1592 
Leverage  -0.9750***  -1.0197   0.6885  -0.5268***  -2.7149 -0.5725***  -0.1805  -0.1729  -1.0498  -1.3396***  -1.8569**  -0.9428*** 
Tax losses  -1.2869  -1.3451 -24.8587   0.2913  -5.7625 -0.5535   1.6346   1.0480   0.6459  -0.8655  -4.3550   0.8027 
Current ratio  -0.0036  -1.3451   0.1013  -0.0377*  -0.0496  0.0036  -0.1194**  -0.1526***  -0.1264**  -0.0994***  -0.0425  -0.2209*** 
Dividends    0.4126   0.4068   1.3669   0.0383  -0.6947 -0.1684***  -0.1768  -0.1969**  -0.1301  -0.1362  -0.0372  -0.1302 
ROA  -0.4111***  -0.4140***  -2.0645  -0.3315***   0.0338 -0.4015***  -0.0718***  -0.0707***  -0.6737***  -0.6624***  -0.0795  -0.0844 
Tangible assets  -0.6609  -0.6875 -11.1780  -0.3133   4.1334 -0.3856    omitted    omitted   0.4813   0.1812  -0.9250   0.2518 
R&D expenditure  -0.0525  -0.0512   8.8340   6.8080*  -0.0392 -0.0033*   0.4449   0.4721   0.0166   0.0189*  -0.5364   0.5745 
Capital expenditure  -0.4091***  -0.4097***   0.9124  -0.4839***   0.4205 -0.5446***  -0.6963**  -0.7085***  -0.0527  -0.2984   0.1358  -0.9558 
Firm size   0.4203***   0.4224***   1.8727   0.2228***   0.5118  0.3127***   0.2899*   0.4196***   0.7494***   0.6190***   0.4891***   0.4227*** 
Foreign income   -0.6014  -0.5898*   3.9503   0.1306  -1.8092 -0.4634***  -0.0259   0.1945  -0.6245  -0.4294  -0.5481  -0.5921* 
Constant  -3.6750***  -3.6804***  -5.7685  -2.2666***  -1.8092 -3.0019***  -3.7456**  -4.4190***  -7.0845  -5.7662***  -0.5481**  -3.3448*** 
Observations  206 205 225 224 210 210 230 228 221 220 171 168 
F-test FE model   24.71*** 24.94***  0.03 39.21*** 0.56 51.13*** 6.72*** 11.76*** 9.82***    14.94*** 4.44*** 9.29*** 
Davidson-MacK. F-test 0.0025   2.4429    22.829***  2.7959*  0.5812  3.0052*  
Anderson LM statistics 3.93**   0.02  0.229  3.50*  1.16  2.75*  
Cragg-Donald Wald F-
test               3.73   0.00  0.212  5.36  1.09  2.56  
Note: This table shows the results of instrumental variable regressions for panel data of the decision to use derivatives on Tobin’s Q by industry for Australian firms with “higher debt”. Firms are classified 
as higher debt firms if they have leverage above their industry median leverage for a given year. Model (1) IV estimate coefficients and) OLS estimate coefficients represent the results for instrumental-
variable and ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions, respectively. Derivatives is a dummy variable that takes ‘1’ if the firm uses derivatives. Tangible assets has been omitted for Consumer Discretionary 
firms due to collinearity. The Davidson-MacKinnon F-test (Davidson-MacK. F-test) computes a test of exogeneity for a panel regression estimated via instrumental variables. The null hypothesis states 
that an OLS estimator of the same equation would yield consistent estimates, a rejection of the null indicates that endogenous regressors' effects on the estimates are meaningful. The Anderson LM statistics 
is a test of underidentification, i.e. it tests that the excluded instruments are ‘relevant’ and correlated with the endogenous variable. The null hypothesis states that the model is underidentified, a rejection 
of the null indicates that the model is identified. The Cragg-Donald Wald F-test provides a test statistic to evaluate weak identification, which may arise when excluded instruments are only weakly 
correlated with endogenous variables. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
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Appendix K.8 Value of hedging for higher debt firms: Australia Model (2)  
Tobin’s Q 
Energy  Industrials  Materials  Consumer Discretionary Health Care  IT  
Model (2) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (2) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Model (2) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (2) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Model (2) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (2) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Model (2) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (2) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Model (2) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (2) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Model (2) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (2) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
DFV   5.9848  -1.8720   1.4875   0.1530   2.6770   0.0304  -6.9138  -0.5377  26.6404  -6.4223*   3.5670   1.7527 
Leverage  -1.0855***  -0.9736***  -0.6604***  -0.5420***  -0.0981  -0.5873***   0.7128  -0.1023  -1.6348***  -1.3017***  -0.8378***  -0.8357*** 
Tax losses  -1.2326  -1.3773  -0.6617   0.0565  -3.6745  -0.6358   0.7102   1.0510  -1.2832  -0.9244   0.4381   1.3046 
Current ratio  -0.0043  -0.0035  -0.0193  -0.0360*   0.0004   0.0030  -0.1339***  -0.1494***  -0.0838**  -0.0997**  -0.2300***  -0.2405*** 
Dividends    0.2748   0.4573   0.0222   0.0414  -0.1938  -0.1735***  -0.0641  -0.1876*  -0.2495  -0.1081  -0.1675  -0.1531 
ROA  -0.3127  -0.4400***  -0.3665***  -0.3375***  -0.3385*  -0.3968***  -0.0659*** -0.0703***  -0.6589***  -0.6617***  -0.1007  -0.0876 
Tangible assets  -0.4621  -0.7195  -0.2627  -0.3288   0.4410  -0.3360    omitted    omitted  -0.7876   0.3777   0.3920   0.3772 
R&D expenditure  -0.0544  -0.0508   8.2016   7.1701*  -0.0021  -0.0036**  -0.0413   0.4313   0.0181   0.0194*   0.4842   0.6719 
Capital expenditure  -0.4754***  -0.3846***  -0.4819***  -0.4857***  -0.7159*  -0.5378***  -0.7757***  -0.7157***  -0.5659  -0.2628  -1.2209*  -1.1393* 
Firm size   0.3445**   0.4502***   0.2067***   0.2196***   0.3387***   0.3147***   0.4866***   0.4185***   0.5684***   0.6137***   0.4173***  0.4206**** 
Foreign income   -0.6640*  -0.5505 *   0.1515   0.1557  -0.2636  -0.4733***   0.0231   0.1718  -0.3760  -0.4176  -0.5580*  -0.5981* 
Constant  -2.8450  -4.0168***  -2.0356**  -2.1544***  -4.2392  -3.0257***  -5.5965***  -4.4736***  -4.4088*  -5.9168***  -3.4364***  -3.4584*** 
Observations  206 205 224 223 209 209 229 227 221 220 171 169 
F-test FE model 20.34*** 25.37*** 23.16*** 36.99*** 15.22*** 50.30*** 9.46*** 11.62*** 9.83*** 15.40*** 9.10*** 9.01*** 
Davidson-MacK. F-test 0.5824  1.0096  0.6684  -5.5965  4.0715**  0.0609  
Anderson LM statistics 2.679  1.795  0.313  9.059***  7.15***  10.54***  
Cragg-Donald Wald F-
test               2.518  1.689  0.290  9.005  6.97  10.49  
Note: This table shows the results of instrumental variable regressions for panel data of the extent of derivative use on Tobin’s Q by industry for Australian firms with “higher debt”. Firms are classified 
as higher debt firms if they have leverage above their industry median leverage for a given year. Model (2) IV estimate coefficients and OLS estimate coefficients represent the results for instrumental-
variable and ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions, respectively. DFV denotes the extent of derivative use is proxied by the derivative fair values scaled by total assets. Tangible assets has been omitted 
for Consumer Discretionary firms due to collinearity. The Davidson-MacKinnon F-test (Davidson-MacK. F-test) computes a test of exogeneity for a panel regression estimated via instrumental variables. 
The null hypothesis states that an OLS estimator of the same equation would yield consistent estimates, a rejection of the null indicates that endogenous regressors' effects on the estimates are meaningful. 
The Anderson LM statistics is a test of underidentification, i.e. it tests that the excluded instruments are ‘relevant’ and correlated with the endogenous variable. The null hypothesis states that the model is 
underidentified, a rejection of the null indicates that the model is identified. The Cragg-Donald Wald F-test provides a test statistic to evaluate weak identification, which may arise when excluded 
instruments are only weakly correlated with endogenous variables. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
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Appendix K.9 Value of hedging for higher debt firms: Australia Model (3) 
Tobin’s Q 
Energy  Industrials  Materials  Consumer Discretionary Health Care  IT  
Model (3) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (3) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Model (3) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (3) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Model (3) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (3) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Model (3) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (3) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Model (3) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (3) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Model (3) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (3) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
FX derivatives   4.5965  -0.1012   -0.4890  -0.0538   -2.7051   0.0163  -0.1178   0.0421   0.1416  -0.2303   0.4888  -0.0747 
IR derivatives   2.5211   0.0634   -0.0661   0.0852**   2.7356  -0.0834  -2.0146  -0.0279   2.1721   0.0433  -2.1924   0.0615 
Com derivatives   5.1416   0.0053  -0.4882  -0.0370   1.4679   0.0495  -0.1992  -0.0360   2.6114  -0.1795    omitted    omitted 
Leverage  -3.5681  -1.0025***  -0.6016***  -0.5119***   1.5074  -0.5957***  -0.1999  -0.1801  -1.8887**  -1.3239***  -0.4368  -0.8951*** 
Tax losses  -1.9003  -1.3304   1.5078   0.1119   1.5074  -0.5932  -0.7804   1.0430  -2.5472  -1.1149   1.0449   1.2366 
Current ratio  -0.0310  -0.0035  -0.0405  -0.0384**   0.0064   0.0034  -0.1963*   1.0430***  -0.0790  -0.0943***  -0.2986**  -0.2299*** 
Dividends   1.3041   0.4788   0.0256   0.0483  -0.6046  -0.1819**   0.0027  -0.1958*  -0.2284  -0.0943  -0.1533  -0.1357 
ROA   1.3041  -0.3983***  -0.1915  -0.3324***  -0.4167  -0.4029***  -0.0717***  -0.0707***  -0.6638***  -0.6581***  -0.1047  -0.0837 
Tangible assets -10.3456  -0.5883  -0.3846  -0.3299  10.5663  -0.5011    omitted    omitted   0.3126   0.2285   0.9822   0.3280 
R&D expenditure  -0.2082  -0.0510   7.3748   6.8317*   0.0054  -0.0034**   0.4849   0.4850   0.0215   0.0184*  -1.8508   0.7027 
Capital expenditure  -1.5265  -0.4041***  -0.4069  -0.5301***  -0.4702  -0.5390***  -0.5910  -0.6972***  -0.4599  -0.3059  -2.3432  -0.9631 
Firm size  -0.0447   0.4239***   0.2333   0.2018***   0.4186   0.3115***   0.7327   0.4138***   0.5115   0.6187***   0.4032***   0.4188*** 
Foreign income   -2.1030  -0.5778  -0.0555   0.1486  -1.1681  -0.4610***   0.3900   0.1870  -0.4064  -0.3779  -0.2993  -0.6106* 
Constant  10.7816  -3.7991***  -1.9085  -1.9286** -15.2565  -2.8388***  -7.2647  -4.3959***  -5.1193*  -5.8152***  -3.5634***  -3.3971*** 
Observations  205 205 225 224 210 209 230 228 221 219 169 167 
F-test FE model 0.74 20.92*** 15.49*** 33.03***  2.24** 42.95*** 4.47*** 9.66*** 7.19***   12.31*** 3.84*** 8.16*** 
Davidson-MacK. F-test   12.30***  1.17   10.01***   0.9843  0.8551  1.277  
Anderson LM statistics 8.81***  1.23  7.46***    0.49  0.88  2.18  
Sargan statistic Chi2 0.003  0.051  0.005   0.441  0.020  0.076  
Note: This table shows the results of instrumental variable regressions for panel data of the decision to use foreign exchange (FX derivatives), interest rate (IR derivatives) and commodity derivatives (Com 
derivatives) on Tobin’s Q by industry for Australian firms with “higher debt”. Firms are classified as higher debt firms if they have leverage above their industry median leverage for a given year. Model 
(3) IV estimate coefficients and OLS estimate coefficients represent the results for instrumental-variable and ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions, respectively. FX derivatives, IR derivatives and Com 
derivatives are dummy variables that take ‘1’ if the firm uses foreign exchange, interest rate and commodity derivatives, respectively. Com derivatives has been omitted for IT firms due to collinearity. 
Tangible assets has been omitted for Consumer Discretionary firms due to collinearity. The Davidson-MacKinnon F-test (Davidson-MacK. F-test) computes a test of exogeneity for a panel regression 
estimated via instrumental variables. The null hypothesis states that an OLS estimator of the same equation would yield consistent estimates, a rejection of the null indicates that endogenous regressors' 
effects on the estimates are meaningful. The Anderson LM statistics is a test of underidentification, i.e. it tests that the excluded instruments are ‘relevant’ and correlated with the endogenous variable. The 
null hypothesis states that the model is underidentified, a rejection of the null indicates that the model is identified. The Sargan statistic Chi2  provides a test of overidentifying restrictions. The joint null 
hypothesis is that the instruments are valid instruments, i.e., uncorrelated with the error term, and that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation. Statistical significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.  
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Appendix K.10 Value of hedging for higher debt firms: Canada Model (1)  
Tobin’s Q 
Energy  Industrials  Materials  Consumer Discretionary Health Care  IT  
Model (1) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (1) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Model (1) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (1) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Model (1) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (1) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Model (1) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (1) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Model (1) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (1) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Model (1) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (1) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Derivatives   0.1034   0.0618   1.2199  -0.0085   0.1576  -0.1326**  -0.3845  -0.0913*  -8.0928   0.1376  -0.8321  -0.0198 
Leverage  -0.6643***  -0.6491***  -0.4895  -0.0409  -1.6579***  -1.6205***  -1.0715***  -1.0355***   0.0273  -1.1737  -1.4696***  -1.3299** 
Tax losses  -1.7618**  -1.7416**   0.4920  -2.3585   5.9360***   5.7448***  -2.5674  -0.4210   1.4929  -1.3554   1.5763  -1.4710 
Current ratio    0.0353***   0.0347***   0.0457  -0.0664  -0.0213  -0.0244*  -0.0180  -0.0045  -0.0988  -0.0662  -0.0220  -0.0320 
Dividends   -0.0562  -0.0613  -0.2989*  -0.0037  -0.2023  -0.1970  -0.0291  -0.0280    omitted    omitted   0.0398   0.0210 
ROA  -0.0562**  -0.5996***  -0.9945  -0.5292  -0.0188   0.0100   0.7970   0.2120   0.1855   0.0913   0.4359   0.2787 
Tangible assets   1.1554**   1.1749***   0.0520   1.3662   0.4688   0.8223  -0.3611   0.5316  -1.8609   0.0860   0.6451   0.2677 
R&D expenditure  -0.0184***  -0.0187*** 38.6142  44.0320   0.2748   0.5824 10.4584  -3.5357  -0.0059  -0.0007   1.7270   2.2480 
Capital expenditure  -0.5168***  -0.5163***  -1.2732  -0.7547**  -0.1449***  -0.1384***  -0.2884  -0.2167  -1.2527  -2.0921  -2.7488**  -3.4156*** 
Firm size    0.1905***   0.1972***  -0.3154**   0.1708   0.3245***   0.3482***   0.3659***   0.3518***   0.5708  -0.0247   0.5555***   0.4219*** 
Foreign income   -0.3129**  -0.3154**   0.3811  -0.2180   0.1226   0.1568   0.0886  -0.0135   1.2226   1.2604   0.3305   0.5703 
Constant  -2.9800**  -3.0671***   4.0387  -0.2180  -4.3490***  -4.9342***  -3.7270***  -4.4155***  -0.5762   1.8953  -6.1855***  -4.8317*** 
Observations  210 210 155 155 215 215 115 115 58 58 74 74 
F-test FE model  66.70*** 67.47*** 0.67 1.79*  38.98*** 44.83***  24.76*** 36.67 0.38 1.09 6.42*** 8.15*** 
Davidson-MacKinnon F 0.0111  0.8030  0.6906  2.2926  0.4923  1.2110  
Anderson LM statistics 1.45  0.50  5.13**  5.062**  0.324  4.842**  
Cragg-Donald Wald F-
test               1.36  0.45  4.92  4.67  0.251  4.223  
Note: This table shows the results of instrumental variable regressions for panel data of the decision to use derivatives on Tobin’s Q by industry for Canadian firms with “higher debt”. Firms are classified 
as higher debt firms if they have leverage above their industry median leverage for a given year. Model (1) IV estimate coefficients and OLS estimate coefficients represent the results for instrumental-
variable and ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions, respectively. Derivatives is a dummy variable that takes ‘1’ if the firm uses derivatives. Dividends has been omitted for Health Care firms due to 
collinearity. The Davidson-MacKinnon F-test (Davidson-MacK. F-test) computes a test of exogeneity for a panel regression estimated via instrumental variables. The null hypothesis states that an OLS 
estimator of the same equation would yield consistent estimates, a rejection of the null indicates that endogenous regressors' effects on the estimates are meaningful. The Anderson LM statistics is a test 
of underidentification, i.e. it tests that the excluded instruments are ‘relevant’ and correlated with the endogenous variable. The null hypothesis states that the model is underidentified, a rejection of the 
null indicates that the model is identified. The Cragg-Donald Wald F-test provides a test statistic to evaluate weak identification, which may arise when excluded instruments are only weakly correlated 
with endogenous variables. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
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Appendix K.11 Value of hedging for higher debt firms: Canada Model (2)  
Tobin’s Q 
Energy  Industrials  Materials  Consumer Discretionary Health Care  IT  
Model (2) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (2) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Model (2) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (2) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Model (2) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (2) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Model (2) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (2) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Model (2) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (2) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Model (2) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (2) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
DFV -13.9352   1.2185  -4.1025  -0.1017   1.4598  -0.5331   4.6178   0.2857 -29.5679  -0.1385 -77.0380  -5.3143 
Leverage  -0.0599  -0.6852***   0.2401   0.0163  -1.5791***  -1.5863***  -0.9848***  -1.0237***  -0.1565 -1.1490  -0.6005  -1.2764*** 
Tax losses  -1.0234  -1.9050***  -2.9860  -3.0172   5.8375***   5.8463***   1.3886   0.3148  -0.6002 -1.3045   6.7787  -0.9709 
Current ratio    0.0315*   0.0325***  -0.0637  -0.0608  -0.0211  -0.0235   0.0094  -0.0011  -0.0856 -0.0669  -0.1054  -0.0373 
Dividends   -0.0757  -0.0651   0.0705   0.0061  -0.2553*  -0.2483*  -0.0095  -0.0264    omitted    omitted  -0.2085   0.0048 
ROA  -0.6079*  -0.6524***  -0.4499  -0.5467  -0.0331  -0.0023   0.1368   0.0406   0.1712 0.0932  -0.1571   0.2451 
Tangible assets   1.0897   1.2330***   1.3120   1.3374   0.6562   0.6551   1.2623   0.0406  -0.0022 0.0532   2.2313   0.3946 
R&D expenditure  -0.0276  -0.0179*** 41.8013  43.6616   0.4259   0.4543  -8.2031  -7.8893  -0.0053 -0.0008   3.3574   2.3363 
Capital expenditure  -0.5182***  -0.5308***  -0.8529**  -0.8004**  -0.1394***  -0.1369***  -0.2975  -0.2034  -2.2169 -2.0787  -4.5495**  -3.5090*** 
Firm size    0.2692*   0.2040***   0.1657   0.1567   0.3402***   0.3522***   0.3978***   0.3491***   0.2246 -0.0137   0.1707   0.4015*** 
Foreign income   -0.4013  -0.3254**  -0.2640  -0.2124   0.1275   0.1372   0.0079  -0.0422   1.4151 1.2604   1.5031   0.6401* 
Constant  -3.9982*  -3.1576***  -2.8830  -2.7108  -4.7094  -4.8611***  -5.7373***  -4.6895***  -0.9213 1.8410  -3.9556   0.6401*** 
Observations  205 205 146 146 212 212 113 113 58 58 74 74 
F-test FE model  15.64***   57.06*** 1.37 1.52   40.42*** 43.02***  14.75*** 30.43***  0.91   1.09 3.59*** 8.23*** 
Davidson-MacKinnon F 0.8012  0.4902   0.6142  1.2258   0.4095  1.2424  
Anderson LM statistics 0.33  3.633*   9.79***  1.30   2.11  1.2424  
Cragg-Donald Wald F-
test               0.304  3.364   9.711  1.14   1.705  1.15  
Note: This table shows the results of instrumental variable regressions for panel data of the extent of derivative use on Tobin’s Q by industry for Canadian Australian firms with “higher debt”. Firms are 
classified as higher debt firms if they have leverage above their industry median leverage for a given year. Model (2) IV estimate coefficients and OLS estimate coefficients represent the results for 
instrumental-variable and ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions, respectively. DFV denotes the extent of derivative use is proxied by the derivative fair values scaled by total assets. Dividends has been 
omitted for Health Care firms due to collinearity. The Davidson-MacKinnon F-test (Davidson-MacK. F-test) computes a test of exogeneity for a panel regression estimated via instrumental variables. The 
null hypothesis states that an OLS estimator of the same equation would yield consistent estimates, a rejection of the null indicates that endogenous regressors' effects on the estimates are meaningful. The 
Anderson LM statistics is a test of underidentification, i.e. it tests that the excluded instruments are ‘relevant’ and correlated with the endogenous variable. The null hypothesis states that the model is 
underidentified, a rejection of the null indicates that the model is identified. The Cragg-Donald Wald F-test provides a test statistic to evaluate weak identification, which may arise when excluded 
instruments are only weakly correlated with endogenous variables. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.  
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Appendix K.12 Value of hedging for higher debt firms: Canada Model (3)  
Tobin’s Q 
Energy  Industrials  Materials  Consumer Discretionary Health Care  IT  
Model (3) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (3) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Model (3) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (3) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Model (3) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (3) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Model (3) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (3) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Model (3) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (3) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Model (3) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (3) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
FX derivatives   0.0325  -0.0229    0.1262  -0.2122*  -7.0408  -0.0962 -0.3815  -0.0569    omitted    omitted   0.2968   0.0318 
IR derivatives  -0.1865   0.0347   0.3585   0.0764  -1.6631   0.0306 0.3702*   0.0045 -0.0124 -0.2350 -2.0097*  -0.4240** 
Com derivatives  -0.2472   0.0478  -2.1696   0.0261   7.9885  -0.0758    omitted    omitted    omitted    omitted    omitted    omitted 
Leverage  -0.5487**  -0.6373***  -0.0384  -0.0528  -3.6578  -1.6071*** -1.3275***  -1.0455*** -1.1530 -1.1403 -0.4214  -1.1478*** 
Tax losses  -2.1839*  -1.6297**   0.5261  -2.1664  12.1170   6.3793*** 5.1155   0.4186 -1.3227 -1.1403 -3.1093  -1.8658 
Current ratio   0.0337**   0.0337***   0.0866  -0.0691  -0.0940  -0.0251* 0.0275   0.0013 -0.0669 -0.0682 -0.1373*  -0.0547** 
Dividends  -0.0891  -0.0631   0.1366   0.0065  -0.6564  -0.1814 0.0699  -0.0284    omitted    omitted -0.1373  -0.0825 
ROA  -0.8989  -0.5803***  -0.7981  -0.5621  -0.2872   0.0096 0.3128   0.0152 0.0972 0.0948 -0.0438   0.2168 
Tangible assets   1.1723   1.2210***   1.7726   1.3510  22.0410   0.4831 3.1788**   0.8601 0.0502 -0.0098   2.0483   0.6664 
R&D expenditure  -0.0207*  -0.0190***  42.6717  43.4613   3.0745   0.3882 7.0947  -5.1524 -0.0008 -0.0009   1.3399   2.0295 
Capital expenditure  -0.4481**  -0.5283***  -0.0245  -0.7899**  -0.4275  -0.1387*** -0.0998  -0.2042 -2.0832 -2.1743 -3.7919**  -3.4714*** 
Firm size   0.2841   0.1941***   0.3167   0.1572  -1.1086   0.3437*** 0.2595***   0.3398*** -0.0138 0.0028   0.4192*   0.4242*** 
Foreign income   -0.2791  -0.3328**  -0.3471  -0.1827   0.2976   0.1327 0.1029   0.0043 1.2581 1.2289   0.7095   0.5882* 
Constant  -4.1280* -3.0464***  -5.6533  -2.5837  -4.5906  -4.5120*** -5.4315***  -4.5495*** 1.8502 1.7816 -6.0958**  -5.1319*** 
Observations  210 210 155 155 215 215 115 115 58 58 74 74 
F-test FE model  37.25*** 56.00*** 0.59 1.89** 0.24 37.24*** 9.81*** 32.12***  1.09   1.09 3.12*** 8.71*** 
Davidson-MacK. F-test 0.1527  1.27  4.63***  9.91***    4.10**  
Anderson LM statistics 0.25  1.72  0.05  3.235    3.12  
Sargan statistic Chi2 3.512*     0.096  0.001  1.174    1.291  
Note: This table shows the results of instrumental variable regressions for panel data of the decision to use foreign exchange (FX derivatives), interest rate (IR derivatives) and commodity derivatives 
(Com derivatives) on Tobin’s Q by industry for Canadian firms with “higher debt”. Firms are classified as higher debt firms if they have leverage above their industry median leverage for a given year. 
Model (3) IV estimate coefficients and OLS estimate coefficients represent the results for instrumental-variable and ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions, respectively. FX derivatives, IR derivatives 
and Com derivatives are dummy variables that take ‘1’ if the firm uses foreign exchange, interest rate and commodity derivatives, respectively. Com derivatives has been omitted for Consumer 
Discretionary, Health Care and IT firms due to collinearity. FX derivatives and Dividends have been omitted for Health Care firms due to collinearity. The Davidson-MacKinnon F-test (Davidson-MacK. 
F-test) computes a test of exogeneity for a panel regression estimated via instrumental variables. The null hypothesis states that an OLS estimator of the same equation would yield consistent estimates, a 
rejection of the null indicates that endogenous regressors' effects on the estimates are meaningful. The Anderson LM statistics is a test of underidentification, i.e. it tests that the excluded instruments are 
‘relevant’ and correlated with the endogenous variable. The null hypothesis states that the model is underidentified, a rejection of the null indicates that the model is identified. The Sargan statistic Chi2  
provides a test of overidentifying restrictions. The joint null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid instruments, i.e., uncorrelated with the error term, and that the excluded instruments are correctly 
excluded from the estimated equation. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.  
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Appendix K.13 Value of hedging with increasing debt: Australia Model (4)  
Tobin’s Q 
Energy  Industrials  Materials  Consumer Discretionary Health Care  IT  
Model (4) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (4) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Model (4) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (4) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Model (4) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (4) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Model (4) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (4) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Model (4) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (4) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Model (4) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (4) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Derivatives *Leverage   7.6261   0.1024  -0.7618   0.0888 -125.8727   0.0283  -9.4498  -0.2027 -32.9135  -0.2475 -13.1065**  -0.6520 
Leverage  -4.0349**  -1.1756***  -0.1877  -0.6454***    59.3181  -0.1731   3.6685  -0.7796***   5.2243  -0.5267*   0.4913  -0.5228 
Tax losses   0.2304  -1.8699  -0.1584   0.1378    10.1248  -0.9617  -2.8438  -0.2686   1.7303   0.9196   5.9674***   5.9150*** 
Current ratio  -0.0041**  -0.0040***  -0.0385  -0.0435***   -0.0093  -0.0048***  -0.0319  -0.0824***  -0.0026  -0.0055**  -0.0014  -0.0010 
Dividends   0.7435   0.5251*   0.0360   0.0205   -2.0846  -0.1743*  -0.2123  -0.2237**  -0.1965   0.1466   0.4592   0.1347 
ROA  -0.2547  -0.4214***  -0.6217***  -0.6086***   -0.1091  -0.0793***  -0.0129  -0.0739***   0.0004   0.0003  -0.2740**  -0.2842*** 
Tangible assets  -1.9655   0.1482   0.5993   0.7069*    7.2724  -1.5013*  -7.7857  -4.4040***   0.6219   0.2423  -1.3309**  -1.4035*** 
R&D expenditure  -0.0096  -0.0049  -0.0064**  -0.0061***    0.0099   0.0075**   0.0620  -4.4040**   0.0052   0.0052*  -0.0026  -0.0022 
Capital expenditure  -0.5033***  -0.4106***  -0.7151***  -0.6838***    1.1560  -0.6994***   0.0191  -0.5362***  -1.4568  -0.5477*  -0.1639  -0.5650 
Firm size   0.4165***   0.4868***   0.3175***   0.3228***    1.1339   0.2856***   0.8553   0.4644***   0.4120**   0.4824***   0.4675***   0.4604*** 
Foreign income    0.0042   0.0064   0.0139  -0.1180   -0.1564  -0.3465**   0.5941   0.3438   -0.3935  -0.0492  -1.1423**  -0.8598*** 
Constant  -2.3225  -5.2433*** -3.8908**  -4.0470  -19.5838  -1.2341  -1.5582  -0.1756 -3.1947  -4.2132***  -2.5484***  -2.5744*** 
Observations  437 438 447 450 409 412 456 458 459 459 339 339 
F-test FE model 17.48*** 49.42*** 50.20*** 62.35***   0.09 36.83***  4.59*** 36.04*** 0.77*** 12.53***  8.08*** 18.37*** 
Davidson-MacKinnon F   6.0498**   0.0273    45.32***  1.27  1.90   7.26***  
Anderson LM statistics  3.285*   0.12   0.097  0.193  0.128   5.37**  
Cragg-Donald Wald F-test                3.211   0.12   0.094  0.187  0.124   5.58  
Note: This table shows the results of the interaction between the decision to use of derivatives and leverage on Tobin’s Q by industry for Australian firms. Model (4) IV estimate coefficients and OLS 
estimate coefficients represent the results for instrumental-variable and ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions, respectively. Derivatives is a dummy variable that takes ‘1’ if the firm uses derivatives. 
The Davidson-MacKinnon F-test (Davidson-MacK. F-test) computes a test of exogeneity for a panel regression estimated via instrumental variables. The null hypothesis states that an OLS estimator of 
the same equation would yield consistent estimates, a rejection of the null indicates that endogenous regressors' effects on the estimates are meaningful. The Anderson LM statistics is a test of 
underidentification, i.e. it tests that the excluded instruments are ‘relevant’ and correlated with the endogenous variable. The null hypothesis states that the model is underidentified, a rejection of the null 
indicates that the model is identified. The Cragg-Donald Wald F-test provides a test statistic to evaluate weak identification, which may arise when excluded instruments are only weakly correlated with 
endogenous variables. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.   
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Appendix K.14 Value of hedging with increasing debt: Australia Model (5)  
Tobin’s Q 
Energy  Industrials  Materials  Consumer Discretionary Health Care  IT  
Model (5) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (5) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Model (5) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (5) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Model (5) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (5) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Model (5) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (5) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Model (5) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (5) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Model (5) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (5) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
DVF *Leverage 63.8707  -1.4980   6.0600   0.2570 29.3661*   1.5309   6.1642   1.9042** 85.7209  -18.4533 -18.0103   2.8068 
Leverage  -2.2651**  -1.1144***  -0.8369***  -0.6092***  -2.4441*  -0.2820  -1.3297***  -1.0192***  -0.8649  -0.4210  -0.7022  -0.5739 
Tax losses  -1.7307  -1.9439  -0.1057   0.0904  -1.8201  -0.6698   0.0493  -0.1310   0.8935   0.9702   5.7527***   5.9147*** 
Current ratio  -0.0043***  -0.0041***  -0.0437***  -0.0434***  -0.0038  -0.0050***  -0.0905***  -0.0857***  -0.0055**  -0.0056**  -0.0017  -0.0010 
Dividends   0.4033   0.5266*   0.0167   0.0207  -0.2103  -0.1760*  -0.2760***  -0.2405***   0.1257   0.1931   0.3499   0.1141 
ROA  -0.2707*  -0.4252***  -0.6125***  -0.6065***  -0.0767  -0.0791***  -0.0815***  -0.0772***   0.0003   0.0003  -0.2756***  -0.2849*** 
Tangible assets  -0.0306   0.1992   1.0217*   0.7220*   6.8743  -1.0448  -3.8278***  -4.1758***  -0.2669  -0.0292  -1.2673**  -1.4095*** 
R&D expenditure  -0.0075  -0.0047  -0.0061***  -0.0062***   0.0067   0.0070**   0.1608***   0.1518***   0.0054*   0.0054*  -0.0003  -0.0022 
Capital expenditure  -0.5067***  -0.4031***  -0.6317***  -0.6860***  -0.9850***  -0.7145***  -0.5327***  -0.5441***  -0.7957**  -0.7096**  -0.3330  -0.5899 
Firm size   0.3924***   0.4915***   0.3283***   0.3200***   0.2601***   0.2853***   0.4146***   0.4433***   0.3930***   0.3927***   0.4335***   0.4604*** 
Foreign income    0.0030   0.0062  -0.0774  -0.1018  -0.2166  -0.3423**   0.3983   0.3570  -0.1875  -0.2412  -1.0302***  -0.8421** 
Constant  -3.8552*** -5.3515***  -4.4018***  -4.0238***  -8.9062*  -1.6632*  -0.0328  -0.1114  -2.7994***  -3.0062***  -2.3675***  -2.5790*** 
Observations  436 437 446 449 405 409 453 456 459 459 339 339 
F-test FE model   24.78*** 49.40***   38.41*** 61.96*** 9.91*** 37.55***   34.02*** 36.14***   10.39*** 12.65***   11.05*** 18.22*** 
Davidson-MacKinnon F 5.3488**   1.2159    10.74***   0.4891   1.6046   3.4418**  
Anderson LM statistics 5.30**   2.067   3.791*  10.837***   7.84***   5.162**  
Cragg-Donald Wald F-test               5.56   2.014   3.705  10.832   7.77   5.704  
Note: This table shows the results of instrumental variable regressions for Australian industry level panel data of the interaction between the extent of derivative use and leverage. Model (5) IV estimate 
coefficients and OLS estimate coefficients represent the results for instrumental-variable and ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions, respectively. DFV denotes the extent of derivative use is proxied by 
the derivative fair values scaled by total assets. The Davidson-MacKinnon F-test (Davidson-MacK. F-test) computes a test of exogeneity for a panel regression estimated via instrumental variables. The 
null hypothesis states that an OLS estimator of the same equation would yield consistent estimates, a rejection of the null indicates that endogenous regressors' effects on the estimates are meaningful. The 
Anderson LM statistics is a test of underidentification, i.e. it tests that the excluded instruments are ‘relevant’ and correlated with the endogenous variable. The null hypothesis states that the model is 
underidentified, a rejection of the null indicates that the model is identified. The Cragg-Donald Wald F-test provides a test statistic to evaluate weak identification, which may arise when excluded 
instruments are only weakly correlated with endogenous variables. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.   
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Appendix K.15 Value of hedging with increasing debt: Australia Model (6)  
Tobin’s Q 
(1) Energy  (2) Industrials  (3) Materials  (4) Consumer Disc.  (5) Health Care (6) IT  
IV estimate 
coefficients 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
FX derivatives* Leverage -45.7500  -0.5489  -0.4773  -0.0580  33.4237   0.2660  -1.7254  -0.2097  -0.2944  -0.9629 -41.3469   0.2421 
IR derivatives* Leverage   0.7321  -0.1928  -0.0235   0.0915 -25.0616  -0.6665   0.7476  -0.1102    4.9279   0.0341 114.6325  -0.5341 
Com derivatives* Leverage   1.4981   0.3318   3.3932  -0.1343   3.3031  -0.2593   1.6490  -0.0134 -12.6907  -0.3496    omitted    omitted 
Leverage   6.7821  -1.1271***  -0.5472  -0.6023*** -13.0656  -0.1602  -0.3788  -0.7328***  -1.3428*  -0.4276  -4.9723  -0.5665 
Tax losses   6.0880  -1.7995   0.1440   0.0956  -5.0950  -0.9631  -0.4240  -0.3169   0.9013   0.9648   1.9357   5.9342*** 
Current ratio  -0.0040  -0.0041***  -0.0403*  -0.0438***  -0.0032  -0.0047***  -0.0763***  -0.0818***  -0.0063**  -0.0056**  -0.0067  -0.0010 
Dividends  -1.2923   0.4755  -0.0116   0.0244  -0.1568  -0.1843*  -0.2877***  -0.2182***   0.2522   0.1799  -1.4826   0.1248 
ROA  -0.0392  -0.4089***  -0.5533***  -0.6064***  -0.0806  -0.0793***  -0.0705***  -0.0735***   0.0003    0.0003  -0.1661  -0.2857*** 
Tangible assets   9.6846   0.2317   0.3123   0.7045* -23.5326  -1.8947**  -4.0047***  -4.4090***   0.0054   -0.0694  -0.7415  -1.4146*** 
R&D expenditure   0.0164  -0.0046  -0.0062***  -0.0062***   0.0037**   0.0074**   0.1562***   0.1467***  -0.0687   0.0054*   0.0197  -0.0023 
Capital expenditure  -0.1527  -0.4043***  -0.6110***  -0.6923***  -1.3964**  -0.7045***  -0.5206***  -0.5430***  -0.6561*  -0.7182**   1.2992  -0.5974 
Firm size   0.5906**   0.4911***   0.2905***   0.3187***   0.0795   0.2862***   0.4421***   0.4637***   0.3974***   0.3960***   0.4295   0.4600*** 
Foreign income    0.0190   0.0064  -0.1487  -0.0979   0.9749  -0.3326**   0.3697   0.3410  -0.2215  -0.2155  -2.9415  -0.8318*** 
Constant -15.8007  -5.3676***  -3.2847  -3.9944***  23.3494  -0.8379  -0.2816  -0.1666  -3.0870***  -3.0025***  -1.5811  -2.5769*** 
Observations  436 437 445 448 408 411 452 457 458 459 339 339 
F-test FE model 1.82** 41.93***  34.63*** 52.32***  1.28 31.24***   23.93*** 30.35*** 7.51*** 10.60*** 0.31   16.69*** 
Davidson-MacK. F-test 20.5078***   -3.2847*    22.674***   1.094  0.9257    14.861***  
Anderson LM statistics 22.65***     1.71    18.59***   0.82  1.11   9.85***  
Sargan statistic Chi2 0.741  0.028  0.174   0.260  1.488    0.002  
Note: This table shows the results the interaction between leverage and the decision to use foreign exchange (FX derivatives), interest rate (IR derivatives) and commodity derivatives (Com derivatives) 
on Tobin’s Q for Australian firms, respectively. Model (6) IV estimate coefficients and OLS estimate coefficients represent the results for instrumental-variable and ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions, 
respectively. FX derivatives, IR derivatives and Com derivatives are dummy variables that take ‘1’ if the firm uses foreign exchange, interest rate and commodity derivatives, respectively. The interaction 
variable Com derivatives*Leverage have been omitted for IT firms due to collinearity. The Davidson-MacKinnon F-test (Davidson-MacK. F-test) computes a test of exogeneity for a panel regression 
estimated via instrumental variables. The null hypothesis states that an OLS estimator of the same equation would yield consistent estimates, a rejection of the null indicates that endogenous regressors' 
effects on the estimates are meaningful. The Anderson LM statistics is a test of underidentification, i.e. it tests that the excluded instruments are ‘relevant’ and correlated with the endogenous variable. The 
null hypothesis states that the model is underidentified, a rejection of the null indicates that the model is identified. The Sargan statistic Chi2  provides a test of overidentifying restrictions. The joint null 
hypothesis is that the instruments are valid instruments, i.e., uncorrelated with the error term, and that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation. Statistical significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.  
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Appendix K.16 Value of hedging with increasing debt: Canada Model (4)  
Tobin’s Q 
Energy  Industrials  Materials  Consumer Discretionary Health Care  IT  
Model (4) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (4) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Model (4) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (4) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Model (4) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (4) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Model (4) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (4) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Model (4) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (4) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Model (4) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (4) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Derivatives *Leverage  -4.8018   0.4167** -10.3193  -0.2118 12.1286  -0.3156   0.0523  -0.1119  -5.9692  -0.3909 5.1488  -2.2673*** 
Leverage   2.6081  -1.0734*** 4.9207  -0.1533  -6.4784  -1.4091***  -0.9863*  -0.9048***   0.9342  -1.309* -1.8990  -0.5760* 
Tax losses  -0.0731   0.1673 -13.6862  -0.2261 13.4597   5.5406***   1.5627   1.4500  -1.2558   0.0354 -0.0601   0.3759 
Current ratio  -0.0112  -0.0095* -0.2051  -0.0854***   0.0014   0.0010  -0.0692***  -0.0679***  -0.0753  -0.0882*** 0.0260  -0.0487*** 
Dividends  -0.2180  -0.1377** 0.5956   0.0241  -0.2992  -0.3841***   0.0215   0.0148    omitted    omitted -0.0271   0.2243 
ROA  -0.3220   -0.0722 1.5399  -0.1199  -0.4661  -0.1056  -0.3189  -0.2919  -0.2291  -0.1906 -0.2343  -0.2092 
Tangible assets   2.4347   1.0832*** -3.8884  -0.6649   1.3590   1.2883*   0.2910   0.3153*  -1.0401  -0.4238 -0.7526   0.3487 
R&D expenditure  -0.0539  -0.0014 -0.4676  -0.7444   0.0203  -0.0236*  -0.1279  -0.1322  -0.0081  -0.0008 0.3052   0.1897 
Capital expenditure  -0.5448***  -0.6437*** 1.6069  -0.5704***  -0.2130  -0.1460***  -0.1487  -0.1392**  -0.0288  -0.2675 -4.4392  -2.1493*** 
Firm size   0.3922**   0.2353*** 1.0834   0.4001***   0.2790   0.4346***   0.5230***   0.5312***   0.5616   0.3139** 0.3068   0.4459*** 
Foreign income    0.3344   0.2353* -0.1456  -0.4257*  -0.9773   0.0673  -0.4766***  -0.4698***   0.8151   0.4392 0.3404  -0.0629 
Constant  -6.8439*  -3.3074*** -9.8135  -3.5605***  -4.0911  -6.3421***  -6.2685***  -6.3930***  -3.8004  -1.4495 -2.3301  -4.5294*** 
Observations  420 420 315 315 434 434 235 235 119 119 149 149 
F-test FE model 20.84*** 84.51*** 0.55 12.64*** 7.71*** 54.20***    60.74*** 61.53*** 2.51** 3.40*** 5.36 *** 13.21*** 
Davidson-MacKinnon F 4.37**  1.60  2.01    0.02  0.52  0.3656  
Anderson LM statistics 1.47  0.08  0.34    2.02  1.56  0.32  
Cragg-Donald Wald F-test               1.42  0.07  0.33    1.92  1.41  0.293  
Note: This table shows the results of the interaction between the decision to use of derivatives and leverage on Tobin’s Q by industry for Canadian firms. Model (4) IV estimate coefficients and OLS 
estimate coefficients represent the results for instrumental-variable and ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions, respectively. Derivatives is a dummy variable that takes ‘1’ if the firm uses derivatives. 
Dividends has been omitted for Health Care firms due to collinearity. The Davidson-MacKinnon F-test (Davidson-MacK. F-test) computes a test of exogeneity for a panel regression estimated via 
instrumental variables. The null hypothesis states that an OLS estimator of the same equation would yield consistent estimates, a rejection of the null indicates that endogenous regressors' effects on the 
estimates are meaningful. The Anderson LM statistics is a test of underidentification, i.e. it tests that the excluded instruments are ‘relevant’ and correlated with the endogenous variable. The null hypothesis 
states that the model is underidentified, a rejection of the null indicates that the model is identified. The Cragg-Donald Wald F-test provides a test statistic to evaluate weak identification, which may arise 
when excluded instruments are only weakly correlated with endogenous variables. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.   
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Appendix K.17 Value of hedging with increasing debt: Canada Model (5)  
Tobin’s Q 
Energy  Industrials  Materials  Consumer Discretionary Health Care  IT  
Model (5) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (5) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Model (5) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (5) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Model (5) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (5) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Model (5) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (5) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Model (5) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (5) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
Model (5) 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
Model (5) 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
DVF *Leverage -31.3590   3.7623 -14.5761   0.2350 28.9850*    0.1331 10.6896   0.5756 -11.7454  -5.5402 -46.1066 -37.1738* 
Leverage  -0.1747  -0.8946***   0.0120  -0.2741  -1.8780***  -1.5115***  -1.0093***  -0.9706***  -1.2060  -1.3440**  -0.2755  -0.9241*** 
Tax losses   0.2678   0.1050  -1.4384  -0.4836   6.4875***   5.7740***   2.0195   1.5350   0.0402   0.0855   7.2058   0.7992 
Current ratio  -0.0083  -0.0099*  -0.0798*  -0.0833**   0.0010   0.0011  -0.0641***  -0.0683***  -0.0886***  -0.0889***  -0.1059  -0.0322* 
Dividends  -0.1458*  -0.1356**   0.1114  -0.0231  -0.4118**  -0.4131***   0.0342   0.0192    omitted    omitted   0.2085   0.1523 
ROA  -0.1169  -0.0911  -0.2303  -0.2091  -0.2486*  -0.1184  -0.4119*  -0.3096*  -0.1930  -0.1904  -1.0601  -0.2843 
Tangible assets   1.2538**   1.1900**  -0.5612  -0.6873   1.4677   1.2846*   0.3145   0.2929*  -0.3858  -0.3831   1.7879   0.1539 
R&D expenditure  -0.0164  -0.0023  -0.8909  -0.8445  -0.0201  -0.0226*  -0.0761  -0.1417  -0.0012  -0.0007  -0.0963   0.1994 
Capital expenditure  -0.6140***  -0.6423***  -0.4886*  -0.5333**  -0.1521***  -0.1469***  -0.1404*  -0.1397**  -0.2299  -0.2586  -1.5196  -2.7431*** 
Firm size   0.2630***   0.2451***   0.3863***   0.3982***   0.4182***   0.4328***   0.5528***   0.5314***   0.3276**   0.3112***   0.4599**   0.4079*** 
Foreign income    0.2188   0.2038*  -0.5171  -0.4987*  -0.0173   0.0355  -0.4840***  -0.4837***   0.4504   0.4306   0.3829   0.0862 
Constant  -3.9393***  -3.5369***  -3.6142***  -3.4908***  -6.2820  -6.3006***  -6.7303***  -6.3893***  -1.6680  -1.4655  -6.1627  -4.0413*** 
Observations  414 414 296 296 431 432 232 232 119 119 149 149 
F-test FE model   49.72*** 80.25***  6.24*** 10.08***  30.56***   53.41***   39.38***   59.25***  3.39*** 3.42***  2.49***   11.34*** 
Davidson-MacKinnon F  1.3086   2.402   5.0822**    1.425    0.0200   0.6168  
Anderson LM statistics  2.20   3.80 *   6.67**    2.93*    4.81**   0.20  
Cragg-Donald Wald F-test                2.14   3.68   6.59    2.802    4.81   0.178  
Note: This table shows the results of instrumental variable regressions for Australian industry level panel data of the interaction between the extent of derivative use and leverage. Model (5) IV estimate 
coefficients and OLS estimate coefficients represent the results for instrumental-variable and ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions, respectively. DFV denotes the extent of derivative use is proxied by 
the derivative fair values scaled by total assets. Dividends has been omitted for Health Care firms due to collinearity. The Davidson-MacKinnon F-test (Davidson-MacK. F-test) computes a test of 
exogeneity for a panel regression estimated via instrumental variables. The null hypothesis states that an OLS estimator of the same equation would yield consistent estimates, a rejection of the null 
indicates that endogenous regressors' effects on the estimates are meaningful. The Anderson LM statistics is a test of underidentification, i.e. it tests that the excluded instruments are ‘relevant’ and 
correlated with the endogenous variable. The null hypothesis states that the model is underidentified, a rejection of the null indicates that the model is identified. The Cragg-Donald Wald F-test provides 
a test statistic to evaluate weak identification, which may arise when excluded instruments are only weakly correlated with endogenous variables. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is 
indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.   
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Appendix K.18 Value of hedging increasing debt: Canada Models (6)  
Tobin’s Q 
(1) Energy  (2) Industrials  (3) Materials  (4) Consumer Disc.  (5) Health Care (6) IT  
IV estimate 
coefficients 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
IV estimate 
coefficients 
OLS estimate 
coefficients 
FX derivatives* Leverage  -6.5022   0.0045   1.8698  -0.4869***   7.3086  -0.0238   5.3400  -0.0256 13.9328   0.8085  -6.2920   0.5971 
IR derivatives* Leverage   2.8570   0.0737   2.1571   0.1259 -16.6801  -0.0752   1.6533   0.0308   1.3813  -0.8508   3.6438  -2.5241*** 
Com derivatives* Leverage   4.1888   0.5862***  -7.7762   0.0369 -33.4837  -0.0278 -19.7456   7.6014**    omitted    omitted    omitted    omitted 
Leverage  -2.0305  -1.1851***  -1.0948  -0.0633  12.5646  -1.5060***  -3.2302  -0.9565***  -3.2657  -1.3217*   2.7265  -1.0496** 
Tax losses   0.7678   0.1840   2.1719   0.8114  20.4841   5.8039***   9.1872  -0.3934   3.6050   0.0876  -3.0314   0.6760 
Current ratio  -0.0161  -0.0095*   0.0341  -0.0904***   0.0085   0.0011   0.0004  -0.0729***  -0.1072  -0.0892***  -0.0503  -0.0503*** 
Dividends  -0.0994  -0.1396**   0.2257   0.0061  -0.9383  -0.3868***   0.0777   0.0201    omitted    omitted   0.2847   0.0742 
ROA   0.0379  -0.0639  -0.4367  -0.1247   0.4928  -0.1155   0.6679  -0.3200*  -0.1971  -0.1954   0.8563  -0.3009 
Tangible assets   0.5157   1.0974***   0.3263  -0.6528  -2.0653   1.3064*  -1.3750   0.3326*   0.5152  -0.3886  -0.3643   0.4969 
R&D expenditure  -0.0067   0.0006  -0.9242  -0.7490  -0.1466  -0.0227*  -0.9378   0.3574   0.0053  -0.0008   0.4937   0.1629 
Capital expenditure  -0.6697***  -0.6508***  -0.2147  -0.5984***   0.0236  -0.1476***   0.0060  -0.1491**   0.2342  -0.2002  -2.3073  -2.7289*** 
Firm size    0.2800   0.2281***   0.3125   0.3973***   0.9675*   0.4305***   0.4715**   0.5176***   0.1843   0.3269**   0.3062   0.4466*** 
Foreign income  - 0.5569   0.1912*  -1.0359  -0.3934   0.3248   0.0435  -1.6856  -0.4508***  -0.0441   0.4140  -0.1888  -0.0057 
Constant  -3.1559  -3.2158***  -3.6597  -3.5182*** -10.0174  -6.2965***  -4.4342  -6.2391***  -0.8859  -1.6288  -2.2674  -4.6516*** 
Observations  420 420 315 315 434 434 235 235 119 119 149 149 
F-test FE model  8.69*** 72.35***  1.59* 11.57***   1.12 45.33***  3.76*** 53.21*** 1.85* 3.13*** 3.00*** 12.89*** 
Davidson-MacK. F-test  4.382***   1.1736  38.08***   3.3142**   0.53   1.0845  
Anderson LM statistics  6.24***   0.58  28.75***   0.20   0.21   0.66  
Sargan statistic Chi2  1.576   0.170    0.017   1.200   0.017   0.036  
Note: This table shows the results the interaction between leverage and the decision to use foreign exchange (FX derivatives), interest rate (IR derivatives) and commodity derivatives (Com derivatives) 
on Tobin’s Q for Canadian firms, respectively. Model (6) IV estimate coefficients and) OLS estimate coefficients represent the results for instrumental-variable and ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions, 
respectively. FX derivatives, IR derivatives and Com derivatives are dummy variables that take ‘1’ if the firm uses foreign exchange, interest rate and commodity derivatives, respectively. The interaction 
variable Com derivatives*Leverage have been omitted for Health Care and IT firms due to collinearity. Dividends has been omitted for Health Care firms due to collinearity. The Davidson-MacKinnon 
F-test (Davidson-MacK. F-test) computes a test of exogeneity for a panel regression estimated via instrumental variables. The null hypothesis states that an OLS estimator of the same equation would 
yield consistent estimates, a rejection of the null indicates that endogenous regressors' effects on the estimates are meaningful. The Anderson LM statistics is a test of underidentification, i.e. it tests that 
the excluded instruments are ‘relevant’ and correlated with the endogenous variable. The null hypothesis states that the model is underidentified, a rejection of the null indicates that the model is identified. 
The Sargan statistic Chi2  provides a test of overidentifying restrictions. The joint null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid instruments, i.e., uncorrelated with the error term, and that the excluded 
instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.  
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Appendix L. Additional regression results  
First stage regression results 
To estimate Models (1) to (6) in Chapter Five a two-stage least square (2SLS) approach 
has been used. For example, Model (1) tests Hypotheses 7 and 8 and examines the impact 
of derivative use on Tobin’s Q. Recall that Model (1) in Chapter Five is represented by 
Equation 1 as follows: 
TQit = a0 + b1 DER it + b2 LEV it + b3TAXL it + b4CURit + b5 DIV it +b6ROAit + b7 TANGit +b8 
RD it + b9 CAPX + b10 SIZEit + b11 FINC it ++eit 
            (1) 
Where, TQit = Tobin’s Q for firm i in year t, DER = derivative dummy, TAXL = tax 
losses, LEV = leverage, CUR = current ratio, DIV = dividend dummy, ROA = return on 
assets, TANG = tangible assets, RD = R&D expenditure, CAPX = capital expenditure, 
SIZE = firm size, FINC = foreign income.  
Here, the first stage regression estimates the likelihood of using derivatives by regressing 
derivative use on the instrumental variable (i.e. Derivative industry % = the percentage 
of firms in the same industry using derivatives in a given year) and various control 
variables (i.e. Tax losses, Leverage, Current ratio, Dividend dummy, Return on assets, 
Tangible assets, R&D expenditure, Capital expenditure, Firm size, Foreign income and 
year dummies). In the second stage, the derivative variable is replaced with its predicted 
probabilities. Then, the proxy for firm value, Tobin’s Q, is regressed on these predicted 
probabilities and the same control variables.  
As an illustrative example, the table named Appendix L.1 shows the results of testing the 
relationship between the use of derivatives on Tobin’s Q for Australian firms (Model 1) 
including the first and second stage regressions – these results correspond to the 
regressions results presented in Table 5.2 of this thesis. 
The results of the first stage regression show that the coefficient on the IV variable is 
statistically significant for All firms, Small firms and Large firms (0.9809, p<0.001; 
0.7235, p<0.05; 1.2592, p<0.001). This is also the case for the other first stage IV 
variables in the other models estimated in Chapter Five. For brevity, other first stage 
regressions are not shown in the thesis, but they can be provided by the author if required. 
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Appendix L.1 Firm value of hedging: Australia Model (1):  First stage regressions  
Panel A: First stage fixed-effects regression 
 All firms (N=2,585) Small firms (N=1,289) Large firms (N=1,296) 
Derivatives Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value 
Leverage 0.1095 0.0143** 0.1199 0.0267** 0.0417 0.6417 
Tax losses 0.0671 0.6548 0.1499 0.3343 -0.2620 0.4965 
Current ratio 0.0001 0.8849 0.0001 0.7526 -0.0017 0.3773 
Dividends 0.0145 0.5262 -0.0166 0.5953 0.0062      0.8668 
ROA 0.0000 0.9126 0.0000 0.9843      0.0289 0.4648 
Tangible assets 0.0192 0.8163 0.0349 0.7262 0.0225 0.8865 
R&D expenditure -0.0016 0.0455** -0.0012 0.1968 -0.0013 0.3943 
Capital expenditure 0.0786 0.0000*** 0.0667 0.0003*** 0.1743 0.0008*** 
Firm size 0.0515 0.0000*** 0.0252 0.0257** 0.0878 0.0001*** 
Foreign income  0.0014 0.9087 -0.0041 0.9231 0.0006 0.9655 
Derivative industry % 0.9808 0.0000*** 0.7235 0.0140** 1.2592 0.0008*** 
Constant -0.6493 0.0000*** -0.4388 0.0166** -1.0755  0.0025*** 
Year dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  
F-test  5.95 0.0000*** 2.74 0.0004*** 3.07 0.0001*** 
Panel B: Second stage fixed-effects IV regression 
 All firms (N=2,585) Small firms (N=1,289) Large firms (N=1,296) 
Tobin’s Q Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value 
Derivatives -0.8886 0.0815* -2.3934 0.1153 -0.3017 0.3503 
Leverage -0.6011 0.0000*** -0.2494 0.3563 -0.7951 0.0000*** 
Tax losses 1.2535 0.0002*** 1.6422 0.0094*** 0.2549 0.5521 
Current ratio -0.0040 0.0000*** -0.0037 0.0060*** -0.0058 0.0066*** 
Dividends -0.0501 0.3323 -0.1511 0.2029 -0.0039 0.9225 
ROA 0.0003 0.2684 0.0003 0.4978 -0.2523 0.0000*** 
Tangible assets 0.0638 0.7280 0.2157 0.5654 0.1196 0.4841 
R&D expenditure 0.0044 0.0212** 0.0051 0.1917 -0.0020 0.2703 
Capital expenditure -0.4526 0.0000*** -0.4069 0.0010*** -0.5101 0.0000*** 
Firm size 0.4850 0.0000*** 0.4353 0.0000*** 0.5466 0.0000*** 
Foreign income  -0.0218 0.4080 -0.1294 0.4122 0.0014 0.9261 
Constant -4.5390 0.0000*** -3.7117 0.0000*** -6.0515 0.0000*** 
Year dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  
Instrumented Derivatives Derivatives Derivatives 
Instruments Derivative industry % Derivative industry % Derivative industry % 
F-test IV-FE model 88.11 0.0000*** 16.45 0.0000*** 86.43 0.0000*** 
Wu-Hausman F-test 19.1203 0.0000*** 6.5741 0.0105*** 1.10879 0.2925 
Anderson LM 
statistics 18.81 0.0000*** 6.11 0.0134** 11.33 0.0008*** 
Cragg-Donald Wald F-test               18.84  6.11  11.28  
Note: This table shows the results of fixed effects instrumental variable regressions of the decision to use derivatives 
(Model 1) on Tobin’s Q for Australian firms. Derivatives is a dummy variable that takes ‘1’ if the firm uses derivatives. 
Small firms indicate a subset of firms with firm size smaller than the industry median. Large firms indicate a subset of 
firms with firm size larger than the industry median. The instrumental variable (IV) Derivative industry % indicates 
the percentage of firms in the same industry which use derivatives in a given year.  The Wu-Hausman F-test examines 
whether the instrumented derivative variables are exogenous. Statistically significant p-value indicate that the null 
hypothesis should be rejected and that the variable is endogenous. The Anderson LM statistics is a test of 
underidentification, i.e. it tests that the excluded instruments are ‘relevant’ and correlated with the endogenous variable. 
The null hypothesis states that the model is underidentified, a rejection of the null indicates that the model is identified. 
The Cragg-Donald Wald F-test provides a test statistic to evaluate weak identification, which may arise when excluded 
instruments are only weakly correlated with endogenous variables. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.  
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Including standalone derivative variables  
Models (4), (5) and (6) examine Hypothesis 9 and consider the interaction between 
leverage and derivative use and between leverage and the extent of derivative use, 
respectively. For example, recall that Model (4) is represented by Equation 4 as follows: 
TQit = a0 + b1 (DER*LEV) it + b2 LEVit + b3TAXL it + b4CUR it + b5 DIVit+b6 
ROAit +b7 TANG it +b8 RD it + b9CAPX + b10 SIZEit + b11 FINC it ++ei 
                     (4) 
Initially, a version of this model including DER as a standalone variable in addition to 
the interaction term (DER*LEV) has been run to examine whether hedging becomes 
valuable with increasing leverage. Using this version of the model means that there are 
two derivative variables, DER and DER*LEV, which require at least two valid 
instrumental variables to estimate the IV regressions for Models (4).  
As an illustrative example, results presented in the tables named Appendix L.2 and 
Appendix L.3 show the results of from estimating Model (4) without and with a 
standalone derivative variable (DER) for Australian firms, respectively.  
Appendix L.2 Firm value of hedging with increasing leverage: Model (4) Australia (no 
standalone variable) 
Panel A: First stage fixed-effects regression  Panel B: Second stage fixed-effects IV regression 
Derivatives* Leverage Coefficient p-Value Tobin’s Q Coefficient p-Value 
   Derivatives* Leverage -3.4324 0.1049 
Leverage 0.3635 0.0000*** Leverage 0.5492 0.4806 
Tax losses -0.0078   0.8841 Tax losses 1.1670 0.0011*** 
Current ratio 0.0000 0.8509 Current ratio -0.0040 0.0000*** 
Dividends 0.0058 0.4837 Dividends -0.0432 0.4436 
ROA 0.0000 0.9017 ROA 0.0003 0.2928 
Tangible assets 0.0707 0.0172** Tangible assets 0.2894 0.2405 
R&D expenditure 0.0001 0.8333 R&D expenditure 0.0060 0.0011*** 
Capital expenditure 0.0199 0.0008*** Capital expenditure -0.4543 0.0000*** 
Firm size 0.0088 0.0043*** Firm size 0.4694 0.0000*** 
Foreign income  0.0010 0.8196 Foreign income  -0.0197 0.4881 
Derivative industry %      0.2539 0.0017***    
Constant -0.2227 0.0000*** Constant -4.7264 0.0000*** 
Instrumented Derivatives* Leverage    
Instruments Derivative industry %   
Year dummies Yes   Yes  
F-test  43.08 0.0000***  76.34 0.0000*** 
Wu-Hausman F-test    20.0246 0.0000*** 
Anderson LM statistics    9.86 0.0017*** 
Cragg-Donald Wald F-test                  9.840  
Note: This table shows the results of instrumental variable regressions for Australian panel data of the interaction between Leverage 
and the decision to use derivatives (Model 4). Derivatives take ‘1’ if the firm uses derivatives. The instrumental variable (IV) 
Derivative industry % indicates the percentage of firms in the same industry which use derivatives in a given year.  The Wu-Hausman 
F-test examines whether the instrumented derivative variables are exogenous. Statistically significant p-value indicate that the null 
hypothesis should be rejected and that the variable is endogenous. The Anderson LM statistics is a test of underidentification, i.e. it 
tests that the excluded instruments are ‘relevant’ and correlated with the endogenous variable. The null hypothesis states that the 
model is underidentified, a rejection of the null indicates that the model is identified. The Cragg-Donald Wald F-test provides a test 
statistic to evaluate weak identification, which may arise when excluded instruments are only weakly correlated with endogenous 
variables. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.   
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Appendix L.2 presents results from estimating Model (4) without a standalone derivative 
variable (DER) for Australian firms – this table corresponds to results presented in Table 
5.8 in Chapter Five. Panel A presents the first stage regression results, which shows that 
the coefficient on the instrumental variable is statistically significant (0.2539, p<0.001). 
Results on the second-stage IV regression are shown in Panel B, the coefficient on the 
interaction between derivative use and leverage is not statistically significant (p>0.1), 
providing no evidence to support or reject Hypothesis 9.  
Appendix L.3 shows results from estimating a version of Model (4) including the 
standalone derivative variable DER for Australian firms. Panel A and B include the first 
stage regression results on the instrumented variables, derivatives and the interaction 
between derivatives and leverage, respectively. Panel C shows the results of the second 
stage IV regressions. Similar to results shown in Appendix L.2, the coefficient on the 
interaction between derivative use and leverage is not statistically significant, providing 
no evidence to support or reject Hypothesis 9.  
Moreover, unreported results on examining the influence of the interaction between 
leverage and the extent of hedging (Model 5) show that including a standalone variable 
for the derivative fair value ratio (DVF) into Model (5) does not change the overall results 
regarding the interaction between DFV and leverage (i.e. negative coefficients, not 
statistically significant).  
Therefore, including the additional standalone derivative variable does not improve the 
results nor does it change the overall conclusion that can be drawn from these models. 
However, including the standalone variables requires additional valid instruments that 
can be used consistently across the various models and sub-samples, which are hard to 
identify.  
For the sake of brevity, only the simpler models testing Hypothesis 9 without the 
standalone variables have been reported in Chapter Five. This limits the use of 
instrumental variables to fewer, but more suitable instruments and improves the 
consistency across different models.  
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Appendix L.3 Firm value of hedging with increasing leverage: Model (4) Australia (standalone 
derivative variable) 
Panel A: First stage fixed-effects regression (1) Panel B: First stage fixed-effects regression (2) 
Derivatives* 
Leverage Coefficient p-Value Derivatives Coefficient p-Value 
Leverage 0.3633 0.0000*** Leverage 0.1104 0.0136 ** 
Tax losses -0.0078 0.9014 Tax losses 0.0669 0.6556 
Current ratio 0.0000 0.7981 Current ratio 0.0001 0.8809 
Dividends 0.0065 0.4660 Dividends 0.0126 0.5841 
ROA 0.0000 0.9002 ROA 0.0000 0.9119 
Tangible assets 0.0706 0.0186** Tangible assets 0.0195 0.8139 
R&D expenditure 0.0001 0.8185 R&D expenditure -0.0016 0.0453** 
Capital expenditure 0.0197 0.0017*** Capital expenditure 0.0791 0.0000*** 
Firm size 0.0087 0.0063*** Firm size 0.0516 0.0000*** 
Foreign income  0.0010 0.8074 Foreign income  0.0014 0.9084 
Derivative industry % 0.2543 0.0017*** Derivative industry % 0.9798 0.0000*** 
Other RM instruments -0.0484 0.0461 ** Other RM instruments 0.1337 0.1287 
Constant -0.2224 0.0000*** Constant -0.6500     0.0000*** 
Year dummies Yes  Yes  
F-test  40.46 0.0000***  5.64 0.0000*** 
Panel C: Second stage fixed-effects IV regression 
Tobin’s Q Coefficient p-Value    
Derivatives* Leverage -0.8057 0.8193    
Derivatives -0.6800 0.4676    
Leverage -0.3311 0.7828    
Tax losses 1.2332 0.0003    
Current ratio -0.0040 0.0000***    
Dividends -0.0484 0.3551    
ROA 0.0003 0.2660    
Tangible assets 0.1167 0.6944    
R&D expenditure 0.0048 0.0437    
Capital expenditure -0.4530 0.0000 ***    
Firm size 0.4814 0.0000 ***    
Foreign income  -0.0213 0.4205    
Constant -4.5830 0.0000***    
Year dummies Yes     
Instrumented Derivatives* Leverage, Derivatives   
Instruments Derivative industry %, Other RM instruments   
F-test IV-FE model 82.67 0.0000***    
Anderson LM statistics 4.679 0.0305**    
Cragg-Donald Wald F-test               4.66     
Note: This table shows the results of instrumental variable regressions for Australian panel data of the interaction between Leverage 
and the decision to use derivatives (Model 4). Derivatives take ‘1’ if the firm uses derivatives. The instrumental variables (IV) 
Derivative industry % indicates the percentage of firms in the same industry which use derivatives in a given year and Other RM 
instruments indicates whether a firms uses other risk management instruments. The Anderson LM statistics is a test of 
underidentification, i.e. it tests that the excluded instruments are ‘relevant’ and correlated with the endogenous variable. The null 
hypothesis states that the model is underidentified, a rejection of the null indicates that the model is identified. The Cragg-Donald 
Wald F-test provides a test statistic to evaluate weak identification, which may arise when excluded instruments are only weakly 
correlated with endogenous variables. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, 
respectively.  
 
